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INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

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INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
BY SIDNEY & BEATRICE
WEBB. VOLUME ONE ^^

\<LV

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. :

39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON :

NEW YORK AND BOMBAY. 1897.

/■A

PREFACE

We have attempted in these volumes to give a scientific
analysis of Trade Unionism in the United Kingdom. To
this task we have devoted six years' investigation, in the
course of which we have examined, inside and out, the
constitution of practically every Trade Union organisation,
together with the methods and regulations which it uses to
attain its ends. In the History of Trade Unionism, published
in 1894, we traced the origin and growth of the Trade
Union movement as a whole, industrially and politically,
concluding with a statistical account of the distribution of
Trade Unionism according to trades and localities ; and a
sketch from nature of Trade Union life and character. The
student has, therefore, already had before him a picture of
those external characteristics of Trade Unionism, past and
present, which — borrowing a term from the study of animal
life — we may call its natural history. These external
characteristics — the outward form and habit of the creature —
are obviously insufficient for any scientific generalisation as to
its purpose and its effects. Nor can any useful conclusions,
theoretic or practical, be arrived at by arguing from " common
notions " about Trade Unionism ; nor even by refining these
into a definition of some imaginary form of combination
in the abstract. Sociology, like all other sciences, can ad-
vance only upon the basis of a precise observation of actual
facts.

The first part of our work deals with Trade Union Struc-
ture, In the Anglo-Saxon world of to-day we find that Trade
Unions are democracies : that is to say, their internal constitu-

vi Industrial Democracy

tions are all based on the principle of " government of the
people by the people for the people." How far they are
marked off from political governments by their membership
being voluntary will be dealt with in the course of the analysis.
They are, however, scientifically distinguished from other
democracies in that they are composed exclusively of manual-
working wage -earners, associated according to occupations.
We shall show how the different Trade Unions reveal this
species of democracy at many different stages of development.
This part of the book will be of little interest to those who
want simply to know whether Trade Unionism is a good or
a bad influence in the State. To employers and Trade
Union officials on active service in the campaign between
Capital and Labor, or to politicians hesitating which side
to take in a labor struggle, our detailed discussions of the
relations between elector, representative, and civil servant ;
between central and local government ; and between taxation
and representation — not to speak of the difficulties connected
with federation, the grant of " Home Rule " to minorities, or
the use of the Referendum and the Initiative — will seem
tedious and irrelevant. On the other hand, the student of de-
mocracy, not specially interested in the commercial aspect of
Trade Unionism, will probably find this the most interesting
part of the book. Those who regard the participation of the
manual-working wage-earners in the machinery of government
as the distinctive, if not the dangerous, element in modern
politics, will here find the phenomenon isolated. These thou-
sands of working-class democracies, spontaneously growing up
at different times and places, untrammelled by the traditions or
interests of other classes, perpetually recasting their constitu-
tions to meet new and varying conditions, present an unrivalled
field of observation as to the manner in which the working
man copes with the problem of combining administrative
efficiency with popular control.

The second part of the book, forming more than half its
total bulk, consists of a descriptive analysis of Trade Union
Function : that is to say, of the methods used, the regulations

Preface vii

imposed, and the policy followed by Trade Unions. We
have done our best to make this analysis both scientifically
accurate and, as regards the United Kingdom at the present
day, completely exhaustive. We have, of course, not enumer-
ated every individual regulation of every individual union ;
but we have pushed our investigations into every trade in
every part of the kingdom ; and our analysis includes, we
believe, every existing type and variety of Trade Union
action. And we have sought to make our description
quantitative. We have given statistics wherever these could
be obtained ; and we have, in all cases, tried to form and
convey to the reader an impression of the relative proportion,
statical and dynamic, which each type of regulation bears to
the whole body of Trade Union activity. In digesting the
almost innumerable technical regulations of every trade, our
first need was a scientific classification. After many experi-
ments we discovered the principle of this to lie in the psycho-
logical origin of the several regulations : that is to say, the
direct intention with which they were adopted, or the im-
mediate grievance they were designed to remedy. Our
consequent observations threw light on many apparent con-
tradictions and inconsistencies. Thus, to mention only two
among many instances, the student will find, in our chapter on
" The Standard Rate," an explanation of the reason why some
Trade Unions strike against Piecework and others against
Timework ; and, in our chapter on " The Normal Day," why
some Trade Unions make the regulation of the hours of
labor one of their foremost objects, whilst others, equally
strong and aggressive, are indifferent, if not hostile to it.
The same principle of classification enables the student to
comprehend and place in appropriate categories the seem-
ingly arbitrary and meaningless regulations, such as those
against " Smooting " or " Partnering," which bewilder the
superficial observer of working-class life. It assists us to
unravel the intricate changes of Trade Union policy with
regard to such matters as machinery, apprenticeship, and the
admission of women. It serves also for the deeper analysis

viii Industrial Democracy

of the division of the whole action of Trade Unionism into
three separate and sometimes mutually exclusive policies,
based on different views of what can economically be effected,
and what state of society is ultimately desirable. It is
through the psychology of its assumptions that we discover
how significantly the cleavages of opinion and action in the
Trade Union world correspond with those in the larger world
outside.

It is only in the third part of our work — the last four
chapters of the second volume — that we have ventured into
the domain of theory. We first trace the remarkable change
of opinion among English economists as to the effect of Trade
Unionism on the production and distribution of wealth. Some
readers may stop at this point, contented with the authorita-
tive, though vague, deliverances favorable to combination
among wage-earners now given by the Professors of Political
Economy in the universities of the United Kingdom. But
this verdict, based in the main upon an ideal conception
of competition and combination, seems to us unsubstantial.
We have, therefore, laid before the student a new analysis of
the working of competition in the industrial field — our vision
of the organisation and working of the business world as it
actually exists. It is in this analysis of the long series of
bargainings, extending from the private customer in the
retail shop, back to the manual laborer in the factory or the
mine, that we discover the need for Trade Unionism. We
then analyse the economic characteristics, not of combination
in the abstract in a world of ideal competition, but of the
actual Trade Unionism of the present day in the business
world as we know it. Here, therefore, we give our own
theory of Trade Unionism — our own interpretation of the
way in which the methods and regulations that we have
described actually affect the production and distribution of
wealth and the development of personal character. This
theory, in conjunction with our particular view of social
expediency, leads us to sum up emphatically in favor
of Trade Unionism of one type, and equally emphatically

Preface ix

against Trade Unionism of another type. In our final
chapter we even venture upon precept and prophecy ; and we
consider the exact scope of Trade Unionism in the fully
developed democratic state — the industrial democracy of the
future.

A book made up of descriptions of fact, generalisations
into theory, and moral judgments must, in the best case,
necessarily include parts of different degrees of use. The
description of structure and function in Parts I. and II. will,
we hope, have its own permanent value in sociology as an
analytic record of Trade Unionism in a particular country at
a particular date. The economic generalisations contained
in Part III., if they prove sound on verification by other
investigators, can be no more than stepping-stones for the
generalisations of reasoners who will begin where we leave
off. Like all scientific theories, they will be quickly broken
up, part to be rejected as fallacious or distorted, and part
to be absorbed in later and larger views. Finally, even
those who regard our facts as accurate, and accept our
economic theory as scientific, will only agree in our judg-
ment of Trade Unionism, and in our conception of its
permanent but limited function in the Industrial Democracy
of the future, in so far as they happen to be at one with us
in the view of what state of society is desirable. .;

Those who contemplate scientific work in any depart-
ment of Sociology may find some practical help in a brief
account of the methods of investigation which we have found
useful in this and other studies.

To begin with, the student must resolutely set himself
to find out, not the ultimate answer to the practical
problem that may have tempted him to the work, but what
is the actual structure and function of the organisation
about which he is interested. Thus, his primary task is
to observe and dissect facts, comparing as many specimens

X Industrial Democracy

as possible, and precisely recording all their resemblances
and differences whether or not they seem significant. This
does not mean that the scientific observer ought to start with
a mind free from preconceived ideas as to classification and
sequences. If such a person existed, he would be able to
make no observations at all. The student ought, on the
contrary, to cherish all the hypotheses he can lay his hands
on, however far-fetched they may seem. Indeed, he must
be on his guard against being biassed by authority. As an
instrument for the discovery of new truth, the wildest sugges-
tion of a crank or a fanatic, or the most casual conclusion
of the practical man may well prove more fertile than verified
generalisations which have already yielded their full fruit.
Almost any preconceived idea as to the connection between
phenomena will help the observer, if it is only sufficiently
limited in its scope and definite in its expression to be capable
of comparison with facts. What is dangerous is to have only a
single hypothesis, for this inevitably biasses the selection of
facts ; or nothing but far-reaching theories as to ultimate
causes and general results, for these cannot be tested by any
facts that a single student can unravel.

From the outset, the student must adopt a definite prin-
ciple in his note-taking. We have found it convenient to use
separate sheets of paper, uniform in shape and size, each of
which is devoted to a single observation, with exact particulars
of authority, locality, and date. To these, as the inquiry
proceeds, we add other headings under which the recorded
fact might possibly be grouped, such, for instance, as the
industry, the particular section of the craft, the organisation,
the sex, age, or status of the persons concerned, the psycho-
logical intention, or the grievance to be remedied. These
sheets can be shuffled and reshuffled into various orders,
according as it is desired to consider the recorded facts in
their distribution in time or space, or their coincidence
with other circumstances. The student would be well-
advised to put a great deal of work into the completeness
and mechanical perfection of his note-taking, even if this

Preface xi

involves, for the first few weeks of the inquiry, copying and
recopying his material.

Before actually beginning the investigation it is well to
read what has been previously written about the subject.
This will lead to some tentative ideas as to how to break
up the material into definite parts for separate dissection.
It will serve also to collect hypotheses as to the con-
nections between the facts. It is here that the voluminous
proceedings of Royal Commissions and Select Committees
find their real use. Their innumerable questions and
answers seldom end in any theoretic judgment or practical
conclusion of scientific value. To the investigator, however,
they often prove a mine of unintentional suggestion and
hypothesis, just because they are collections of samples
without order and often without selection.

In proceeding to actual investigation into facts, there are
three good instruments of discovery : the Document, Personal
Observation, and the Interview. All three are useful in
obtaining preliminary suggestions and hypotheses ; but as
methods of qualitative and quantitative analysis, or of verifica-
tion, they are altogether different in character and unequal
in value.

The most indispensable of these instruments is the
Document. It is a peculiarity of human, and especially of
social action, that it secretes records of facts, not with any
view to affording material for the investigator, but as data
for the future guidance of the organisms themselves. The
essence of the Document as distinguished from the mere
literature of the subject is the unintentional and automatic
character of its testimony. It is, in short, a kind of
mechanical memory, registering facts with the minimum of
personal bias. Hence the cash accounts, minutes of private
meetings, internal statistics, rules, and reports of societies of
all kinds furnish invaluable material from which the in-
vestigator discovers not only the constitution and policy of
the organisation, but also many of its motives and intentions.
Even documents intended solely to influence other people,

xii Industrial De7H0C7'acy

such as public manifestoes or fictitious reports, have their
documentary value if only as showing by comparison with
the confidential records, what it was that their authors
desired to conceal. The investigator must, therefore,
collect every document, however unimportant, that he can
acquire. When acquisition is impossible, he should copy the
actual words, making his extracts as copious as time permits ;
for he can never know what will afterwards prove significant
to him. In this use of the Document, sociology possesses a
method of investigation which to some extent compensates
it for inability to use the method of deliberate experiment.
We venture to think that collections of documents will be to
the sociologist of the future, what collections of fossils or skele-
tons are to the zoologist ; and libraries will be his museums.
Next in importance comes the method of Personal
Observation. By this we mean neither the Interview nor
yet any examination of the outward effects of an organisation,
but a continued watching, from inside the machine, of the
actual decisions of the human agents concerned, and the play
of motives from which these spring. The difficulty for the
investigator is to get into such a post of observation without
his presence altering the normal course of events. It is
here, and here only, that personal participation in the work of
any social organisation is of advantage to scientific inquiry.
The railway manager, the member of a municipality, or the
officer of a Trade Union would, if he were a trained investi-
gator, enjoy unrivalled opportunities for precisely describing
the real constitution and actual working of his own organisa-
tion. Unfortunately, it is extremely rare to find in an active
practical administrator, either the desire, the capacity, or the
training for successful investigation. The outsider wishing
to use this method is practically confined to one of two
alternatives. He may adopt the social class, join the
organisation, or practise the occupation that he wishes to
study. Thus, one of the authors has found it useful, at
different stages of investigation, to become a rent collector,
a tailoress, and a working-class lodger in working-class

Preface xiii

families ; whilst the other has gained much from active
membership of democratic organisations and personal par-
ticipation in administration in more than one department.
Participation of this active kind may be supplemented by
gaining the intimacy and confidence of persons and organisa-
tions, so as to obtain the privilege of admission to their
establishments, offices, and private meetings. In this passive
observation the woman, we think, is specially well-adapted
for sociological inquiry ; not merely because she is accustomed
silently to watch motives, but also because she gains access and
confidence which are instinctively refused to possible com-
mercial competitors or political opponents. The worst of
this method of Personal Observation is that the observer can
seldom resist giving undue importance to the particular facts
and connections between facts that he happens to have seen.
He must, therefore, record what he has observed as a set of
separate, and not necessarily connected facts, to be used merely
as hypotheses of classification and sequence, for verification by
an exhaustive scrutiny of documents or by the wider-reaching
method of the Interview.

By the Interview as an instrument of sociological inquiry
we mean something more than the preliminary talks and
social friendliness which form, so to speak, the antechamber
to obtaining documents and opportunities for personal
observation of processes. The Interview in the scientific
sense is the skilled interrogation of a competent witness as
to facts within his personal experience. As the witness is
under no compulsion, the interviewer will have to listen
sympathetically to much that is not evidence, namely to
personal opinions, current tradition, and hearsay reports of
facts, all of which may be useful in suggesting new sources
of inquiry and revealing bias. But the real business of the
Interview is to ascertain facts actually seen by the person
interviewed. Thus, the expert interviewer, like the bedside
physician, agrees straightway with all the assumptions and
generalisations of his patient, and uses his detective skill to
sift, by tactful cross-examination, the grain of fact from the

xiv Industrial Democracy

bushel of sentiment, self-interest, and theory. Hence, though
it is of the utmost importance to make friends with the head
of any organisation, we have generally got much more actual
information from his subordinates who are personally occupied
with the facts in detail. But in no case can any Interview
be taken as conclusive evidence, even in- matters of fact. It
must never be forgotten that every man is biassed by his
creed or his self-interest, his class or his views of what is
socially expedient. If the investigator fails to detect this bias,
it may be assumed that it coincides with his own ! Conse-
quently, the fullest advantage of the Interview can be obtained
only at the later stages of an inquiry, when the student has
so far progressed in his analysis that he knows exactly what
to ask for. It then enables him to verify his provisional
conclusions as to the existence of certain specified facts, and
their relations to others. And there is a wider use of the
Interview by which a quantitative value may be given to a
qualitative analysis. Once the investigator has himself
dissected a few type specimens, and discovered which among
their obviously recognisable attributes possess significance for
him, he may often be able to gain an exhaustive knowledge
of the distribution of these attributes by what we may call
the method of wholesale interviewing. One of the most
brilliant and successful applications of this method was Mr.
Charles Booth's use of all the School Board visitors of the
East End of London. Having, by personal observation, dis-
covered certain obvious marks which coincided with a scien-
tific classification of the East End population, he was able,
by interviewing a few hundred people, to obtain definite par-
ticulars with regard to the status of a million. And when
results so obtained are checked by other investigations — say,
for instance, by the Census, itself only a gigantic and some-
what unscientific system ~ wholesale interviewing — a high
degree of verified quantitative value may sometimes be given
to sociological inquiry.

Finally, we would suggest that it is a peculiar advantage,
in all sociological work, if a single inquiry can be conducted

Preface xv

by more than one person. A closely-knit group, dealing
contemporaneously with one subject, will achieve far more
than the same persons working individually. In our inquiry
into Trade Unionism we have found exceptionally useful, not
only our own collaboration in all departments of the work,
but also the co-operation, throughout the whole six years, of
our colleague and friend, Mr. F. W. Galton. When the
members of a group " pool " their stocks of preconceived
ideas or provisional hypotheses ; their personal experience of
the facts in question, or of analogous facts; their knowledge
of possible sources of information ; their opportunities for
interviewing, and access to documents, they are better able
than any individual to cope with the vastness and com-
plexity of even a limited subject of sociological investigation.
They can do much by constant criticism to save each other
from bias, crudities of observation, mistaken inferences, and
confusion of thought. But group -work of this kind has
difficulties and dangers of its own. Unless all the members
are in intimate personal communication with each other,
moving with a common will and purpose, and at least so far
equal in training and capacity that they can understand each
other's distinctions and qualifications, the result of their
common labors will present blurred outlines, and be of little
real value. Without unity, equality, and discipline, different
members of the group will always be recording identical
facts under different names, and using the same term to
denote different facts.

By the pursuit of these methods of observation and
verification, any intelligent, hard-working, and conscientious
students, or group of students, applying themselves to
definitely limited pieces of social organisation, will certainly
produce monographs of scientific value. Whether they will
be able to extract from their "icts a new generalisation,
applicable to other facts — whether, that is to say, they will
discover any new scientific law — will depend on the possession
of a somewhat rare combination of insight and inventiveness,
with the capacity for prolonged and intense reasoning. When

b

xvi ■ Industrial Democracy

such a generalisation is arrived at, it provides a new field of
work for the ensuing generation, whose task it is, by an
incessant testing of this " order of thought " by comparison
with the " order of things," to extend, limit, and qualify the
first imperfect statement of the law. By these means alone,
whether in sociology or any other sphere of human inquiry,
does mankind enter into possession of that body of organised
knowledge which is termed science.

We venture to add a few words as to the practical value
of sociological investigation. Quite apart from the interest
of the man of science, eager to satisfy his curiosity about
every part of the universe, a knowledge of social facts
and laws is indispensable for any intelligent and deliberate
human action. The whole of social life, the entire structure
and functioning of society, consists of human intervention.
The essential characteristic of civilised, as distinguished from
savage society, is that these interventions are not impulsive
but deliberate ; for, though some sort of human society may
get along upon instinct, civilisation depends upon organised
knowledge of sociological facts and of the connections between
them. And this knowledge must be sufficiently generalised to
be capable of being diffused. We can all avoid being practical
engineers or chemists ; but no consumer, producer, or citizen
can avoid being a practical sociologist. Whether he pursues
only his own pecuniary self-interest, or follows some idea of
class or social expediency, his action or inaction will promote
his ends only in so far as it corresponds with the real order of
the universe. A workman may join his Trade Union, or
abstain from joining ; but if his decision is to be rational,
it must be based on knowledge of what the Trade Union is,
how far it is a sound benefit society, whether its methods
will increase or decrease his liberty, and to what extent its
regulations are likely to improve or deteriorate the conditions
of employment for himself and his class. The employer who
desires to enjoy the maximum freedom of enterprise, or to
gain the utmost profit, had better, before either fighting his
workmen or yielding to their demands, find out the cause and

Preface xvii

meaning of Trade Unionism, what exactly it is likely to give
up or insist on, its financial strength and weakness, and its
hold on public opinion. Common hearsay, or the gossip of
a club, whether this be the public-house or a palace in Pall
Mall, will no more enable a man intelligently to " manage his
own business," than it will enable the engineer to build a
bridge. And when we pass from private actions to the par-
ticipation of men and women as electors, representatives, or
officials, in public companies, local governing bodies, or the
State itself, the inarticulate apprehension of facts which often
contents the individual business man, will no longer suffice.
Deliberate corporate action involves some definite policy,
communicable to others. The town councillor or the cabinet
minister has perpetually to be making up his mind what is
to be done in particular cases. Whether his action or
abstention from action is likely to be practicable, popular,
and permanently successful in attaining his ends, depends on
whether it is or is not adapted to the facts. This does not
mean that every workman and every employer, or even every
philanthropist and every statesman, is called upon to make
his own investigation into social questions any more than
to make for himself the physiological investigations upon
which his health depends. But whether they like it or not,
their success or failure to attain their ends depends on their
scientific knowledge, original or borrowed, of the facts of the
problem, and of their causal connections. Perfect wisdom
we can never attain, in sociology or in any other science ;
but this does not absolve us from using, in our action, the
most authoritative exposition, for the time being, of what is
known. That nation will achieve the greatest success in the
world-struggle, whose investigators discover the greatest body
of scientific truth, and whose practical men are the most
prompt in their application of it.

What is not generally recognised is that scientific investi-
gation, in the field of sociology as in other departments of
knowledge, requires, not only competent investigators, but a
considerable expenditure. Practically no provision exists in

xviii Industrial Democracy

this country for the endowment or support from public funds
of any kind of sociological investigation. It is, accordingly,
impossible at present to make any considerable progress
even with inquiries of pressing urgency. Social reformers are
always feeling themselves at a standstill, for sheer lack of
knowledge, and of that invention which can only proceed
from knowledge. There is, we believe, no purpose to which
the rich man could devote his surplus with greater utility to
the community than the setting on foot, in the hands of
competent investigators, of definite inquiries into such
questions as the administrative control of the liquor traffic,
the relation between local and central government, the popu-
lation question, the conditions of women's industrial employ-
ment, the real incidence of taxation, the working of municipal
administration, or many other unsolved problems that could
be named. It may be assumed that to deal adequately
with any of these subjects would involve an out-of-pocket
expenditure for travelling, materials, and incidental outlays
of all kinds, of something like ;^iooo, irrespective of the
maintenance of the investigators themselves, or the possible
expense of publication. To make any permanent provision
for discovery in any one department — to endow a chair —
requires the investment of, say, ;^ 10,000. At present, in
London, the wealthiest city in the world, and the best of all
fields for sociological investigation, the sum total of the
endowments for this purpose does not reach ;^ioo a year.

It remains only to express our grateful acknowledgments
to the many friends, employers as well as workmen, who have
helped us with information as to their respective trades.
Some portions of our work have been read in manuscript or
proof by Professor Edgeworth, Professor Hewins, Mr. Leonard
Hobhouse, and other friends, to whom we are indebted for
many useful suggestions- and criticisms. Early drafts of
some chapters have appeared in the Eco7toniic Journal^
Economic Review, Nijieteenth Century, and Progressive Review
in this country ; the Political Science Quarterly in New York ;

Preface ' xix

and Dr. Braun's Archivfur Sociale Gesetzgebung und Statistik
in Berlin. They are reproduced here by permission of the
editors. A large portion of the book was given in the form
of lectures at the London School of Economics and Political
Science during 1896 and 1897.

SIDNEY AND BEATRICE WEBB.

41 Grosvenor Road, Westminster,
London, November 1897.

CONTENTS OF VOL. I

PART I
TRADE UNION STRUCTURE

CHAPTER I

PAGE

Primitive Democracy 3

CHAPTER n
Representative Institutions ;^8

CHAPTER HI
The Unit of Government . . . . . . 72

CHAPTER IV

INTERUNION RELATIONS I04

PART II
TRADE UNION FUNCTION

CHAPTER I
Introduction 145

The Method of Mutual Insurance . . . . 152

xxii Indtistrial Democracy

CHAPTER II

PAGE

The Method of Collective Bargaining . . . 173

CHAPTER HI
Arbitration . 222

CHAPTER IV
The Method of Legal Enactment .... 247

CHAPTER V
The Standard Rate 279

CHAPTER VI
The Normal Day 324

CHAPTER VII
Sanitation and Safety 354

CHAPTER VIII

New Processes and Machinery 392

CHAPTER IX
Continuity of Employment 430

PART I
TRADE UNION STRUCTURE

VOL. I

CHAPTER I

PRIMITIVE DEMOCRACY^

In the local trade clubs of the eighteenth century,
democracy appeared in its simplest form. Like the citizens
of Uri or Appenzell ^ the workmen were slow to recognise
any other authority than " the voices " of all concerned.
The members of each trade, in general meeting assembled,
themselves made the regulations, applied them to particular
cases, voted the expenditure of funds, and decided on
such action by individual members as seemed necessary
for the common weal. The early rules were accordingly
occupied with securing the maintenance of order and
decorum at these general meetings of " the trade " or
" the body." With this view the president, often chosen
only for the particular meeting, was treated with great
respect and invested with special, though temporary,

1 Copyright in the United States of America, 1896, by Sidney and Beatrice
Webb.

- The early Trade Union general meetings have, indeed, many interesting
resemblances, both in spirit and in form, to the " Landesgemeinden," or general
meetings of all citizens, of the old Swiss Cantons. The best description of these
archaic Swiss democracies, as they exist to-day, is given by Eugene Rambert in
his work Les Alpes Suisses : Etudes Hisioriqites et Naiionales (Lausanne, 1889).
J. M. Vincent's State and Federal GovernT?ient in Switzerland (Baltimore, 1891)
is more precise and accurate than any other account in the English language.
Freeman's picturesque reference to them in The Growth of the English Constitu-
tion (London, 1872) is well known.

4 T^-ade Union Structure

authority. Thus the constitution of the London Society
of Woolstaplers, established 1785, declares "that at every
meeting of this society a president shall be chosen to
preserve the rules of decorum and good order ; and if any
member should not be silent on due notice given by the
president, which shall be by giving three distinct knocks on
the table, he shall fine threepence ; and if any one shall in-
terrupt another in any debate while addressing the president,
he shall fine sixpence ; and if the person so fined shall
return any indecent language, he shall fine sixpence more ;
and should any president misconduct himself, so as to cause
uproar and confusion in the society, or shall neglect to
enforce a strict observance of this and the following article,
he shall be superseded, and another president shall be chosen
in his stead. The president shall be accommodated with
his own choice of liquors, wine only excepted," ^ And the
Articles of the Society of Journeymen Brushmakers, to
which no person was to be admitted as a member " who is
not well-affected to his present Majesty and the Protestant
succession, and in good health, and of a respectable char-
acter," provide " that on each evening the society meets there
shall be a president chosen from the members present to
keep order ; to be allowed a shilling for his trouble ; any
member refusing to serve the office to be fined sixpence. If
any member dispute on politics, swear, lay wagers, promote
gambling, or behave otherwise disorderly, and will not be
silent when ordered by the chairman, he shall pay a fine of
a shilling."^

The rules of every old society consist mainly of safe-
guards of the efficiency of this general meeting. Whilst
political or religious wrangling, seditious sentiments or songs,
cursing, swearing, or obscene language, betting, wagering,
gaming, or refusing to keep silence were penalised by fines,
elaborate and detailed provision was made for the entertain-

1 The Articles of the London Society of Woolstaplers [X-'^'^^^'^^ 1813).

2 Articles of the Society of Journeytnen Brushmakers, held at the sign of the
Craven Head, Drury Lane (London, 1806).

Primitive Democracy 5

ment of the members. Meeting, as all clubs did, at a public-
house in a room lent free by the landlord, it was taken as
a matter of course that each man should do his share of
drinking. The rules often prescribe the sum to be spent at
each meeting : in the case of the Friendly Society of Iron-
founders, for instance, the member's monthly contribution in
1809 was a shilling " to the box," and threepence for liquor,
" to be spent whether present or not." The Brushmakers
provided "that on every meeting night each member shall
receive a pot ticket at eight o'clock, a pint at ten, and
no more." ^ And the Manchester Compositors resolved
in 1826 " that tobacco be allowed to such members of this
society as require it during the hours of business at any
meeting of the society." ^

After the president, the most important officers were,
accordingly, the stewards or marshalmen, two or four members
usually chosen by rotation. Their duty was, to use the
words of the Cotton-spinners, " at every meeting to fetch all
the liquor into the committee room, and serve it regularly
round " ; ^ and the members were, in some cases, " forbidden
to drink out of turn, except the officers at the table or
a member on his first coming into the town."* Treasurer

1 The account book of the little Preston Society of Carpenters, whose mem-
bership in 1807 averaged about forty-five, shows an expenditure at each meeting
of 6s. to 7s. 6d. As late as 1837 the rules of the Steam-Engine Makers'
Society provided that one-third of the income — fourpence out of the monthly
contribution of a shilling — "shall be spent in refreshments. ... To prevent
disorder no person shall help himself to any drink in the club-room during club
hours, but what is served him by the waiters or marshalmen who shall be
appointed by the president every club night." Some particulars as to the dying
away of this custom are given in our History of Trade Unionism, pp. 185, 1 86 ;
see also the article by Prof. W. J. Ashley on "Journeymen's clubs," in Political
Science Quarterly, March 1897.

2 MS. Minutes of the Manchester Typographical Society, 7th March 1826.

' Articles, Rules, Orders, and Regulations made and to be obsefved by and
between the Friendly Associated Cotton-spinners within the township of Oldham
(Oldham, 1797 : reprinted 1829).

^ Friendly Society of Ironfounders, Rules, 1809. The Rules of the Liverpool
Shipwrights' Society of 1784 provided also " that each member that shall call for
drink without leave of the stewards shall forfeit and pay for the drink they call for
to the stewards for the use of the box. . . . That the marshalmen shall pay the over-
plus of drink that comes in at every monthly meeting more than allowed by the

6 Trade Union Struchire

there was often none, the scanty funds, if not consumed
as quickly as collected, being usually deposited with the
publican who acted as host. Sometimes, however, we
have the archaic box with three locks, so frequent
among the gilds ; and in such cases members served
in rotation as " keymasters," or, as we should now say,
trustees. Thus the Edinburgh Shoemakers provided that
" the keymasters shall be chosen by the roll, beginning at
the top for the first keymaster, and at the middle of the
roll for the youngest keymaster, and so on until the roll
be finished. If any refuse the keymaster, he shall pay
one shilling and sixpence sterling." ^ The ancient box of
the Glasgow Ropemakers' Friendly Society (established
1824), elaborately decorated with the society's "coat of
arms," was kept in the custody of the president, who was
elected annually.^ Down to within the last thirty years
the custom was maintained on the " deacons' choosing,"
or annual election day, of solemnly transporting this box
through the streets of Glasgow to the house of the new
president, with a procession of ropespinners headed by a
piper, the ceremony terminating with a feast. The keeping
of accounts and the writing of letters was a later develop-
ment, and when a clerk or secretary was needed, he had
perforce to be chosen from the small number qualified for
the work. But there is evidence that the early secre-
taries served, like their colleagues, only for short periods,

society ; and no member of this society is allowed to call for or smoak tobacco
during club hours in the club room ; for every such offence he is to forfeit and
pay fourpence to the stewards for the use of the box." — A7-ticles to be observed by
a Society of Shipivrights, or the True British Society, all Freemen (Liverpool,
1784), Articles 8 and 9.

1 Articles of the Journeymen Shoemakers of the City of Edinburgh (Edinburgh,
1778) — a society established in 1727.

2 Articles and Regulations of the Associated Ropemakers'' Friendly Society
(Glasgow, 1836), repeated in the General Laws and Regulations of the Glasgow
Ropemakers' Trade Protective and Friendly Society {Glzsgovf, 1884). The members
of the Glasgow Typographical Society resolved, in 1823, "that a man be pro-
vided on election nights to carry the box from the residence of the president to the
place of meeting, and after the meeting to the new president's house." — MS.
Minutes of general meeting, Glasgow Typographical Society, 4th October 1823.

Primitive Democracy 7

and occupied, moreover, a position very subordinate to the
president.

Even when it was necessary to supplement the officers
by some kind of committee, so far were these infant demo-
cracies from any superstitious worship of the ballot-box,
that, although we know of no case of actual choice by lot,^
the committee-men were usually taken, as in the case of the
Steam-Engine Makers' Society, " in rotation as their names
appear on the books." ^ "A fine of one shilling," say the
rules of the Southern Amicable Union Society of Wool-
staplers, " shall be levied on any one who shall refuse to serve
on the committee or neglect to attend its stated meetings,
. . . and the next in rotation shall be called in his stead." ^
The rules of the Liverpool Shipwrights declared " that the
committee shall be chosen by rotation as they stand in the
books ; and any member refusing to serve the office shall
forfeit ten shillings and sixpence."^ As late as 1843 we
find the very old Society of Curriers resolving that for this
purpose " a list with three columns be drawn up of the
whole of the members, dividing their ages as near as possible
in the following manner : the elder, the middle-aged and the
young ; so that the experience of the elder and the sound

1 The selection of officers by lot was, it need hardly be said, frequent in
primitive times. It is interesting to find the practice in the Swiss " Landes-
gemeinden." In 1640 the " Landesgemeinde " of Glarus began to choose eight
candidates for each office, who then drew lots among themselves. Fifty years
later Schwyz followed this example. By 1793 the " Landesgemeinde " of Glarus
was casting lots for all offices, including the cantonal secretaryship, the steward-
ships of dependent territories, etc. The winner often sold his office to the
highest bidder. The practice was not totally abolished until 1837, and old men
still remember the passing round of the eight balls, each wrapped in black cloth,
seven being silvern and the eighth gilt. — Les Alpes Suisses : Etudes Historiques
et Nationales, by Eugene Rambert (Lausanne, 1889), pp. 226, 276.

2 Rules of the Steam-En^ne Makers' Society, edition of 1837.

3 Rules of the Southern Amicable Unioti of Woolstaplers (London, 1837).

* Articles to be observed by the Association of the Friendly Union of Shipwrights,
instituted ijt Liverpool on Tuesday, nth November 1800 (Liverpool, 1800), Rule
19. The London Sailmakers resolved, in 1836, "that from this evening the
calling for stewards shall begin from the last man on the committee, and that
from and after the last steward the twelve men who stand in rotation on the
book do form the committee." — MS. Minutes of general meeting, 26th September
1836.

8 Trade Union Striichire

judgment of the middle-aged will make up for any deficiency
on the part of the young." ^ In some cases, indeed, the
members of the committee were actually chosen by the
officers. Thus in the ancient society of Journeymen Paper-
makers, where each " Grand Division " had its committee of
eight members, it was provided that " to prevent imposition
part of the committee shall be changed every three months,
by four old members going out and four new ones coming
in ; also a chairman shall be chosen to keep good order,
which chairman, with the clerk, shall nominate the four
new members which shall succeed the four old ones." ^

The early trade club was thus a democracy of the most
rudimentary type, free alike from permanently differentiated
officials, executive council, or representative assembly.
The general meeting strove itself to transact all the
business, and grudgingly delegated any of its functions
either to officers or to committees. When this delegation
could no longer be avoided, the expedients of rotation
and short periods of service were used " to prevent im-
position " or any undue influence by particular members.
In this earliest type of Trade Union democracy we find, in
fact, the most childlike faith not only that "all men are
equal," but also that " what concerns all should be decided
by all."

It is obvious that this form of democracy was compatible
only with the smallest possible amount of business. But it
was, in our opinion, not so much the growth of the financial
and secretarial transactions of the unions, as the exigencies of

^ MS. Minutes of the London Society of Journeymen Curriers, January 1843.

2 Rules and Articles to be observed by the Journeymen Papermakers througJwut
England {l2i2T,), Appendix 18 to Report on Combination Laws, 1825, p. 56. The
only Trade Union in which this example still prevails is that of the Flint Glass
Makers, where the rules until lately gave the secretary "the power to nominate
a central committee (open to the objection of the trade), in whose hands the
executive power of the society shall be vested from year to year." — Rules and
Regulations of the National Flint Glass Makers'" Sick and Friendly Society (Man-
chester, 1890). This has lately been modified, in so far that seven members are
now elected, the central secretary nominating four " from the district in which
he resides, but open to the objection of the trade." — Rule 67 (Rules, reprinted
with additions, Manchester, 1893).

Primitive Democracy 9

their warfare with the employers, that first led to a departure
from this simple ideal. The legal and social persecutions to
which Trade Unionists were subject, at any rate up to 1824,
made secrecy and promptitude absolutely necessary for suc-
cessful operations ; and accordingly at all critical times we
find the direction of affairs passing out of the hands of the
general meeting into those of a responsible, if not a repre-
sentative, committee. Thus the London Tailors, whose
militant combinations between 1720 and 1834 repeatedly
attracted the attention of Parliament,^ had practically two
constitutions, one for peace and one for war. In quiet times,
the society was made up of little autonomous general meet-
ings of the kind described above at the thirty " houses of
call " in London and Westminster. The organisation for war,
as set forth in 1 8 1 8 by Francis Place, was very different :
" Each house of call has a deputy, who on particular occasions
is chosen by a kind of tacit consent, frequently without its
being known to a very large majority who is chosen. The
deputies form a committee, and they again choose, in a
somewhat similar way, a very small committee, in whom,
on very particular occasions, all power resides, from whom
all orders proceed, and whose commands are implicitly
obeyed ; and on no occasion has it ever been known that
their commands have exceeded the necessity of the occasion,
or that they have wandered in the least from the purpose
for which it was understood they were appointed. So perfect
indeed is the organisation, and so well has it been carried
into effect, that no complaint has ever been heard ; with so
much simplicity and with so great certainty does the whole
business appear to be conducted that the great body of
journeymen rather acquiesce than assist in any way in it." ^
Again, the protracted legal proceedings of the Scottish Hand-

^ See the interesting Select Documents illustrating the History of Trade
Unionism: I. The Tailoritig TVao'is, edited by F. W. Galton (London, 1896),
being one of the "Studies" published by the London School of Economics
and Political Science.

2 The Gorgon, No. 20, 3rd October 1818, reprinted in The Tailoring Trade
by F. W. Galton, pp. 153, 154.

lo Trade Union Structure

loom Weavers, ending in the great struggle when 30,000
looms from Carlisle to Aberdeen struck on a single day
(loth November i 8 1 2), were conducted by an autocratic com-
mittee of five, sitting in Glasgow, and periodically summon-
ing from all the districts delegates who carried back to their
constituents orders which were implicitly obeyed.^ Before
the repeal of the Combination Laws in 1824, the employers
in all the organised trades complained bitterly of these " self-
appointed " committees, and made repeated attempts to
scatter them by prosecutions for combination or conspiracy.
To this constant danger of prosecution may be ascribed
some of the mystery which surrounds the actual constitution
of these tribunals ; but their appearance on the scene when-
ever an emergency called for strong action was a necessary
consequence of the failure of the clubs to provide any con-
stitutional authority of a representative character.

So far we have dealt principally with trade clubs confined
to particular towns or districts. When, in any trade, these
local clubs united to form a federal union, or when one of
them enrolled members in other towns, government by a
general meeting of " the trade," or of all the members, be-
came impracticable.^ Nowadays some kind of representa-

' Evidence before the House of Commons Committee on Artisans and
Machinery, 1824, especially that of Richmond.

^ A branch of a national union is still governed by the members in general
meeting assembled ; and for this and other reasons, it is customary for several
separate branches to be established in large towns where the number of members
becomes greater than can easily be accommodated in a single branch meeting-
place. Such branches usually send delegates to a district committee, which thus
becomes the real governing authority of the town or district. But in certain
unions the idea of direct government by an aggregate meeting of the trade still so
far prevails that, even in so large a centre as London, resort is had to huge mass
meetings. Thus the London Society of Compositors will occasionally summon
its ten thousand members to meet in council to decide, in an excited mass
meeting, the question of peace or war with their employers. And the National
Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives, which in its federal constitution adopts a
large measure of representative institutions, still retains in its local organisation
the aggregate meeting of the trade as the supreme governing body for the district.
The Shoemakers of London or Leicester frequently hold meetings at which the
attendance is numbered by thousands, with results that are occasionally calamitous
to the union. Thus, when in 1891 the men of a certain London firm had
impetuously left their work contrary to the agreement made by the union with

Primitive Democracy 1 1

tive institutions would seem to have been inevitable at this
stage. But it is significant to notice how slowly, reluctantly
and incompletely the Trade Unionists have incorporated in
their constitutions what is often regarded as the specifically
Anglo-Saxon form of democracy — the elected representative
assembly, appointing and controlling a standing executive.
Until the present generation, no Trade Union had ever
formed its constitution on this model. It is true that in the
early days we hear of^ meetings of delegates from local

the employers, their branch called a mass meeting of the whole body of the
London members (seven thousand attending), which, after refusing even to hear
the union officials, decided to support the recalcitrant strikers, with the result
that the employers " locked out " the whole trade. {Monthly Report of the
National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives, November 1891.) In 1893 the
union executive found it necessaiy to summon at Leicester a special delegate
meeting of the whole society to sit in judgment on the London members who
had decided, at a mass meeting, to withdraw from the national agreement to
submit to arbitration. The circular calling the delegate meeting contains a vivid
description of the scene at this mass meeting: "The hall was well filled, and
Mr. Judge, president of the union, took the chair. From the outset it was soon
found that the rowdy element intended to again prevent a hearing, and thus make
it impossible for our views to be laid before the bulk of the more intelligent and
reasonable members. ... If democratic unions such as ours are to have the
meetings stopped by such proceedings, ... if the members refuse to hear, and
insult by cock-crowing and cat-calls their own accredited and elected executive,
then it is time that other steps be taken." The delegate meeting, by 74 votes to
9, severely censured the London members, and reversed their decision (Circular of
Executive Committee, 14th March 1893 • Special Report of the Delegate
Meeting at Leicester, 17th April 1893). In most unions, however, experience
has shown that in truth "aggregate meetings" are "aggravated meetings," and
has led to their abandonment in favor of district committees or delegate meetings.
^ In the History of Trade Unionism, p. 46, we described the Hatters as hold-
ing in 1772, 1775, and 1777, "congresses" of delegates from all parts of the
country. Further examination of the evidence (House of Commons Journals,
vol. xxxvi. ; Place MS. 27,799-68; Committee on Artisans and Machinery)
inclines us to believe that these "congresses," like another in 18 16, comprised
only delegates from the various workshops in London. We can discover
no instance during the eighteenth century of a Trade Union gathering made up
of delegates from the local clubs throughout the country. But though the con-
gresses of the Hatters probably represented only the London workmen, their
" bye -laws " were apparently adopted by the clubs elsewhere, and came thus to
be of national scope. Similar instances of national regulation by the principal
centre of a trade may be seen in the "resolutions" addressed "to the Wool-
staplers of England " by the London Society of Woolstaplers, and in the
"articles to be observed by the Journeymen Papermakers throughout England,"
formulated at a meeting of the trade at large held at Maidstone. In the loose
alliances of the local clubs in each trade, the chief trade centre often acted, in
fact, as the "governing branch."

12 Trade Union Structure

clubs to adopt or amend the " articles " of their association.
A " deputation " from nine local societies of Carpenters
met thus in London in 1827 to form the Friendly Society
of Operative House Carpenters and Joiners, and similar
meetings were annually held to revise the rules and
adjust the finances of this federation. It would have
been a natural development for such a representative
congress to appoint a standing committee and executive
officers to act on behalf of the whole trade. But when
between 1824 and 1840 the great national societies of
that generation settled down into their constitutions, the
congress of elected representatives either found no place at
all, or else was called together only at long intervals and for
strictly limited purposes. In no case do we see it acting
as a permanent supreme assembly. The Trade Union met
the needs of expanding democracy by some remarkable
experiments in constitution-making.

The first step in the transition from the loose alliance of
separate local clubs into a national organisation was the
appointment of a seat of government or " governing branch."
The members residing in one town were charged with
the responsibility of conducting the current business of the
whole society, as well as that of their own branch. The
branch officers and the branch committee of this town accord-
ingly became the central authority.^ Here again the leading
idea was not so much to get a government that was repre-

1 In some of the more elaborate Trade Union constitutions formulated between
1820 and 1834 we find a hierarchy of authorities, none of them elected by the
society as a whole, but each responsible for a definite part of the common admini-
stration. Thus The Rules and Articles to be observed by the Journeymen Paper-
makers va. 1823 provide "that there shall be five Grand Divisions throughout
England where all money shall be lodged, that when wanted may be sent to
any part where emergency may require." These "Grand Divisions" were the
branches in the five principal centres of the trade, each being given jurisdiction
over all the mills in the counties round about it. Above them all stood " No. I
Grand Division " (Maidstone), which was empowered to determine business of
too serious a nature to be left to any other Grand Division. This geographical
hierarchy is interesting as having apparently furnished the model for most of the
constitutions of the period, notably of the Owenite societies of 1833- 1834, includ-
ing the Builders' Union and the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union itself.

Primitive Deinocracy 13

sentative of the society as to make each section take its turn
at the privileges and burdens of administration. The seat
of government was accordingly always changed at short
intervals, often by rotation. Thus the Steam-Engine Makers'
rules of 1826 provide that "the central branch of the society
shall be held alternately at the different branches of this
society, according as they stand on the books, commencing
with Branch No. i, and the secretary of the central branch
shall, after the accounts of the former year have been balanced,*
send the books to the next central branch of the society." ^
In other cases the seat of government was periodically deter-
mined by vote of the whole body of members, who appear
usually to have been strongly biassed in favor of shifting it
from town to town. The reason appears in this statement
by one of the lodges of the Ironfounders : " What, we ask,
has been the history of nearly every trade society in this
respect ? Why, that when any branch or section of it has
possessed the governing power too long, it has become care-
less of the society's interests, tried to assume irresponsible
powers, and invariably by its remissness opened wide the
doors of peculation, jobbery, and fraud." ^

The institution of a " governing branch " had the advantage
of being the cheapest machinery of central administration
that could be devised. By it the national union secured
its executive committee, at no greater expense than a small
local society.^ And so long as the function of the national

The same geographical hierarchy was a feature of the constitution of the Southern
Amicable Society of Woolstaplers until the last revision of rules in 1892. In only
one case has a similar hierarchy survived. The United Society of Brushmakers,
established in the eighteenth century, is still divided into geographical divisions
governed by the six head towns, with London as the centre of communication.
The branches in the West Riding, for instance, are governed by the Leeds com-
mittee, and when in 1892 the Sheffield branch had a strike, this was managed by
the secretary of the Leeds branch.

1 Rule 19 ; rules of 1S26 as reprinted in the Annual Report for 1837.

2 Address of the Bristol branch of the Friendly Society of Ironfounders to the
members at large (in Annual Report for 1849).

^ Both the idea of rotation of office, and that of a local governing branch, can
be traced to the network of village sick-clubs which existed all over England in
the eighteenth century. In 1824 these clubs were described by a hostile critic as
" under the management of the ordinary members who succeed to the several offices

14 Trade Union Structure

executive was confined to that of a centre of communication
between practically autonomous local branches, no alteration
in the machinery was necessary. The duties of the secretary,
like those of his committee, were not beyond the competence
of ordinary artisans working at their trade and devoting only
their evenings to their official business. But with the multi-
plication of branches and the formation of a central fund, the
secretarial work of a national union presently absorbed the
whole time of a single officer, to whom, therefore, a salary
had to be assigned. As the salary came from the common
fund, the right of appointment passed, without question, from
the branch meeting to " the voices " of the whole body of
members. Thus the general secretary was singled out for a
unique position : alone among the officers of the union he
was elected by the whole body of members. Meanwhile the
supreme authority continued to be " the voices." Every pro-
position not covered by the original " articles," together with
all questions of peace and war, was submitted to the votes
of the members.^ But this was not all. Each branch, in

in rotation ; frequently without being qualified either by ability, independence, or
impartiality for the due discharge of their respective offices ; or under the control
of a standing committee, composed of the most active and often the least eligible
members residing near the place of meeting" — The Constitution of Friendly Societies
upon Legal and Scietitific Principles, by Rev. John Thomas Becher (2nd edition,
London, 1824), p. 50.

Comparing small things with great, we may say that the British Empire is
administered by a "governing branch." The business common to the Empire as
a whole is transacted, not by imperial or federal officers, but by those of one part
of the Empire, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland ; and they are
supervised, not by an Imperial Diet or Federal Assembly, but by the domestic
legislature at Westminster.

1 The very ancient United Society of Brushmakers, which dates from the early
part of the eighteenth century, retains to this day its archaic method of collecting
" the voices." In London, said to be the most conservative of all the districts, no
alteration of rule is made without " sending round the box " as of yore. In the
society's ancient iron box are put all the papers relating to the subject under dis-
cussion, and a member out of employment is deputed to carry the box from shop
to shop until it has travelled "all round the trade." When it arrives at a shop,
all the men cease work and gather round ; the box is opened, its contents are read
and discussed, and the shop delegates are then and there instructed how to vote
at the next delegate meeting. The box is then refilled and sent on to the next
shop. Old minutes of 1829 show that this custom has remained unchanged, down
to the smallest detail, for, at any rate, a couple of generations. It is probably
nearly two centuries old.

Primitive Democracy 1 5

general meeting assembled, claimed the right to have any
proposition whatsoever submitted to the vote of the society
as a whole. And thus we find, in almost every Trade Union
which has a history at all, a most instructive series of experi-
ments in the use, misuse, and limitations of the Referendum.

Such was the typical Trade Union constitution of the
last generation. In a few cases it has survived, almost
unchanged, down to the present day, just as its pre-
decessor, the archaic local club governed by the general
meeting, still finds representatives in the Trade Union
world. But wherever an old Trade Union has maintained
its vitality, its constitution has been progressively modified,
whilst the most powerful of the modern unions have been
formed on a different pattern. An examination of this
evolutionary process will bring home to us the transitional
character of the existing constitutional forms, and give us
valuable hints towards the solution, in a larger field, of the
problem of uniting efficient administration with popular
control.

We have already noted that, in passing from a local to
a national organisation, the Trade Union unwittingly left
behind the ideal of primitive democracy. The setting apart
of one man to do the clerical work destroyed the possibility of
equal and identical service by all the members, and laid the
foundation of a separate governing class. The practice of
requiring members to act in rotation was silently abandoned.
Once chosen for his post, the general secretary could rely with
confidence, unless he proved himself obviously unfit or grossly
incompetent, on being annually re-elected. Spending all
day at office work, he soon acquired a professional expert-
ness quite out of the reach of his fellow -members at
the bench or the forge. And even if some other member
possessed natural gifts equal or superior to the acquired
skill of the existing officer, there was, in a national organisa-
tion, no opportunity of making these qualities known. The
general secretary, on the other hand, was always adver-
tising his name and his personality to the thousands of

1 6 Trade Union Structure

members by the printed circulars and financial reports, which
became the only link between the scattered branches, and
afforded positive evidence of his competency to perform
the regular work of the office. With every increase in the
society's membership, with every extension or elaboration
of its financial system or trade policy, the position of the
salaried official became, accordingly, more and more secure.
The general secretaries themselves changed with the develop-
ment of their office. The work could no longer be
efficiently performed by an ordinary artisan, and some
preliminary office training became almost indispensable.
The Coalminers, for instance, as we have shown in our
description of the Trade Union world, have picked their
secretaries to a large extent from a specially trained section,
the checkweigh-men.^ The Cotton Operatives have even
adopted a system of competitive examination among the
candidates for their staff appointments.^ In other unions any
candidate who has not proved his capacity for office work
and trade negotiations would stand at a serious disadvantage
in the election, where the choice is coming every day to be
confined more clearly to the small class of minor officials.
The paramount necessity of efficient administration has
co-operated with this permanence in producing a progressive
differentiation of an official governing class, more and more
marked off by character, training, and duties from the bulk
of the members. The annual election of the general
secretary by a popular vote, far from leading to frequent
rotation of office and equal service by all the members,
has, in fact, invariably resulted in permanence of tenure
exceeding even that of the English civil servant. It is
accordingly interesting to notice that, in the later rules
of some of the most influential of existing unions, the
practical permanence of the official staff is tacitly recognised
by the omission of all provision for re-election. Indeed, the

1 History of Trade Unionism, p. 291.

2 Ibid. p. 294 ; see also the subsequent chapter on "The Method of Collective
Bargaining," where a specimen examination paper is reprinted.

Primitive Democracy 1 7

Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners goes
so far as expressly to provide in its rules that the general
secretary " shall continue in office so long as he gives satis-
faction." ^

While everything was thus tending to exalt the position
of the salaried official, the executive committee, under whose
direction he was placed, being composed of men working at
their trade, retained its essential weakness. Though modi-
fied in unimportant particulars, it continued in nearly all the
old societies to be chosen only by one geographical section
of the members. At first each branch served in rotation as
the seat of government. This quickly gave way to a system
of selecting the governing branch from among the more
important centres of the trade. Moreover, though the desire
periodically to shift the seat of this authority long manifested
itself and still lingers in some trades,^ the growth of an
official staff, and the necessity of securing accommodation
on some durable tenancy, has practically made the head-
quarters stationary, even if the change has not been ex-
pressly recorded in the rules. Thus the Friendly Society
of Ironfounders has retained its head office in London since
1846, and the Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons
since 1883. The United Society of Boilermakers, which
long wandered from port to port, has remained in Newcastle
since 1880; and finally settled the question in 1888 by
building itself palatial offices on a freehold site.^ Here again

1 Rule 12 in the editions of Rules of 1891 and 1894.

2 Notably the Plumbers and Irondressers. In 1877 a proposal at the general
council of the Operative Bricklayers' Society to convert the executive into a shift-
ing one, changing the headquarters every third year, was only defeated by a cast-
ing vote. — Operative Bricklayers^ Society Trade Circular, September 1877.

^ Along with this change has gone the differentiation of national business from
that of the branch. The committee work of the larger societies became more than
could be undertaken, in addition to the branch management, by men giving only
their evenings. We find, therefore, the central executive committee becoming a
body distinct from the branch committee, sometimes (as in the United Society of
Operative Plumbers) elected by the same constituents, but more usually by the
members of all the branches within a convenient radius of the central office. Thus
the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters gives the election to the members within
twelve miles of the head office— that is, to the thirty-five branches in and near
Manchester — and the Friendly Society of Ironfounders to the six branches of the
VOL. I C

1 8 Trade Union Structure

the deeply-rooted desire on the part of Trade Union demo-
crats to secure to each section an equal and identical share
in the government of the society has had to give way before
the necessity of obtaining efficient administration. In ceas-
ing to be movable the executive committee lost even such
moral influence over the general secretary as was conveyed
by an express and recent delegation by the remainder of the
society. The salaried official, elected by the votes of all the
members, could in fact claim to possess more representative
authority than a committee whose functions as an executive
depended merely on the accident of the society's offices being
built in the town in which the members of the committee
happened to be working. In some societies, moreover,
the idea of Rotation of Office so far survived that the
committee men were elected for a short term and disqualified
for re-election. Such inexperienced and casually selected
committees of tired manual workers, meeting only in the
evening, usually found themselves incompetent to resist, or
even to criticise, any practical proposal that might be brought
forward by the permanent trained professional whom they
were supposed to direct and control.^

In face of so weak an executive committee the most
obvious check upon the predominant power of the salaried
officials was the elementary device of a written constitution.
The ordinary workman, without either experience or imagina-
tion, fondly thought that the executive government of a
great national organisation could be reduced to a mechanical
obedience to printed rules. Hence the constant elaboration
of the rules of the several societies, in the vain endeavor to
leave nothing to the discretion of officers or committees. It
was an essential part of the faith of these primitive democrats
that the difficult and detailed work of drafting and amending

London district. In the United Society of Boilermakers, down to 1897, the
twenty lodges in the Tyne district, each in rotation, nominated one of the seven
members of which the executive committee is composed.

^ The only organisation, outside the Trade Union world, in which the execu-
tive committee and the seat of government are changed annually, is, we believe,
the Ancient Order of Foresters, the worldwide federal friendly society.

Primitive Democracy 19

these rules should not be delegated to any particular person
or persons, but should be undertaken by " the body " or " the
trade " in general meeting assembled.^

When a society spread from town to town, and a meeting
of all the members became impracticable, the " articles " were
settled, as we have mentioned, by a meeting of delegates, and
any revision was undertaken by the same body. Accordingly,
we find, in the early history of such societies as the Iron-
founders, Stonemasons, Carpenters, Coachmakers, and Steam-
Engine Makers, frequent assemblies of delegates from the
different branches, charged with supplementing or revising
the somewhat tentative rules upon which the society had
been based. But it would be a serious misconception to
take these gatherings for " parliaments," with plenary power
to determine the policy to be pursued by the society. The
delegates came together only for specific and strictly limited
purposes. Nor were even these purposes left to be dealt
with at their discretion. In all cases that we know of the
delegates were bound to decide according to the votes
already taken in their respective branches. In many
societies the delegate was merely the vehicle by which
" the voices " of the members were mechanically con-
veyed. Thus the Friendly Society of Operative Stone-
masons, at that time the largest and most powerful Trade

1 This preference of Trade Unionists for making their own rules will remind
the political student that "direct legislation by the people" has an older and
wider history with regard to the framing and revising of constitutions than with
regard to ordinary legislation. Thus, already in 1779 the citizens of Massa-
chusetts insisted on asserting, by popular vote, that a constitution should be
framed, and equally on deciding that the draft prepared should be adopted. In
1 81 8 the Connecticut constitution included a provision that any particular
amendment to it might be submitted to the popular vote. In Europe the first
constitution to be submitted to the same ordeal was the French constitution of
1793) which, though adopted by the primary assemblies, never came into force.
The practice became usual with regard to the Swiss cantonal constitutions after
the French Revolution of 1830, St. Gall leading the way in July 1831. See the
elaborate treatise of Charles Borgeaud on The Adoption and Amendment of
Constitutions (London, 1895); Bryce's The American Co?nmo7ncealth (London,
1891); and Le Referendum en Suisse hy Simon Deploige (Brussels, 1892), of
which an English translation by C. P. Trevelyan and Lilian Tomn, with
additional notes and appendices, will shortly be published by the London
School of Economics and Political Science.

20 Trade Union Structure

Union, held annual delegate meetings between 1834 and
1839 fo^ th^ sc)l^ purpose of revising its rules. How limited
was the power of this assembly may be judged from the
following extract from an address of the central executive :
" As the delegates are about to meet, the Grand Committee
submit to all lodges the following resolutions in reference to
the conduct of delegates. It is evident that the duty of
delegates is to vote according to the instructions of the majority
of their constituents, therefore they ought not to propose any
measure unless recommended by the Lodges or Districts
they represent. To effect this we propose the following
resolutions : that each Lodge shall furnish their delegates
with written instructions how to vote on each question they
have taken into their consideration, and that no delegate
shall vote in opposition to his instructions, and when it
appears by examining the instructions there is a majority
for any measure, it shall be passed without discussion." ^ The
delegate meeting of 1838 agreed with this view. All lodges
were to send resolutions for alterations of rules two months
before the delegate meeting ; they were to be printed in the
Fortnightly Return, and discussed by each lodge ; the delegate
was then to be instructed as to the sense of the members by
a majority vote ; and only if there was no decided majority
on any point was the delegate to have discretion as to his
vote. But even this restriction did not satisfy the Stone-
masons' idea of democracy. In 1837 the Liverpool Lodge
demanded that " all the alterations made in our laws at the
grand delegate meeting" shall be communicated to all the
lodges " for the consideration of our society before they are
printed." " The central executive mildly deprecated such a
course, on the ground that the amendment and passing of
the laws would under those circumstances take up the whole
time of the society until the next delegate meeting came
round. The request, however, was taken up by other

1 Stonemasons' Fortnightly Return, May 1836 (the circular issued fortnightly
to all the branches by the executive committee).

2 Ibid. May 1837.

Primitive Democracy 21

branches, and by 1844 we find the practice established of
making any necessary amendment in the rules by merely
submitting the proposal in the Fortnightly Return, and adding
together the votes taken in each lodge meeting. A similar
change took place in such other great societies as the Iron-
founders, Steam-Engine Makers, and Coachmakers. The
great bulk of the members saw no advantage in incurring
the very considerable expense of paying the coach fares of
delegates to a central town and maintaining them there at
the rate of six shillings a day,^ when the introduction of
penny postage made possible the circulation of a fortnightly
or monthly circular, through the medium of which their
votes on any particular proposition could be quickly and
inexpensively collected. The delegate meeting became, in
fact, superseded by the Referendum.^

By the term Referendum the modern student of political
institutions understands the submission to the votes of the
v/hole people of any measure deliberated on by the repre-
sentative assembly. Another development of the same prin-
ciple is what is called the Initiative, that is to say, the right of
a section of the community to insist on its proposals being
submitted to the vote of the whole electorate. As a repre-
sentative assembly formed no part of the earlier Trade Union
constitutions, both the Referendum and the Initiative took
with them the crudest shape. Any new rule or amendment
of a rule, any proposed line of policy or particular application
of it, might be straightway submitted to the votes of all the

^ In 1838 a large majority of the lodges of the Friendly Society of Operative
Stonemasons voted "that on all measures submitted to the consideration of our
Society, the number of members be taken in every Lodge for and against such a
measure, and transmitted through the district Lodges to the Seat of Government,
and in place of the number of Lodges, the majority of the aggregate members to
sanction or reject any measures." — Fortnightly Return, 19th January 1838.

^ It is interesting to find that in at least one Trade Union the introduction of
the Referendum is directly ascribed to the circulation in England between 1850 and
i860 of translations of pamphlets by Rittinghausen and Victor Considerant. It is
stated in the Typographical Circular for March 1889, that John Melson, a Liver-
pool printer, got the idea of " Direct Legislation by the People " from these
pamphlets, and urged its adoption on the union, at first unsuccessfully, but at the
1 86 1 delegate meeting with the result that the Referendum was adopted as the
future method of legislation.

22 Trade Union Structure

members. Nor was this practice of consulting the members
confined to the central executive. Any branch might equally
have any proposition put to the vote through the medium of
the society's official circular. And however imperfectly the
question was framed, however inconsistent the result might
be with the society's rules and past practice, the answer re-
turned by the members' votes was final and instantly operative.
Those who believe that pure democracy implies the direct
decision, by the mass of the people, of every question as it
arises, will find this ideal realised without check or limit in the
history of the larger Trade Unions between 1834 and 1870.
The result was significant and full of political instruction.
Whenever the union was enjoying a vigorous life we find, to
begin with, a wild rush of propositions. Every active branch
had some new rule to suggest, and every issue of the official
circular was filled with crude and often inconsistent projects
of amendment. The executive committee of the United
Kingdom Society of Coachmakers, for instance, had to put
no fewer than forty-four propositions simultaneously to the
vote in a single circular.^ It is difficult to convey any
adequate idea of the variety and, in some cases, the absurdity
of these propositions. To take only those recorded in the
annals of the Stonemasons between 1838 and 1839; ^^^
have one branch proposing that the whole society should go
in for payment by the hour, and another that the post of
general secretary should be put up to tender, " the cheapest
to be considered the person elected to that important
office." ^ We have a delegate meeting referring to a vote of
the members the momentous question whether the central
executive should be allowed " a cup of ale each per night,"
and the central executive taking a vote as to whether all the
Irish branches should not have Home Rule forced upon
them. The members, under fear of the coming Parliamentary

1 Quarterly Report, June i860.

2 The sale of public offices by auction to the highest bidder was a frequent
incident in the Swiss " Landesgemeinden " of the seventeenth century. See
Eugene Rambert's Les Alpes Suisses : Etudes Historiques et Nationales, p. 225.

Primitive Democracy 23

inquiry, vote the abolition of all "regalia, initiation, and
pass-words," but reject the proposition of the Newcastle
Lodge for reducing the hours of labor " as the only method
of striking at the root of all our grievances." The central
executive is driven to protest against " the continual state of
agitation in which the society has been kept for the last ten
months by the numerous resolutions and amendments to
laws, the tendency of which can only be to bring the laws
and the society into disrespect." ^ As other unions come to
the same stage in development, we find a similar result.
" It appears evident," complains the executive committee of
the Friendly Society of Ironfounders, " that we have got into
a regular proposition mania. One branch will make propo-
sitions simply because another does ; hence the absurd and
ridiculous propositions that are made." ^ The system worked
most disastrously in connection with the rates of contributions
and benefits. It is not surprising that the majority of work-
men should have been unable to appreciate the need for
expert advice on these points, or that they should have
disregarded all actuarial considerations. Accordingly, we
find the members always reluctant to believe that the rate
of contribution must be raised, and generally prone to listen
to any proposal for extending the benefits — a popular bias
which led many societies into bankruptcy. Still more dis-
integrating in its tendency was the disposition to appeal to
the votes of the members against the executive decision that
particular individuals were ineligible for certain benefits. In
the United Kingdom Society of Coachmakers, for instance,
we find the executive bitterly complaining that it is of no
use for them to obey the rules, and rigidly to refuse accident
benefit to men who are suffering simply from illness ; as in
almost every case the claimant's appeal to the members,
backed by eloquent circulars from his friends, has resulted
in the decision being overruled.^ The Friendly Society of

^ Fortnightly Return, July 1838.

^ Ironfo7inders' Monthly Repoii, April 1855.

2 United Kingdom Society of Coachmakers' Quarterly Report, September 1859.

24 Trade Union StrucHire

Ironfounders took no fewer than nineteen votes In a single
year, nearly all on details of benefit administration.^ And
the executive of the Stonemasons had early occasion to
protest against the growing practice under which branches,
preparatory to taking a vote, sent circulars throughout the
society in support of their claims to the redress of what they
deemed to be personal grievances.^

The disadvantages of a free resort to the Referendum
soon became obvious to thoughtful Trade Unionists. It stands
to the credit of the majority of the members that wild and
absurd propositions were almost uniformly rejected ; and in
many societies a similar fate became customary in case of
any proposition that did not emanate from the responsible
executive.^ The practical abandonment of the Initiative
ensued. Branches got tired of sending up proposals which
uniformly met with defeat. But the right of the whole
body of members themselves to decide every question as
it arose was too much bound up with their idea of
democracy to permit of its being directly abrogated, or even
expressly criticised. Where the practice did not die out
from sheer weariness, it was quietly got rid of in other ways.
In one society after another the central executive and the
general secretary — the men who were in actual contact with
the problems of administration — silently threw their influence
against the practice of appealing to the members* vote. Thus
the executive committee of the United Kingdom Society of
Coachmakers made a firm stand against the members' habit
of overruling its decision in the grant of benefits under the
rules. The executive claimed the sole right to decide who
was eligible under the rules, and refused to allow discontented
claimants to appeal through the official circular. This caused
great and recurring discontent ; but the executive committee

1 Report for 1869.

2 Fortnightly Return, 1 8th January 1849.

^ The political student will be reminded of the very small number of cases
in which the Initiative in Switzerland has led to actual legislation, even in
cantons, such as Zurich, where it has been in operation for over twenty years.
See StUssi, Referendum und Initiative im Canton Zurich.

Prhnitive Democracy 25

held firmly to their position and eventually maintained it.
When thirteen branches of the Operative Bricklayers' Society
proposed in 1868 that the age for superannuation should
be lowered and the office expenses curtailed, the general
secretary bluntly refused to submit such inexpedient proposals
to the members' vote, on the excuse that the question could
be dealt with at the next delegate meeting.^ The next step
was to restrict the number of opportunities for appeals on
any questions whatsoever. The Coachmakers' executive
announced that, in future, propositions would be put to the
vote only in the annual report, instead of quarterly as hereto-
fore, and this restriction was a few years later embodied in
the rules.^ Even more effectual was the enactment of a rule
throwing the expense of taking a vote upon the branch which
had initiated it, in case the verdict of the society proved to
be against the proposition.^ Another device was to seize the
occasion of a systematic revision of rules to declare that no
proposition for their alteration was to be entertained for a
specified period : one year, said the General Union of Car-
penters in 1863 ; three years, declared the Bookbinders'
Consolidated Union in 1869, and the Friendly Society of
Operative Stonemasons in 1878 ; ten years, ordained the
Operative Bricklayers' Society in 1889.* Finally, we have
the Referendum abolished altogether, as regards the making
or alteration of rules. In 1866 the delegate meeting of the
Amalgamated Society of Carpenters decided that the execu-
tive should " not take the votes of the members concerning
any alteration or addition to rules, unless in cases of great
emergency, and then only on the authority of the General
Council."^ In 1878 the Stonemasons themselves, who forty
years previously had been enthusiastic in their passion for
voting on every question whatsoever, accepted a rule

1 Monthly Circular, April 1868.

2 Quarterly Report, November 1854 ; Rules of 1857.

' Rules of the Associated Blacksmiths' Society (Glasgow, 1892), and many
others.

* Monthly Report, October 1889.

* Monthly Circular, April 1866.

26 Trade Union Structure

which confined the work of revision to a specially elected
committee.

Thus we see that half a century of practical experience
of the Initiative and the Referendum has led, not to its
extension, but to an ever stricter limitation of its application.
iThe attempt to secure the participation of every member in
the management of his society was found to lead to in-
stability in legislation, dangerous unsoundness of finance, and
general weakness of administration. The result was the early
abandonment of the Initiative, either by express rule or through
the persistent influence of the executive. This produced a
further shifting of the balance of power in Trade Union con-
stitutions. When the right of putting questions to the vote
came practically to be confined to the executive, the Referen-
dum ceased to provide the members with any effective control.
If the executive could choose the issues to be submitted, the
occasion on which the question should be put, and the form in
which it should be couched, the Referendum, far from supply-
ing any counterpoise to the executive, was soon found to be
an immense addition to its power. Any change which the
executive desired could be stated in the most plausible
terms and supported by convincing arguments, which almost
invariably secured its adoption by a large majority. Any
executive resolution could, when occasion required, thus be
given the powerful moral backing of a plebiscitary vote.^
The reliance of Trade Union democrats on the Referendum
resulted, in fact, in the virtual exclusion of the general body
of members from all real share in the government. And

^ Mr. Lecky points out {Democracy and Liberty, vol. i. pp. 12, 31, 32) how,
in France, "successive Governments soon learned how easily a plebiscite vote
could be secured and directed by a strong executive, and how useful it might
become to screen or justify usurpation. The Constitution of 1795) which founded
the power of the Directors ; the Constitution of 1799, which placed the executive
power in the hands of three Consuls elected for ten years ; the Constitution of 1802,
which made Buonaparte Consul for life, and again remodelled the electoral system ;
the Empire, which was established in 1804, and the additional Act of the Con-
stitution promulgated by Napoleon in 181 5, were all submitted to a direct popular
vote." The government of Napoleon III., from 1S52 to 1870, was ratified by
four separate plebiscites. See also Laferriere, Constitutions de la France deptiis
I/Sg; Jules Clere, Histoire du Souffrage Universel.

Pi'i77titive Democracy 27

when we remember the practical subordination of the
executive committee to its salaried permanent officer, we
shall easily understand that the ultimate effect of such a
Referendum as we have described was a further strengthen-
ing of the influence of the general secretary, who drafted the
propositions, wrote the arguments in support of them, and
edited the official circular which formed the only means
of communication with the members.

We see, therefore, that almost every influence in the
Trade Union organisation has tended to magnify and con-
solidate the power of the general secretary. If democracy
could furnish no other expedient of popular control than the
mass meeting, the annual election of public officers, the,
Initiative and the Referendum, Trade Union history makes
it quite clear that the mere pressure of administrative needs
would inevitably result in the general body of citizens losing
all effective control over the government. It would not be
difficult to point to influential Trade Unions at the present
day which, possessing only a single permanent official, have
not progressed beyond the stage of what is virtually a
personal dictatorship. But it so happens that the very
development of the union and its business which tends, as
we have seen, to increase the influence of the general
secretary, calls into existence a new check upon his personal
authority. If we examine the constitution of a bank or joint
stock company, or any other organisation not formed by the
working class, we shall find it almost invariably the rule that
the chief executive officers are appointed, not by the members
at large, but by the governing committee, and that these
officers are allowed a free hand, if not absolute power, in the
choice and dismissal of their subordinates. Any other plan,
it is contended, would seriously detract from the efficient
working of the organisation. Had the Trade Unions
adopted this course, the general secretary would have
been absolutely supreme. But working-class organisations
in England have, almost without exception, tenaciously
clung to the direct election of all officers by the general

28 Trade Union Structure

body of members. Whether the post to be filled be
that of assistant secretary at the head office or district
delegate to act for one part of the country, the members
have jealously retained the appointment in their own hands.
In the larger trade societies of the present day the general
secretary finds himself, therefore, at the head, not of a staff of
docile subordinates who owe office and promotion to himself,
but of a number of separately elected functionaries, each
holding his appointment directly from the members at large.^
Any attempt at a personal dictatorship is thus quickly
checked. There is more danger that friction and personal
jealousies may unduly weaken the administration. But the
usual outcome is the close union of all the salaried officials
to conduct the business of the society in the way they think
best. Instead of a personal dictatorship, we have, therefore,
a closely combined and practically irresistible bureaucracy.

Under a constitution of this type the Trade Union
may attain a high degree of efficiency. The United Society
of Boilermakers and Ironshipbuilders (established 1832;
membership in December 1896, 40,776) is, for instance,
admittedly one of the most powerful and best conducted of
English trade societies. For the last twenty years its career,
alike in good times and bad, has been one of continuous
prosperity. For many years past it has dominated all the
shipbuilding ports, and it now includes practically every
ironshipbuilder in the United Kingdom. As an insurance
company it has succeeded in paying, even in the worst years
of an industry subject to the most acute depressions, benefits
of an unusually elaborate and generous character. Notwith-
standing these liberal benefits, it has built up a reserve fund
of no less than ;^ 175,560. Nor has this prosperity been

1 Even the office staff has been, until quite recently, invariably recruited by
the members from the members ; and only in a few unions has it begun to be
realised that a shorthand clerk or trained bookkeeper, chosen by the general
secretary or the executive committee, can probably render better service at the
desk than the most eligible workman trained to manual labor. The Operative
Bricklayers' Society, however, lately allowed their executive committee to appoint
a shorthand clerk.

Primitive Democracy 29

attained by any neglect of the militant side of Trade
Unionism. The society, on the contrary, has the reputa-
tion of exercising stricter control over the conditions of its
members' work than any other union. In no trade, for
instance, do we find a stricter and more universally enforced
limitation of apprentices, or a more rigid refusal to work
with non-unionists. And, as we have elsewhere described,
no society has more successfully concluded and enforced
elaborate national agreements applicable to every port in the
kingdom. Moreover, this vigorous and successful trade
policy has been consistent with a marked abstention from
strikes — a fact due not only to the financial strength and
perfect combination of the society, but also to the implicit
obedience enforced upon its members, and the ample dis-
ciplinary power vested in and exercised by the central
executive.^

The efficiency and influence of this remarkable union is,
no doubt, largely due to the advantageous strategic position
which has resulted from the extraordinary expansion of iron-
shipbuilding. It is interesting, however, to notice what a
perfect example it affords of a constitution retaining all the
features of the crudest democracy, but becoming, in actual
practice, a bureaucracy in which effective popular control has
sunk to a minimum. The formal constitution of the Boiler-
makers' Society still includes all the typical features of the
early Trade Union. The executive government of this great
national society is vested in a constantly changing committee,
the members of which, elected by a single district, serve only
for twelve months, and are then ineligible for re-election
during three years. All the salaried officials are separately
elected by the whole body of members, and hold their posts
only for a prescribed term of two to five years. Though
provision is made for a delegate meeting in case the society
desires it, all the rules, including the rates of contribution and

^ See the enthusiastic description of this organisation in Zum Socialen Frieden
(Leipzig, 1890), 2 vols., by Dr. G. von Schulze-Gaevernitz, translated as Social
Peace (London, 1893), pp. 239-243,

2,0 Trade Union Structu7'e

benefit, can be altered by aggregate vote ; and even if a
delegate meeting assembles, its amendments have to be
submitted to the votes of the branches in mass meeting.
Any branch, moreover, may insist that any proposition
whatsoever shall be submitted to this same aggregate vote.
The society, in short, still retains the form of a Trade Union
democracy of the crudest type.

But although the executive committee, the branch
meeting and the Referendum occupy the main body of the
society's rules, the whole policy has long been directed and
the whole administration conducted exclusively by an infor-
mal cabinet of permanent officials which is unknown to the
printed constitution. Twenty years ago the society had the
good fortune to elect as general secretary, Mr. Robert Knight,
a man of remarkable ability and strength of character, who
has remained the permanent premier of this little kingdom.
During his long reign, there has grown up around him a staff
of younger officials, who, though severally elected on their
individual merits, have been in no way able to compete with
their chief for the members' allegiance. These district dele-
gates are nominally elected only for a term of two years, just
as the general secretary himself is elected only for a term of
five years. But, for the reasons we have given elsewhere, all
these officials enjoy a permanence of tenure practically equal
to that of a judge. Mr. Knight's unquestioned superiority in
Trade Union statesmanship, together with the invariable
support of the executive committee, have enabled him to
construct, out of the nominally independent district delegates,
a virtual cabinet, alternately serving as councillors on high
issues of policy and as ministers carrying out in their own
spheres that which they have in council decided. From the
written constitution of the society, we should suppose that
it was from the evening meetings of the little Newcastle
committee of working platers and rivetters that emanated all
those national treaties and elaborate collective bargains with
the associated employers that have excited the admiration of
economic students. But its unrepresentative character, the

Primitive Democracy 3 1

short term of service of its members and the practical rota-
tion of office make it impossible for the constantly shifting
executive committee to exercise any effective influence over
even the ordinary routine business of so large a society. The
complicated negotiations involved in national agreements are
absolutely beyond its grasp. What actually happens is that,
in any high issue of policy, Mr. Knight summons his district
delegates to meet him in council at London or Manchester,
to concert, and even to conduct, with him the weighty
negotiations which the Newcastle executive formally endorses.
And although the actual administration of the benefits is
conducted by the branch committees, the absolute centralisa-
tion of funds and the supreme disciplinary power vested in
the executive committee make that committee, or rather the
general secretary, as dominant in matters of finance as in
trade policy. The only real opportunity for an effective
expression of the popular will comes to be the submission of
questions to the aggregate vote of the branches in mass
meeting assembled. It is needless to point out that a
Referendum of this kind, submitted through the official
circular in whatsoever terms the general secretary may
choose, and backed by the influence of the permanent staff
in every district, comes to be only a way of impressing the
official view on the whole body of members. In effect
the general secretary and his informal cabinet were, until the
change of 1895, absolutely supreme.^

In the case of the Boilermakers, government by an
informal cabinet of salaried officials has, up to the present
time, been highly successful. It is, however, obvious that a
less competent statesman than Mr. Knight would find great
difficulty in welding into a united cabinet a body of district

^ In 1895, after this chapter was written, the constitution was changed, owing
to the growing feeling of the members in London and some other towns, that their
bureaucracy was, under the old forms, completely beyond their control. By the
new rules the government is vested in a representative executive of seven salaried
members, elected by the seven electoral districts into which the whole society
is divided, for a term of three years, one-third retiring annually. — Rules of the
United Society of Boilermakers, etc. (Newcastle, 1895). It is as yet too soon to
comment on the effect of this change, which only came into operation in 1897.

32 Trade Union Structure

officers separately responsible to the whole society, and
nominally subject only to their several district committees.
Under these circumstances any personal friction or disloyalty
might easily paralyse the whole trade policy, upon which the
prosperity of the society depends. Moreover, though under
Mr. Knight's upright and able government the lack of any
supervising authority has not been felt, it cannot but be
regarded as a defect that the constitution provides no prac-
tical control over a corrupt, negligent, or incompetent general
secretary. The only persons in the position to criticise
effectually the administration of the society are the salaried
officials themselves, who would naturally be indisposed to
risk their offices by appealing, against their official superior,
to the uncertain arbitrament of an aggregate vote. Finally,
this constitution, with all its parade of democratic form,
secures in reality to the ordinary plater or rivetter little if
any active participation in the central administration of
his Trade Union ; no real opportunity is given to him for
expressing his opinion ; and no call is made upon his
intelligence for the formation of any opinion whatsoever.
In short, the Boilermakers, so long as they remained
content with this form of government, secured efficient
administration at the expense of losing all the educative
influences and political safeguards of democracy.

Among the well-organised Coalminers of the North of
England the theory of "direct legislation by the people"
is still in full force. Thus, the 19,000 members of the
Northumberland Miners' Mutual Confident Association (estab-
lished 1863) decide every question of policy, and even many
merely administrative details, by the votes taken in the several
lodge meetings ; ^ and although a delegate meeting is held
every quarter, and by a rule of 1894 is expressly declared to
" meet for the purpose of deliberating free and untrammelled
upon the whole of the programme," its function is strictly
limited to expressing its opinion, the entire list of propositions

1 See, for instance, the twenty-five separate propositions voted on in a single
batch, 9th June 1894. — Northumberland Miners' Minutes, 1894, pp. 23-26.

Primitive Democracy 33

being then " returned to the lodges to be voted on." ^ The
executive committee is elected by the whole body ; and
the members, who retire after only six months' service, are
ineligible for re-election. Finally, we have the fact that the
salaried officials are themselves elected by the members at large.
To this lack of organic connection between the different parts
of the constitution, the student will perhaps attribute a certain
instability of policy manifested in successive popular votes.
In June 1894, a vote of all the members was taken on the
question of joining the Miners' Federation, and an affirmative
result was reached by 6730 to 5807. But in the very next
month, when the lodges were asked whether they were pre-
pared to give effect to the well-known policy of the Federa-
tion and claim the return of reductions in wages amounting to
sixteen per cent, which they had accepted since 1892, they
voted in the negative by more than two to one ; and backed
this up by an equally decisive refusal to contribute towards
the resistance of other districts. " They had joined a
Federation knowing its principles and its policy, and im-
mediately after joining they rejected the principles they had
just embraced," was the comment of one of the members

1 Rule 15. We see here a curious instance of the express separation of the
deliberative from the legislative function, arising out of the inconvenient results
of the use of the Imperative Mandate. The committee charged with the revision
of the rules in 1893- 1894 reported that "the present mode of transacting business
at delegate meetings has long been felt to be very unsatisfactory. Suggestions
are sent in for programme which are printed and remitted to the lodges, and
delegates are then sent with hard and fast instructions to vote for or against as
the case may be. It not unfrequently happens that delegates are sent to support
a vote against suggestions which are found to have an entirely different meaning,
and may have a very different effect from those expected by the lodges when
voting for them. To avoid the mischief that has frequently resulted from our
members thus committing themselves to suggestions upon insufficient information,
we suggest that after the programmes have been sent to the lodges, lodges send
their delegates to a meeting to deliberate on the business, after which they shall
return and report the results of the discussion and then forward their votes by
proxy to the office. To carry out this principle, which we consider is of the
greatest possible interest and importance to our members, no more meetings will
be required or expense incurred than under the present system, while on the other
hand lodges will have the opportunity of casting their votes on the various
suggestions with full information before them, instead of in the absence of this
information in most cases, as at present." — Report of 3rd February 1S94, in
Northumberland Miners' Minutes, 1894, pp. 87-88.

VOL. I " D

34 - Trade Union Structure

of their own executive committee.^ This inconsistent action
led to much controversy, and the refusal of the Northumber-
land men to obey the decision of the special conference, the
supreme authority of the Federation, was declared to be
inconsistent with their remaining members of the organisation.
Nevertheless, in July 1894 they again voted, by 8445 to
5507, in favor of joining the Federation, despite the power-
ful adverse influence of their executive committee. The
Federation officials not unnaturally asked whether the re-
newed application for membership might now be taken to
imply a willingness to conform to the policy of the organisa-
tion which it was wished to join. On this a further vote was
taken by lodges, when the proposition to join was negatived
by a majority of over five to one.^

It may be objected that, in this instance of joining the
Miners' Federation, the question at issue was one of great
difficulty and of momentous import to the union, and that
some hesitation on the part of the members was only to be
expected. We could, however, cite many similar instances
of contradictory votes by the Northumberland men, on both
matters of policy and points of internal administration. We
suggest that their experience is only another proof that,
whatever advantages may be ascribed to government by the
Referendum, it has the capital drawback of not providing the
executive with any policy. In the case of the Northumber-
land Miners' Union, the result has been a serious weakening
of its influence, and, on more than one occasion, the gravest

1 Report of Conference, 23rd September 1893, in Northumberland Miners
Alimites, 1893.

2 It should be explained that the Referendum among the Northumberland
Miners takes two distinct forms, the " ballot," and the so-called "proxy voting."
Questions relating to strikes, and any others expressly ordered by the delegate
meeting, are decided by a ballot of the members individually. The ordinary
business remitted from the delegate meeting to the lodges is discussed by the
general meeting of each lodge, and the lodge vote, or " proxy," is cast as a whole
according to the bare majority of those present. The lodge vote counts from one
to thirty, in strict proportion to its membership. It is interesting to note (though
we do not know whether any inference can be drawn from the fact) that the two
votes in favor of the Federation were taken by ballot of the members, whilst
those against it were taken by the " proxy " of the lodges.

Primitive Democracy 35

danger of disintegration.^ Fortunately, the union has enjoyed
the services of executive officers of perfect integrity, and of
exceptional ability and experience. These officers have
throughout had their own clearly defined and consistent
policy, which the uninformed and contradictory votes of the
members have failed to control or modify.

It will not be necessary to give in detail the constitution
of the Durham Miners' Association (established 1869), since
this is, in essential features, similar to that of the Northumber-
land Miners.^ But it is interesting to notice that the Durham
experience of the result of government by the Referendum
has been identical with that of Northumberland,^ and even
more detrimental to the organisation. The Durham Miners'
Association, notwithstanding its closely concentrated 60,000
members, fails to exercise any important influence on the
Trade Union world, and even excites complaints from the
employers as to " its internal weakness." The Durham coal-
owners declare that, with the council overruling the executive,
and the ballot vote reversing the decision of the council, they
never know when they have arrived at a settlement, or how
long that settlement will be enforced on a recalcitrant lodge.

It is significant that the newer organisations which haye
sprung up in these same counties in direct imitation of the
miners' unions give much less power to the members at large.
Thus the Durham Cokemen's and Laborers' Association, which,
springing out of the Durham Miners' Association in 1874,
follows in its rules the actual phrases of the parent organisa-
tion, vests the election of its executive committee and officers,
not in the members at large, but in a supreme " council."

1 See, for instance, the report of the special conference of 23rd September
1893, expressly summoned to resist the "disintegration of our Association." —
Northumberland Aliners" Minutes, 1893.

2 In the Durham Miners' Association the election of officers is nominally
vested in the council, but express provision is made in the rules for each lodge to
"empower" its delegate how to vote.

3 This may be seen, for instance, from the incidental references to the Durham
votes given in the Miners' Federation Minutes, 1893- 1896; or, with calamitous
results, in the history of the great Durham strike of 1892 ; or in that of the Silk-
stone strike of 1891. The Durham Miners' Minutes are not accessible to any
non-member.

36 Trade Union Structure

Much the same may be said of the Durham County Colliery
Enginemen's Mutual Aid Association, established 1872; the
Durham Colliery Mechanics' Association, established 1879;
and (so far as regards the election of officers) the Northumber-
land Deputies' Mutual Aid Association, established 1887.

If, therefore, democracy means that everything which
" concerns all should be decided by all," and that each citizen
should enjoy an equal and identical share in the government,
Trade Union history indicates clearly the inevitable result.
Government by such contrivances as Rotation of Office, the
Mass Meeting, the Referendum and Initiative, or the Delegate
restricted by his Imperative Mandate, leads straight either to
inefficiency and disintegration, or to the uncontrolled domin-
ance of a personal dictator or an expert bureaucracy. Dimly
and almost unconsciously this conclusion has, after a whole
century of experiment, forced itself upon the more advanced
trades. The old theory of democracy is still an article
of faith, and constantly comes to the front when any organi-
sation has to be formed for brand-new purposes ; ^ but Trade
Union constitutions have undergone a silent revolution. The
old ideal of the Rotation of Office among all the members
in succession has been practically abandoned. Resort to the
aggregate meeting diminishes steadily in frequency and im-
portance. The use of the Initiative and the Referendum has

1 We may refer, by way of illustration, to the frequent discussions during
1894-1895 among the members of the political association styled the " Independ-
ent Labor Party." On the formation of the Hackney Branch, for instance, the
members "decided that no president and no executive committee of the branch
be appointed, its management devolving on the members attending the weekly
conferences" {Labour Leader, 26th January 1895). Nor is this view confined to
the rank and file. The editor of the Clarioti himself, perhaps the most influential
man in the party, expressly declared in his leading article of 3rd November 1 894 :
"Democracy means that the people shall rule themselves ; that the people shall
manage their own affairs ; and that their officials shall be public servants, or dele-
gates, deputed to put the will of the people into execution. ... At present there
is too much sign of a disposition on the part of the rank and file to overvalue the
talents and usefulness of their officials. ... It is tolerably certain that in so
far as the ordinary duties of officials and delegates, such as committee men or
members of Parliament, are concerned, an average citizen, if he is thoroughly
honest, will be found quite clever enough to do all that is needful. . . . Let all
officials be retired after one year's services, and fresh ones elected in their place. "

Primitive Democracy 37

been tacitly given up in all complicated issues, and gradually-
limited to a few special questions on particular emergencies.
The delegate finds himself every year dealing with more
numerous and more complex questions, and tends therefore
inevitably to exercise the larger freedom of a representative.
Finally, we have the appearance in the Trade Union world of
the typically modern form of democracy, the elected repre-
sentative assembly, appointing and controlling an executive
committee under whose direction the permanent official staff
performs its work.

CHAPTER II

REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS

The two organisations in the Trade Union world enjoying
the greatest measure of representative institutions are those
which are the most distinctly modern in their growth and pre-
eminence. In numbers, political influence, and annual income
the great federal associations of Coalminers and Cotton
Operatives overshadow all others, and now comprise one-fifth
of the total Trade Union membership. We have elsewhere
pointed out that these two trades are both distinguished by
their establishment of an expert civil service, exceeding in
numbers and efficiency that possessed by any other trade.^
They resemble each other also, as we shall now see, in the
success with which they have solved the fundamental problem
of democracy, the combination of administrative efficiency
and popular control. In each case the solution has been
found in the frank acceptance of representative institutions.

In the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-
spinners, which may be taken as typical of cotton organisa-
tions, the "legislative power" is expressly vested " in a meeting
comprising representatives from the various provinces and dis-
tricts included in the association." ^ This " Cotton-spinners'
Parliament " is elected annually in strict proportion to

^ History of Trade Unionism, p. 298 ; see also the subsequent chapter on
"The Method of Collective Bargaining."

2 Rides of the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners (Man-
chester, 1894), p. 4, Rule 7.

Representative Institutions 39

membership, and consists of about a hundred representatives.
It meets in Manchester regularly every quarter, but can be
called together by the executive council at any time. Once
elected, this assembly is, like the British Parliament, abso-
lutely supreme. Its powers and functions are subject to no
express limitation, and from its decisions there is no appeal.
The rules contain no provision for taking a vote of the
members ; and though the agenda of the quarterly meeting
is circulated for information to the executives of the district
associations, so little thought is there of any necessity for the
representatives to receive a mandate from their constituents,
that express arrangements are made for transacting any other
business not included in the agenda.-^

The actual " government " of the association is conducted
by an executive council elected by the general representative
meeting, and consisting of a president, treasurer, and secretary,
with thirteen other members, of whom seven at least must
be working spinners, whilst the other six are, by invariable
custom, the permanent officials appointed and maintained
by the principal district organisations. Here we have the
" cabinet " of this interesting constitution — the body which
practically directs the whole work of the association and
exercises great weight in the counsels of the legislative body,
preparing its agenda and guiding all its proceedings. For
the daily work of administration this cabinet is authorised
by the rules to appoint a committee, the " sub-council," which
consists in practice of the six " gentlemen," as the district
officials are commonly called. The actual executive work is
performed by a general secretary, who himself engages such
office assistance as may from time to time be necessary. In
marked contrast with all the Trade Union constitutions which
we have hitherto described, the Cotton-spinners' rules do not

^ Rule 9, p. 5. The general representative meeting even resembles the British
Parliament in being able itself to change the fundamental basis of the constitution,
including the period of its own tenure of office. The rules upon which the
Amalgamated Association depends can be altered by the general representative
meeting in a session called by special notice, without any confirmation by the
constituents. — Rule 45, pp. 27-28.

40 Trade Union Structure

give the election of this chief executive officer to the general
body of members, but declare expressly that " the sole right
of electing a permanent general secretary shall be vested in
the provincial and district representatives when in meeting
assembled, by whom his salary shall be fixed and deter-
mined." ^ Moreover, as we have already mentioned, the
candidates for this office pass a competitive examination, and
when once elected the general secretary enjoys a permanence
of tenure equal to that of the English civil service, the rules
providing that he " shall be appointed and continue in office
so long as he gives satisfaction." ^

The Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-
spinners is therefore free from all the early expedients for
securing popular government. The general or aggregate
meeting finds no place in its constitution, and the rules con-
tain no provision for the Referendum or the Initiative. No
countenance is given to the idea of Rotation of Office. No
officers are elected by the members themselves. Finally, we
have the complete abandonment of the delegate, and the sub-
stitution,^both in fact and in name, of the representative. On
the other hand, the association is a fully-equipped democratic
state of the modern type. It has an elected parliament,
exercising supreme and uncontrolled power. It has a cabinet
appointed by and responsible only to that parliament. And
its chief executive officer, appointed once for all on grounds
of efficiency, enjoys the civil-service permanence of tenure.^

1 Rule 12, p. 6. 2 Hid,

3 The other branches of the cotton trade, notably the federations of weavers
and cardvoom hands, are organised on the same principle of an elected repre-
sentative assembly, itself appointing the officers and executive committee, though
there are minor differences among them. The United Textile Factory Workers'
Association, of which the spinners form a part, is framed on the same model,
a "legislative council," really an executive committee, being elected by the
"conference," or representative assembly. (This organisation temporarily
suspended its functions in 1S96.) Moreover, the rules of the several district
associations of the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners exhibit
the same formative influences. In the smaller societies, confined to single
villages, we find the simple government by general meeting, electing a committee
and officers. Peraianence of tenure is, however, the rule, it being often expressly
provided that the secretary and the treasurer shall each ' ' retain office as long as
he gives satisfaction." More than half the total membership, moreover, is

Representative Institutions 41

We have watched the working of this remarkable consti-
tution during the last seven years, and we can testify to the
success with which both efficiency and popular control are
secured. The efficiency we attribute to the existence of
the adequate, highly-trained, and relatively well-paid and
permanent civil service.^ But that this civil service is
effectively under public control is shown by the accuracy
with which the cotton officials adapt their political and
industrial policy to the developing views of the members
whom they serve. This sensitiveness to the popular
desires is secured by the real supremacy of the elected
representatives. For the " Cotton-spinners' Parliament " is
no formal gathering of casual members to register the decrees
of a dominant bureaucracy. It is, on the contrary, a
highly -organised deliberative assembly, with active repre-
sentatives from the different localities, each alive to the distinct,
and sometimes divergent, interests of his own constituents.
Their eager participation shows itself in constant " party
meetings " of the different sections, at which the officers and
workmen from each district consult together as to the line
of policy to be pressed upon the assembly. Such consulta-
tion and deliberate joint action is, in the case of the Oldham
representatives at any rate, carried even further. The consti-
tution of the Oldham Operative Cotton-spinners' Provincial
Association is, so far as we know, unique in all the annals of
democracy in making express provision for the " caucus." ^

included in two important *' provinces," Oldham and Bolton, which possess
elaborate federal constitutions of their own. These follow, in general outline,
the federal constitution, but both retain some features of the older form. Thus
in Oldham, where the officers enjoy permanence of tenure and are responsible
only to the representative assembly, any vacancy is filled by general vote of the
members. And though the representative assembly has supreme legislative and
executive powers, it is required to take a ballot of all the members before deciding
on a strike. On the other hand, Bolton, which leaves everything to its repre-
sentative assembly, shows a lingering attachment to rotation of office by providing
that the retiring members of its executive council shall not be eligible for re-election
during twelve months.

1 The nineteen thousand members of the Amalgamated Association of Opera-
tive Cotton-spinners command the services of ten permanent officials, besides
numerous local officers still working at their trade.

2 The •* caucus," in this sense of the term, is supposed to have been first

42 Trade Union Structure

The rules of 1891 ordain that "whenever the business to be
transacted by the representatives attending the quarterly
or special meetings of the Amalgamation is of such import-
ance and to the interest of this association as to require unity
of action in regard to voting by the representatives from this
province, the secretary shall be required to summon a special
meeting of the said representatives by announcing in the
monthly circular containing the minutes the date and time
of such meeting, which must be held in the council room at
least seven days previous to the Amalgamation meeting
taking place. The provincial representatives on the amalga-
mated council shall be required to attend such meeting, to
give any information required, and all resolutions passed by
a majority of those present shall be binding upon all the
representatives from the Oldham province attending the
amalgamated quarterly or special meetings, and any one
acting contrary to his instructions shall cease to be a repre-
sentative of the district he represents, and shall not be allowed
to stand as a candidate for any office connected with the
association for the space of twelve months. The allowance
for attending these special meetings shall be in accordance
with the scale allowed to the provincial executive council." ^
But even without so stringent a rule, there would be but
little danger of the representatives failing to express the
desires of the rank and file. Living the same life as their
constituents, and subject to annual election, they can scarcely
fail to be in touch with the general body of the members.
The common practice of requiring each representative to
report his action to the next meeting of his constituents, by
whom it is discussed in his presence, and the wide circulation

introduced about the beginning of this century, in the United States Congress, by
the Democratic Party. See the Statesman's Manual, vol. i. pp. 294, 338 ;
Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government, 12th edit. (New York, 1896), pp.
327-330; Lalor's Cyclopedia of Political Science (New York, 1891), vol. i. p.
357. The "caucus" in the sense of " primary assembly " is regulated by law
in many American States, especially in Massachusetts. See Nominations for
Elective Office in the United States, by F. W. Dallinger (London, 1897).

1 Rule 64, pp. 41-42, of Rules and Regulations for the Government of the
Oldham Operative Cotton-spinners' Provincial Association (Oldham, 1891).

Representative Institittio7is 43

of printed reports among all the members furnish efficient
substitutes for the newspaper press. On the other hand, the
facts that the representative assembly is a permanent insti-
tution wielding supreme power, and that in practice its
membership changes little from year to year, give it a very
real authority over the executive council which it elects every
six months, and over the officers whom it has appointed.
The typical member of the "Cotton-spinners' Parliament"
is not only experienced in voicing the desires of his
constituents, but also possesses in a comparatively large
measure that knowledge of administrative detail and of
current affairs which enables him to understand and control
the proceedings of his officers.

The Coalminers are, as we have elsewhere mentioned,
not so unanimous as the Cotton Operatives in their
adoption of representative institutions. The two great
counties of Northumberland and Durham have unions which
preserve constitutions of the old-fashioned type. But when
we pass to other counties, in which the Miners have come
more thoroughly under the influence of the modern spirit,
we find representative government the rule. The powerful
associations of Yorkshire, Lancashire, and the Midlands are
all governed by elected representative assemblies, which
appoint the executive committees and the permanent officers.
But the most striking example of the adoption of repre-
sentative institutions among the Coalminers is presented by
the Miners' Federation of Great Britain, established 1887.
This great federal organisation, which now comprises
two -thirds of the Coalminers in union, adopted from the
outset a completely representative constitution. The supreme
authority is vested in a " conference," summoned as often
as required, consisting of representatives elected by each
county or district association. This conference exercises
uncontrolled power to determine policy, alter rules, and levy
unlimited contributions.^ From its decision there is no

^ This was expressly pointed out, doubtless with reference to some of the old-
fashioned county unions which still clung to the custom of the Referendum or the

44 Trade Union Structure

appeal. No provision is made for taking the votes of the
general body of members, and the conference itself appoints
the executive committee and all the officers of the Federa-
tion. Between the sittings of the conference the executive
committee is expressly given power to take action to promote
the interests of the Federation, and no rule savoring of
Rotation of Office deprives this executive of the services of
its experienced members.

The " Miners' Parliament," as this conference may not
improperly be termed, is in many respects the most im-
portant assembly in the Trade Union world. Its regular
annual session, held in some midland town, lasts often for a
whole week, whilst other meetings of a couple of days' dura-
tion are held as business requires. The fifty to seventy
members, who represent the several constituent bodies, consti-
tute an exceptionally efficient deliberative assembly. Among
them are to be found the permanent officers of the county
unions, some of the most experienced of the checkweigh-men
and the influential leaders of opinion in the mining villages.
The official element, as might be expected, plays a prominent
part in suggesting, drafting, and amending the actual pro-
posals, but the unofficial members frequently intervene with
effect in the business-like debates. The public and the press
are excluded, but the conference usually directs a brief and
guarded statement of the conclusions arrived at to be supplied
to the newspapers, and a full report of the proceedings —
sometimes extending to over a hundred printed pages — is
subsequently issued to the lodges. The subjects dealt with
include the whole range of industrial and political policy,
from the technical grievance of a particular district up to the
" nationalisation of mines." ^ The actual carrying out of the

Imperative Mandate, in the circular summoning the important conference of
July 1893 : "Delegates must be appointed to attend Conference -with full po-zver
to deal with the wages question. "

1 Thus the agenda for the Annual Conference in 1S94 comprised, besides
formal business, certain revisions of rules and the executive committee's report,
the Eight Hours Bill, the stacking of coal, the making of Saturday a regular
whole holiday, the establishment of a public department to prevent unscrupulous
competition in trade, the amendment of the Mines Regulation and Employers'

Representative Institutions 45

policy determined on by the conference is left unreservedly
to the executive committee, but the conference expects to be
called together whenever any new departure in policy is
required. In times of stress the executive committee shows
its real dependence on the popular assembly by calling it
together every few weeks.^ And the success with which the
Miners' Federation wields its great industrial and political
power over an area extending from Fife to Somerset and a

Liability Acts, international relations with foreign miners' organisations and the
nationalisation of mines. It may here be observed that the representatives at
the Federal Conference have votes in proportion to the numbers of the members
in their respective associations. This practice, often called "proxy voting," or,
more accurately, " the accumulative vote," has long been characteristic of the
Coalminers' organisations, though unknown to any other section of the Trade
Union World. Thus the rules of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain are
silent as to the number of representatives to be sent to the supreme " Conference,"
but provide "that each county, federation or district vote upon all questions
as follows, viz. : one vote for every looo financial members or fractional part of
1000, and that the vote in every case shall be taken by numbers" (Rule lo,
Rules of the Miners^ Federation of Great Britain, 1895). A similar
principle has always been applied at the International Miners' Conferences,
and the practice prevails also in the several county unions or federations. The
Lancashire and Cheshire Federation fixes the number of representatives to be
sent to its Conferences at one per 500 members, but expressly provides that the
voting is to be "by proxy" in the same proportion. The Midland Federation
adopts the same rule. The Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Durham, and West
Cumberland associations allow each branch or lodge only a single representative,
whose vote counts strictly in proportion to the membership he represents. This
"accumulative vote" is invariably resorted to in the election of officers and in all
important decisions of policy, but it is not uncommon for minor divisions to be
taken, unchallenged, on the principle of " one man one vote." It is not easy to
account for the exceptional preference of the Coalminers for this method of voting,
especially as their assemblies are, as we have pointed out, in practice more
"representative" in their character, and less trammelled by the idea of the
imperative mandate, than those of any other trade but the Cotton Operatives.
The practice facilitates, it is true, a diminution in the size of the meetings, but
this appears to be its only advantage. In the absence of any system of "pro-
portional representation " it affords no real guide to the relative distribution of
opinion ; the representatives of Yorkshire, for instance, in casting the vote of the
county, can at best express the views only of the majority of their constituents,
and have therefore no real claim to outvote a smaller district, with whose views
nearly half their own constituents may be in sympathy. If, on the other hand,
the whole membership of the Miners' Federation were divided into fairly equal
electoral districts, each electing a single member, there would be more chance
of every variety of opinion being represented, whilst an exact balance between
the large and the small districts would nevertheless be preserved.

^ During the great strike in 1893 the Conference met eight times in six
months.

46 Trade Union Structure

membership numbering two hundred thousand, furnishes
eloquent testimony to the manner in which it has known
how to combine efficient administration with genuine popular
assent.

The great federal organisations of Cotton Operatives and
Coalminers stand out from among the other Trade Unions
in respect of the completeness and success with which they
have adopted representative institutions. But it is easy to
trace a like tendency throughout the whole Trade Union
world. We have already commented on the innovation,
now almost universal, of entrusting the task of revising rules
to a specially elected committee. It was at first taken for
granted that the work of such a revising committee was
limited to putting into proper form the amendments pro-
posed by the branches themselves, and sometimes to choosing
between them. Though it is still usual for the revised rules
to be formally ratified by a vote of the members, the revising
committees have been given an ever wider discretion, until
in most unions they are nowadays in practice free to make
changes according to their own judgment.^ But it is in
the constitution of the central executive that the trend
towards representative institutions is most remarkable, the
old expedient of the " governing branch " being superseded
by an executive committee representative of the whole body
of the members.^

^ There is a similar tendency to disapprove of the Imperative Mandate in the
principal Friendly Societies. The Friendly Societies' Mo7ithly Magazine for
April 1890 observes that " Lodges are advised ... to instruct their delegates
as to how they are to vote. With this we entirely disagree. A proposition till
it is properly thrashed out and explained, remains in the husk, and its full import
is lost. Delegates fettered with instructions simply become the mechanical
mouthpiece of the necessarily unenlightened lodges which send them, and there-
fore the legislation of the Order might just as well be conducted by post."

2 Thus the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (established 1872)
administers the affairs of its forty-four thousand members by an executive committee
of thirteen (with the three officers), elected annually by ballot in thirteen equal
electoral districts. This committee meets in London at least quarterly, and
can be summoned oftener if required. Above this is the supreme authority of
the annual assembly of sixty delegates, elected by sixty equal electoral districts,
and sitting for four days to hear appeals, alter rules, and determine the policy of
the union. A similar constitution is enjoyed by the Associated Society of

Representative Institutioits 47

This revolution has taken place in the National Union
of Boot and Shoe Operatives (37,000 members) and the
Amalgamated Society of Engineers (87,313 members), the
two societies which, outside the worlds of cotton and coal,
exceed nearly all others in membership. Down to 1890 the
National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives was governed
by a local executive council belonging to a single town,
controlled only by occasional votes of a delegate assembly,
meeting, at first, every four years, and afterwards every two
years. Seven years ago the constitution was entirely trans-
formed. The society was divided into five equal electoral
districts, each of which elected one member to serve for two
years on an executive council consisting of only these five
representatives, in addition to the three other officers elected
by the whole body of members. To the representative execu-
tive thus formed was committed not only all the ordinary
business of the society, but also the final decision in cases of
appeals by individual members against the decision of a
branch. The delegate meeting, or " National Conference,"
meets to determine policy and revise rules, and its decisions
no longer require ratification by the members' vote. Although
the Referendum and the Mass Meeting of the district are
still formally included in the constitution, the complication
and difficulty of the issues which have cropped up during the
last few years have led the executive council to call together
the national conference at frequent intervals, in preference
to submitting questions to the popular vote.

Locomotive Enginemen and Firemen (established 1880). It is this model that
has been followed, with unimportant variations in detail, by the more durable of
the labor unions which sprang into existence in the great upheaval of 1S89,
among which the Gasworkers and the Dockers are the best known. The practice
of electing the executive committee by districts is, as far as we know, almost
unknown in the political world. The executive council of the State of Penn-
sylvania in the eighteenth century used to be elected by single -member
districts {^Federalist, No. LVII.), and a similar arrangement appears occa-
sionally to have found a place in the ever-changing constitutions of one or two
Swiss Cantons. (See State and Federal Government in Sivitzerland, by
J. M. Vincent, Baltimore, 1891.) We know of no case where it prevails
at present (Lowell's Goveriunents and Parties in Continental Europe, London,
1896).

48 Trade Union Structure

In the case of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers
the constitutional revolution has been far more sweeping.
In the various editions of the Engineers' rules from 185 i to
1 89 1 we find the usual reliance on the Mass Meeting, the
Referendum and the direct election of all officers by the
members at large. We also see the executive control vested
in a committee elected by a single district, — the chairman,
moreover, being forbidden to serve for more than two years
in succession. In the case of the United Society of Boiler-
makers we have already described how a constitution of
essentially similar type has resulted in remarkable success
and efficiency, but at the sacrifice of all real control by the
members. In the history of the Boilermakers from 1872
onwards we watch the virtual abandonment in practice, for
the sake of a strong and united central administration, of
everything that tended to weaken the executive power.
The Engineers, on the contrary, clung tenaciously to every
institution or formality which protected the individual
member against the central executive.-^ Meanwhile, although
the very object of the amalgamation in 1 8 5 i was to secure
uniformity of trade policy, the failure to provide any salaried
official staff left the central executive with little practical
control over the negotiations conducted or the decisions
arrived at by the local branch or district committee. The
result was not only failure to cope with the vital problems

1 In financial matters, for instance, though ever)^ penny of the funds belonged
to the whole society, each branch retained its own receipts, subject only to the
cumbrous annual " equalisation." The branch accordingly had it in its power to
make any disbursement it chose, subject only to subsequent disallowance by the
central executive. Nor was the decision of the central executive in any way
final. The branch aggrieved by any disallowance could, and habitually did,
appeal — not to the members at large, who would usually have supported the
executive — but to another body, the general council, which met every three years
for the express purpose of deciding such appeals. There was even a further
appeal from the general council to the periodical delegate meeting. In the
meantime the payment objected to was not required to be refunded, and it will
therefore easily be understood that the vast majority of executive decisions were
instantly appealed against. And when we add that each of these several courts
of appeal frequently reversed a large proportion of the decisions of its immediate
inferior, the effect of these frequent appeals in destroying all authority can easily
be imagined.

Representative Institutions 49

of trade policy involved in the changing conditions of the
industry, but also an increasing paralysis of administration,
against which officers and committee-men struggled in vain.
When in 1892 the delegates met at Leeds to find a remedy
for these evils, they brought from the branches two leading
suggestions. One party urged the appointment, in aid of
the central executive, of a salaried staff of district delegates,
elected, in direct imitation of those of the Boilermakers, by
the whole society. Another section favored the transforma-
tion of the executive committee into a representative body,
and proposed the division of the country into eight equal
electoral districts, each of which should elect a representative
to a salaried executive council sitting continually in London,
and thus giving its whole time to the society's work.
Probably these remedies, aimed at different sides of the
trouble, were intended as alternatives. It is significant of
the deep impression made upon the delegate meeting that it
eventually adopted both, thus at one blow increasing the
number of salaried officers from three to seventeen.^

Time has yet to show how far this revolution in the
constitution of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers will
conduce either to efficient administration or to genuine
popular control. It is easy to see that government by
an executive committee of this character differs essentially
from government by a representative assembly appointing
its own cabinet, and that it possesses certain obvious dis-
advantages. The eight members, who are thus transferred
by the vote of their fellows from the engineer's workshop to
the Stamford Street office, become by this fundamental
change of life completely severed from their constituents.
Spending all their days in office routine, they necessarily
lose the vivid appreciation of the feelings of the man

^ It is interesting to observe that the United Society of Boilermakers, by
adopting in 1895 a Representative Executive, has made its formal constitution
almost identical with that of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. The vital
difference between these two societies now lies in the working relation between
the central executive and the local branches and district committees ; see the
subsequent chapter on " The Unit of Government."

VOL. I E

50 Trade Union Structure

who works at the lathe or the forge. Living constantly in
London, they are subject to new local influences, and tend
unconsciously to get out of touch with the special grievances
or new drifts of popular opinion on the Tyne or the Clyde,
at Belfast or in Lancashire. It is true that the representa-
tives hold office for only three years, at the expiration of
which they must present themselves for re-election ; but
there would be the greatest possible reluctance amongst the
members to relegate to manual labor a man who had once
served them as a salaried official. Unless, therefore, a re-
vulsion of feeling takes place among the Engineers against
the institution itself, the present members of the representa-
tive executive committee may rely with some confidence on
becoming practically permanent officials.

These objections do not apply with equal force to other
examples of a representative executive. The tradition of
the Stamford Street office — that the whole mass of friendly-
society business should be dealt with in all its details by the
members of the executive committee themselves — involves
their daily attendance and their complete absorption in
office work. In other Trade Unions which have adopted
the same constitutional form, the members of the represent-
ative executive reside in their constituencies and, in some
cases, even continue to work at their trade. They are called
together, like the members of a representative assembly, at
quarterly or other intervals to decide only the more im-
portant questions, the detailed executive routine being
delegated to a local sub -committee or to the official staff.
Thus the executive committee of the National Union of
Boot and Shoe Operatives usually meets only for one day
a month ; the executive committee of the Associated Loco-
motive Engineers and Firemen is called together only when
required, usually not more than once or twice a month ; the
executive council of the Amalgamated Society of Railway
Servants comes to London once a quarter, and the same
practice is followed by the executive committee of the
National Union of Gasworkers and General Laborers. It is

Representative Institutions 51

evident that in all these cases the representative executive,
whether formed of the salaried officials of the districts or of
men working at their trade, has more chance of remaining in
touch with its constituents than in the case of the Amalga-
mated Society of Engineers.

But there is, in our opinion, a fundamental drawback to
government by a representative executive, even under the
most favorable conditions. One of the chief duties of a
representative governing body is to criticise, control, and
direct the permanent official staff, by whom the policy of the
organisation must actually be carried out. Its main function,
in fact, is to exercise real and continuous authority over the
civil service. Now all experience shows it to be an essential
condition that the permanent officials should be dependent
on and genuinely subordinate to the representative body.
This condition is fulfilled in the constitutions such as those
of the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners
and the Miners' Federation, where the representative assembly
itself appoints the officers, determines their duties, and fixes
their salaries. But it is entirely absent in all Trade Union
constitutions based on a representative executive. Under this
arrangement the executive committee neither appoints the
officers nor fixes their salaries. Though the representative
executive, unlike the old governing branch, can in its corporate
capacity claim to speak in the name of all the members, so
can the general secretary himself, and often each assistant
secretary. All alike hold their positions from the same
supreme power — the votes of the members ; and have their
respective duties and emoluments defined by the same
written constitution — the society's rules.

This absence of any co-ordination of the several parts
of the constitution works out, in practice, in one of two
ways. There may arise jealousies between the several officers,
or between them and some of the members of the executive
committee. We have known instances in which an incom-
petent and arbitrary general secretary has been pulled up
by one or other of his colleagues who wanted to succeed to

52 Trade Union Structure

his place. The suspicion engendered by the relation of
competitors for popular suffrage checks, it may be, some
positive malpractices, but results also in the obstruction of
useful measures of policy, or even in their failure through dis-
loyalty. More usually the executive committee, feeling itself
powerless to control the officials, tends to make a tacit
and half-unconscious compact with them, based on mutual
support against the criticism of their common constituents.
If the members of the committee are themselves salaried
officials, they not only have a fellow-feeling for the weak-
nesses of their brother officials, but they also realise vividly
the personal risk of appealing against them to the popular
vote. If, on the other hand, the members continue to work
at their trade, they feel themselves at a hopeless disadvantage
in any such appeal. They have neither the business ex-
perience nor the acquaintance with details necessary for a
successful indictment of an officer who is known from one
end of the society to the other, and who enjoys the advantage
of controlling its machinery. Thus we have in many unions
governed by a Representative Executive the formation of
a ruling clique, half officials, half representatives. This
has all the disadvantages of such a bureaucracy as we have
described in the case of the United Society of Boilermakers,
without the efficiency made possible by its hierarchical
organisation and the predominant authority of the head of
the staff. To sum up, if there are among the salaried repre-
sentatives or officials restless spirits, " conscientious critics," or
disloyal comrades, the general body of members may rest
assured that they will be kept informed of what is going on^
but at the cost of seeing their machinery of government
constantly clogged by angry recriminations and appeals. If,
on the other hand, the men who meet at headquarters in
one or another capacity are " good fellows," the machine
will work smoothly with such efficiency as their industry and
capacity happens to be equal to, but all popular control
over this governing clique will disappear.

We see, then, that though government by a representa-

Representative Institutions 53

tive executive is a real advance on the old expedients, it is
likely to prove inferior to government by a representative
assembly, appointing its own cabinet and officers. But a
great national Trade Union extending from one end of the
kingdom to the other cannot easily adopt the superior form,
even if the members desire it. The Cotton Operatives enjoy
the special advantage of having practically all their member-
ship within a radius of thirty miles from Manchester. The
frequent gatherings of a hundred delegates held usually on
a Saturday afternoon entail, therefore, no loss of working
time and little expense to the organisation. The same con-
sideration applies to the great bulk of the membership of
the Miners' Federation, three-fourths of which is concentrated
in Lancashire, West Yorkshire, and the industrial Midlands.
Even the outlying coalfields elsewhere enjoy the advantage
of close local concentration, so that a single delegate may
effectively represent the hundreds of lodges in his own
county. And it is no small consideration that the total
membership of the Miners' Federation is so large that the
cost of frequent meetings of fifty to seventy delegates bears
only a trifling proportion to the resources of the union.
Very different is the position of the great unions in the
engineering and building trades. The 46,000 members of the
Amalgamated Society of Carpenters in the United Kingdom,
for instance, are divided into 623 branches, scattered over
400 separate towns or villages. Each town has its own
Working Rules, its own Standard Rate and Normal Day, and
lacks intimate connection with the towns right and left of it.
The representative chosen by the Newcastle branch might
easily be too much absorbed by the burning local question of
demarcation against the Shipwrights to pay much attention
to the simple grievances of the Hexham branch as to the
Saturday half-holiday, or to the multiplication of apprentices
in the joinery shops at Darlington. Similar considerations
apply to the 497 branches of the Amalgamated Society of
Engineers, whose 80,000 members in the United Kingdom
are working in 300 different towns. In view of the increasing

54 Trade Union Structure

uniformity of working conditions throughout the country, the
concentration of industry in large towns, the growing facih-
ties of travel and the steady multiplication of salaried local
officialSj'we do not ourselves regard the geographical difficulty
as insuperable. But it is easy to understand why, with so
large a number of isolated branches, it has not yet seemed
practicable to constitutional reformers in the building or
the engineering trades, to have frequent meetings of repre-
sentative assemblies.

The tardiness and incompleteness with which Trade
Unions have adopted representative institutions is mainly
due to a more general cause. The workman has been slow
to recognise the special function of the representative in a
democracy. In the early constitutional ideals of Trade
Unionism the representative finds, as we have seen, absolutely
no place. The committee-man elected by rotation of office
or the delegate deputed to take part in a revision of rules
was habitually regarded only as a vehicle by which "the
voices " could be mechanically conveyed. His task required,
therefore, no special qualification beyond intelligence to
comprehend his instructions and a spirit of obedience in
carrying them out. Very different is the duty cast upon
the representative in such modern Trade Union constitutions
as those of the Cotton Operatives and Coalminers. His
main function is still to express the mind of the average
man. But unlike the delegate, he is not a mechanical
vehicle of votes on particular subjects. The ordinary Trade
Unionist has but little facility in expressing his desires ;
unversed in the technicalities of administration, he is unable
to judge by what particular expedient his grievances can
best be remedied. In default of an expert representative he
has to depend on the professional administrator. But for
this particular task the professional administrator is no more
competent than the ordinary man, though for a different
reason. The very apartness of his life from that of the
average workman deprives him of close acquaintance with
the actual grievances of the mass of the people. Immersed

Representative Institutio7is 55

in office routine, he is apt to fail to understand from their
inconsistent complaints and impracticable suggestions what
it is they really desire. To act as an interpreter between
the people and their servants is, therefore, the first function
of the representative.

But this is only half of his duty. To him is entrusted
also the difficult and delicate task of controlling the pro-
fessional experts. Here, as we have seen, the ordinary man
completely breaks down. The task, to begin with, requires
a certain familiarity with the machinery of government, and
a sacrifice of time and a concentration of thought out of the
reach of the average man absorbed in gaining his daily
bread. So much is this the case that when the administra-
tion is complicated, a further specialisation is found necessary,
and the representative assembly itself chooses a cabinet, or
executive committee of men specially qualified for this duty.
A large measure of intuitive capacity to make a wise choice
of men is, therefore, necessary even in the ordinary repre-
sentative. Finally, there comes the important duty of
deciding upon questions of policy or tactics. The ordinary
citizen thinks of nothing but clear issues on broad lines.
The representative, on the other hand, finds himself con-
stantly called upon to choose between the nicely balanced
expediencies of compromise necessitated by the complicated
facts of practical life. On his shrewd judgment of actual
circumstances will depend his success in obtaining, not all
that his constituents desire — for that he will quickly recognise
as Utopian, — but the largest instalment of those desires
that may be then and there possible.

To construct a perfect representative assembly can,
therefore, never be an easy task ; and in a community ex-
clusively composed of manual workers dependent on weekly
wages, the task is one of exceptional difficulty. A
community of bankers and business entrepreneurs finds it
easy to secure a representative committee to direct and
control the paid officials whom it engages to protect its
interests. Constituents, representatives and officials are

56 Trade Union Structure

living much the same life, are surrounded by the same
intellectual atmosphere, have received approximately the
same kind of education and mental training, and are con-
stantly engaged in one variety or another of what is
essentially the same work of direction and control. More-
over, there is no lack of persons able to give the necessary
time and thought to expressing the desires of their class and
to seeing that they are satisfied. It is, therefore, not
surprising that representative institutions should be seen
at their best in middle-class communities.^ In all these
respects the manual workers stand at a grave disadvantage.
Whatever may be the natural endowment of the workman
selected by his comrades to serve as a representative, he
starts unequipped with that special training and that general
familiarity with administration which will alone enable him
to be a competent critic and director of the expert pro-
fessional. Before he can place himself on a level with the
trained official whom he has to control he must devote his
whole time and thought to his new duties, and must there-
fore give up his old trade. This unfortunately tends to
alter his manner of life, his habit of mind, and usually also
his intellectual atmosphere to such an extent that he
gradually loses that vivid appreciation of the feelings of the
man at the bench or the forge, which it is his function to
express. There is a certain cruel irony in the problem
which accounts, we think, for some of the unconscious
exasperation of the wage-earners all over the world against
representative institutions. Directly the working - man
representative becomes properly equipped for one -half of
his duties, he ceases to be specially qualified for the other.
If he remains essentially a manual worker, he fails to cope
with the brain-working officials ; if he takes on the character
of the brain-worker, he is apt to get out of touch with
the constituents whose desires he has to interpret. It will,
therefore, be interesting to see how the shrewd workmen of

1 In this connection see the interesting suggestions of Achille Loria, Les Bases
Economiques de la Constitution Sociale (Paris, 1893), pp. 150-154.

Representative Institutions 57

Lancashire, Yorkshire, and the Midlands have surmounted
this constitutional difficulty.

In the parliaments of the Cotton-spinners and Coalminers
we find habitually two classes of members, salaried officials
of the several districts, and representative wage-earners still
working at the mule or in the mine. It would almost seem
as if these modern organisations had consciously recognised
the impossibility of combining in any individual representa-
tive both of the requirements that we have specified. As it
is, the presence in their assemblies of a large proportion of
men who are still following their trade imports into their
deliberations the full flavor of working-class sentiment. And
the association, with these picked men from each industrial
village, of the salaried officers from each county, secures that
combination of knowledge, ability, and practical experience
in administration, which is, as we have suggested, absolutely
indispensable for the exercise of control over the professional
experts. If the constituencies elected none but their fellow-
workers, it is more than doubtful whether the representative
assembly so created would be competent for its task. If,
on the other hand, the assembly consisted merely of a
conference of salaried officials, appointing one or more of
themselves to carry out the national work of the federation,
it would inevitably fail to retain the confidence, even if it
continued to express the desires of the members at large.
The conjunction of the two elements in the same repre-
sentative assembly has in practice resulted in a very efficient
working body.

It is important to notice that in each of the trades the
success of the experiment has depended on the fact that the
organisation is formed on a federal basis. The constituent
bodies of the Miners' Federation and the Amalgamated
Association of Operative Cotton - spinners have their
separate constitutions, their distinct funds, and their own
official staffs. The salaried officers whom they elect to sit as
representatives in the federal parliament have, therefore, quite
other interests, obligations, and responsibilities than those of

58 Trade Union Structure

the official staff of the Federation itself. The secretary of
the Nottinghamshire Miners' Association, for instance, finds
himself able, when sitting as a member of the Conference of
the Miners' Federation, freely to criticise the action of the
federal executive council or of the federal official staff, with-
out in any way endangering his own position as a salaried
officer. Similarly, when the secretary of the Rochdale
Cotton-spinners goes to the quarterly meeting at Manchester,
he need have no hesitation in opposing and, if possible,
defeating any recommendation of the executive council of
the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners
which he considers injurious to the Rochdale spinners. In
the form of the representative executive, this use of salaried
officers in a representative capacity is likely to tend, as we
have seen, to the formation of a virtually irresponsible
governing clique. But in the form of a federal representative
assembly, where the federal executive and official staff are
dependent, not on the members at large but on the assembly
itself, and where the representatives are responsible to quite
other constituencies and include a large proportion of the
non-official element, this danger is reduced to a minimum.

We have now set before the reader an analysis of the
constitutional development of Trade Union democracy. The
facts will be interpreted in different ways by students of
different temperaments. To us they represent the long and
inarticulate struggle of unlettered men to solve the problem
of how to combine administrative efficiency with popular
control. Assent was the first requirement. The very
formation of a continuous combination, in face of legal
persecution and public disapproval, depended on the active
concurrence of all the members. And though it is con-
ceivable that a strong Trade Union might coerce a few
individual workmen to continue in its ranks against
their will, no such coercive influence could permanently
prevail over a discontented majority, or prevent the secession,
either individually or in a body, of any considerable number
who were seriously disaffected. It was accordingly assumed

Representative Institutions 59

without question that everything should be submitted to
" the voices " of the whole body, and that each member
should take an equal and identical share in the common
project. As the union developed from an angry crowd
unanimously demanding the redress of a particular grievance
into an insurance company of national extent, obliged to
follow some definite trade policy, the need for administrative
efficiency more and more forced itself on the minds of the
members. This efficiency involved an ever-increasing special-
isation of function.^ The growing mass of business and the
difficulty and complication of the questions dealt with involved
the growth of an official class, marked off by capacity, training,
and habit of life from the rank and file. Failure to specialise
the executive function quickly brought about extinction. On
the other hand this very specialisation undermined the popular
control, and thus risked the loss of the indispensable popular
assent. The early expedients of Rotation of Office, the
Mass Meeting, and the Referendum proved, in practice, utterly
inadequate as a means of securing genuine popular control.
At each particular crisis the individual member found himself
overmatched by the official machinery which he had created.
At this stage irresponsible bureaucracy seemed the inevitable
outcome. But democracy found yet another expedient, which
in some favored unions has gone far to solve the problem.
The specialisation of the executive into a permanent expert
civil service was balanced by the specialisation of the legis-
lature, in the establishment of a supreme representative
assembly, itself undertaking the work of direction and control
for which the members at large had proved incompetent.
We have seen how difficult it is for a community of manual
workers to obtain such an assembly, and how large a part is

^ "The progressive division of labour by virhich both science and government
prosper." — Lord Acton, The Unity of Modern History (London, 1896), p. 3.
" If there be one principle clearer than another, it is this : that in any business,
whether of government or of mere merchandising, somebody must be trusted. . . .
Power and strict accountability for its use, are the essential constituents of good
government." — Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Gover7W!ent {^tvfYorV., 1S96),
12th edit.

6o Trade Union Struchire

inevitably played in it by the ever-growing number of salaried
officers. But in the representative assembly these salaried
officers sit in a new capacity. The work expected from them
by their employers is not that of execution, but of criticism
and direction. To balance the professional civil servant we
have, in fact, the professional representative. \.'

This detailed analysis of humble working-class organisa-
tions will to many readers be of interest only in so far as it
furnishes material for political generalisations. It is there-
fore important to consider to what extent the constitutional
problems of Trade Union democracy are analogous to those
of national or municipal politics.

The fundamental requisites of government are the same
in the democratic state as in the Trade Union. In
both cases the problem is how to combine administrative
efficiency with popular control. Both alike ultimately
depend on a continuance of general assent. In a voluntary
association, such as the Trade Union, this general assent
is, as we have seen, the foremost requirement : in the
democratic state relinquishment of citizenship is seldom a
practicable alternative, whilst the operation of changing
governors is not an easy one. Hence, even in the
most democratic of states the continuous assent of the
governed is not so imperative a necessity as in the Trade
Union. On the other hand, the degree of administrative
efficiency necessary for the healthy existence of the state is
far greater than in the case of the Trade Union. But whilst
admitting this transposition in relative importance, it still
remains true that, in the democratic state as in the Trade
Union, government cannot continue to exist without com-
bining a certain degree of popular assent with adequate
administrative efficiency.

More important is the fact that the popular assent is in
both cases of the same nature. In the democratic state, as
in the Trade Union, the eventual judgment of the people is
pronounced not upon projects but upon results. It avails
not that a particular proposal may have received the prior

Representative Instittitions 6i

authorisation of an express popular vote ; if the results are
not such as the people desire, the executive will not continue
to receive their support. Nor does this, in the democratic
state any more than in the Trade Union, imply that an
all-wise government would necessarily secure this popular
assent. If any particular stage in the march of civilisation
happens to be momentarily distasteful to the bulk of the
citizens, the executive which ventures to step in that direction
will be no less ruthlessly dismissed than if its deeds had been
evil. All that we have said as to the logical futility of the
Referendum, and as to the necessity for the representative,
therefore applies, we suggest, even more strongly to demo-
cratic states than to Trade Unions. For what is the lesson
to be learned from Trade Union history ? The Referendum,
introduced for the express purpose of ensuring popular
assent, has in almost all cases failed to accomplish its object.
This failure is due, as the reader will have observed, to the
constant inability of the ordinary man to estimate what will
be the effect of a particular proposal. What Democracy
requires is asseyit to results ; what the Referendum gives is
assent to projects. No Trade Union has, for instance,
deliberately desired bankruptcy ; but many Trade Unions
have persistently voted for scales of contributions and benefits
which have inevitably resulted in bankruptcy. If this is the
case in the relatively simple issues of Trade Union admini-
stration, still more does it apply to the infinitely complicated
questions of national politics.

But though in the case of the Referendum the analogy
is sufficiently exact to warrant the transformation of the
empirical conclusions of Trade Union history into a political
generalisation, it is only fair to point out some minor
differences between the two cases. We have had occasion
to describe how, in Trade Union history, the use of the
Referendum, far from promoting popular control, has some-
times resulted in increasing the dominant power of the
permanent civil service, and in making its position practically
impregnable against any uprising opinion among its con-

62 Trade Union Structure

stituents. This particular danger would, we imagine, scarcely
occur in a democratic state. In the Trade Union the
executive committee occupies a unique position. It alone
has access to official information ; it alone commands expert
professional skill and experience ; and, most important of all,
it monopolises in the society's official circular what corre-
sponds to the newspaper press. The existence of political
parties fairly equal in knowledge, ability, and electoral
organisation, and each served by its own press, would always
save the democratic state from this particular perversion of
the Referendum to the advantage of the existing government.
But any party or sect of opinion which, from lack of funds,
education, or social influence, could not call to its aid the
forces which we have named, would, we suggest, find itself as
helpless in face of a Referendum as the discontented section
of a strong Trade Union.

We have seen, moreover, that there is in Trade Union
government a certain special class of questions in which the
Referendum has a distinct use. Where a decision will
involve at some future time the personal co-operation of
the members in some positive act essentially optional in its
nature — still more where that act involves a voluntary
personal sacrifice, or where not a majority alone but
practically the whole body of the members must on pain of
failure join in it, — the Referendum may be useful, not as a
legislative act, but as an index of the probability that the
members will actually do what will be required of them.
The decision to strike is obviously a case in point. Another
instance may be found in the decisions of Trade Unions
or other bodies that each member shall use his municipal or
parliamentary franchise in a particular manner. Here the
success or failure of the policy of the organisation depends not
on the passive acquiescence of the rank and file in acts done
by the executive committee or the officers, but upon each
member's active performance of a personal task. We cannot
think of any case of this kind within the sphere of the
modern democratic state. If indeed, as Mr. Auberon Herbert

Representative Institutions 63

proposes, it were left to the option of each citizen to determine
from time to time the amount and the appHcation of his
contributions to the treasury, the Chancellor of the Exchequer
would probably find it convenient, prior to making up the
estimates, to take a Referendum as a guide to how much
would probably be paid. Or, to take an analogy very near
to that of the Trade Union decision to strike, if each soldier
in the army were at liberty to leave at a day's notice, it
would probably be found expedient to take a vote of the
rank and file before engaging in a foreign war. In the
modern democratic state, however, as it actually exists, it is
not left to the option of the individual citizen whether or not
he will act in the manner decided on. The success or
failure of the policy does not therefore depend on obtaining
universal assent and personal participation in the act itself.
Whether the citizen likes it or not, he is compelled to pay
the taxes and obey the laws which have been decided on by
the competent authority. Whether or not he will maintain
that authority in power, will depend not on his original
impulsive judgment as to the expediency of the tax or the
law, but on his deliberate approval or disapproval of the
subsequent results.

If Trade Union history throws doubt on the advantages
of the Referendum, still less does it favor the institution of
the delegate as distinguished from the representative. Even
in the comparatively simple issues of Trade Union admini-
stration, it has been found, in practice, quite impossible to
obtain definite instructions from the members on all the
matters which come up for decision. When, for instance, the
sixty delegates of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers
met in 1892 to revise the constitution and trade policy of
their society, they were supposed to confine themselves to
such amendments as had previously received the sanction of
one or other of the branches. But although the amendments
so sanctioned filled over five hundred printed pages, it was
found impossible to construct from this material alone any
consistent constitution or line of policy. The delegates were

64 Trade Union Structicre

necessarily compelled to exercise larger freedom and to frame
a set of rules not contemplated by any one of the branches.
And this experience of the Engineers is only a type of what
has been going on throughout the whole Trade Union world.
The increased facilities for communication, on the one hand,
and the growth of representative institutions, on the other,
have made the delegate obsolete. Wherever a Trade Union
has retained the old ideal of direct government by the people,
it has naturally preferred to the Delegate Meeting the less
expensive and more thoroughgoing device of the Referendum.
For the most part the increasing complication and intricacy
of modern industrial affairs has, as we have seen, compelled
the substitution of representative institutions. These con-
siderations apply with even greater force to the democratic
state.

Trade Union history gives, therefore, little support to
the Referendum or the Delegate Meeting, and points rather
to government by a Representative Assembly as the last
word of democracy.^ It is therefore important to see whether]
these Trade Union parliaments have any lesson for the
political student. The governing assemblies of even the
most democratic states have, unlike Trade Union parliaments,
hitherto been drawn almost exclusively from the middle or
upper classes, and have therefore escaped the special difficulties
of communities of wage-earners. If, however, we assume that
the manual workers, who number four-fifths of the population,
will gradually become the dominant influence in the elector-
ate, and will contribute an important and increasing section
of the representatives, the governing assemblies of the Coal-

^ " There are two elements co-existent in the conduct of human affairs — policy
and administration — but, though the confines of their respective jurisdictions
overlap, the functions of each must of necessity be exercised within its own
domain by its own hierarchy — the one consisting of trained specialists and
experts, intimately conversant with the historical traditions of their own depart-
ment and with the minutest details of the subjects with which they are concerned,
the other qualified by their large converse with whatever is influential and
intelligent in their own country or on the European Continent, and, above all,
by their Parliamentary talents and their tactful appreciation of public opinion, to
determine the general lines along which the destinies of their country should be
led." — Speech by the Marquis of Dufferin, Times, 12th June 1897.

Representative Institutions 65

miners or Cotton Operatives to-day may be to a large extent
prophetic of the future legislative assembly in any English-
speaking community.

One inference seems to us clear. Any effective participa-
tion of the wage-earning class in the councils of the nation
involves the establishment of a new calling, that of the
professional representative. For the parish or town council
it is possible to elect men who will continue to work
at their trades, just as a Trade Union branch can be
administered by committee-men and officers in full work.
The adoption of the usual Co-operative and Trade Union
practice of paying travelling expenses and an allowance for
the actual time spent on the public business would suffice
to enable workmen to attend the district or county council.
But the governing assembly of any important state must
always demand practically the whole time of its members.
The working-man representative in the House of Commons
is therefore most closely analogous, not to the working miner
or spinner who attends the Coal or Cotton Parliament, but
to the permanent and salaried official representatives, who,
in both these assemblies, exercise the predominant influence
and control the executive work. The analogy may therefore
seem to point to the election to the House of Commons of
the trained representative who has been successful in the
parliament of his trade.

Such a suggestion misses the whole moral of Trade
Union history. The cotton or coal -mining official repre-
sentative succeeds in influencing his own trade assembly
because he has mastered the technical details of all the
business that comes before it ; because his whole life has
been one long training for the duties which he has to
discharge ; because, in short, he has become a professional
expert in ascertaining and representing the desires of his
constituents and in bringing about the conditions of their
fulfilment. But transport this man to the House of
Commons, and he finds himself confronted with facts and
problems as foreign to his experience and training as his
VOL. I F

66 Trade Union Structure

own business would be to the banker or the country gentle-
man. What the working class will presently recognise is
that the duties of a parliamentary representative constitute
as much a new business to the Trade Union official as the
duties of a general secretary are to the ordinary mechanic.
When workmen desire to be as efficiently represented in
the Parliament of the nation as they are in their own
trade assemblies, they will find themselves compelled to
establish a class of expert parliamentary representatives,
just as they have had to establish a class of expert trade
officials.

We need not consider in any detail what effect an influx
of " labor members " of this new type would probably have
upon the British House of Commons. Any one who has
watched the deliberations of the Coal or the Cotton Parlia-
ment, or the periodical revising committees of the other
great unions, will have been impressed by the disinclination
of the professional representative to mere talk, his impatience
of dilatory procedure, and his determination to " get the
business through " within working hours. Short speeches,
rigorous closure, and an almost extravagant substitution
of printed matter for lengthy " front bench " explanations
render these assemblies among the most efficient of demo-
cratic bodies.^

More important is it to consider in what respects,
judging from Trade Union analogies, the expert professional
representative will differ from the unpaid politician to whom
the middle and upper classes have hitherto been accustomed.
We have already described how in the Trade Union world
the representative has a twofold function, neither part of
which may be neglected with impunity. He makes it just
as much his business to ascertain and express the real
desires of his constituents as he does to control and direct
the operations of the civil servants of his trade. With the

1 These representative assemblies present a great contrast to the Trade
Union Congress, as to which see the subsequent chapter on " The Method of
Legal Enactment."

Representative Institutions 67

entrance into the House of Commons of men of this type,
the work of ascertaining and expressing the wishes of the
constituencies would be much more deHberately pursued
than at present. The typical member of Parliament to-day
attends to such actual expressions of opinion as reach him
from his constituency in a clear and definite form, but
regards it as no part of his work actively to discover what
the silent or inarticulate electors are vaguely desiring. He
visits his constituency at rare intervals, and then only to
expound his own views in set speeches at public meetings,
whilst his personal intercourse is almost entirely limited
to persons of his own class or to political wire-pullers.
Whatever may be his intentions, he is seldom in touch
with any but the middle or upper class, together with
that tiny section of all classes to whom " politics " is of
constant interest. Of the actual grievances and " dim in-
articulate " aspirations of the bulk of the people, the lower
middle and the wage-earning class, he has practically no
conception. When representation of working-class opinion
becomes a profession, as in the Trade Union world, we see
a complete revolution in the attitude of the representative
towards his constituents. To find out what his constituents
desire becomes an essential part of his work. It will not do
to wait until they write to him, for the working-man is slow
to put pen to paper. Hence the professional Trade Union
representative takes active steps to learn what the silent
members are thinking. He spends his whole time, when
not actually in session, in his constituency. He makes few
set speeches at public gatherings, but he is diligent in
attending branch meetings, and becomes an attentive listener
at local committees. At his office he is accessible to every
one of his constituents. It is, moreover, part of the regular
routine of such a functionary to be constantly communicat-
ing with every one of his constituents by means of frequent
circulars on points which he believes to be of special interest
to them. If, therefore, the professional representative, as we
know him in the Trade Union world, becomes a feature of

68 Trade C/nioiz Structure

the House of Commons, the future member of Parliament
will feel himself not only the authoritative exponent of
the votes of his constituents, but also their " London
Correspondent," their parliamentary agent, and their
expert adviser in all matters of legislation or general
politics.^

It is impossible to forecast all the consequences that
would follow from raising (or, as some would say, degrading)
the parliamentary representative from an amateur to a pro-
fessional. But among other things the whole etiquette of
the situation would be changed. At present it is a point
of honor in a member of Parliament not to express his
constituents' desires when he conscientiously differs from
them. To the " gentleman politician " the only alternative
to voting as he himself thinks best is resigning his seat.
This delicacy is unknown to any paid professional agent.
The architect, solicitor, or permanent civil servant, after
tendering his advice and supporting his views with all his
expert authority, finally carries out whatever policy his
employer commands. This is also the view which the
professional representative of the Trade Union world takes
of his own duties. It is his business not only to put before
his constituents what he believes to be their best policy and
to back up his opinion with all the argumentative power he
can bring to bear, but also to put his entire energy into
wrestling with what he conceives to be their ignorance, and
to become for the time a vigorous propagandist of his own
policy. But if, when he has done his best in this way, he
fails to get a majority over to his view, he loyally accepts
the decision and records his vote in accordance with his
constituents' desires. We imagine that professional repre-
sentatives of working-class opinion in the House of Commons
would take the same course.^

1 " Representatives ought to give light and leading to the people, just as the
people give stimulus and momentum to their representatives." — ^J. Bryce, The
American Commonwealth (London, 1 891), vol. i. p. 297.

2 It is interesting to notice that in the country in which the ' ' sovereignty of

Representative Institutions 69

This may at first seem to indicate a return of the pro-
fessional representative to the position of a delegate. Trade
Union experience points, however, to the very reverse. In the
great majority of cases a constituency cannot be said to have
any clear and decided views on particular projects. What
they ask from their representative is that he shall act in the
manner which, in his opinion, will best serve to promote
their general desires. It is only in particular instances,
usually when some well-intentioned proposal entails im-
mediately inconvenient results, that a wave of decided
opinion spreads through a working-class constituency. It
is exactly in cases of this kind that a propagandist campaign
by a professional debater, equipped with all the facts, is of
the greatest utility. Such a campaign would be the very
last thing that a member of Parliament of the present type
would venture upon if he thought that his constituents were
against him. He would feel that the less the points of
difference were made prominent, the better for his own
safety. But once it came to be understood that the final
command of the constituency would be obeyed, the repre-
sentative would run no risk of losing his seat, merely because
he did his best to convert his constituents. Judging from
Trade Union experience he would, in nine cases out of ten,
succeed in converting them to his own view, and thus
perform a valuable piece of political education. In the
tenth case the campaign would have been no less educa-
tional, though in another way ; and, whichever was the
right view, the issue would have been made clear, the facts
brought out, and the way opened for the eventual conversion
of one or other of the contending parties.

Trade Union experience indicates, therefore, a still further
development in the evolution of the representative. Working-

the people " has been most whole-heartedly accepted, the Trade Union practice
prevails. The members of the Swiss " Bundesrath " (Federal Cabinet) do not
resign when any project is disapproved of by the legislature, nor do the members
of the " Nationalrath " throw up their legislative functions when a measure is
rejected by the electors on Referendum. Both cabinet ministers and legislators
set themselves to carry out the popular will.

JO Trade Union Structure

class democracy will expect him not only to be able to
understand and interpret the desires of his electors, and
effectively to direct and control the administrating executive :
he must also count it as part of his duty to be the expert
parliamentary adviser of his constituency, and at times an
active propagandist of his own advice. Thus, if any inference
from Trade Union history is valid in the larger sphere, the
whole tendency of working-class democracy will unconsciously
be to exalt the real power of the representative, and more
and more to differentiate his functions from those of the
ordinary citizen on the one hand, and of the expert admini-
strator on the other. The typical representative assembly of
the future will, it may be suggested, be as far removed from
the House of Commons of to-day as the latter is from the
mere Delegate Meeting. We have already travelled far from
the one man taken by rotation from the roll, and changed
mechanically to convey " the voices " of the whole body. We
may in the future leave equally behind the member to whom
wealth, position, or notoriety secures, almost by accident, a
seat in Parliament, in which he can, in such intervals as his
business or pleasure may leave him, decide what he thinks
best for the nation. In his stead we may watch appearing in
increasing numbers the professional representative, — a man
selected for natural aptitude, deliberately trained for his new
work as a special vocation, devoting his whole time to the
discharge of his manifold duties, and actively maintaining
an intimate and reciprocal intellectual relationship with his
constituency.

How far such a development of the representative will
fit in with the party system as we now know it ; how far it
will increase the permanence and continuity of parliamentary
life ; how far it will promote collective action and tend to
increasing bureaucracy ; how far, on the other hand, it will
bring the ordinary man into active political citizenship, and
rehabilitate the House of Commons in popular estimation ;
how far, therefore, it will increase the real authority of the
people over the representative assembly, and of the repre-

Representative Institutions 71

sentative assembly over the permanent civil service ; how far,
in fine, it will give us that combination of administrative
efficiency with popular control which is at once the requisite
and the ideal of all democracy — all these are questions that
make the future interesting.

CHAPTER III

THE UNIT OF GOVERNMENT

The trade clubs of the eighteenth century inherited from
the Middle Ages the tradition of strictly localised corpora-
tions, the unit of government necessarily coinciding, like that
of the English craft gild, with the area of the particular city
in which the members lived. And we can well imagine that
a contemporary observer of the constitution and policy of
these little democracies might confidently have predicted that
they, like the craft gilds, must inevitably remain strictly
localised bodies. The crude and primitive form of popular
government to which, as we have seen, the workmen were
obstinately devoted, could only serve the needs of a small
and local society. Government by general meeting of all
the members, administration by the forced service of indi-
viduals taken in rotation from the roll — in short, the ideal
of each member taking an equal and identical share in the
management of public affairs — was manifestly impracticable
in any but a society of which the members met each other
with the frequent intimacy of near neighbours. Yet in spite
of all difficulties of constitutional machinery, the historian
watches these local trade clubs, in marked contrast with the
craft gilds, irresistibly expanding into associations of national
extent. Thus, the little friendly club which twenty -three
Bolton ironfounders established in 1809 spread steadily over
the whole of England, Ireland, and Wales, until to-day it
numbers over 16,000 members, dispersed among 122 separate

The Unit of Government ^2)

branches. The scores of little clubs of millwrights and
steam-engine makers, fitters and blacksmiths, as if impelled
by some overmastering impulse, drew together between 1840
and 1 8 5 1 to form the great Amalgamated Society of
Engineers. The Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and
Joiners (established i860) has, in the thirty-five years of its
existence, absorbed several dozens of local carpenters' societies,
and now counts within its ranks four-fifths of the organised
carpenters in the kingdom. Finally, we see organisations
established, like the Amalgamated Society of Railway
Servants in 1872, with the deliberate intention of covering
the whole trade from one end of the kingdom to the other.
How slowly, painfully, and reluctantly the workmen have
modified their crude ideas of democracy to meet the exigencies
of a national organisation, we have already described.

But it was not merely the workman's simplicity in matters
of government that hampered the growth of national organisa-
tion. The traditional policy of the craftsman of the English
town — the restriction of the right to work to those who had
acquired the " freedom " of the corporation, the determined
exclusion of " interlopers," and the craving to keep trade
from going out of the town — has left deep roots in English
industrial life, alike among the shopkeepers and among the
workmen. Trade Unionism has had constantly to struggle
against this spirit of local monopoly, specially noticeable in
the seaport towns.^

Down to the middle of the present century the ship-
wrights had an independent local club in every port, each of
which strove with might and main to exclude from any
chance of work in the port all but men who had learnt their
trade within its bounds. These monopoly rules caused
incessant friction between the men of the several ports.
Shipwrights out of work in one town could not perma-
nently be kept away from another in which more hands were

^ It is interesting to note that the modern forms of the monopoly spirit are
also specially characteristic of the industry of shipbuilding ; see the chapter on
" The Right to a Trade."

74 Trade Uni07i Structure

wanted. The newcomers, refused admission into the old port
society, eventually formed a new local union among them-
selves, and naturally tended to ignore the trade regulations
maintained by the monopolists. To remedy this disastrous
state of things a loose federation was between 1850 and
i860 gradually formed among the local societies for the
express purpose of discussing, at annual congresses, how to
establish more satisfactory relations between the ports. In
the records of these congresses we watch, for nearly thirty
years, the struggle of the monopolist societies against the
efforts of those, such as Glasgow and Newcastle, whose
circumstances had converted them to a belief in complete
mobility of labor within a trade. The open societies
at last lost patience with the conservative spirit of the
others, and in 1882 united to form a national amalgamated
union, based on the principle of a common purse and
complete mobility between port and port. This organisa-
tion, the Associated Shipwrights' Society, has, in fifteen
years, succeeded in absorbing all but three of the local
societies, and now extends to every port in the kingdom.
" In these times of mammoth firms, with large capital," writes
the general secretary, " the days of local societies' utility have
gone by, and it is to be hoped the few still remaining outside
the consolidated association of their trade will ere long lay
aside all local animus and trivial objections, or personal
feeling . . . for the paramount interest of their trade," ^

The history of the Shipwrights' organisation is typical
of that of other port unions. The numerous societies of
Sailmakers, once rigidly monopolist, are now united in a
federation, within which complete mobility prevails,'-^ The
Coopers' societies, which in the port towns had formerly
much in common with the Shipwrights, now, with one excep-
tion, admit to membership any duly apprenticed cooper from

1 Twelfth Annual Report of Associated Shipwrights' Society (Newcastle, 1 894),
p, xi,

2 Rules for the Guidance of the Federation of the Sailmakers of Great Britain
and Ireland (Hull, 1890),

The Unit of Government 75

another town. But the main citadels of local monopoly
in the Trade Union world have always been the trade clubs
of Dublin, Cork, and Limerick. The Dublin Coopers have,
even at the present time, a rigidly closed society, which
refuses all intercourse with other unions, and maintains,
through an ingenious arrangement, a strict monopoly of this
important coopering centre •} and the Cork Stonemasons,
who are combined in an old local club, whilst insisting on
working at Fermoy whenever they please, will not, as we
learn, suffer any mason, from Fermoy or elsewhere, to obtain
employment at Cork.

Even in Ireland, however, the development of Trade
Unionism is hostile to local monopoly. Any growing in-
dustry is quickly invaded by members of the great English
societies, who establish their own branches and force the
local clubs to come to terms. One by one old Irish unions
apply to be admitted as branches into the richer and more
powerful English societies, and have in consequence to accept
the principle of complete mobility of labor. The famous

1 The arrangement is as follows : The DubUn Coopers do not prohibit
strangers from working in Dublin when more coopers are wanted. On such
occasions the secretary writes to coopers' societies in other towns, notably Burton,
stating the number of men required. Upon all such outsiders a tax of a shilling
a week is levied as " working fee," half of which benefits the Dublin society, the
other half being accumulated to pay the immigrant's return fare. As soon as
work shows signs of approaching slackness, the "foreigner" receives warning
that he must instantly depart : it is said that his return ticket is presented to him,
with any balance remaining out of his weekly sixpence. As many as 200
" strangers " will in this way sometimes be paid off, and sent away in a single
week. By this means the Dublin Coopers (a) secure absolute regularity of
employment for their own members, {b) provide the extra labor required in busy
times, and (<:) maintain their own control over the conditions under which the
work is done. The employers appear to be satisfied with the arrangement, which,
so far as we have been able to ascertain, is the only surviving instance of what
was once a common rule of port unions. Thus, the rules of Queenstown Ship-
wrights' Society, right down to its absorption in the Associated Shipwrights'
Society (in 1894), included a provision that "no strange shipwright" should be
allowed to work in the town while a member was idle. And the Liverpool
Sailmakers' Society (established i8i7)has, among the MS. rules preserved in the
old minute-book, one providing that "strangers" with indentures should be
allowed to work at "legal sail-rooms," but should members be unable to obtain
employment elsewhere, then "the stranger shall be discharged and the member be
engaged."

76 Trade Union Structure

" Dublin Regulars," a rigidly monopolist local carpenters'
union, claiming descent from the gilds, and always striving
to exclude from admission any but the sons of the members,^
became, in 1890, at the instance of its younger members, one
of the 629 branches of the Amalgamated Society of Car-
penters and Joiners, bound to admit to work fellow-members
from all parts of the world. Among the Irish Shipwrights,
too, once the most rigidly monopolist of all, this tendency
has progressed with exceptional rapidity. The annual report
of the Associated Shipwrights' Society for 1893 records^
the absorption in that year alone of no fewer than six old
Irish port unions, each of which had hitherto striven to
maintain for its members all the work of its own port.

But although the growth of national organisation has
done much to break down this spirit of local monopoly,
we do not wish to imply that it has been completely
eradicated. The workman, whether a Trade Unionist or
not, still shares with the shopkeeper and the small manu-
facturer, the old instinctive objection to work " going out
of the town." The proceedings of local authorities often
reveal to us the " small master," the retail tradesman,
and the local artisan all insisting that " the ratepayers'
money " should be spent so as directly to benefit the local
trade. Trade Unionists are not backward in making use
of this vulgar error when it suits their purpose, and the
" labor members " of town or county councils can seldom
refrain, whenever it is proposed " to send work into the
country," from adopting an argument which they find so
convincing to many of their middle-class colleagues.^

^ See, for instance, the detailed account of it given in the Report on Trade
Societies and Strikes of the National Association for the Proi7iotion of Social Science
(i860), pp. 418-423-

2 Twelfth Animal Report of the Associated Shipwrights' Society, p. xi. (New-
castle, 1894).

3 During the first eight years of the London County Council (1889-97) several
attempts were made to confine contracts to London firms. It is interesting to
note that these all emanated from middle-class members of the Moderate Party, and
that they were opposed by John Burns and a large majority of the " Labor
Members" and Progressives, as well as by the more responsible of the " Moderates."

The Unit of Government jy

But if we follow the Labor Member from the council
chamber to his Trade Union branch meeting, we shall
recognise that the grievance felt by his Trade Unionist
constituents is not exclusively, or even mainly, based on
the " local protectionism " of the shopkeeper and the small
manufacturer. What the urban Trade Unionist actually
resists is not any loss of work to a particular locality, but
the incessant attempt of contractors to evade the Trade
Union regulations, by getting the work done in districts in
which the workmen are either not organised at all, or in
which they are working at a low Standard Rate. Thus the
Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons incurs consider-
able odium because the branches in many large towns insert
in their local rules a prohibition of the use of stone imported
in a worked state from any outside district. But this general
prohibition arises from the fact that the practical alternative
to working the stone on the spot is getting it worked in the
district in which it is quarried. Now, whatever mechanical
or economic advantage may be claimed for the latter
practice, it so happens that the quarry districts are those
in which the Stonemasons are worst organised. In these
districts for the most part, no Standard Rate exists, the
hours of labor are long and variable, and competitive piece-
work, unregulated by any common agreement, usually prevails.
Moreover, any transference of work from the Stonemasons
of large cities where jobs dovetail with each other, to the
Stonemasons of quarry villages, entirely dependent on the
spasmodic orders for worked stone received by the quarry
owner, necessarily involves an increase in the number of
Stonemasons exposed to irregularity of work, and habitually
" on tramp " from county to county.^

1 For instance the "Working Rules to be observed by the Master Builders
and Operative Stonemasons of Portsmouth," signed in 1893, by ten master
builders and four workmen, on behalf of their respective associations, include the
following provision, "That no piecework be allowed and no worked stone to
come into the town except square steps, flags, curbs, and landings, and no brick-
layers to fix worked stone." The London rules are not so explicit. As formally
agreed to in 1892 by the associations of employers and employed, they provide

78

Trade Union Structure

We may trace a similar feeling in the protests frequently
made by the branches of the National Union of Boot and
Shoe Operatives, against work being sent into the country
villages, or even from a centre in which wages are high, to
one working under a lower " statement." That this is not
merely a disguised " local protectionism " may be seen from
the fact that the Northampton Branch actually resolved in
1888 to strike, not against Northampton employers sending
work out of the town, but against a London manufacturer
sending his work to Northampton.^ In 1889, the Executive
Council of the same union found itself driven to take action
against the systematic attempts of certain employers to
evade the wages agreement which they had formally entered
into, by sending their work away to have certain processes

that " piecework and subcontracting for labor only shall on no account be resorted
to, excepting for granite kerb, York paving and turning." The London Stone-
masons, however, claim, as for instance in their complaint in 1894 against the
Works Department of the London County Council, that this rule must be
interpreted so as to exclude the use in London of stone worked in a quarry
district. This claim was successfully resisted by the Trade Union repre-
sentatives who sat on the Works Committee. We subsequently investigated
this case ourselves, tracing the stone (a long run of sandstone kerb for park
railings) back to Derbyshire, where it was quarried and worked. We found the
district totally unorganised, the stonemasons' work being done largely by boy-
labor, at competitive piecework, without settled agreement, by non-unionists,
working irregular and sometimes excessive hours. It was impossible not to feel
that, although the London Stonemasons had expressed their objection in the
wrong terms and therefore had failed to obtain redress, they were, according
to the "Fair Wages" policy adopted by the County Council and the House
of Commons, justified in their complaint. Unfortunately, instead of bringing
to the notice of the Committee the actual conditions under which the stone
was being worked, they relied on the argument that the London ratepayers'
money should be spent on London workmen. This argument, as they afterwards
explained to us, had been found the most effective with the shopkeepers and
small manufacturers who dominate provincial Town Councils. The Trade
Unionist members of the London County Council proved obdurate to this
economic heresy.

^ Shoe and Leather Record, 28th July 1888. In the same way a general
meeting of the Manchester Stonemasons, in 1862, decided to support a strike
against a Manchester employer who, carrying out a contract at Altrincham, eight
miles off, had his stone worked at Manchester, instead of at Altrincham, as
required by the working rules of the Altrincham branch. In this case, the
Manchester Stonemasons struck against work coming to themselves at a higher
rate per hour than was demanded by the Altrincham masons. — Stonemasons''
Fortnightly Return, September 1862.

The Unit of Government 79

done in lower - paid districts. These employers were
accordingly informed, not that the work must be kept in
the town, but that, wherever it was executed, the " shop
statement " which they had signed must be adhered to. It
was at the same time expressly intimated that if these
employers chose to set up works of their own in a new
place, " they will be at perfect liberty to do so," without
objection from the union, even if they chose a low-paid
district, " provided that they pay the highest rate of wages
of the district to which they go," ^

We have quoted the strongest instances of Trade Union
objection to " work going out of the town," in order to
unravel, from the common stock of economic prejudice, the
impulse which is distinctive of Trade Unionism itself. It is
customary for persons interested in the prosperity of one
establishment, one town or one district, to seek to obtain
trade for that particular establishment, town or district.
Had Trade Unions remained, like the mediaeval craft gilds,
organisations of strictly local membership, they must, almost
inevitably, have been marked by a similar local favoritism.
But the whole tendency of Trade Union history has been
towards the solidarity of each trade as a whole. The
natural selfishness of the local branches is accordingly always
being combated by the central executives and national
delegate meetings, in the wider interests of the whole body
of the members wherever they may be working. Just in
proportion as Trade Unionism is strong and well established
we find the old customary favoritism of locality replaced
by the impartial enforcement of uniform conditions upon
all districts alike. When, for instance, the Amalgamated
Association of Cotton Weavers, in delegate meeting assembled,
finally decided to adopt a uniform list of piecework prices,
the members then working at Great Harwood found no
sympathy for their plea that such a measure would reduce

1 The "National Conference" of the Union passed a similar resolution in
1886 ; Monthly Report of the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives,
January 1 8S7 and February 1889.

8o Trade Union Striichire

their own exceptionally high rates. And although it was
foreseen and declared that uniformity would tend to the
concentration of the manufacture in the most favorably
situated districts, to the consequent loss of the more remote
villages, the delegates from these villages almost unanimously
supported what was believed to be good for the trade as a
whole.^

In another industry, the contrast between the old " local
protectionism " and the Trade Unionist view has resulted in
an interesting change in electioneering tactics. The London
Society of Compositors and the Typographical Association
have, for the last ten years, used more electoral pressure with
regard to the distribution of local work, than any other Trade
Union. So long as parliamentary electors belonged mainly to
the middle class, a parliamentary candidate was advised by his
agent to distribute his large printing orders fairly among all
parts of his constituency, and under no circumstances to employ
a printer living beyond its boundary. Now the astute agent,
eager to conciliate the whole body of organised workmen in
the constituency, confines his printing strictly to the best
Trade Union establishments, although this usually involves
passing over most of the local establishments and sometimes
even giving work to firms outside the district. The influence
of the Trade Union leaders is used, not to maintain their
respective trades in all the places in which they happen to
exist, but to strengthen, at the expense of the rest, those
establishments, those towns, and even those districts, in which
the conditions of work are most advantageous.

We see, therefore, that in spite of the difficulties of
government, in spite of the strong inherited tradition of
local exclusiveness, and in spite, too, of the natural selfish-
ness of each branch in desiring to preserve its own local
monopoly, the unit of government in the workmen's organ-
isations, in complete contrast to the gilds of the master-

1 Special meeting of General Council of Amalgamated Association of Cotton
Weavers, 30th April 1892, attended by one of the authors ; see other instances
cited in the chapter on " The Standard Rate."

The Unit of Government 8 1

craftsmen, has become the trade instead of the town.^
Our description of this irresistible tendency to expan-
sion has already to some extent revealed its cause, in the
Trade Union desire to secure uniform minimum conditions
throughout each industry. In our examination of the
Methods and Regulations of Trade Unionism, and in our
analysis of their economic working, we shall discover the
means by which the wage-earners seek to attain this end,
and the reasons which convince them of its importance.
In the final part of our work we shall examine how far such
an equality is economically possible or desirable. For the
moment the reader must accept the fact that this uniformity
of minimum is, whether wisely or not, the most permanent
of Trade Union aspirations.

Meanwhile it is interesting to note that this conception
of the solidarity of each trade as a whole is checked by
racial differences. The great national unions of Engineers
and Carpenters find no difficulty in extending their organisa-
tions beyond national boundaries, and easily open branches
in the United States or the South African Republic, France
or Spain, provided that these branches are composed of British
workmen,^ But it is needless to say that it has not yet
appeared practicable to any British Trade Union even to
suggest amalgamation with the Trade Union of any other
country. Differences in legal position, in political status, in
industrial methods, and in the economic situation between

1 Where at the present day a widespread English industry is without a pre-
ponderating national Trade Union, it is simply a mark of imperfect organisation.
Thus the numerous little Trade Unions of Painters, and Chippers and Drillers
include only a small proportion of those at work in the trades.

^ The Amalgamated Society of Engineers had, in 1896, 82 branches beyond
the United Kingdom, and the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners no
fewer than 87. About half of these are in the United States or Canada, and
most of the remainder in the Australian Colonies or South Africa, The Engineers
had one branch in France, at Croix, and formerly one in Spain, at Bilbao,
where the United Society of Boilermakers also had a branch until 1894. I" the
years 1880-82 the United Society of Boilermakers even had a branch at Con-
stantinople. The only other English Trade Union having branches beyond sea
is the Steam-Engine Makers' Society, which has opened lodges at New York,
Montreal, and Brisbane.

VOL. I G

o

0~

82 Trade Union Structure

French and English workers — not to mention the barrier of
language — easily account for the indisposition on the part
of practical British workmen to consider an international
amalgamated union. And it is significant that, even within
the British Isles, the progress towards national union has
been much hampered by differences of racial sentiment and
divergent views of social expediency. The English carpenter,
plumber, or smith who finds himself working in a Scotch
town, is apt to declare the Scotch union in his trade to be
little better than a friendly society, and to complain that
Scotch workmen are too eager for immediate gain and for
personal advancement sufficiently to resist such dangerous
innovations as competitive piecework, nibbling at the
Standard Rate, or habitual overtime. The Scotchman
retorts that the English Trade Union is extravagant in its
expenditure, especially at the head office in London or
Manchester, and unduly restrictive in its Regulations and
Methods. In some cases the impulse towards amalgama-
tion has prevailed over this divergence as to what is socially
expedient. The United Society of Boilermakers, which
extends without a rival from sea to sea, was able in 1889,
through the loyalty of the bulk of its Scottish members, to
stamp out an attempted secession, aiming at a national
society on the banks of the Clyde, which evoked the support
of Scottish national feeling, voiced by the Glasgow Trades
Council. In other cases Scotch pertinacity has conquered
England. The Associated Shipwrights' Society, the rise and
national development of which we have already described,
sprang out of the Glasgow Shipwrights' Union, which gave
to the wider organisation its able and energetic secretary,
Mr. Alexander Wilkie. The British Steel Smelters' Associa-
tion (established 1886) has spread from Glasgow over the
whole industry in the Northern and Midland districts of
England. In both these cases the Scotch have " stooped
to conquer," the Scottish secretary moving to an English
town as the centre of membership shifted towards the south.
But in other trades the prevailing tendency towards complete

The Unit of Government ^2,

national amalgamation is still baffled by the sturdy Scotch
determination — due partly to differences of administration
but mainly to racial sentiment — not to be " governed from
England." -^ The powerful English national unions of Car-
penters, Handworking Bootmakers, Plumbers, and Bricklayers
have either never attempted or have failed to persuade their
Scottish fellow-workmen to give up their separate Scottish
societies. The rival national societies of Tailors are always
at war, making periodical excursions across the Border, this
establishment of branches in each other's territories giving
rise to heated recriminations. In many important trades,
such as the Compositors, Stonemasons, and Ironfounders,
effective Trade Unionism is as old in Scotland as in
England, and the two national societies in each trade, whilst
retaining complete Home Rule, have settled down to a
fraternal relationship, which amounts to tacit if not formal
federation.

Ireland presents a similar case of racial differences,
working in a somewhat different manner. Whereas the
English Trade Unions have keenly desired union with
Scottish local societies, they have, until lately, manifested a
marked dislike to having anything to do with Ireland.^ This
has been, in some cases at least, the result of experience.

1 xVnalogous tendencies may be traced in the Friendly Society movement,
though to a lesser extent. The Scottish lodges of the Manchester Unity of Odd-
fellows have their own peculiar rules. The Scottish delegates to the Foresters'
High Court at Edinburgh in 1894, were among the most strenuous opponents
of the proposal to fix the headquarters (at present moving annually from town to
town) in London or Birmingham. And though exclusively Scottish Orders have
never yet succeeded in widely establishing themselves, it is not uncommon for
Scottish lodges to threaten secession, as when, in 1889, five Scottish lodges of
the Bolton Unity of the Ancient Noble Order of Oddfellows endeavoured to start
a new "Scottish Unity" {Oddfellows' Magazine, March 1889, p. 70). Such a
secession from the Manchester Unity resulted in the "Scottish Order of Odd-
fellows" which has, however, under 2000 members. There exist also the "St.
Andrew's Order of Ancient Free Gardeners of Scotland," with 6000 members, and
a " United Order of Scottish Mechanics," with 4000 members, which refuse to
merge themselves in the larger Orders.

2 Scottish branches are declared by Trade Union secretaries to be profitable
recruits from a financial point of view, because they are habitually frugal and
cautious in dispensing friendly benefits.

84 Trade Union Structure

From 1832 down to 1840, Irish lodges were admitted to
the Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons, on the same
footing as English, whilst the Scotch masons had already
their independent organisation. The fortnightly reports
during these years reveal constant friction between the
central executive and the Irish branches, who would not
agree among themselves, and who persisted in striking
against members from other Irish towns. At the Delegate
Meeting in 1839 ^^^ Irish branches had to be specially
deprived of the right to strike without prior permission, even
in those cases in which the rules allowed to English branches
the instantaneous cessation of work to resist encroachments
on established customs.^ But even with this precaution
the drain of the Irish lodges upon the English members
became unendurable. At length in 1840, the general
secretary was sent on a special mission of investigation,
which revealed every kind of financial irregularity. The
Irish lodges were found to have an incurable propensity to
dispense benefits to all and sundry irrespective of the rules,
and an invincible objection to English methods of account-
keeping. The Dublin lodge had to be dissolved as a
punishment for retaining to itself monies remitted by the
Central Committee for other Irish lodges. The central
executive who, in 1837, had successfully resisted a proposi-
tion emanating from a Warwickshire district in favor of
Home Rule for Ireland, " as such separation would injure
the stability of the society," ^ now reported in its favor. " We
are convinced," says the report, " that a very great amount
of money had been sent to Ireland for the relief of tramps,
etc. ... to which they had no legal right. . . . However
much a separation may be regretted, we feel convinced that
until they are thrown more on their own resources, they will
not sufficiently estimate the benefits derivable from such an
institution to exert themselves on its behalf." ^ The receipts

1 Rules of the Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons (edition of 1839).

2 Resolutions of the Delegate Meeting 1837.

3 Stonemasotis' Fortnightly Heturn, 2nd January 1840.

The Unit of Government 85

from Ireland for the year had been £a,'j : los,, whilst the
remittances to Ireland had amounted to no less than ij^545-
It is not surprising that the society promptly voted the
exclusion of all the Irish branches.

In 1850 the Executive Committee of the Provincial
Typographical Association were " reluctantly compelled to
declare their conviction that no English executive can
successfully manage an Association embracing branches so
geographically distant and so materially different in their
regulations and their mode of remuneration as those of the
sister kingdom." The union thereupon gave up the one
Irish branch (Waterford) which had not already insisted on
its independence, and refused to entertain any proposals for
new ones.^ Other societies which, in more recent years, have
had Irish branches appear to have found them equally un-
profitable, and a source of constant trouble. The records of
the Amalgamated Society of Tailors are full of references to
the extravagance and financial mismanagement of its Irish
branches. During the year 1892 no less than four of the
principal Irish branches of the society were rebuked by the
Executive Council upon this account. One of these had sub-
sequently to be closed, the Executive stating that its " report
is altogether wrong, and does not balance. The contributions
do not average lod. per member, and the rent of the club-
room is more than the whole income from the branch. If a
satisfactory explanation is not sent at once the branch must be
closed."^ Finally, in 1896, the Executive of the Associated

1 Half -Yearly Report of the Provincial Typographical Association, 31st
December 1850.

■^ Quarterly Report of the Amalgamated Society of Tailors, April 1892.
Report on the Ennis branch. In this connection the following extract from the
proceedings of the High Court of the Ancient Order of Foresters in 1894 will
be interesting. The executive had found it necessary to hold a special investiga-
tion into the affairs of the Dublin District ; and they recommended the grant of
certain advantages upon condition of reform. This proposal led to a lively
debate. "Were they going," said one prominent Forester, "to encourage
extravagant, reckless, and fraudulent mismanagement ? The report presented
to them showed distinctly that there had been extravagant, reckless, and
fraudulent mismanagement. . . . Not less than £gq7 had been voted by
previous High Courts towards the relief of Dublin Courts. . . . The Order's

86 Trade Union Structiwe

Shipwrights' Society reported that it had been compelled
" to close the Dublin branch, notwithstanding that the E. C.
had instructed both the general secretary and the Humber
Delegate to visit them. We have not been able to
receive any correct reports from them for some time, and
the only word we could get from them was that there was
no work and no money, yet when your representatives
visited them the officers were so busy working they had not
time to convene a meeting of members. . . . Your E. C.
offered to have all the idle men sent to ports where em-
ployment could be found them, but we are informed where
this has been done some of these men, notwithstanding all
that has been done for them, refused to pay up their
arrears, and rather than pay left their employment and went
home. . . . When the branch books were examined it was
found they were paying both sick and unemployed benefit
to members who were not entitled to it, and the branch
officers were receiving salary for work they failed or refused
to do. Seeing the Dublin branch entirely ignored the
registered rules, your E. C. had no other option but to
close the branch. The different branches must deal with
these men should they come to their ports." ^

So strong, however, is the dominant impulse towards the
complete union of a trade from one end of the United
Kingdom to the other, that it seems, during the last few
years, to be slowly overcoming the reluctance of both English
and Irish organisations. From 1889 onward, we find such
great national unions as the Carpenters, Railway Servants,
Engineers, Tailors, and Shipwrights freely opening branches
in Irish towns and absorbing the surviving trade clubs of

Chief Official Valuer said • the members have never done their duty.' That
officer thereupon interposed with the remark, ' It was believed that in connection
with sickness there was a good deal of malingering.' Another prominent
Forester said he would attach the (Dublin) Courts to the Glasgow District. . . .
There was only one element of danger, and it was of putting too many Irishmen
together."- — Foresters' Miscellany (September 1894), p. 180.

1 The Fifty-eighth Quarterly Report, July to September 1896, of the Associ-
ated Society of Shipwrights, p. 8.

The Unit of Government 87

local artisans.^ The Provincial Typographical Association,
now become the Typographical Association, has, since 1878,
opened sixteen branches in Ireland, and now employs a
salaried organiser for that island, whose efforts have brought
in many recruits. This tendency has been greatly assisted,
especially in the engineering and shipbuilding trades, by the
remarkable industrial development of Belfast. Since i860
a constant stream of skilled artisans from England and
Scotland have settled in that town, with the result that it
now possesses strong branches of all the national unions of
both countries. With the shifting of the effective centre of
Irish Trade Unionism from Dublin to Belfast has come an
almost irresistible tendency to accept an English or Scottish
government. On the other hand, attempts to unite the
separate local societies of Irish towns in national Trade
Unions for Ireland have almost invariably failed, the Irish
clubs displaying far more willingness to become branches of
British unions than to amalgamate among themselves.^

Past experience of British Trade Unionism seems, there-
fore, to point to the whole extent of each trade within the
British Isles as forming the proper unit of government for
any combination of the wage-earners in that trade. Any
unit of smaller area produces an organisation of unstable
equilibrium, either tending constantly to expansion, or liable
to supersession by the growth of a rival society. But there
is a marked contrast between the union of Scotland with
England, and that effected between either of them and
Ireland. The English and Scottish Trade Unions federate
or combine with each other on equal terms. If complete
amalgamation is decided on, it is frequently the Scotchman,
bringing with him Scotch procedure and Scotch traditions,

^ The Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants now (1897) possesses no
fewer than 56 Irish branches, the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and
Joiners 56, the Amalgamated Society of Tailors 35, the Amalgamated Society of
Engineers 19, and the Associated Shipwrights' Society 9.

" Almost the only Irish national trade society is the Operative Bakers of
Ireland National Federal Union, formed in November 1889. An Irish Trade
Union Congress has been held annually since 1894.

88 Trade Union Struchtre

who is chosen to reign in England, the centre of government
being shifted almost automatically to the main centre of the
industry. Union with Ireland invariably means the simple
absorption of the Irish branch, and the unconditional accept-
ance of the English or Scottish rules and organisation. This
is usually brought about by the English or Scottish immi-
grants into Ireland, aided by sections of Irish members who
desire to escape from the weakness of internal dissensions,
and to secure the benefits of efficient administration, with the
support of a comparatively wealthy and powerful organisation.^
Passing now from the boundaries of the autonomous
state to the relation between central and local authorities
within it, we watch the Trade Unionists breaking away
from the traditions of British Democracy. In the political
expansion of the Anglo-Saxon race, the development of
local institutions has at least kept pace with the extension
of empire. In the other great organisations of the British
working class, which have, equally with Trade Unionism,
grown from small local beginnings to powerful corporations
of national, or even international extent, the workmen have
successfully maintained the complete independence of each
local unit. The Co-operative Movement includes within the
British Isles a nominal membership as great as that of Trade
Unionism, with financial transactions many times larger in
amount. The 1700 separate Co-operative Societies have
united in the colossal business federations of the English
and Scottish Wholesale Societies, and in the educational
and political federation called the Co-operative Union.
But though the Co-operative Movement has gone through
many developments since its re-bir.th in 1844, and has built
up a " State within the State," the great federal bodies have

^ It may not be improper to observe, for English political readers, that
the authors are divided in opinion as to the policy of granting Home Rule to
Ireland, and are therefore protected against bias in drawing political inferences
from Trade Union experience in this respect. If it is thought that the facts
adduced in this chapter tell against Irish self-government, the considerations
brought forward in the next chapter may be regarded as making against the
policy of complete union with Great Britain.

The Unit of Government 89

remained in all cases nothing but the agents and servants of
the local societies.-^ And if we turn to a movement still
more closely analogous to Trade Unionism, we may watch
in the marvellous expansion of the " Affiliated Orders "
among the friendly societies, the growth of a world-wide
working-class organisation, based on an almost complete
autonomy of the separate " lodges " within each " Order." "
To the members of an Oddfellows' Court or a Foresters'
Lodge any proposal to submit an issue of policy to the
federal executive would seem an unheard-of innovation. But
it is in their financial system that this insistence on com-
plete local autonomy shows itself most decisively. How-
ever strongly the qualities of benevolence or charity may
prevail among the Foresters or the Oddfellows, it has never
occurred to their rich Courts or Lodges to regard their
surplus funds as being freely at the disposal of those which
were unable to meet their engagements. Each retains and
controls its own funds for its own purposes, and its surplus
balances are considered as being as much the private
property of its own particular members as their individual
investments.

To outward seeming the scattered members of a national
Trade Union enjoy no less local self-government than those
of the Ancient Order of Foresters or the Manchester
Unity of Oddfellows. If the reader were to seek out, in some
tavern of an industrial centre, the local meeting-place of the
Foresters or the Carpenters, the Oddfellows or the Boiler-
makers, he might easily fail, on a first visit, to detect any
important difference between the Trade Union branch and
the court or lodge of the friendly society. The Oddfellows
who use the club-room on a Monday, the Carpenters who
meet there on a Tuesday, the Foresters who assemble on a
Thursday, and the Stonemasons or Boilermakers who come

1 The Co-operative Movement in Great Britain, by Beatrice Potter (Mrs.
Sidney Webb).

- See The Friendly Societies' Movement (London, 1885) and Muttial Thrift
(London, 1892), by the Rev. J. Frome Wilkinson, and English Associations of
Working Men, by Dr. J. Baernreither (London, 1892).

go Trade Union Structure

on successive Fridays, all seem " clubs " managing their own
affairs. Every night sees the same interminable proces-
sion of men, women, and children bringing the contribution
money. When the deliberations begin, they all affect the
same traditional mystery about " keeping the door," and
retain the long pause outside before admitting the nervous
aspirant for " initiation " ; they all " open the lodge " with the
same kind of cautious solemnity, and dignify with strange
titles and formal methods of address the officers whom they
are perpetually electing and re-electing. But if the visitor
listens carefully he will notice, in the Trade Union business,
constant references to mysterious outside authorities. The
whole branch may show itself in favor of the grant of
benefit to a particular applicant, but the secretary will
observe that any such payment would have to come out
of his own pocket, as the central executive has intimated
that the case is not within its interpretation of the rules.
The branch treasurer may announce that the balance in
hand has suddenly sunk to a few pounds, as he has been
ordered by the central office to remit £ioo to a branch at
the other end of the kingdom. And when a question arises
as to some dispute with an employer, the visitor will be
surprised to find that this characteristic Trade Union business
is not in the hands of the branch at all, but is being dealt
with by another outside authority, the " district," on instruc-
tions from the general secretary. ^

Trade Unionism has, in fact, been based from the outset
on the principle of the solidarity of the trade. Even the
eighteenth-century clubs of handicraftsmen, without national
organisation of any kind, habitually contributed their surplus

1 Branch meetings of Trade Unions are private, but it is not impossible for a
bona-fide student of Trade Unionism to gain admission as the friend of one of the
officials. The authors have attended branch meetings of almost every trade in
various industrial centres, and have found their proceedings of great interest, not
only as revealing the inner working of Trade Unionism, but also as displaying
the marked differences of physique, intellect, and character between the different
sections of the wage-earning class, often erroneously regarded as homogeneous.
Some of these differences are referred to in the chapter on " The Assumptions of
Trade Unionism."

The Unit of Government 9 1

balances in support of each other's temporary needs. When
the clubs drew together in a national union, it was
assumed, as a matter of course, that any cash in pos-
session of any branch was available for the needs of any
other branch. Thus we learn from the resolution of the
Stonemasons' Delegate Meeting of 1833, ^^^^ ^^e several
lodges were expected spontaneously to send their surplus
monies to the aid of any district engaged in a strike.^ This
archaic trustfulness in the brotherhood of man still contents
such a conservative -minded trade as the Coopers, whose
" Mutual Association " remains only a loose alliance of local
clubs, aiding each other's disputes by voluntary grants.^ But
in the large industries the same spirit soon embodied itself
in formal machinery. Among the Stonemasons the primi-
tive arrangement was, it is not surprising to learn, in the
opinion of the " Grand Central Committee," " wholly in-
efficient," each district sending only such funds as it chose,
and selecting which out of several districts on strike it would
support. The next step, which appears in the first manu-
script rules (probably of 1834), was to make each branch
" immediately contribute a proportionate share " of the cost
of maintaining each strike, fixed by the Grand Committee.
Finally, in 1837, we have what has become the typical Trade
Union arrangement of a fund belonging, not to the branch,
but to the society ; available only for the purposes prescribed
by the rules, but within those purposes common to the whole
organisation.

It is easy to understand why the Stonemasons, dispersed
over the country in relatively small groups, each conscious
of its own isolation and weakness in face of the great
capitalist contractor, should quickly seize the idea of a
common " war-chest." The Carpenters, working under much

^ Circular of " Grand Central Committee," held in Manchester, 28th
November 1833, preserved in the records of the Friendly Society of Operative
Stonemasons.

- See the various " monthly reports" of the Mutual Association of Coopers.
A proposal is under discussion to form a central fund, fed by regular contributions
for the aid of any branch under attack.

92 Trade Union Structure

the same circumstances, express this feeling in the following
terms : " Although oceans may separate us from each other,
our interests are identical ; and if we become united under
one constitution, governed by one code of rules, having one
common fund available wherever it may be required, we thus
acquire a power which, if judiciously exercised, will protect
our interests more effectually and will confer greater advan-
tages than can possibly be derived from any partial union." ^
But we may see the same process of financial centralisation
at work in trades densely concentrated in a small area. The
Cotton-spinners of Oldham and the surrounding towns were,
down to 1879, organised as a federation of ten financially
autonomous societies, each collecting, expending, and invest-
ing its own funds. The great trade struggle of 1877-78
revealed the weakness of this form of organisation. To
quote the words of an official of the trade,^ " The result
was that when a strike occurred, some of the branches were
on the point of bankruptcy, whilst others were in a good
position as regards funds for maintaining the struggle. They
soon found out their real fighting strength was gauged, not
by the worth of their richest branch, but by the poorest. It
was another exemplification of the old law of mechanics that
the strength of the chain is represented by its weakest link.
After the struggle they remedied the defect by enacting that
all surplus funds should be deposited in one common
account." Since that time each division of the Lancashire
Cotton-spinners has adopted the principle of centralised funds.
" We hold," says the General Secretary of the Bolton
Spinners, " that where the labour of any number of men is
subject to the same fluctuations of trade, when the product
of their labour goes into the same market, and when the
prices and conditions which regulate their wages are identical,
it is imperative upon such men, if they wish to protect their

1 Preface to the Rules of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners
(Manchester, 1891).

2 The late John Fielding, secretary of the Bolton Provincial Operative Cotton-
spinners' Association, one of the ablest leaders of the Cotton-spinners.

The Unit of Government 93

labour, to combine together in one association. It is not
sufficient that they shall join separate district societies which
in time may boast of possessing a respectable reserve fund
entirely under their own control. We have no hesitation in
saying that any such accumulated funds are of little use in
promoting their purely trade interests." ^

The paramount necessity of a central fund, available for
the defence of any branch that might be involved in indus-
trial war, has become so plain to every Trade Unionist that
society after society has adopted the principle of a common
purse. But a common purse, as one or two striking instances
among successful friendly societies prove, does not, in itself,
necessarily involve the establishment of a dominant central
executive wielding all administrative power. Where business
can be reduced to precise rules, into the carrying out of
which no question of policy enters, and no discretion is
allowed, experience shows, as we shall presently see, that
local branch administration may be as efficient and econo-
mical as that of a central authority. But the expenditure
of the Trade Union funds is determined, not exclusively by
the legislation of its members, but largely by the judgment
of its administrators. In all matters of trade protection,
whether it be the elaboration of a complicated list of piece-
work prices, the promotion of a new factory bill, the nego-
tiation of a national agreement with the associated employers,
or the conduct of a strike, it passes the wit of man to pre-
scribe by any written rule the exact method or amount of
the expenditure to be incurred. It follows that the larger
and most distinctive part of Trade Union administration,
unlike the award of friendly benefits, cannot be predeter-
mined by any law or scale, but must be left to the discretion
of the executive authority. To vest this discretion abso-
lutely and exclusively in the central executive representing
the whole body of members is, it is plain, the only way by
which those who have contributed the income can retain

1 Annual Report of the Bolton Provincial Operative Cotton-spinners' Associa-
tion, 1882.

94 Trade Union Structure

any control over its expenditure. But this development
necessarily entails the withdrawal from the branches of all
real autonomy in issues of policy and in the expenditure of
their part of the common income. It follows necessarily from
the merging of the branch monies into a fund common to
the whole society, and from the replenishment of this fund
by levies upon all the members alike, that no local branch
can safely be permitted to involve the whole organisation in
war. Centralisation of finance implies, in a militant organi-
sation, centralisation of administration. Those Trade Unions
which have most completely recognised this fact have proved
most efficient, and therefore most stable. Where funds have
been centralised, and power nevertheless left, through the
inadvertence or lack of skill of the framers of the rules, to
local authorities, the result has been weakness, divided
counsels, and financial disaster.

This cardinal principle of democratic finance has been
only slowly and imperfectly learnt by Trade Unionists, and
a lack of clear insight into the matter still produces calami-
tous results in large and powerful organisations. To take,
for instance, the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, which
was formed for the express purpose of bringing about a
uniform trade policy under the control of a central executive.
It was intended to secure this result by providing that strike
pay should be awarded only by the central executive, leaving
the branches to dispense the other benefits prescribed by
the rules. But unfortunately this strike pay amounts only to
five shillings a week, it being assumed that the member leav-
ing his work will also be receiving the Out of Work donation
of ten shillings a week, awarded by his branch. This con-
fusion of trade with friendly benefits has resulted in a serious
weakening of the authority of the central executive in matters
of trade policy. Whenever the men working in any engineer-
ing establishment are dissatisfied with any decision of their
employer, they can appeal to their own branch, and, on
obtaining its permission, may drop their tools, with the
certainty that they will receive at the cost of the whole

The Unit of Government 95

society the Out of Work benefit of ten shillings a week.^
The matter will be reported, in due course, by the district
committee to the central executive, even if the branch itself
does not trouble to apply for permission to pay the additional
five shillings a week contingent benefit. But meanwhile,
war has been declared, and has actually begun ; the local
employers may have retaliated with a lock-out, the whole
district may even have " come out " in support of their
fellow-workmen ; and the society may find its prestige and
honor involved in maintaining a great industrial conflict
without its central executive ever having decided that the
point at issue was one which should be fought at all. This,
indeed, is precisely what happened in the most disastrous
and discreditable of recent trade disputes, the prolonged
strike of the Engineers and Plumbers in the Tyneside ship-
building yards in 1892, when thousands of men were idle
for over three months, not in order to raise the Standard of
Life of themselves or any other section of the workers, but
because the local Engineers and Plumbers could not agree
as to which of them should fit up two-and-a-half inch
iron piping. It would be easy for any student of the
records of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers to pick
out many other cases in which branches have, by paying
the Out of Work donation to members refusing work,
initiated important trade movements on their own account,
without the prior knowledge or consent of the central
executive.

This unfortunate confusion between Out of Work
benefit and strike pay is not the only ambiguity that
perplexes the administrators of the Amalgamated Society of
Engineers. Although any authorised dispute is supported

1 This injurious practice has been greatly strengthened by the fact that the
"contingent fund," out of which alone the strike pay could formerly be granted,
has often been abolished and subsequently re-established, by votes of the
members. During the periods in which the contingent fund did not exist, the
society had no other means of resisting encroachments than the award of Out of
Work benefit to members who refused to submit to them. But this left the
decision to the branch, though the funds which it dispensed were levied equally
on the whole society.

96 Trade Union Structure

from the funds of the society as a whole, it is left to the
local members through their district committee to begin the
quarrel. This would seem to mean complete local autonomy,
and it is cherished as such by the more active branches.
But the rule also provides that the resolutions of district
committees shall be " subject to the approval " of the central
executive, the ultimate veto, though not the direction of the
policy, being thus vested in headquarters. The incapacity of
the Engineers to make up their minds whether or not they
desire local autonomy in trade policy, has more than once
placed the society in an invidious and even ludicrous position.
Thus, in the autumn of 1895 the Belfast branches, with the
confirmation of the central executive, struck for an advance.
The federated employers thereupon locked out, not only all
the Belfast engineers, but also those on the Clyde. In the
negotiations which ensued the central executive naturally
represented the society, and eventually arranged a com-
promise, which was approved by the Clyde branches. The
Belfast branches, on the other hand, refused to accept the
agreement or to consider the strike at an end, and went on
issuing full strike pay, from the funds of the whole society,
to all their members. The central executive found itself
bitterly reproached by the federated employers for what
seemed a breach of faith, and public opinion was scandalised
by the lack of loyalty and discipline. Eventually the dead-
lock was ended by the central executive taking upon itself
peremptorily to order the Belfast members to resume work,
without waiting for the resolution of the district committee.
Whether the central executive had any right to intervene at
all, otherwise than by confirming or disallowing a resolution
of the district committee, became a matter of heated con-
troversy; and the Delegate Meeting of 1896 not only passed
a resolution censuring this action, but also framed a new
rule which expressly deprives both the central executive and
the district committee of the power of closing a dispute, by
making the consent of a two-thirds majority of the local
members — some or all of whom must be the very persons

The Unit of Government 9 7

concerned — necessary to the closing of a strike.^ This
fanatical attachment of the Engineers to an extreme local
autonomy — their persistent assumption that any one section,
however small and unimportant, ought to be allowed to draw
on the funds of the whole society in support of a policy of
which the majority of the members may disapprove — has
done incalculable harm to the Amalgamated Society of
Engineers. It has been the source of a continuous and need-
less drain on the society's resources. It has more than once
involved thousands of members in a lock-out, when they had
no quarrel of their own. It deprives the federated employers
of all confidence in those who meet them on the workmen's
behalf. And, most important of all, it effectually prevents
the society from maintaining any genuine defence of the
conditions of its members' employment. National agree-
ments such as are concluded by the United Society of Boiler-
makers, the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-
spinners, and the National Union of Boot and Shoe
Operatives, by which a general levelling-up of conditions is
secured, must necessarily be out of the power of an organ-
isation which cannot give its negotiators the mandate of a
common will.

The same conflict between centralisation of finance and
the surviving local autonomy of the branches may be traced
in the rules of most of the unions in the building trade.
Here the tradition has been to require the assent of the
whole society, or of the central executive as its representa-
tive, before any branch may strike, or even negotiate, for an
increase of wages or new trade privileges. But it has been
no less firmly rooted in the practice of the building trades,
for any branch, or even any individual workman, instantly
to cease work, without consulting the central executive,
whenever an employer makes an encroachment on the
existing Working Rules of that town. In such cases, by
the rules of most of the national unions in these trades,
strike pay is granted by the branch as a matter of course.

1 Rules of the Amalgamated Society of EngtJieers (London, 1896), p. 54.
VOL. I H

98 Trade Union Structure

A branch is accordingly expressly authorised to involve the
whole society in war, whenever its own interpretation of
existing customs is challenged by an employer, even in the
minutest particular. We may easily imagine how greatly
international hostilities would be increased, if the governor
of every colony or out-lying dependency were authorised
instantly to declare war, in the name and on the resources
of the whole empire, whenever, in his own private judg-
ment, any infringement of national rights had taken place.
And although, in the Trade Union instance, each particular
branch dispute is usually neither momentous nor prolonged,
the result is a captious and spasmodic trade policy, some-
times even ridiculous in its inconsistency, which the central
executive has no effective power to check. The Friendly
Society of Operative Stonemasons and the Operative Brick-
layers' Society have, until recent years, specially suffered from
a constant succession of petty quarrels with particular em-
ployers, most of which would have been avoided if the point
at issue had been made the subject of quiet negotiation by
an officer acting on behalf of the whole society.^ This has
been dimly perceived by the leaders of the building trades.
Among the Bricklayers and Stonemasons, the traditional
right of the branch to strike against encroachments, without
authorisation from the central executive, has hitherto been
too firmly held to be abolished ; but the newer editions
of the rules expressly limit this right to certain kinds
of encroachment, and require the branch to obtain the

1 Sometimes the interpretation placed by two branches on the Working Rules
of one or both of them may seriously differ. The Kendal branch of the
Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons had, in 1873, in its Working Rules,
a provision requiring employers to provide dinner for men sent to work beyond
a certain distance from their homes in the town. A Kendal employer sent
members of the Kendal branch to a place twenty miles away which was
within the district of another branch having no such rule. The Kendal masons
insisted on their employer complying with the Kendal rules, whereupon he
replaced them by men belonging to the local branch, who contended that the
Kendal rules did not apply to work done in their district. This fine point in
interpretation led to endless recrimination between the two branches, and much
local friction. Finally the issue was referred to a vote of the whole society, which
went against the Kendal branch. — Fortnightly Return, October 1873.

The Unit of Government 99

authority of the whole society before resisting any other
kind of attack. The Amalgamated Society of Carpenters
and Joiners has advanced a step further in centralisation
of policy. For the last twenty years its rules have expressly
forbidden any branch to strike " without first obtaining the
sanction of the executive council . . . whether it be for a
new privilege or against an encroachment on existing ones." ^
It is no mere coincidence that the Amalgamated Society of
Carpenters and Joiners, though younger than many other
societies in the building trades, is now the largest and most
wealthy of them all.

The difficulties that beset the Amalgamated Society of
Engineers and the Operative Bricklayers' Society have been
overcome by the United Society of Boilermakers, a union
which has found a way to combine efficient administration
of friendly benefits with a strong and uniform trade policy.
Here the problem has been solved by an absolute separa-
tion, both in name and in application, between the trade
and friendly benefits. The " donation benefit " for the
support of the unemployed is restricted to " a man thrown
out of employment through depression of trade or other
causes," testified by " a note signed by the foreman or
by three full members that are working in the shop
or yard he has left," and proved to the satisfaction of
the officers of the branch. This benefit cannot be given to
a man leaving his employment on a dispute of any kind
whatsoever. Strike pay is an entirely separate benefit,
awarded, even in the case of a single workman, only by the
central executive, and payable only upon its express and
particular direction.^ It follows that, although the branches
administer the friendly benefits, they are not allowed to deal
in any way with trade matters. If any dispute arises between
an employer and his workmen, or even between him and one
of his workmen, the case is at once taken up by the district
delegate, an officer appointed by and acting for the whole

^ Rule 28, sec. lo of edition of 1893, p. 66.
2 Rules of the United Society of Boilermakos {H^vica.'iWe, 1S95).

loo Trade Union Structure

society, in constant communication with the general secretary
at headquarters. No workman may drop his tools, or even
give notice to his employer, over any question of trade
privileges, except with the prior authorisation of the district
delegate ; and to make doubly sure that this law shall be
implicitly obeyed, not a penny of benefit may be paid by
the branch in any such case, except on the express direction
of the central executive.

Nevertheless, the Trade Union branch, even in the most
centralised society, continues to fulfil an indispensable function
in Trade Union administration. As an association for mutual
insurance, for the provision of sick pay, funeral expenses, and
superannuation allowance, the Trade Union, like the friendly
society, governs its action by definite rules and fixed scales
of benefit, which are nowadays settled as an act of legisla-
tion by the society as a whole. Even the Out of Work
benefit — the " Donation " or " Idle Money," which none but
trade societies have found it possible to undertake, is dealt
with in the same manner. The printed constitution of the
typical modern union prescribes in minute detail what sums
are to be paid for sickness or out of work benefit, and
attempts to provide by elaborate rules for every possible
contingency. The central executive rigidly insists on the
rules being obeyed to the letter, and it might at first seem
as if nothing had been left for the branch to do. This
is very far from being the case. To protect the funds
from imposition, local and even personal knowledge is
indispensable. Is a man sick or malingering? Has an
unemployed member lost his situation through slackness of
his employer's business or slackness of his own energy?
These are questions that can best be answered by men
who have worked with him in the factory, know the
foreman who has dismissed him, and the employer
who has refused to take him on, and are acquainted
with the whole circumstances of his life. Here we find
the practical utility which has kept the Trade Union
branch alive as a vital part of Trade Union organisation.

The Unit of Government loi

It serves as a jury for determining, not questions of policy,
but issues of fact.^

And if for a moment we leave the question of local self-
government, and consider all the functions of the branch, we
shall recognise the practical convenience of this institution
even in the most highly centralised society. It is no small
gain in a democratic organisation to have insured the regular
meeting together of the great bulk of the members, under
conditions which lead directly to the discussion of their
common needs. Nor is the educational value of the branch
meeting its only justification. In every Trade Union, whether
governed by the Referendum or by a Representative Assembly,

^ The utility of this jury system, if we may so describe the branch function,
may be gathered from the experience of other benefit organisations. It is, to
begin with, significant that the great industrial insurance companies and collecting
societies, with their millions of working-class customers, and their ubiquitous
network of paid officials, but without a jury system, find it financially impossible
to undertake to give even sick pay, let alone out of work benefit. The Prudential
Assurance Company, the largest and best managed of them all, began to do so,
but had to abandon it because, as the secretary told the Royal Commission on
Friendly Societies in 1873, "after five years' experience we found we were
unable to cope with the fraud that was practised." Among friendly societies
proper, in which sick benefit is the main feature, it is instructive to find that
it is among the Foresters and Oddfellows, where each court or lodge is financially
autonomous, that the rate of sickness is lowest. One interesting society, the
Rational Sick and Burial Association (established in 1837 by Robert Owen and
his "Rational Religionists"), is organised exactly like a national amalgamated
Trade Union, with branches administering benefits payable from a common fund.
In this society, as we gather, the rate of sickness is slightly greater than in the
Affiliated Orders, where each lodge not only decides on whether benefit shall be
given, but also has itself to find the money. Finally, when we come to the
Hearts of Oak Benefit Society, the largest and most efficient of the centralised
friendly societies having no branches at all, and dispensing all benefits from the
head office, we find the rate of sickness habitually far in excess of the experience
of the Foresters or the Oddfellows, or even of the Rationals, an excess due,
according to the repeated declarations of the actuary, to nothing but inadequate
provision against fraud and malingering. During the eight years 1884-91, for
instance, the "expected sickness," according to the 1866-70 experience of the
Manchester Unity of Oddfellows (all districts), was 1,111,553 weeks; the actual
weeks for which benefit was drawn numbered no fewer than 1,452,106, an
excess of over 30 per cent {Ati Enquiry into the MetJwds, etc., of a Friendly
Society, by R. P. Hardy, 1894, p. 36). "Centralised societies," says the
Rev. Frome Wilkinson, "will never be able to avoid being imposed upon; not
so, however, a well-regulated branch of an affiliated society with its machineiy in
good working order" i^The Friendly Societies Movet/ient, p. 193). See also
" Fifty Years of Friendly Society Progress," by the same author, in the Oddfellows^
Magazine for 1888.

I02 Trade Union Structure

the branch forms an integral part of the legislative machinery.
If the laws are made by the votes of the members, it is
the branch meeting which is the deliberative assembly, and
usually also the polling place. When the society enjoys
fully developed representative institutions, the branch becomes
at once a natural and convenient electoral division, and
supplies, what is so sorely needed in political democracy, a
means by which the representative must regularly meet every
section of his constituents. In other trades it is common to
require that no important alteration of the society's rules shall
be put before the Representative Assembly until it has been
first discussed, and sometimes voted on, by one or more of
the branches. In attending branch meetings we have found
most interesting that part of the evening which is taken up
with the reports made by the branch representatives on the
local Trades Council, on a district or joint committee of the
trade, or in the Representative Assembly of the society itself.
It has often occurred to us how much it would enliven and
invigorate political democracy if the member of Parliament
or the Town Councillor had habitually to report to, and
discuss with, every section of his constituents, supporters and
opponents alike, all the public business in which they were
interested. Quite apart, therefore, from any administrative
functions, organisation by branches has manifold uses, even
in the most centralised society. But these uses have little
connection with the problem of centralisation and local
autonomy. In all these respects the branches are not separate
units of government, but constitute, in effect, a single mass
meeting of members, geographically sliced up into aggregates
of convenient size.

Thus, in the vexed problem of how to divide ad-
ministration between central and local authorities. Trade
Union experience affords no guide, either to other volun-
tary associations or to political democracy. The extreme
centralisation of finance and policy, which the Trade Union
has found to be a condition of efficiency, has been forced
upon it by the unique character of its functions. The lavish

The Unit of Government 103

generosity with which the early trade clubs granted their
surplus funds right and left to the clubs in other towns that
needed assistance, was not simply an outburst of brotherly
unselfishness. Each club had a keen appreciation that a
reduction of wages in one centre was likely soon to spread to
other towns, as a result either of the competition among the
employers, or of the migration among the workmen. And
when the various local clubs drew together into a national
combination and appointed one salaried officer after another
to execute the commands of a central executive, this was not
due to any indifference to local self-government or liking for
bureaucracy, nor even to any philanthropic impulse to be kind
to their weaker brethren, but to a dim recognition of their
own dependence upon securing a trade policy uniform from
one end of the kingdom to the other. This aspiration has
crystallised in the minds of all experienced Trade Unionists
into a fixed conviction, which has long since spread to the
rank and file. It is obvious that a uniform policy can only
be arrived at and maintained by a central body acting for
the whole trade. And thus it comes about that the constant
tendency to a centralised and bureaucratic administration is,
in the Trade Union world, accepted, and even welcomed, by
men who, in all the other organisations to which they belong,
are sturdy defenders of local autonomy.^

1 This generalisation applies, in its entirety, only to the trade funds and trade
policy of the unions. In so far as the friendly society side of Trade Unionism is
used only as an adventitious attraction in obtaining members, there is no inherent
difficulty in each local branch, in its capacity of "benefit club," fixing its own
rates of contribution, retaining its own funds, and administering its own affairs,
whilst at the same time forming part, for all trade protection purposes, of a strictly
centralised national combination. More usually, however, the friendly society
side of Trade Unionism is valued also for the adventitious aid which its accu-
mulating funds bring to the war chest. Thus we find that the national Trade
Unions, with very few exceptions, have now centralised not only their trade but
also their friendly society resources, the whole of each member's contribution being
l^aid into a common fund available for all the purposes of the society. The result
is, accordingly, to concentrate still more authority in the hands of the central
executive.

CHAPTER IV

INTERUNION RELATIONS

Throughout the foregoing chapters we have accepted the
current assumption that there is such a thing as a " trade,"
as to the boundaries of which no question can arise. In
the preface to nearly every Trade Union book of rules we
find some passage to the following effect : " Every artisan
following a given occupation has an interest, in common
with all those similarly engaged, in forming rules by which
that particular trade shall be regulated." But what is a
" trade," and how are its limits to be defined ? By the
journalist or professional man, every mechanic employed
at Armstrong's or Whitworth's would naturally be classed as
an engineer ; would be expected to belong to the " Engineers'
Trade Union " ; and would at any rate be clearly distin-
guished from a plumber, a joiner, or a shipwright. Yet the
grouping of these mechanics into their several organisations,
and the relations of these organisations to each other, are
responsible for some of the most serious difficulties of British
Trade Unionism.

We had better first state the problem as it appears in
some of the principal trades. A single industry will often
include sections of workers differing widely from each other
in their standard earnings, in the kind and amount of pro-
tection called for by their circumstances, and in the strategic
strength of their respective positions against the employer,
upon which, in the end, their trade policy will depend. Thus

Interunion Relations 105

a cotton-spinning mill, with 40 pairs of mules, will employ-
about 90 cardroom operatives, mostly women, the men earn-
ing from 1 8s. to 30s. per week and the women 12s. 6d. to
1 9s. 6d. ; 40 adult male mule-spinners, earning, by piecework,
from 30s. to 50s. per week ; 80 boys and men as piecers,
engaged and paid by the mule-spinners at 6s. 6d. to 20s. per
week ; and 2 overlookers with weekly salaries of 42s. and
upwards. The adjacent cotton -weaving shed, with 800
looms, will employ about 260 male and female weavers, paid
by the piece and earning from 14s. to 20s. per week ; 8
overlookers (men), paid by a percentage on the weavers'
earnings, and getting 32s. to 42s. per week ; 10 twisters and
drawers, earning at piecework 25s. to 32s. per week; 5
warpers and beamers working by the piece and making from
20s. to 30s. per week ; 3 or 4 tapesizers with a fixed weekly
wage of 42s. per week ; a number of children varying from
I to 50, employed by the weavers as tenters, and paid small
sums ; and a manager over the whole with a salary of ;i^200
or ;!^300 per annum.^

All these operatives may be engaged by a single em-
ployer, work upon the same raw material, and produce for
the same market. They have obviously many interests in
common. But for all that they do not form a simple unit of
government. It is impossible to devise any constitution which
would enable these six or more classes of cotton operatives
to form an amalgamated union, having a common policy, a
common purse, a common executive, and a common staff of
officials, without sacrificing the financial and trade interest of
one, or even all of the different sections. It suits the well-
paid sections, such as the Spinners, Tapesizers, Beamers,
Twisters, Drawers, and Overlookers, to pay a high weekly
contribution, which would be beyond the means of the
Cardroom Operatives and the Weavers. But the manner in
which each section desires to apply its funds varies even

^ Compare the still more detailed classification of workers incidentally given
in the Board of Trade Report by Miss Collet on the Statistics of EmploymciU
of Women and Girls, C. 7564, 1894.

io6 Trade Union Structure

more than their amount. The Tapesizers, deriving their
strategic strength from their highly specialised skill, the
impossibility of replacing them, and the small proportion
which their wages bear to the total cost of production, can
afiford to spend their funds on ample sick and funeral benefits.
With a uniform time rate in each district, and few occasions
for dispute with their employers, they need no offices or
salaried officials whatsoever. It pays the Spinners and
Weavers, on the other hand, to maintain a highly skilled
professional staff for the purpose of computing and maintain-
ing their earnings under the complicated lists of piecework
prices. But the Weavers stand at the disadvantage of need-
ing also a large staff of paid collectors to secure the regular
payment of contributions from the girls and married women,
who are indisposed to bring their weekly pence to the public-
house in which the branch meeting is still frequently held.
This applies also to the Cardroom Operatives, but these,
working usually at time rates, do not need the weavers' skilled
calculator. The Beamers, Twisters, and Drawers, on the one
hand, and the Overlookers on the other, have again their own
peculiarities. To unite, in any common scheme of contri-
butions and benefits, classes so diverse in their means and
requirements, appears absolutely impossible. Still more
difficult would it be to provide for the effective representation
upon a common executive of sections so different in numerical
strength. Not to mention the Tapesizers and Overlookers,
who must be completely submerged by the rest, it would be
difficult to induce the 19,000 well-paid, well-officered, and
well-disciplined Spinners to submit their trade policy to the
decision of the 22,000 ill-paid Cardroom Operatives or the
85,000 Weavers, of whom two-thirds are women. On the
other hand, the Weavers would not permanently forego the
advantage of their overwhelming superiority in numbers, nor
would the Spinners allow the Tapesizers an equal voice with
themselves. But even if a representative executive could, by
some device, be got together, it would not form a fit body
to decide the technical questions peculiar to each class.

Interunioil Relations 107

On each point as it arose, the experts would be in a
minority, and the decisions, whatever their justice, would
invariably cause dissatisfaction to one section or another.
Moreover, quite apart from technical details, the moments of
strategic advantage differ from section to section. It may
suit the Spinners to move for an advance, at a time when the
weaving trade is depressed, and both will be more ready to
move than the Overlookers. The Tapesizers, on the other
hand, will prefer, to any overt strike, the silent withdrawal of
one man after another from a recalcitrant employer, until he
is ready to offer the Trade Union terms. It is obvious that
a council representing such diverse elements would find it
extremely difficult to maintain an active and consistent
course. On the other hand, all the sections of Cotton
Operatives have manifold interests in common. Every
factory act regulating the sanitation, hours of labor,
machinery, age of children, and inspection of factories,
directly or indirectly concerns every worker in the mill.
Such industrial dislocations as Liverpool " cotton corners,"
or the employers' mutual agreement to reduce stocks by
working short time, affect all alike. The policy of the
Indian Secretary, the Minister of Education, or the Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer, may, any moment, touch them all
on a vital point. If, therefore, the Cotton Operatives are to
have any effective voice in regulating these essentially trade
matters, their organisation must in some form be co-extensive
with the whole cotton industry.

Another instance of these difficulties is presented by the
great industry of engineering. A century ago the small
skilled class of millwrights executed every kind of engineer-
ing operation, from making the wooden patterns to erecting
in the mill the machines which had been constructed by
their own hands. The enormous expansion of the engineer-
ing industry has long since brought about a division of
labor, and the mechanics in a great engineering establish-
ment to-day are divided into numerous distinct classes of
workers, who are rarely able to do each other's work. The

io8 Trade Union Structure

pattern-makers, working in wood, have become sharply-
marked off from the boilermakers and the ironfounders.
The smiths, again, are distinguished from the fitters, turners,
and erectors. Another form of specialisation has arisen with
the increased use of other metals than iron and steel, and
we have brass -founders, brass-finishers, and coppersmiths.
Each generation sees a great development in the use of
machines to make machines, so that a modern engineering
shop, in addition to the time-honored lathe, includes a be-
wildering variety of drilling, shaping, boring, planing, slotting,
milling, and other machines, attended by wholly new classes
of machine-minders and tool-makers, displaying every grade
of skill. Finally, we have such new kinds of work, with new
classes of specialists, as are involved in the innumerable
applications of iron and steel in modern civilisation, such as
iron ships and bridges, ordnance and armour-plating, hydraulic
apparatus and electric-lighting, sewing-machines and bicycles.
To discover the exact limits of a " trade " in these closely
related but varied occupations is a task of supreme difficulty.
All are working in the same industry, and in the large
establishments of to-day, all may be engaged by a single
employer. The same recurring waves of expansion and
contraction sooner or later affect all alike. On the other
hand, there exist between the separate occupations great
varieties of methods of remuneration, standard earnings, and
strategic position. The strictly - apprenticed boilermakers
(shipyard platers) working in compact groups, at co-operative
piecework, earning sometimes as much as a pound a day,
find it advantageous in good times to roll up, by large sub-
scriptions, a huge reserve fund, to maintain a staff of special
trade officers to arrange their piecework prices at every port,
and to provide handsomely for their recurring periods of
trade depression. At the other end of the scale we have the
intelligent laborer become an automatic machine-minder,
securing relative continuity of low-paid employment by
working any simple machine in any kind of engineering
establishment, and interested mainly in the opening of every

Interunion Relations 109

operation to the quickwitted outsider. The pattern-maker
again, working in wood, at a high time rate, has httle in
common with the piece-working smith at the forge. When
trade begins to improve, the pattern-makers, followed by the
ironfounders, will be busy long before the smiths, fitters,
and turners, and, if they wish to recover the wages lost in
the previous depression, must move for an advance whilst
all the rest of the engineering industry is still on short time.
Finally, there is the difficulty of the method and basis of
representation. Shall the government be centred in an iron
shipbuilding port, where the boilermakers would be supreme,
or in an inland engineering centre, when the fitters and
turners would have an equally great preponderance ? How
can the tiny groups of pattern-makers, dispersed over the
whole kingdom, get their separate interests attended to amid
the overwhelming majorities of the other classes ? Any
attempt to represent, upon an executive council, each dis-
tinct occupation, let alone each great centre, must either
ignore all proportional considerations, or involve the forma-
tion of a body of impossible dimensions and costliness.

We see, therefore, that within the circle of what is usually
called a trade, there are often smaller circles of specialised
classes of workmen, each sufficiently distinctive in character
to claim separate consideration. The first idea is always to
cut the Gordian knot by ignoring these differences, and
making the larger circle the unit of government. So fas-
cinating is this idea of " amalgamation " that it has been
tried in almost every industry. The reader of the History
of Trade Unionism will remember the remarkable attempt
in 1833-34 to form a national "Builders' Union," to com-
prise the seven different branches of building operatives.
The same years saw a succession of general unions in the
cloth-making industry. In 1844, and again in 1863, the
coalminers sought to combine in one amalgamated union
every person employed in or about the mines, from one end
of the kingdom to the other. The " Iron Trades " again
were, between 1840 and 1850, the subject of innumerable

iio Trade Union Structure

local projects of amalgamation, in which not only the " Five
Trades of Mechanism," but also the Boilermakers and the
Ironfounders were all to be included. We need not describe
the failure of all these attempts. More can, perhaps, be
learnt from the experience of the great modern instance, the
Amalgamated Society of Engineers.

It does not seem to have occurred to William Newton,
when he launched this famous amalgamation, that any diffi-
culty could arise as to the classes of workers to be included.
What he was primarily concerned about was to merge in
one national organisation all the various local societies of
engineering mechanics, whether pattern-makers, smiths, turners,
fitters, or erectors, working either in iron or brass. But
" sectionalism " stood, from the very first, in the way. The
various local clubs of Smiths and Pattern-makers objected
strongly to sink their individuality in a general engineers'
union. In the same way, the more exclusive Steam-Engine
Makers' Society, in which millwrights, fitters, and turners
predominated, refused to merge itself in the wider organisa-
tion. To Newton and Allan all these objections seemed to
arise from the natural reluctance of local clubs to lose their
individuality in a national union. This dislike, as they
rightly felt, was destined to give way before the superior
advantages of national combination. But subsequent ex-
perience has shown that the resistance to the amalgamation
was due to more permanent causes. The merely local
societies dropped in, one by one, to their greater rival. But
this only revealed a more serious cleavage. The present
rivals of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers are, not any
local engineers' clubs, but national societies each claiming
the exclusive allegiance of different sections of the trade.
The pattern-makers, for instance, came to the conclusion in
1872 that their interests were neglected in the Amalgamated
Society of Engineers, and formed the United Pattern-makers'
Association, which now includes a large and increasing
majority of this highly skilled class. The Associated Society
of Blacksmiths, originally a Glasgow local club, now dominates

Interunion Relations

1 1 1

its particular section of the trade on the Clyde and in
Belfast, and has branches in the North of England. The
Brass-workers, the Coppersmiths, and the Machine-minders
have now all their own societies of national extent. The
result has been that the Amalgamated Society of Engineers
does not realise Newton's idea as regards any section what-
ever. The Boilermakers, who refused to have anything to
do with amalgamation, and who have persistently put their
energy into organising their own special craft, have succeeded,
as we have mentioned, in forming one undivided, consolidated,
and centralised society for the entire kingdom. Very different
is the condition of the engineers. Neither the fitters nor the
smiths, the pattern-makers nor the machine-minders, the
brass-workers nor the coppersmiths, are united in any one
society, or able to maintain a uniform trade policy, even for
their own section of the industry. For all this confusion, the
enthusiastic adherents of the Amalgamated Society have gone
on preaching the one remedy of an ever-wider amalgama-
tion. " The future basis of the Amalgamated Society," urged
Mr. Tom Mann in 1891, " must be one that will admit every
workman engaged in connection with the engineering trades,
and who is called upon to exhibit mechanical skill in the
performance of his labor. This would include men on
milling and drilling machines, tool-makers, die-sinkers, and
electrical engineers, and it would make it necessary to have
the requisite staff at the general office to cater for so large a
constituency, as there are at least 250,000 men engaged in
the engineering and machine trades of the United Kingdom,
and the work of organising this body must be undertaken
by the A. S. E." ^ Somewhat against the advice of the
more experienced officials, successive delegate meetings have
included within the society one section of workmen after
another. At the delegate meeting of 1892, which opened
the society to practically every competent workman in the
most miscellaneous engineering establishment, it was even

1 Address to the East End Institute of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers,
London, in Trade Unionist, loth October 1891.

112 Trade Union Structure

urged by some branches that the boundaries should be
still further enlarged, so as to permit the absorption of
plumbers and ironfounders. This proposal was with some
reluctance rejected, but only on the ground that it would
have brought the Amalgamation into immediate collision
with the 16,278 members of the Friendly Society of Iron-
founders (established 1809); and with the compact and
militant United Operative Plumbers' Society (established
1848, membership 8758), rivals too powerful to be lightly
encountered. Each successive widening of the amalgama-
tion brings it, in fact, into conflict with a larger number of
other unions, who become its embittered enemies. The very
competition between rival societies which Newton's amal-
gamation was intended to supersede, has, through this all-
inclusive policy itself, been rendered more intense and
intractable.

And here it is imperative that the reader should fully
appreciate the disastrous effect of this competition and rivalry
between separate Trade Unions. The evil will be equally
apparent whether we regard the Trade Union merely as a
friendly society for insuring the weekly wage-earner against
loss of livelihood through sickness, old age, and depression
of trade, or as a militant organisation for enabling the
manual worker to obtain better conditions from the capitalist
employer.

Let us consider first the side of Trade Unionism which
has, from the outset, been universally praised and admired,
the " ancient and most laudable custom for divers artists
within the United Kingdom to meet and form themselves
into societies for the sole purpose of assisting each other in
cases of sickness, old age, and other infirmities, and for the
burial of their dead." ^ Now, whatever weight may be given,
in matters of commerce, to the maxim caveat emptor — how-
ever thoroughly we may rely, as regards articles of personal
consumption, on the buyer's watchfulness over his own

1 Preamble to Rules of the Friendly Society of Ironmoulders (Manchester,
1809), and to those of many other unions of this epoch.

Interunion Relations 113

interests — it is indisputable that, in the whole realm of
insurance, competition does practically nothing to promote
efficiency. The assumption which underlies the faith in
unrestricted competition is that the consumer is competent
to judge of the quality of what he pays for, or that he will at
any rate become so in the act of consumption. In matters
of financial insurance no such assumption can reasonably be
maintained. Apart from the dangers of irregularities and
defalcations, the whole question of efficiency or inefficiency
in friendly society administration is bound up with the
selection of proper actuarial data, the collection and verifica-
tion of the society's own actuarial experience, and the con-
sequent fixing of the due rates of contribution and benefits.
When rival societies bid against each other for members,
competition inevitably takes the form, either of offering the
common benefits at a lower rate, or of promising extravagant
benefits at the common rate of subscription. The ordinary
man, innocent of actuarial science, is totally unable to
appreciate the merits of the rival scales put before him.
To the raw recruit the smallness of the weekly levy offers
an almost irresistible attraction. Nor does such illegitimate
competition between societies work, as might be supposed,
its own cure. The club charging rates insufficient to meet
its liabilities will, it is true, in the end bring about its own
destruction. But the actuarial nemesis is slow to arrive, as
many years must elapse before the full measure of the
liability for death claims and superannuation allowances
can be tested. And when the inevitable collapse comes,
the prudent society gains little by the dissolution of its
unsound rival. A club which has failed to meet its engage-
ments, and has been broken up, leaves those who have been
its members suspicious of all forms of organisation and
indisposed to renew their contributions. The payment for
some time of high benefits in return for low subscriptions
will have falsified the standard of expectation. Those who
have lost their money ascribe the failure to the dishonesty
or incapacity of the officers, to the workmen's lack of loyalty,
VOL. I I

114 Trade Union Structure

to any cause, indeed, rather than to their own unreasonable-
ness in expecting a shilling's worth of benefits for a sixpenny
contribution.

In the case of Friendly Societies proper, and in that of
Insurance Companies, the untrustworthiness of competition
as a guarantee of financial efficiency has been fully recog-
nised by the community, and dealt with by the legislature.^
Trade Unions, however, have, for good and sufficient reasons,
been left outside the scope of these provisions.^ But, as a
matter of fact, competition between Trade Unions on their
benefit club side is even more injurious to their soundness
than it is to Friendly Societies proper. Dealing as they do,
not with a specially selected class of thrifty citizens, but
with the whole body of men in their trade ; unable, owing to
their other functions, to concentrate their members' attention
upon the actuarial side of their affairs ; and destitute of any
authoritative data or scientific calculation for such benefits
as Out of Work pay. Trade Unions must always find it
specially difficult to resist a demand for increase of benefits, or
lowering of contribution. If two unions are competing for the
same class of members, the pressure becomes irresistible.

The history of Trade Unionism is one long illustration of
this argument. In one trade after another we watch the
cropping up of " mushroom unions," their heated rivalry

^ It is unnecessary for us to do more than refer to the long series of statutes,
beginning in 1786, which provide for the registration, publication of accounts,
public audit, and even compulsory valuation of Friendly Societies and Industrial
Insurance Companies. By every means, short of direct prohibition, the State
now seeks to put obstacles in the way of "under-cutting," and, to use the words
of Mr. Reuben Watson before the Select Committee on National Provident
Insurance in 1885 (Question 893), discourages "the formation of new societies
on the unsound principles of former times." Within the two great "affiliated
orders " of Oddfellows and Foresters, which together comprise at least half the
friendly society world, the legal requirements are backed by an absolute prohibi-
tion to open any new lodge or court without adopting, as a minimum, the definitely
approved scale of contributions and benefits. Even with regard to middle-class
life assurance companies, Parliament has not only insisted on a specific account-
keeping and publication of financial position, but has, since 1872, practically
stopped the uprising of additional competitors, by requiring a deposit of ;^20,ooo
from any new company before business can be begun.

^ See the chapter on "The Method of Mutual Insurance."

Interunion Relations 115

with the older organisations, and consequent mad race for
members ; and finally, after a few years of unstable existence,
their ignoble bankruptcy and dissolution. Meanwhile the
responsible officials of the older societies will have been
struggling with their own " Delegate Meetings " and " Revising
Committees," to maintain a relatively sound scale of con-
tributions and benefits. Any attempt at financial improve-
ment will have been checked by the representations of the
branch officers that the only result would be to divert all the
recruits to their rasher and more open-handed competitors.
The records of every important union contain bitter
complaints of this injurious competition. The Friendly
Society of Ironfounders, for instance, which dates from 1809,
is one of the oldest and most firmly established Trade
Unions. Its 16,000 members include an overwhelming
majority of the competent ironmoulders in England, Ireland,
and Wales. For over sixty years it has collected and
preserved admirable statistical data of the cost of its various
benefits, to provide for which it maintains a relatively high
rate of contribution and levies. In August 1891, a leading
member called attention to the touting for membership
that was going on among his trade in certain districts.
" I have now noticed," he concludes, " three distinct
societies that enter moulders (ironfounders) who are
eligible to join us. They offer, more or less, a high rate
of benefit at a low rate of contribution. Whether they
are likely to fulfil their promises I leave to the judgment of
any thoughtful man who will sit down and compare their
rates of contribution and benefits with the statistical figures
of our society, as shown continually in the annual reports.
Those figures have been arrived at by experience, which is
the truest basis of calculation for the future, and I would
commend them to the notice of all who set themselves the
task of computing the maximum rate of benefit to be
obtained at the minimum rate of subscription."-^ Nor was

1 Letter from H. G. Percival in the Monthly Report of the Friendly Society
of Ironfounders (August 1891), pp. 18-21.

1 1 6 Trade Union Structure

this warning unneeded. When, in the very next month, the
Ironfounders met in delegate meeting to revise their rules,
branch after branch suggested, in order to outstrip the
attractions of their extravagant rivals, an increase of
benefits, without any addition to the contribution. Thus
Gateshead, Keighley, and Greenwich urged that the Out of
Work benefit should be increased by more than ten per
cent ; Huddersfield and Oldham sought to raise the maxi-
mum sum receivable in any one year ; Barrow, Halifax,
and Liverpool asked that travellers should be allowed
sixpence per night instead of fourpence ; Oldham tried
largely to increase the scale of superannuation allowances,
and to raise the Accident Grant from ;!^50 to i^ioo ;
St. Helens and many other branches demanded a ten per
cent increase of the sick benefit ; whilst Brighton, Keighley,
and Wakefield proposed to raise the funeral money from
;^io to £,\2. On the other hand, Chelsea proposed a
reduction of the entrance fee by 33 per cent, whilst
Gloucester sought to lower it by one-half ; Liverpool would
take in men up to the age of 45, instead of stopping at
40 ; and Wakefield suggested the abandonment of any
medical examination at entrance.^ Fortunately for the
Ironfounders, their officers, with the statistical tables at
their back, were able to stave off most of these pro-
posals. But even responsible officials are forced to pay
heed to this reckless competition. Thus in 1885, when
certain branches of the Steam - Engine Makers' Society,
getting anxious about their old age, suggested that the
provision for the superannuation benefit should be increased,
the central executive demurred to raising the contribution,
pointing out " the keen competition " for membership which
they had to meet, "just as though we were engaged in
commerce. In every workshop," they continue, " we have
numerous societies to contend with, some of whose members

^ Siiggestiotis from B)'a7iches of the Friendly Society of Ironfounders . . .for
consideration at the Delegate Meeting to be held in September 189 1 (London,
1891).

Interunion Relations 117

think that taking a man from another society and squeezing
him into theirs is a valiant act. Many cases will occur to
all, but we give one instance. We learned of the Pattern-
makers' Association taking members of ours for an entrance
fee of 5 s., placing them in benefit at once, and even giving
them credit for ten years' membership, should they apply for
superannuation in the future." ^ These examples enable us
to understand why it is that the Trade Unions accumulating
the largest reserve funds to meet their prospective liabilities
are to be found in the trades in which a single union is
co-extensive with the industry. Thus, among the larger
organisations, the United Society of Boilermakers with a
balance in 1896 of ^^"175,000, or ;^4 : 7 : 6 per head of its
41,000 members, towers above all other societies in the
engineering and shipbuilding trades.

We have dwelt in some detail upon the evils of com-
petition between Trade Unions considered merely as benefit
clubs, because this part of their function has secured universal
approval. But assuming that the workmen are right in
believing trade combination to be economically useful to
them — assuming, that is to say, that the institution of Trade
Unionism has any justification at all — the case against com-
petition among unions becomes overwhelming in strength.
If a trade is split up among two or more rival societies,
especially if these are unequal in numbers, scope, or the
character of their members, there is practically no possibility
of arriving at any common policy to be pursued by all the
branches, or of consistently maintaining any course of action
whatsoever. " The general position of our society in Liverpool,"
reports the District Delegate of the Amalgamated Society
of Engineers in 1893, "is far from satisfactory, the work of
organising the trade being rendered exceptionally difficult,
not only by the existence of a large non-union element,
but by the existence of a number of sectional societies.
Here, as elsewhere, these small and unnecessary organisations

1 Steam-Engine Makers^ Society ; Executive Council Report on Revision of
Rules, 25th July 1885.

1 1 8 Trade Union Structure

are the causes of endless complications and inconvenience.
How many of these absurd and irritating institutions actually
exist here I am not yet in a position to say, but the following
are those with which I am at present acquainted : Smiths and
Strikers (Amalgamated), Mersey Shipsmiths, Steam-Engine
Makers, United Pattern-makers, Liverpool Coppersmiths,
Brass -finishers (Liverpool), Brass -finishers (Birmingham),
United Machine Workers, Metal Planers, National Engineers.
All these societies are naturally inimical to our own, yet how
long shall we be able to tolerate their existence is another
question. . . . The Boilermakers would never permit any
section of their trade to organise apart from them ; why we
should do so is a question which will assuredly have to be
settled definitely sooner or later." ^ The "small and unnecessary
organisations " naturally take a different view. The general
secretary of the United Pattern-makers' Association, in a
circular full of bitter complaints against the Amalgamated
Society of Engineers, thus describes the situation : " For the
information of those who may not be intimately acquainted
with the engineering trade, we may explain that the Pattern-
makers form almost the smallest section of that trade — the
organised portion being split up into no less than four
different sections [societies] — the largest section outside the
ranks of the United Pattern-makers' Association belonging to
the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. It will be easily
understood that this division makes it very difficult for our
society to act on the offensive with that promptitude which
is often essential to the successful carrying out of a particular
movement, as we have to consult with and obtain the co-
operation of three societies other than our own ; and as our
trade in these societies are in an insignificant minority, it is
perhaps only natural that so far as the Amalgamated Society
of Engineers is concerned, legislation for the trades that
comprise the vast majority of its members should have a
priority over a consideration of those questions which concern

1 " Report of Organising District Delegate (No. 2 division) of Amalgamated
Society of Engineers" in Quarterly Report for quarter ended March 1893.

Interunion Relatio7is 1 1 9

so small a handful as the Pattern-makers belonging to their
society." ^ An actual example of the everyday working life
of a Trade Union branch will show how real is the difficulty
thus caused. "Our Darlington members," reports the Pattern-
makers' Executive, " have been engaged in a wages movement
which has had in one respect a most unsatisfactory termination.
The ' Mais ' ^ and non-society men pledged themselves to assist
our members to get the money up, until the critical moment
arrived when notices were to be given in. The non-society
element and the ' Mais ' then formed an ignominious com-
bination, and declined to go any further in the matter, the
Darlington branch of the ' Mais ' writing our Secretary to
the effect that they would not permit their P.M.'s [Pattern-
makers] to strike. They only number three, and the non-
society men twice as many, so fortunately they could not do
the cause very much injury. The advance was conceded by
every firm excepting the Darlington Iron and Steel Works,
where our men were drawn out, leaving two ' Mais ' and their
present allies, the non-society men, at work. Your general
secretary wrote the executive committee of the * Mais ' on
the subject over three weeks ago, but so insignificant a
matter as this is apparently beneath the notice of this august
body, as no reply has yet been vouchsafed." ^

Trade Union rivalry has, however, a darker side. When
the officers of the two organisations have been touting for
members, and feeling keenly each other's competition, oppor-
tunities for friction and ill-temper can scarcely fail to arise.
Accusations will be made on both sides of disloyalty and
unfairness, which will be echoed and warmly resented by the

1 Circular of United Pattern-makers' Association (on Belfast dispute), 22nd
June 1892. The same note recurs in the Report of Proceedings of the Sixth
Annual Meeting of the Federation of Engineering and Shipbuilding Trades
(Manchester, 1896). "As a consequence of their present divided state," said
Mr. Mosses, the general secretary of the United Pattern-makers' Association,
at this meeting, "they had one district going in for advances, followed in a
haphazard fashion by other districts ; and one body of men coming out on strike
for the benefit of others who remained at their work."

2 Members of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers.

^ Monthly Report of the United Pattern-makers^ Association, September 1889.

I20 Trade Union Structure

rank and file. Presently some dispute occurs between an
employer and the members of one of the unions. These
workmen may be dismissed by the employer, or withdrawn
by order of their own district committee. The officers of the
rival union soon hear of the vacancies from the firm in
question. Members of their own society are walking the
streets in search of work, and drawing Out of Work pay from
the funds. To let these take the places left vacant — to
" blackleg " the rival society — is to commit the gravest crime
against the Trade Unionist faith. Unfortunately, in many
cases, the temptation is irresistible. The friction between
the rival organisations, the personal ill-feeling of their officers,
the traditions of past grievances, the temptation of pecuniary
gain both to the workmen and to the union, all co-operate to
make the occasion " an exception." At this stage any pretext
suffices. The unreasonableness of the other society's demand,
the fact that it did not consult its rival before taking action,
even the non-arrival of the letter officially announcing the
strike, serves as a plausible excuse in the subsequent recrimi-
nations. Scarcely a year passes without the Trade Union
Congress being made the scene of a heated accusation by one
society or another, that some other union has " blacklegged "
a dispute in which it was engaged, and thereby deprived its
members of all the results of their combination.^

1 Whenever rivalry and competition for members have existed betw^een unions
in the same industry we find numberless cases of " blacklegging. " The relations,
for instance, between the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, and all the sectional
societies, abound in unfortunate instances on the one side or the other. The two
societies of Bricklayers have, in the past, frequently accused each other's members
of the same crime. The "excursions across the Border" of the English and
Scottish societies of Tailors and Plumbers have been enlivened by similar recrimi-
nations, which are also bandied about among the several unions of general
laborers. The Coalmining and Cotton manufacturing industries are honorably
free from this feature. An exceptionally bad case of an established union becoming,
through blacklegging, a mere tool of the employers, came to light at the Trade
Union Congress of 1892, and was personally investigated by us.

The Glasgow Harbour Laborers' Union, established among the Clyde steve-
dores in 1853, had, up to 1889, maintained an honorable record for stability and
success. In the latter year it found itself, with only 230 members, menaced with
extinction by the sudden uprising of the National Union of Dock Laborers in
Great Britain and Ireland, a society organised on the antagonistic idea of including
every kind of dock and wharf laborers in a national amalgamation. The small.

Interunion Relations 121

The foregoing detailed description has placed the reader
in a position to appreciate the disastrous effect of com-
petition between Trade Unions for members. Whilst
seriously impairing their financial stability as benefit clubs,
this rivalry cuts at the root of all effective trade combination.
It is no exaggeration to say that to competition between
overlapping unions is to be attributed nine- tenths of the
ineffectiveness of the Trade Union world. The great army
of engineering operatives, for instance, though exceptional in
training and intelligence, and enrolled in stable and well-
administered societies, have as yet not succeeded either in
negotiating with the employers on anything like equal terms,
or in maintaining among themselves any common policy
whatsoever. An even larger section of the wage -earning
world — that engaged in the great industry of transport — has
so far failed, from a similar cause, to build up any really
effective Trade Unionism. The millions of laborers, who

old-fashioned, and local society, with its traditions of exclusiveness and "privilege,"
refused to merge itself, but offered to its big rival a mutual "next preference"
working arrangement- — that is to say, whilst each society maintained for its own
members a preferential right to be taken on at the wharves or yards where they
were accustomed to work, it should accord to the members of the other society
the right to fill any further vacancies at those yards or wharves in preference to
outsiders. The answer to this was a peremptory refusal on the part of the
National Union to recognise the existence of its tiny predecessor, whose members
accordingly found themselves absolutely excluded from work. The National
Union no doubt calculated that it would, in this way, compel the smaller society
to yield. But at the very moment it had a great struggle on hand, both in Liver-
pool and Glasgow, with one of the principal shipping firms. Communications
were quickly opened up between that firm and the Glasgow Harbour Laborers'
Society, with the result that the latter undertook to do the firm's work, and thus
at one blow not only defeated the aggressive pretensions of the National Union
but also secured its own existence. This line of conduct was repeated whenever
a dispute arose between the employers and any Union on the Clyde. When the
Blast-furnacemen on strike had successfully appealed to the National Amalgamated
Sailors' and Firemen's Union, not to unload Spanish pig iron, the Glasgow Harbour
Laborers' Union promptly came to the employers' rescue. During the strike of
the Scottish Railway Servants' Union, the same society was to the fore in supplying
•'scab laborers." Its crowning degradation, in Trade Union eyes, came in an
alliance with the Shipping Federation, the powerful combination by which the
employers have, since 1892, sought to crush the whole Trade Union movement
in the waterside industries. Its conduct was, in that year, brought before the
Trade Union Congress, which happened to meet at Glasgow, and the Congress
almost unanimously voted the exclusion of its delegates.

122 Trade Unio7i Striuture

must in any case find it difficult to maintain a common
organisation, are constantly hampered in their progress by
the existence of competing societies which, starting from
different industries, quickly pass into general unions, in-
cluding each other's members. Indeed, with the remarkable
exceptions of the coal and cotton industries, and, to a
lesser extent, that of house-building, there is hardly a great
trade in the country in which the workmen's organisations
are not seriously crippled by this fatal dissension.

Now, experience shows that the permanent cause of this
competitive rivalry and overlapping between unions is their
organisation upon bases inconsistent with each other. When
two societies include and exclude precisely the same sections
of workmen, competition between them loses half its bitter-
ness, and the solution of the difficulty is only a question of
time. We see, for instance, since 1862, the Amalgamated
Society of Carpenters and Joiners rapidly distancing its elder
competitor, the General Union of Carpenters and Joiners
(established 1827). But because the members of both
societies belong to identically the same trade, are paid by
the same methods, earn the same rates, work the same hours,
have the same customs and needs, and are in no way to
be distinguished from each other, the branches in a given
town find no difficulty in concerting, by means of a joint
committee, a common trade policy. And although the
existence of two societies weakens the financial position of
the one as well as of the other, the identity of the members'
income and requirements, and their constant intercourse, tend
steadily to an approximation of the respective scales of
contribution and benefits. Under these circumstances the
tendency to amalgamation is, as we have seen in the pre-
ceding chapter, almost irresistible, and is usually delayed
only by the natural reluctance of some particular official to
abdicate the position of leadership.

The problem which the engineers, the transit workers,
and the laborers have so far failed to solve, is how to
define a trade. Among the engineers, for instance, there is

Interunio7i Relations 123

no general agreement which groups of workmen have
interests sufficiently distinct from the remainder as to make
it necessary for them to combine in a sectional organisation ;
and there is but little proper appreciation of the relation
of these , sectional interests to those which all engineering
mechanics have in common. The enthusiast for amalgama-
tion is always harping on the necessity of union amongst
all classes of engineering workmen in order to abolish
systematic overtime, to reduce the normal hours of labor,
and to obtain recognition of Trade Union conditions from
the government. To the member of the United Pattern-
makers' Association or of the Associated Blacksmiths,
these objects, however desirable, are subordinate to some
re - arrangement of the method or scale of remuneration
peculiar to his own occupation. The solution of the
problem is to be found in a form of organisation which
secures Home Rule for any group possessing interests
divergent from those of the industry as a whole, whilst
at the same time maintaining effective combination through-
out the entire industry for the promotion of the interests
which are common to all the sections.

Fortunately, we are not left to our imagination to devise
a paper constitution which would fulfil these conditions. In
another industry we find the problem solved with almost
perfect success. We have already described the half-
dozen distinct classes into which the Cotton Operatives are
naturally divided. Each of these has its own independent
union, which carries on its own negotiations with the
employers, and would vigorously resist any proposal for
amalgamation. But in addition to the sectional interests
of each of the six classes, there are subjects upon which two
or more of the sections feel in common, and others which
concern them all. Accordingly, instead of amalgamation
on the one hand, or isolation on the other, we find the
sectional unions combining with each other in various
federal organisations of great efficiency. The Cotton-
spinners and the Cardroom Operatives, working always for

124 Trade Union Structure

the same employers in the same establishments, have
formed the Cotton -Workers' Association, to the funds of
which both societies contribute. Each constituent union
carried on its own collective bargaining and has its own
funds. But it agrees to call out its members in support
of the other's dispute, whenever requested to do so, the
members so withdrawn being supported from the federal
fund. The Cotton-spinners thus secure the stoppage of
the material for their work, whenever they withdraw their
labor, and thereby place an additional obstacle in the way
of the employer obtaining blackleg spinners. The Card-
room Operatives on the other hand, whose labor is almost
unskilled, and could easily be replaced, obtain in their
disputes the advantage of the support of the indispensable
Cotton-spinners. No federation for these purposes would be
of use to the Cotton -weavers, who often work for employers
devoting themselves exclusively to weaving, and whose
product goes to a different market. But the Cotton-weavers
join with the Cotton-spinners and the Cardroom Operatives
in the United Textile Factory Workers' Association, a purely
political organisation for the purpose of obtaining and en-
forcing the factory and other legislation common to the
whole trade.-^ And it is interesting to notice that the
Cotton Operatives not only refrain from converting this
strong and stable federation into an amalgamation, but even
carry the federal form into the different sections of their
industry. The 19,000 Cotton-spinners, for instance, form
a single fighting unit, which, for compactness and absolute
discipline, bears comparison even with the United Society
of Boilermakers. But though the Cotton-spinners call their
union an amalgamation, the larger " provinces " retain the
privilege of electing their own officers, and of fixing their
own contributions for local purposes and special benefits,
and even preserve a certain degree of legislative autonomy.
The student who derives his impression of these organisa-
tions merely from their elaborate separate rules and reports,
1 This organisation was temporarily suspended in 1896.

Interunion Relations 125

might easily conclude that, in the relation between the
Oldham or Bolton " province," and the " Representative
Meeting " of the Amalgamated Association of Operative
Cotton-spinners, we have a genuine case of local and central
government. This, however, is not the case. The partial
autonomy of the " provinces " of Oldham and Bolton is not
a case of geographical, but of industrial specialisation.
Each " province " has its own peculiar trade, spinning
different " counts " for widely different markets. Each is
governed by its own peculiar list of piecework prices, based
on different considerations. And though the prevailing
tendency is towards a greater uniformity of terms and
methods, there is still a sufficient distinction between the
Oldham and Bolton trades themselves, and between those
of the smaller districts, to make any amalgamation a
hazardous experiment. Similar considerations have hitherto
applied to the Cotton - weavers, who have, indeed, only
recently united into a single body. Differences of trade
interests, not easy of explanation to the outsider, have
hitherto separated town and town, each working under its
own piecework list. These sectional differences resulted,
until lately, in organisation by loosely federated autonomous
groups. It is at least an interesting coincidence that the
increasing uniformity of conditions which, in 1884, per-
mitted the concentration of these groups into the Northern
Counties Amalgamated Association of Cotton-weavers, re-
sulted, in 1892, in the adoption, from one end of Lancashire
to the other, of a uniform piecework list.

The history of Trade Unionism among the Coalminers
also supplies instructive instances of federal action.
In Northumberland and Durham the present unions
included, for the first ten years of their existence, not
only the actual hewers of the coal, but also the Deputies
(Overlookers), the Enginemen, the Cokemen, and the
Mechanics employed in connection with the collieries. This
is still the type of union in some of the more recently
orsranised districts. Both in Northumberland and in

126 Trade Union Structure

Durham, however, experience of the difficulties of com-
bining such diverse workers has led to the formation of
distinct unions for Deputies, Cokemen, and Colliery-
Mechanics. Each of these acts with complete independ-
ence in dealing with the special circumstances of its own
occupation, but unites with the others in the same county
in a strong federation for general wage movements.^ And
if we pass from the " county federations " which are so
characteristic of this industry, to the attempts to weld all
coal-hewers into a single national organisation, we shall see
that these attempts have hitherto succeeded only when they
have taken the federal form. In 1868 and again in 1874
attempts at complete amalgamation quickly came to grief.
Effective federation of all the organised districts has, on the
other hand, endured since 1863.^ We attribute this pre-
ference for the federal form, not to the difficulty of uniting
the geographically separated coalfields, but to the divergence
of interests between them. Northumberland, Durham, and
South Wales, producing chiefly for foreign export, feel
that their trade has little in common with that of the
Midland Coalfields, which supply the home market. The
thin seams of Somersetshire demand different methods of
working, different rates of remuneration, and different
allowances, from those in vogue in the rich mines of York-
shire. The " fiery " mines of Monmouthshire demand quite
a different set of working rules from the harmless seams of
Cannock Chase.^ It was, therefore, quite natural that, in
1887, when a demand arose for a strong and active national
organisation, this did not take the form of an amalgamated
union. The Miners' Federation, which now includes 200,000
members from Fife to Somerset, is composed of separate

1 The Durham County Mining Federation, established 1878, includes the
Durham Coalminers, Enginemen's, Cokemen's, and Mechanics' Associations.
The Northumberland associations have not established any formal federation but
act constantly together.

2 See History of Trade Unionism, pp. 274, 287, 335, 350, 380.

3 See, for instance, the animated discussion on proposed clause to restrict
shot-firing, National Conference of Miners, Birmingham, 9th- 12th January 1893.

Interunion Relations 1 27

unions, each retaining complete autonomy in its own affairs,
and only asking for the help of the federal body in matters
common to the whole kingdom, or in case of a local dispute
extending to over 1 5 per cent of the members. Any
attempt to draw tighter these bonds of union would, in all
probability, at once cause the secession of the Scottish
Miners' unions, and would absolutely preclude the adhesion
of Northumberland, Durham, and South Wales.^

^ Other industries afford instances of federal union. The compositors employed
in the offices of the great London daily newspapers, at specially high wages, and
under quite exceptional conditions, have, since 1853, formed an integral part of
the London Society of Compositors. But they have, from the beginning, had
their own quarterly meetings, and elected their own separate executive committee
and salaried secretary, who conduct all their distinctive trade business, moving
for new privileges and advances independently of the general body. One or
more delegates are appointed by the News Department to represent it at general
or delegate meetings of the whole society, whilst two representatives of the Book
Department (which comprises nine-tenths of the society) sit on the newsmen's
executive committee. There is even a tendency to establish similar relations
with the special " music printers." The National Union of Boot and Shoe
Operatives presents an example of incipient federation. The union is made up
of large branches in the several towns, each possessing local funds and appointing
its own salaried officials. In so far as the members belong to an identical
occupation, the tendency is towards increased centralisation. But it has become
the rule for the members in each town to divide into branches, not according
to geographical propinquity, but according to the class of work which they do.
Thus, in any town, " No. i Branch " is composed exclusively of Rivetters and
Finishers, "No. 2 Branch" are the Clickers, and where a separate class of
Jewish workers exists, these form a "No. 3 Branch." The central executive
is elected by electoral divisions according to membership, and has hitherto
usually been composed exclusively of the predominating classes of Rivetters and
Finishers. But the Clickers, whose interests diverge from those of their
colleagues, have, for some time, been demanding separate representation, which
they have now been informally granted by the election of their chief salaried
official as treasurer of the whole union. A similar movement may be discerned
among the Finishers, as against the Rivetters (now become "Lasters"), and it
seems probable that this desire for sectional representation, following on partial
sectional autonomy, will presently find formal recognition in the constitution.

The building trades afford an interesting case of the abandonment of the
experiment of a general union in favor of separate national societies, which are
not at present united in any national federation. The Builders' Union of 1830-34
aimed at the ideal afterwards pursued in the engineering industry. All the
operatives engaged in the seven sections of the building trade were to be united
in a single national amalgamation. This attempt has never been repeated. In
its place we have the great national unions of Stonemasons, Carpenters, Brick-
layers, Plumbers, and Plasterers, whilst the Painters and the Builders' Laborers
have not yet emerged from the stage of the local trade club. Between the
central executives of these societies there is no federal union. In almost every

128 Trade Union Structure

These examples of success and failure in uniting several
sections of workmen in a single unit of government, point
to the existence of an upper and a lower limit to the
process of amalgamation. It is one of the conditions of
effective trade action that a union should include all the
workmen whose occupation or training is such as to enable
them, at short notice, to fill the places held by its members.
It would, for instance, be most undesirable for such inter-
changeable mechanics as fitters, turners, and erectors, to
maintain separate Trade Unions, with distinct trade policies.
And if the Cardroom Operatives could easily " mind " the
self-acting mule of the Cotton-spinners, it might possibly
suit the latter to arrange an amalgamation between the two
societies, just as the Rivetters found it convenient to absorb
the Holders-up into the United Society of Boilermakers and
Iron Shipbuilders.^ There appears to be no advantage in
carrying amalgamation (as distinct from federation) beyond
this point. But there are often serious difficulties in going
even thus far. The efficient working of an amalgamated
society requires that all sections of the members should be
fairly uniform in the methods of their remuneration, the
conditions of their employment, and the amount of their
standard earnings. Moreover, it may confidently be pre-
dicted that no amalgamation will be stable in which the
several sections differ appreciably in strategic position, in
such a manner as to make it advantageous for them to

town there has, however, grown up a local Building Trades' Federation, formed
by the local branches to concert joint action against their common employers,
as regards hours of labor and local advances or reductions of wages, both of
which are in each town usually simultaneous and identical for all sections. We
have elsewhere referred to the difficulties arising from this separate action of each
town, and it is at least open to argument whether the building trades would not
be better advised to form a national federation to concert a common national
policy, having federal officials in the large towns, who would, like the district
delegates of the United Society of Boilermakers, represent the whole organisation,
though acting in consultation with local committees.

^ The Holders-up were admitted into the society in 1881, at the instance of
the general secretary, who represented that Holders-up were indispensable fellow-
workers and possible blacklegs, and must therefore be brought under the control
of the organisation, more especially as they were beginning to form separate clubs
of their own.

Interunion Relations 129

move at different times, or by different expedients.
Finally, experience seems to show that in no trade will a
well-paid and well-organised but numerically weak section
permanently consent to remain in the subordination to
inferior operatives, which any amalgamation of all sections
of a large and varied industry must usually involve.

Let us apply these axioms to the tangle of competing
societies in the engineering trade. The fitters, turners,
and erectors who work in the same shop, on the same job,
under identical methods of remuneration, for wages ap-
proximately equal in amount, and who can without difficulty
do each other's work, form, no doubt, a natural unit of
government.^ We might perhaps add to these the smiths,
though the persistence of a few separate smiths' societies,
and the uprising of joint societies of smiths and strikers,
may indicate a different cleavage. With regard to the
pattern-makers, it is easy to understand why the United
Pattern-makers' Association is now attracting a majority of
the men entering this section of the trade. These highly
skilled and superior artisans constitute a tiny minority amid
the great engineering army ; they usually enjoy a higher
Standard Rate than any other section ; and any advances
or reductions in their wages must almost necessarily occur
at different times from similar changes among the engineers
proper. It is even open to argument whether, for Collective
Bargaining, the pattern-makers are not actually stronger when
acting alone than when in alliance with the whole engineering
industry. We are, therefore, disposed to agree with the con-
tention of the United Pattern-makers' Association that "when
the interests of our own particular section are concerned, we
hold it as the first principle of our Association that these
interests can only be thoroughly understood, and effectively
looked after, by ourselves." ^ The same conclusions apply,

^ In 1896, though the Amalgamated Society of Engineers enrolled the un-
precedented total of 13,321 new meml)ers, all but 1803 of these belonged to the
classes of fitters, turners, or millwrights.

2 Preface to Rules of the United Pattern-makers' Association (Manchester,
1892).

VOL. I ' K

130 Trade Union Structure

though in a lesser degree, to some other sections now included
in the Amalgamated Society, and they would decisively
negative the suggestion to absorb such distinct and highly
organised trades as the Plumbers and Ironfounders.^

This conclusion does not mean that each section of the
engineering trade should maintain a complete independence.
" We quite acknowledge," state the Pattern-makers, " that
it would be neither politic nor possible to completely sever
our connection with the organisation representative of the
engineering trade, and we are always ready to co-operate
with contemporary societies in movements which affect the
interests of the general body." ^ There are, indeed, some
matters as to which the whole engineering industry must act
in concert if it is to act at all. A great establishment like
Elswick, employing 10,000 operatives in every section of
the industry, would find it intolerable to conduct separate
negotiations, and fix different meal-times or different holidays
for the different branches of the trade. We find, in fact, the
associated employers on the North-east Coast expressly com-

1 Our analysis thus definitely refutes the suggestion that the quarrels be-
tween the engineers and plumbers, and the shipwrights and joiners respectively,
might be obviated by the amalgamation of the competing unions. The two
trades overlap in a few shipbuilding jobs, but in nine-tenths of their work it
would be impossible for an engineer to take the place of the plumber, or a ship-
wright that of a joiner, or vice versd. In strategic position the plumber differs
fundamentally from the engineer, and the joiner from the shipwright. The
engineering and shipbuilding trades are subject to violent fluctuations, which
depend upon the alternate inflations and depressions of the national commerce.
The building trades, on the other hand, with which nine-tenths of the joiners and
plumbers must be counted, vary considerably according to the season of the year,
but fluctuate comparatively little from year to year ; and the general fluctuations
to which they are subject do not coincide with those of the shipbuilding and
engineering industries. By the time that the wave of expansion has reached the
building trades, the staple industries of the country are already in the trough of
the succeeding depression. It would have been difficult to have persuaded a
Newcastle engineer or a shipwright in the spring of 1893, when 20 per cent of
his colleagues were out of work, that the plumbers and carpenters were well
advised in choosing that particular moment to press for better terms. Finally, we
have the almost insuperable difficulty of securing adequate representation for the
9000 plumbers, scattered in every town amid the 87,000 engineers ; and, on the
other hand, the 14,000 shipwrights concentrated in a few ports amid the 49,000
joiners spread over the whole country.

- Preface to Rtiles of the United Pattern-fuakers' Association (Manchester,
1892).

Interunion Relations 131

plaining in 1890, "of the great inconvenience and difficulty
experienced in the settlement of wages and other general
questions between employers and employed"; and ascribing
the constant friction that prevailed to the " want of uniformity
of action and similarity of demand put forward by the
various societies representing the skilled engineering labor."
Collective Bargaining becomes impracticable when different
societies are proposing new regulations on overtime in-
consistent with each other, and when rival organisations,
each claiming to represent the same section of the trade, are
putting forward divergent claims as to the methods and
rates of remuneration. The employers were driven to insist
that the " deputations meeting them to negotiate . . . should
represent all the societies interested in the question under
consideration." ^ And when the method to be employed is
not Collective Bargaining but Parliamentary action, federal
union is even more necessary. If the mechanics in the
great government arsenals and factories desire modifica-
tions in their conditions of employment, union of purpose
among the tens of thousands of engineering electors all over
the country is indispensable for success.

So long, however, as the Amalgamated Society of
Engineers claims to include within its own ranks every
kind of engineering mechanic, and to decide by itself the
policy to be pursued, a permanent and effective federal
organisation is impossible. Any attempt to combine in the
same industry the mutually inconsistent schemes of amal-
gamation and federation may even intensify the friction.
Thus we find, in 1888, to quote again from a report of the

1 Circular of the Iron Trades Employers' Association on the Overtime Ques-
tion, October 1891. We attribute the practical failure of the Engineering
operatives to check systematic overtime, an evil against which they have been
striving ever since 1836, to the chaotic state of the organisation of the trade. A
similar lack of federal union stood in the way of the London bookbinders in 1893,
when they succeeded without great difficulty in obtaining an Eight Hours' Day
from those employers who were bookbinders only. In the great printing estab-
lishments, such as Waterlow's and Spottiswoode's, they found it practically
impossible to arrange an Eight Hours' Day in the binding departments, whilst
the printers contin\ied to work for longer hours.

132 Trade Ujiioii Structure

United Pattern-makers' Association, "the sectional societies
(on North-east Coast), indignant at the arbitrary manner in
which the Amalgamated Society of Engineers had acted,
federated together with the avowed object of resisting a
repetition of any such behaviour in case of further wages
movements, and asserting their right to be consulted before
definite action was taken. ... It is impossible," continues
the report, " to dissociate the action of our contemporaries
(the Amalgamated Society of Engineers) from their recent
unsuccessful attempt at amalgamating the various sectional
societies ; and it would seem that they, finding it impossible
to absorb their weaker brethren by fair means, had resolved
to shatter the confidence they have in their unions by
showing them their impotence to influence, of themselves,
their relations between their employers and members." ^ The
" Federal Board," thus formed by the smaller engineering
societies on Tyneside in antagonism to their more powerful
rival, lasted for three years, but failed, it is needless to say,
in securing industrial peace. A more important and more
promising attempt has been marred by the persistent absten-
tion of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. In 1890,
Mr. Robert Knight, the able general secretary of the United
Society of Boilermakers, succeeded, after repeated failures, in
drawing together in a powerful national federation the great
majority of the unions connected with the engineering and
shipbuilding industries. This "Federation of Engineering and
Shipbuilding Trades of the United Kingdom " includes such
powerful organisations as the United Society of Boilermakers,
40,776 members; the Associated Shipwrights' Society, 14,235
members ; and the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and
Joiners, 48,631 members, who are content to meet on equal
terms such smaller unions as the Steam-Engine Makers'
Society, 7000 members ; the United Operative Plumbers*
Society, 8758 members; the United Pattern-makers' Associa-
tion, 3636 members; the National Amalgamated Society of
Painters and Decorators, and half a dozen more minute

1 Monthly Report of the United Pattern-}7iakers'' Society, January 1889.

Interunio7t Relations 133

sectional societies. This federation has now lasted over seven
years, and has fulfilled a useful function in settling disputes
between the different unions. But as an instrument for
Collective Bargaining with the employers, or for taking
concerted action on behalf of the whole industry, it is useless
so long as the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, with its
87,455 niembers, holds resolutely aloof. And the Amal-
gamated Society of Engineers, still wedded to the ideal of
one undivided union, cannot bring itself to accept as per-
manent colleagues, the sectional societies which it regards
as illegitimate combinations undermining its own position.^

^ The first numbers of the Amalgamated Engineers' Monthly Joui-nal — an
official organ started on the accession of Mr. George Barnes to the general
secretaryship — shows that thinking members of the Amalgamation are coming
round to the idea of federal union with the sectional societies, and others con-
nected with the engineering and shipbuilding industry. Thus Mr. Tom Mann, in
the opening number (January 1897, PP- lo-ii), declares "that the bulk of the
Amalgamated Society of Engineers' men are ashamed ... of their present power-
lessness. . . . Whence comes the weakness ? Beyond any doubt it is primarily due
to the fact that no concerted action is taken by the various unions. . . . That is,
the Amalgamated Society of Engineers has not yet learnt the necessity for form-
ing part of a real federation of all trades connected with this particular profession.
. . . What member can look back over the last few years and not blush with shame
at what has taken place between the Amalgamated Society of Engineers and the
Plumbers, and the Boilermakers and Shipbuilders ; and who can derive satisfac-
tion in reflecting upon the want of friendly relations between the Amalgamated
Society of Engineers . . . and the Pattern-makers and Shipwrights, and Steam -
Engine Makers, etc. ? A fighting force is wanted ... and this can only be
obtained by a genuine federation of societies connected with the trades referred
to. . . . The textile workers (cotton) have federated the various societies, and
are able to secure united action on a scale distinctly in advance of that of the
engineering trades." And in the succeeding issue Mr. John Burns vigorously
strikes the same note. " To really prevent this internecine and disintegrating
strife, the first step for the Amalgamated Engineers this year is to join at once
with all the other unions in [a] federation of engineering trades." Two months
later (April 1897, pp. 12-14) comes a furious denunciation of the proposal,
signed "Primitive," who invokes the "shades of Allan and eloquence of Newton "
against this attempted undoing of their work. "Just because a few interested
labor busybodies have got it into their heads that they can run a cheap-jack
show for every department of our trade with the same effect as our great combina-
tion, we are to drop our arms, pull down our socks, hide our tail under our
nether parts, and shout 'peccavi.' . . . Sectional societies for militant purposes
are useless, and therefore they only exist — where such is practised — as friendly
societies. . . . Amalgamation is our title, our war-cry and our principle ; antl
once we admit that it is necessary to ' federate ' with sectional societies we give
away the whole case to the enemy. . . . Federation with trades whose work-
shop practice is keenly distinct from our own is a good means to a better end.

134 Trade Union Structure

If now, looking back on the whole history of organisation
in the engineering trade, we may be " wise after the event,"
we suggest that it would have been better if the local
trade clubs had confined themselves each to a single section
of engineering workmen, and if they had then developed into
national societies of like scope. Had this been the case, and
could Newton and Allan have foreseen the enormous growth
and increasing differentiation of their industry, they would
have advocated, not a single comprehensive amalgamation,
but a federation of sectional societies of national extent, for
such purposes as were common to the whole engineering
trade. This federation would have, in the first instance,
included a great national society of fitters, turners, and
erectors on the one hand, and smaller national societies of
smiths and pattern-makers respectively. And as organisa-
tion proceeded among the brass-workers, coppersmiths, and
machine-workers, and as new classes arose, like the electrical
engineers, these could each have been endowed with a
sufficient measure of Home Rule, and admitted as separate
sections to the federal union. This federal union might then
have combined in a wider and looser federation, for specified
purposes, with the United Society of Boilermakers, the
Friendly Society of Ironfounders, the Associated Shipwrights'
Society, and the other organisations interested in the great
industry of iron steamship building and equipping.^

One practical precept emerges from our consideration of
all these forms of association. It is a fundamental condi-
tion of stable and successful federal action that the degree
of union between the constituent bodies should correspond
strictly with the degree of their unity of interest. This will

Federation with trades whose shop practice is similar, whose interests are
identical, and who ought to be with us in every fight, is a maudlin means to a
general fizzle." The question is now (August 1897) a subject of keen debate in
the society.

^ The several national societies of Carpenters, Plumbers, Painters, Cabinet-
makers, etc., would, in respect of their members working in shipbuilding yards,
also join this Federation ; whilst they would, at the same time, continue to be in
closer federal union with the Bricklayers, Stonemasons, and other societies of
building operatives.

Interunion Relations 135

be most easily recognised on the financial side. We have
already more than once adverted to the fact that a scale
of contributions and benefits, which would suit the require-
ments of one class, might be entirely out of the reach of
other sections, whose co-operation was nevertheless indis-
pensable for effective common action. But this is not all.
We have to deal, not only with classes differing in the
amount of their respective incomes, but also with wide
divergences between the ways in which the several classes
need to lay out their incomes. The amount levied by the
federal body for the common purse must therefore not only
be strictly limited to the cost of the services in which all
the constituent bodies have an identical interest, but must
also not exceed, in any case, the amount which the poorest
section finds it advantageous to expend on these services.

But our precept has a more subtle application to the
aims and policy of the federal body, and to the manner in
which its decisions are arrived at. The permanence of the
federation will be seriously menaced if it pursues any course
of action which, though beneficial to the majority of its
constituent bodies, is injurious to any one among them.
The constituent bodies came together, at the outset, for
the promotion of purposes desired, not merely by a
majority, but by all of them ; and it is a violation of the
implied contract between them to use the federal force,
towards the creation of which all have contributed, in a
manner inimical to any one of them. This means that,
where the interests diverge, any federal decision must be
essentially the result of consultation between the representa-
tives of the several sections, with a view of discovering the
" greatest common measure." These issues must, therefore,
never be decided merely by counting votes. So long as the
questions dealt with affect all the constituents in approxi-
mately the same manner, mere differences of opinion as to
projects or methods may safely be decided by a majority
vote. If the results are, in fact, advantageous, the dis-
approval of the minority will quickly evaporate ; if, on the

o

6 Trade Union Structure

other hand, the results prove to be disadvantageous, the
dissentients will themselves become the dominant force. In
either case no permanent cleavage is caused. But if the
difference of opinion between the majority and the minority
arises from a real divergence of sectional interests, and is
therefore fortified by the event, any attempt on the part of
the majority to force its will on the minority will, in a
voluntary federation, lead to secession.

Thus, we are led insensibly to a whole theory of " pro-
portional representation" in federal constitutions. In a homo-
geneous association, where no important divergence of actual
interest can exist, the supreme governing authority can safely
be elected, and fundamental issues can safely be decided, by
mere counting of heads. Such an association will naturally
adopt a representative system based on universal suffrage
and equal electoral districts. But when in any federal body
we have a combination of sections of unequal numerical
strength, having different interests, decisions cannot safely
be left to representatives elected or voting according to the
numerical membership of the constituent bodies. For this,
in effect, would often mean giving a decisive voice to the
members of the largest section, or to those of the two or
three larger sections, without the smaller sections having any
effective voting influence on the result. Any such arrange-
ment seldom fails to produce cleavage and eventual secession,
as the members of the dominant sections naturally vote for
their own interest. It is therefore preferable, as a means of
securing the permanence of the federation, that the represen-
tation of the constituent bodies should not be exactly propor-
tionate to their respective memberships. The representative
system of a federation should, in fact, like its finances, vary
with the degree to which the interests of the constituent
bodies are really identical. Wherever interests are divergent,
the scale must at any rate be so arranged that no one con-
stituent, however large, can outvote the remainder ; and,
indeed, so that no two or three of the larger constituents
could, by mutual agreement, swamp all their colleagues. If,

Interunion Relations 137

for instance, it is proposed to federate all the national unions
in the engineering trade, it would be unwise for the Amalga-
mated Society of Engineers to claim proportional represen-
tation for its 87,000 members, mainly fitters and turners,
as compared with the 10,000 pattern-makers, smiths, and
machine -workers divided among three sectional societies.
And when a federation includes a large number of very
different constituents, and exists for common purposes so
limited as to bear only a small proportion to the particular
interests of the several sections, it may be desirable frankly
to give up all idea of representation according to member-
ship, and to accord to each constituent an equal voice.
Hence the founders of the Federation of the Engineering
and Shipbuilding Trades exercised, in our opinion, a wise
discretion when they accorded to the 9000 members of the
Operative Plumbers' Society exactly the same representation
and voting power as is enjoyed by the 41,000 members of
the United Society of Boilermakers, or by the 49,000 members
of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters. A federal body
of this kind, formed only for certain definite purposes, and
composed of unions with distinct and sometimes divergent
interests, stands at the opposite end of the scale from the
homogeneous " amalgamated " society. The representatives
of the constituent bodies meet for the composing of mutual
differences and the discovery of common interests. They
resemble, in fact, ambassadors who convey the desires of their
respective sovereign states, contribute their special knowledge
to the common council, but are unable to promise obedience
to the federal decision, unless it commends itself as a suit-
able compromise, or carries with it the weight of an almost
unanimous consensus of opinion.^

The problem of finding a stable unit of government and
of determining the relation between superior and subordinate
authorities seems, therefore, to be in a fair way of solution

1 We revert to these considerat'ons when, in describing the Trade Union
machinery for pohtical action, we come to deal with such federations as the
Trade Union Congress and the local Trades Councils.

138 Trade Uiiion Structure

in the Trade Union world. With the ever - increasing
mobility of labor and extension of industry, the local trade
club has had to give place to a combination of national
extent. So long as the craft or occupation is fairly uniform
from one end of the kingdom to the other, the geographical
boundaries of the autonomous state must, in the Trade
Union world, ultimately coincide with those of the nation
itself. We have seen, too, how inevitably the growth of
national Trade Unions involves, for strategic, and what may
be called military reasons, the reduction of local autonomy
to a minimum, and the complete centralisation of all financial,
and therefore of all executive government at the national
headquarters. This tendency is strengthened by economic
considerations which we shall develop in a subsequent
chapter. If the Trade Union is to have any success in
its main function of improving the circumstances of its
members' employment, it must build up a dyke of a uniform
minimum of conditions for identical work throughout the
kingdom. This uniformity of conditions, or, indeed, any
industrial influence whatsoever, implies a certain uniformity
and consistency of trade policy, which is only rendered
possible by centralisation of administration. So far, our
conclusions lead, it would seem, to the absolute simplicity
of one all-embracing centralised autocracy. But, in the
Trade Union world, the problem of harmonising local ad-
ministration and central control, which for a moment we
seemed happily to have got rid of, comes back in an even
more intractable form. The very aim of uniformity of con-
ditions, the very fact that uniformity of trade policy is
indispensable to efficiency, makes it almost impossible to
combine in a single organisation, with a common purse, a
common executive, and a common staff of salaried officials,
men of widely different occupations and grades of skill,
widely different Standards of Life and industrial needs, or
widely different numerical strengths and strategic oppor-
tunities. A Trade Union is essentially an organisation for
securing certain concrete and definite advantages for all its

Interunion Relations 139

members — advantages which differ from trade to trade
according to its technical processes, its economic position,
and, it may be, the geographical situation in which it is
carried on. Hence all the attempts at " General Unions "
have, in our view, been inevitably foredoomed to failure.
The hundreds of thousands of the working class who joined
the "Grand National Consolidated Trades Union" in 1833-34
came together, it is true, on a common basis of human brother-
hood, and with a common faith in the need for a radical
reconstruction of society. But instead of inaugurating a
" New Moral World," either by precept or by political revolu-
tion, they found themselves as a Trade Union, fighting the
employers in the Lancashire cotton mills to get shorter
hours of labor, in the Leeds cloth trade to obtain definite
piecework rates, in the London building trade to do away
with piecework altogether, in Liverpool to abolish the sub-
contractor, in the hosiery trade to escape from truck and
deductions. Each trade, in short, translated " human brother-
hood " into the remedying of its own particular technical
grievance, and the central executive was quite unable to
check the accuracy of the translation. The whole history
of Trade Unionism confirms the inference that a Trade
Union, formed as it is, for the distinct purpose of obtaining
concrete and definite material improvements in the conditions
~i of its members' employment, cannot, in its simplest form,
safely extend beyond the area within which those identical
improvements are shared by all its members — cannot spread,
that is to say, beyond the boundaries of a single occupa-
tion. But the discovery of this simple unit of government
does not exhaust the problem. Whilst the differences
between the sections render complete amalgamation im-
practicable, their identity in other interests makes some bond
of union imperative. The most efficient form of Trade
Union organisation is therefore one in which the several
sections can be united for the purposes that they have in
common, to the extent to which identity of interest prevails,
and no further, whilst at the same time each section preserves

140 Trade Union Structure

complete autonomy wherever its interests or purposes diverge
from those of its allies. But this is only another form of
the difficult political problem of the relation of supreme to
subordinate authorities. Whilst the student of political
democracy has been grappling with the question of how to
distribute administration between central and local author-
ities, the unlettered statesmen of the Trade Union world
have had to decide the still more difficult issue of how to
distribute power between general and sectional industrial
combinations, both of national extent. The solution has
been found in a series of widening and cross-cutting federa-
tions, each of which combines, to the extent only of its own
particular objects, those organisations which are conscious
of their identity of purpose. Instead of a simple form of
democratic organisation we get, therefore, one of extreme
complexity. Where the difficulties of the problem have
been rightly apprehended, and the whole industry has been
organised on what may be called a single plane, the result
may be, as in the case of the Cotton Operatives, a complex
but harmoniously working democratic machine of remarkable
efficiency and stability. Where, on the other hand, the
industry has been organised on incompatible bases, as among
the Engineers, we find a complicated tangle of relationships
producing rivalry and antagonism, in which effective common
action, even for such purposes as are common to all sections,
becomes almost impossible.

Trade Union organisation, if it is to reach its highest
possible efficiency, must therefore assume a federal form.
Instead of a supreme central government, delegating parts
of its power to subordinate local authorities, we may expect
to see the Trade Union world developing into an elaborate
series of federations, among which it will be difficult to
decide where the sovereignty really resides. Where the
several sections closely resemble each other in their cir-
cumstances and needs, where their common purposes are
relatively numerous and important, and where, as a result,
individual secession and subsequent isolation would be

Inte7'unio7i Relations 141

dangerous, the federal tie will be strong, and the federal
government will, in effect, become the supreme authority.
At the other end of the scale will stand those federations,
little more than opportunities for consultation, in which
the contracting parties retain each a real autonomy, and
use the federal executive as a convenient, but strictly
subordinate machinery for securing those limited purposes
that they have in common. And we have ventured to
suggest, as an interesting corollary, that the basis of re-
presentation should, in all these constitutions, vary accord-
ing to the character of the bond of union, representation
proportionate to membership being perfectly applicable only
to a homogeneous organisation, and decreasing in suitability
with every degree of dissimilarity between the constituent
bodies. Where the sectional interests are not only distinct,
but may, in certain cases, be even antagonistic, as, for
instance, in industries subject to demarcation disputes, rule
by majority vote must be frankly abandoned, and the repre-
sentatives of societies widely differing in numerical strength
must, under penalty of common failure, consent to meet
on equal terms, to discover, by consultation, how best to
conciliate the interests of all.

PART II
TRADE UNION FUNCTION

INTRODUCTION

" The chief object of our society is to elevate the social
position of our members," is the comprehensive truism by
which the ordinary Trade Union defines its function. This
simple assertion, of what we may term " corporate self-help,"
is, in many of the older unions, embellished by rhetorical
appeals to the brotherhood of man, and realistic descriptions
of the precarious position of the weekly wage-earners. Thus
the " main principle " that actuated the " originators " of the
Friendly Society of Ironfounders " was that of systematic
organisation, and the desire of forming a bond of brotherhood
and sympathy throughout the trade, in order that those who,
by honest labor, obtained a livelihood in this particular
branch of industry might, in their combined capacity, more
successfully compete against the undue and unfair encroach-
ments of capital than could possibly be the case by any
number of workmen when acting individually." ^ " We are
willing to admit," observe the founders of the Amalgamated
Society of Engineers, " that whilst in constant employment
our members may be able to obtain all the necessaries, and
perhaps some of the luxuries of life. . . . Notwithstanding
all this, there is a fear always prominent on the mind of him
who thinks of the future that it may not continue, that to-
morrow may see him out of employment, his nicely-arranged

1 Rules of the Friendly Ironmoulders' [now Ironfounders'] Society, instituted
for the purpose of mtitual relief in cases of old age, sichjiess, and infirmity, and
for the burial of their dead : "Made at Bolton, 19th June 1809. Allowed

at Quarter Sessions, 19th July 1809" (Bolton, 1S09) ; see edition of 1891,

preface.

VOL. I L

146 Trade Union Function

matters for domestic comfort overthrown, and his hopes of
being able, in a few years, by constant attention and frugality,
to occupy a more permanent position, proved only to be a
dream. How much is contained in that word continuance,
and how necessary to make it a leading principle of our
association ! " ^

But these descriptions of the ultimate objects of working-
class organisation afford us little clue to the actual operation
of Trade Unionism. The Trade Unionists of our own
generation are more explicit. With dry and ungrammatical
precision the great modern unions give as their " Objects "
long strings of specific proposals, in which are incidentally
revealed, with perfect frankness, the means relied upon to
achieve these ends. The Amalgamated Association of Opera-
tive Cotton-spinners " is formed to secure to all its members
the fair reward of their labor ; to provide for the settlement
in a conciliatory manner of disputes between employer and
employed, so that a cessation of work may be avoided ; the
enforcement of the Factory Acts or other legislative enact-
ments for the protection of labor ; to afford pecuniary
assistance to any member who may be victimised or without
employment in consequence of a dispute or lock-out or when
disabled by accident." ^ The Miners' Federation of Great
Britain declares that its objects of association " are to take
into consideration the question of trade and wages, and to
protect miners generally ; to seek to secure mining legislation
affecting all miners connected with this Federation ; to call
conferences to deal with questions affecting miners, both of a
trade, wage, and legislative character ; to seek and obtain an
eight hours' day from bank to bank in all mines for all
persons working underground ; to deal with and watch all
inquests upon persons killed in the mines where more
than three persons are killed by any one accident ; to seek

1 The original Rides and Regulations of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers
(London, 1851), made at Birmingham, September 1850.

- Rules of the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cot ton- spinners (Man-
chester, 1 89 1).

Introduction 147

to obtain compensation where more than three persons are
injured or killed in any one accident, in all cases where
counties, federations, or districts have to appeal, or are
appealed against, from decisions in the lower courts." ^ The
National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives (established
1874) declares that "The objects of the union are: the
establishment of a central fund for the protection of members
and advancement of wages ; the establishment of healthy and
proper workshops, the employers to find room, grindery,
fixtures, fire, and gas, free of charge ; the establishment, as
far as practicable, of a uniform rate of wages for the same
class of work throughout the union ; to abolish sweaters and
control the system of apprentices ; to reduce the hours of
labor ; to assist members who are compelled to travel in
search of employment ; the introduction of Industrial Co-
operation in our trade ; the use of all legitimate means for
the moral, social, educational, and political advancement of
its members ; also to make provision for the union being
represented by a Parliamentary Agent ; to raise funds for the
mutual support of its members in time of sickness, and for
the burial of deceased members and their wives ; to establish
a system of inter-communication with the Boot and Shoe
Operatives of other countries." ^ Finally, we may cite the
most prominent and successful of the so-called " new unions,"
formed in the great uprising of 1889. The rules of the
National Union of Gasworkers and General Laborers state
that " The objects of the union are to shorten the hours of
labor, to obtain a legal eight hours' working day or forty-eight
hours' week ; to abolish, wherever possible, overtime and Sun-
day labor, and where this is not possible, to obtain payment
at a higher rate ; to abolish piecework ; to raise wages, and
where women do the same work as men, to obtain for them
the same wages as paid the men ; to enforce the provisions
of the Truck Acts in their entirety ; to abolish the present
system of contracts and agreements between employers and

1 Miners' Federation of Great Britain — Rules (Openshaw, 1S93).
2 Rules of the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives (Leicester, 1S92).

148 Trade Union Function

employed ; to settle all labor disputes by amicable agree-
ment whenever possible ; to obtain equality of employers and
employed before the law ; to obtain legislation for the better-
ing of the lives of the working class ; to secure the return of
members of the union to vestries, school boards, boards of
guardians, municipal bodies, and to Parliament, provided such
candidates are pledged to the collective ownership of the
means of production, distribution, and exchange ; to set aside
annually a maximum sum of ^200, to be used solely for the
purpose of helping to return and maintain members on public
representative bodies ; to assist similar organisations having
the same objects as herein stated." ^

We must, however, not look to the formal rules or
rhetorical preambles for a scientific or complete account of
Trade Union action. Drafted originally by enthusiastic
pioneers, copied and recopied by successive revising com-
mittees, the printed constitutions of working-class associa-
tions represent rather the aspirations than the everyday
action of the members. More trustworthy data may be
obtained from a scrutiny of the cash accounts, or from a
close study of the voluminous internal literature of the
unions — the monthly, quarterly, and yearly reports of the
central executives, the frequent official circulars on particular
questions, and the elaborate verbatim notes of conferences
and joint committees. The printed documents circulated by
some societies include the diary of their principal trade
official, detailing his day-by-day negotiation with employers.^
Other unions publish to their members periodical reports
from their district delegates stationed in the principal indus-
trial centres, containing valuable information as to the move-
ments of trade, graphic accounts of disputes with employers
or other societies, and appeals for guidance as to the policy to
be pursued. To the student of sociology this literature —
poured out to the extent of hundreds of volumes annually —

1 Rules of the National Union of Casworkers and General Laborers of Great
Britain and Ireland (London, 1894).

2 See the extracts printed in the chapter on "The Standard Rate."

Introduction 1 49

is of fascinating interest. It affords a graphic picture of the
actual structure and working of the modern world of manu-
facturing industry, with its constant changes of process and
shiftings of trade. It lays bare, more completely than any
other records known to us, the real nature and action of
democratic organisation in the Anglo-Saxon race. And,
what is most relevant to our present purpose, it reveals, with
all the pathos of success and failure, the working of the
various Trade Union Methods and Regulations with the
underlying assumptions as to social expediency on which
they are based.

But documents, however frank and confidential, are apt to
distort facts as well as to display them. A heated recrimi-
nation between a local official and the general secretary, a
dispute about the wages on a new process, affecting only a
tiny minority of the members, or a Parliamentary agitation
for a new clause in the Factory Acts will loom large in the
proceedings of the year, and may seem to represent the bulk
of the union's activity. Meanwhile, the branches may have
been engaged in a peaceful but successful maintenance of
their old-standing Working Rules, or a new regulation may
silently have become habitual, or an old one silently dropped,
without this action on the part of the majority of the
members rising to the surface in any document whatsoever,
public or private. To complete the knowledge yielded by
documents, the student must watch the men at work, and
discuss the application of particular regulations with em-
ployers, managers, and foremen — not omitting the factory
inspector and the secretary to the Employers' Association —
he must listen to the objections of the small master and the
blackleg ; above all, he must attend the inside meetings of
branches and district committees, where the points at issue
are discussed in technical detail with a frank explicitness
which is untrammelled either by the prejudices of the rank
and file or the fear of the enemy.

This combined plan of studying documents and observing
men is the one that we have, during our six years' investi-

150 Trade Unio7t Function

gation, attempted to follow. In the ensuing chapters we
endeavor to place before the reader an accurate descrip-
tion of the Methods and Regulations actually practised by
British Trade Unionism. We shall see the Trade Unionists,
from the beginning of the eighteenth century down to the
present day, enforcing their Regulations by three distinct
instruments or levers, which we distinguish as the Method
of Mutual Insurance, the Method of Collective Bargaining,
and the Method of Legal Enactment. From the Methods
used to enforce the Regulations, we shall pass to the Regu-
lations themselves. These we shall find grouping themselves,
notwithstanding an almost infinite variety of technical detail,
under seven main heads — the Standard Rate, the Normal
Day, Sanitation and Safety, New Processes and Machinery,
Continuity of Employment, the Entrance into a Trade,
and the Right to a Trade — all of which we examine in
separate chapters. This will lead us to the Implications of
Trade Unionism — certain practical outgrowths and necessary
consequences of Trade Union policy which require elucida-
dation. Finally, we shall bring into light the Assumptions
of Trade Unionism — the fundamental prejudices, opinions, or
judgments lying at the root of Trade Union policy — an
analysis of which will serve at once to explain and to sum-
marise the various forms of Trade Union action.

In the course of this comprehensive description of Trade
Unionism as it is, we shall not abstain from incidentally
criticising the various Methods and Regulations, and the
different types of Trade Union policy, in respect of the
success or failure of Trade Unions to apply them to the facts
of modern life. But in this part of our book we care-
fully avoid any discussion as to the effects of Trade Unionism
upon industry, and, above all, we make no attempt to decide
whether it has or has not resulted in effectively raising
wages, or otherwise improving the conditions of employment.
We venture to think that there can be no useful discussion
of the economic validity of Trade Unionism until the student
has first surveyed its actual contents. Our examination of

Introdttction 151

the theory of trade combination — the possibility, by deliberate
common action, of altering the conditions of employment ;
the effect of the various Methods and Regulations upon the
efficiency of production and the distribution of wealth ; and
the ultimate social expediency of exchanging a system of
unfettered individual competition for one of collective regula-
tion— in a word, our judgment upon Trade Unionism as a
whole — we reserve for the third and final part of this book.

CHAPTER 1

THE METHOD OF MUTUAL INSURANCE

In a certain sense it would not be difficult to regard all the
activities of Trade Unionism as forms of Mutual Insurance.
Whether the purpose be the fixing of a list of piecework
prices, the promotion of a new factory bill, or the defence
of a member against a prosecution for picketing, we see
the contributions, subscribed equally in the past by all the
members, applied in ways which benefit unequally particular
individuals or particular sections among them, independently
of the amount which these individuals or sections may them-
selves have contributed. But this interpretation of insurance
would cover, not Trade Unionism alone, but practically every
form of collective action, including citizenship itself. By
the phrase " Mutual Insurance," as one of the Methods of
Trade Unionism, we understand only the provision of a
fund by common subscription to insure against casualties ;
to provide maintenance, that is to say, in cases in which a
member is deprived of his livelihood by causes over which
neither he nor the union has any control. This obviously
covers the " benevolent " or friendly society side of Trade
Unionism, such as the provision of sick pay, accident benefit,
and superannuation allowance, together with " burial money,"
and such allowances as that made to members of the
Amalgamated Society of Tailors who are prevented from
working by the sanitary authorities, owing to the presence
of infectious disease in their homes. But it includes also

The Method of Mutual Insurance 153

what are often termed " trade " benefits ; grants for replacing
tools lost by theft or fire, and " out-of-work pay," from the
old-fashioned "tramping card" to the modern "donation"
given when a member loses his employment by the tem-
porary breakdown of machinery or " w^ant of pit room," by
the bankruptcy of his employer or the stoppage of a mill,
or merely in consequence of a depression in trade. " The
simplest and universal function of trades societies," it
was reported in i860, "is the enabling the workman to
maintain himself while casually out of employment, or
travelling in search of it."^ On the other hand, our
definition excludes all expenditure incurred by the union as
a consequence of action voluntarily undertaken by it, such
as the cost of trade negotiations, the " victim pay " accorded
to members dismissed for agitation, and the maintenance of
men on strike. These we omit as more properly incidental
to the Method of Collective Bargaining. We also leave to
be dealt with under the Method of Legal Enactment the
provision for the legal aid of members under the Employers'
Liability, Truck, or Factory Acts.

Trade Union Mutual Insurance, thus defined, comprises
two distinct classes of benefit : " Friendly " and " Out of
Work." There is an essential difference between the
insurance against such physical and personal casualties as
sickness, accident, and old age on the one hand, and, on the
other, the stoppage of income caused by mere inability to
obtain employment.

Friendly Mutual Insurance, in many industries the oldest
form of Trade Union activity, has been adopted by practically
every society which has lasted. Here and there, at all times,
one trade or another has, in the first emergence of its
organisation, preferred to confine its action to Collective
Bargaining or to aim at Legal Enactment.^ But directly

' Report of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science on
Trade Societies and Strikes (London, i860), p. xx.

- See for the so-called "New Unionism" of 1889, the History of Trade
Unionism, pp. 401, 406.

154 Trade Union Function

the combination has settled down to everyday life, we find
it adding one or other of the benefits of insurance, and often
developing into the most comprehensive Trade Friendly
Society. For the past hundred years this insurance business
has been steadily growing, not only in volume, but also in
deliberateness and regularity.

In providing friendly benefits the Trade Union comes
into direct competition with the ordinary friendly society
and the industrial insurance company. The engineer or
carpenter who joins his Trade Union might insure against
sickness, old age, and the expenses of burial, by joining the
" Oddfellows " and the " Prudential " instead. And from
an actuarial point of view the Amalgamated Society of
Engineers or Carpenters is not for a moment to be com-
pared with a friendly society of good standing. Unlike the
registered friendly society, the Trade Union, even if registered,
does not enter into any legally binding contract. A Trade
Union cannot be sued ; and the members have individually
no legal remedy against it. A member who has paid for a
whole lifetime to the sick and superannuation funds may, at
any moment, be expelled and forfeit all claim, for reasons
quite unconnected with his desire for insurance in old age.
Against the decision of his fellow-members there is, in no
case, any appeal. Moreover, the scale of contributions and
benefits may at any time be altered, even to the extent of
abolishing benefits altogether ; and such alterations do, in
fact, frequently take place, in spite of all the protests of
minorities of old members. And it is no small drawback
to the security of the individual member that, in a time of
trade depression, just when he himself is probably poorest,
he is invariably required to pay extra levies to meet the
heavy Out of Work liabilities, on pain of being automatically
excluded, and thus forfeiting all his insurance. It is a
further aggravation that in any crisis the Trade Union,
unlike the friendly society, regards the punctual discharge of
its sick and superannuation liabilities as a distinctly secondary
consideration. The paramount requisite of an organisation

The Method of Mutual Insurance 155

professing to provide against sickness and old age is abso-
lute security that the accumulated funds will be reserved
exclusively to meet the growing liabilities. But in a Trade
Union there is no guarantee that any of its funds will be
reserved for this purpose. During a long spell of trade
depression the whole accumulated balance may be spent in
maintaining the members out of work. An extensive strike
may, at any time, drain the society absolutely dry. The
Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons, for instance,
has, during its sixty years' existence, twice been reduced
to absolute beggary, in 1841 by a prolonged strike, and in
1879 by ^^^ severe depression in trade. A still older and
richer union, the Friendly Society of Ironfounders, not only
spent every penny of its funds in 1879, t>ut borrowed many
thousands of pounds from its members' individual savings to
meet the most pressing of its liabilities.^ This " hole in the
stocking" is not mended by any nominal allocation of a
certain part of the income, or a specific share of the funds,
to the sick or superannuation liabilities. No Trade Union
ever dreams of putting any part of its funds legally or
effectively out of the control of its members for the time
being ; and when a time of stress comes, the nominal alloca-
tion offers no obstacle to the " borrowing " of some or all
the ear-marked balance for current purposes. Trade Union-
ists, in short, subscribe their money primarily for the main-
tenance or improvement of their wages or other conditions
of employment : only after this object has been secured do
they expect or desire any sick or other friendly benefits, and
their rules proceed always on the assumption that such
benefits are payable only if and when there is a surplus in
hand.

This entire want of legal or financial security has
hitherto prevented actuaries from giving serious considera-
tion to the problems of Trade Union insurance.^ The

^ History of Trade Unionism, pp. 157, 334.

2 This lack of knowledge and absence of serious study has not prevented
leading actuaries from denouncing stable and well-managed Trade Unions as

156 Trade Union Function

consequence is that the Trade Union scales of contributions
and benefits do not rest on any actuarial basis, and represent,
at best, the empirical guess-work of the members. Scarcely
any attempt has yet been made to collect the data necessary

financially unsound, even on their friendly society side, and inevitably destined to
early bankruptcy. Before the Royal Commission of 1867-68, for instance, two
of the principal actuaries demonstrated that both the Amalgamated Society of
Engineers and the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters were insolvent to the
extent of many hundreds of thousands of pounds, and that they were necessarily
doomed to collapse. In spite of the patent falsification of these prophecies, and
the continued growth in wealth of the great unions, similar denunciations and
predictions are still repeated by actuarial authorities ignorant of their own
ignorance.

A Trade Union differs fundamentally from a friendly society or insurance
company, which undertakes to provide definite payments for a specified premium.
A Trade Union is not only free at any time to revise, or even suspend, its
benefits ; it can, and habitually does, increase its income by levies. Thus,
whilst the nominal contribution of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers is a
shilling per week, the actual amount received from the members during the ten
years 1886-95 averaged, for the whole period, one shilling and twopence halfpenny
per week {^Eighth Report by the Chief Labour Correspondent on Trade Unions,
C. 8232, 1896, p. 404), and the rules expressly provide that "when the funds
are reduced to ^3 per member the contributions shall be increased by such sum
per week as will sustain the funds at not less than that amount " (Rule XXV. of
edition of 1896, p. 12 1). A society with such a rule can obviously never
become insolvent so long as it retains any members, and chooses to meet its
engagements.

But there is another and no less important difference in actuarial position
between a Trade Union and a friendly society. A friendly society is rightly
deemed unsound if the contributions paid by the members when young do not
enable a fund to be accumulated to meet the greatly increased liabilities for sick-
ness, superannuation, and burial as they grow older. A society may have cash in
hand, and yet be steering into bankruptcy, if the average age of its members is
increasing, or might presently (by a stoppage of recruiting) be found to be
increasing. This rapid increase of liabilities with advancing age constitutes what
insurance experts denounce as "the vice of assessmentism " — the fallacious
assumption that the year's payments can safely be met by the year's levies on the
members for the time being. But where membership is universal, the average
age, and therefore the liabilities, do not, and cannot, increase. If sick-pay,
superannuation, and burial were provided by the State for all citizens, the number
of cases year by year would, from an actuarial point of view, remain constant, or
would be affected only by the slow and gradual changes in national health. A
single trade is, in this respect, in much the same position as the nation, and when
a Trade Union habitually includes all the operatives in its industry the percentage
of benefit cases is remarkably uniform. Moreover, even in less universal organ-
isations, where the motives for joining are very largely unconnected with
friendly benefits, and there is no competing union, the result is practically the
same. As a matter of fact, the average age of the members of well-established
Trade Unions, so far as this can be ascertained, remains remarkably stable, and
seems to increase only with the general improvement in sanitation.

The Method of Mutual Insurance 157

for a more precise computation ; and even such elementary-
facts as the average age of the members, or the special
death rate or sickness rate of the occupation, are often
unknown. There is no graduation of contributions accord-
ing to age, practically no attempt at medical selection of can-
didates for membership, and a complete uncertainty as to
what interest will be received on investments, or whether the
funds will be invested at interest at all. In short, the Trade
Union, considered merely as a friendly society, does not
profess to afford its members any legal security or certain
guarantee against destitution in sickness or old age. Its
promises of superannuation allowances, and even of sick pay,
are, in reality, conditional on there being money left over
after providing for other purposes. " The right " [of members
to] "any benefit," wrote Daniel Guile, in 1869, in the name
of the Ironfounders' Executive, " only exists as long as the
Society has power to pay it. Any determination of the
exact amount of return a member may rightly expect for a
particular amount of contribution rests upon averages of a
nature far too abstruse to be entered upon here, and for
which, indeed, even the groundwork is wanting." ^ In face
of this lack of security, and absence of actuarial basis, it
seems at first sight surprising that union after union should
add to its purely trade functions the business of an ordinary
friendly society. But, as Professor Beesly remarked in 1867,
" it is much more economical to depend upon one society
combining all benefits, than to contribute to a friendly
society for sick and funeral benefits, and to a union for tool
and accident benefit and trade purposes." ^ Whether or not
the ordinary artisan appreciates the economy effected by
" concentration of management and consequent lessening of
working expenses," he at any rate realises that it is less
irksome to pay to one club than to several. But this hardly
explains the persistent advocacy of sick pay and superannua-

1 Monthly Report of the Friendly Society of Ironfotmders, October 1869.
'^ E. S. Beesly, The Amalgamated Society of Carpenters atid Joiners (l^ondon,
1S67), p. 4.

158 Trade Union Fimctioit

tion allowance by experienced Trade Union officials. Their
belief in the advantage of developing the friendly society
side of Trade Unionism rests frankly on the adventitious
aid it brings to working-class organisation. The benefit
club side serves, in the first place, as a potent attraction to
hesitating recruits. To the young man just " out of his
time " the prospect of securing support in sickness or un-
employment is a greater inducement to join the union, and
regularly to keep up his contributions, than the less obvious
advantages to be gained by the trade combination. " It
helps," says Mr. George Howell, "to bind the members to
the union when possibly other considerations might inter-
pose to diminish the zeal of the Trade Unionist pure and
simple." ^

Moreover, when, as is usually the case, the whole contri-
bution goes into a common fund, the society gains the advan-
tage of an additional financial reserve, which can be used in
support of its trade policy in time of need, and replaced as
opportunity permits. Such great Trade Friendly Societies
as the Boilermakers', Engineers', Stonemasons', and Iron-
founders' have, as we have seen, never hesitated to deplete
their balances in order to enable their members to withstand
encroachments on their Standard of Life. Thus, the addition
of friendly society benefits, bringing, as it does, greatly
increased contributions, enables the Trade Union to roll
up an imposing reserve fund, which, even if not actually
drawn upon, is found to be an effective " moral influence " in
negotiations with employers.

We see, therefore, that the friendly society element
supplies to Trade Unionism both adventitious attractions
and an adventitious support. But this is not all. In a
strong and well-organised union, the existence of important
friendly benefits may become a powerful instrument for
maintaining discipline among the members, and for enforcing
upon all the decisions of the majority. If expulsion carries
with it the loss of valuable prospective benefits, such, for

1 Trade Unionism, New and Old, by George Howell (London, 1892), p. 102.

The Method of Mutual Insurance 1 59

instance, as superannuation, it becomes a penalty of great
severity. Similarly, when secession involves the abandon-
ment of all share in a considerable accumulated balance, a
branch momentarily discontented with some decision of the
majority thinks twice before it breaks off in a pet to set up
as an independent society. Thus the addition of friendly
benefits has been, on the whole, a great consolidating force
in Trade Unionism. We can, therefore, quite understand
why thoroughgoing opponents of trade combinations have,
like the associated employers who came before the Royal
Commission in 1867, vehemently denounced the combination
of trade and friendly society as illegitimate and dangerous.^

Friendly benefits have yet another advantage from the
point of view of the Trade Union official. To the permanent
salaried officer of a great union, with his time fully occupied
by his daily routine, it is no small gain that sick pay and
superannuation allowance exercise a great effect in " keeping
the members quiet." This was perceived, as early as 1867,
by a shrewd friend of the great Amalgamated Societies, the
" New Unionism " of that time. " The importance of the
principle [of providing all the usual benefits offered by
friendly societies] will be best understood," observes Professor
Beesly, " by looking at the character and working of the

1 "The combination of trade with benefit purposes was astutely conceived,
with a view to increase the strength of trade organisations. The benefit element
was first to decoy, and then to control. The lure of prospective benefits having
attracted members, the dread of confiscation was to enforce obedience." — Trade
Unionism, by James Stirling (Glasgow, 1869), p. 43.

There is absolutely no warrant for the accusation — still often repeated — that
the use of all the Trade Union funds for strike purposes when the members so
decide, amounts, morally if not legally, to malversation. The Chief Registrar of
Friendly Societies, questioned on this very point by the Royal Commission on
Labor, emphatically upheld the Trade Union practice. "The primary object of
the Trade Union," said Mr. Brabrook, "is protection of trade, and all the rest
is merely subsidiary. . . . The great bulk of members of Trade Unions know
perfectly well that they will not get the benefit in sickness if their money has
been previously spent in trade purposes, and they are perfectly willing it should
be so spent if emergency or necessity arises " (Questions 1561-3). Mr. J. M.
Ludlow, who preceded him in office, entirely confirmed this view. To hypothe-
cate any Trade Union funds for benefit purposes, he added, "might be to the
ruin of the Trade Union, and therefore to the ruin of the men who had contri-
buted those funds" (Questions 1783-S).

i6o Trade Union Ftmction

old-fashioned unions in which it is not adopted. The men
combine purely for ' trade purposes.' The subscription is
insignificant, sometimes only a penny a week. The members
probably belong to the Oddfellows or Foresters for the
benefit purposes ; and their financial tie to their union being
so weak, they join it or leave it with equal carelessness.
Nevertheless, small as the subscription is, a fund will in
course of time be accumulated. There is nothing to do with
this fund. There it is, eating its head off, so to speak. The
men become impatient to use it ; so a demand is made on
the employers, irrespective perhaps of the circumstances of
the trade. A strike follows. The members live on their
fund for a few weeks, and when it is exhausted they give in.
Such societies may be called Strike Societies, for they exist
for nothing else." ^ "A trade society without friendly
benefits," Mr. John Burnett has frequently declared, " is
like a standing army. It is a constant menace to peace."
And thus we find the employers of this generation abandon-
ing the criticisms of their predecessors in 1867, and reserving
their bitterest denunciations for the purely trade society.

With regard to the other branch of their Mutual Insurance
business, the Trade Unions occupy a unique position. How-
ever imperfectly Trade Unions may discharge the function of
providing maintenance for their members when out of work,
they undertake here a service which must, in their absence,
remain unperformed. No other organisation, whether com-
mercial or philanthropic, has yet come forward to protect
the wage-earner against the destitution arising from lack of
employment.^ Experience seems to indicate that Out of

1 E. S. Beesly, The Amalgamated Society cf Carpenters and Joiners, p. 3
(London, 1867).

- Certain experiments have been made since 1894 at Berne, Basle, and St. Gall
(Switzerland) ; at Cologne (Germany) ; and at Bologna (Italy), in the direction
of municipal insurance against unemployment, either voluntary or compulsory.
An account of these experiments, which do not appear to have been very
successful, will be found in the Rapport stir la Question dti Chdmage, published
by the French Government, Conseil Superieur du Travail (Paris, 1896, 398 pp.) ;
and Circulars 2 and 5 (Series B) of the Musee Social, Paris, containing an
elaborate bibliography ; to which we can add Charles Raaijmakers, Verzekering
tegen IVerkloosheid {^K.ra.i>\.e.\^zxa., 1895).

The Method of Mutual Insurance 1 6 1

Work pay cannot be properly administered except by bodies
of men belonging to the same trade and working in the
same establishments. Therefore it is not remarkable that
Trade Unions should give most of their attention to the
administration of their Out of Work benefits. We find, in
fact, that although funeral benefit is almost universal, and
accident allowance very widely adopted, these, like insurance
of tools, make up in the aggregate a very small proportion
of the total expenditure. And though sick pay and super-
annuation stand for appreciable sums, it is Out of Work
benefit which takes the most important place in the Mutual
Insurance business, its limits being extended in many instances,
whilst others are cut down.^ To a middle-class body it
would seem natural to give a kind of preferential lien on
the funds, to insure the continuance of the weekly allowances
to the sick and superannuated members already on the books.
A Trade Union not only refrains from taking this course,
but actually gives a preference, in effect, to its Out of Work
payments, usually continuing them at the full rate, even
when its funds are being rapidly exhausted, until it has
parted with its last penny. The secret of this bias does
not lie altogether in the immense difference in permanence
between middle class and working class employment. The
main object of the individual member may be to provide
against the personal distress which would otherwise be caused
to himself and his family by the stoppage of his weekly
income. But the object of the union, from the collective
point of view, is to prevent him from accepting employment,
under stress of starvation, on terms which, in the common
judgment of the trade, would be injurious to its interests.
This has been recognised from the earliest times as a leading

^ Thus, the Rides and Regulations of the Operative Bleachers, Finishers, and
Dyers' Association (Bolton, 1 891) provide (Rule 24), under the head of sick pay,
only for a case not met by the mere friendly society. " Should any member,
having his family afflicted with smallpox or other infectious disease and as a
consequence be temporarily discharged from following his employment, such
member shall be entitled to the ordinary out of work pay. But if such member
become afflicted himself his pay shall cease.''''

VOL. I M

1 62 Trade Union Function

object of Out of Work pay. Already, in 1 741, it was
remarked that the woolcombers " support one another,
insomuch that they are become one society throughout the
kingdom. And that they may keep up their price, to encourage
idleness rather than labor, if any one of their club is out
of work, they give him a ticket and money to seek for work
at the next town where a box-club is, where he is also
subsisted, suffered to live a certain time with them, and used
as before ; by which means he can travel the kingdom round,
be caressed at each club, and not spend a farthing of his
own or strike one stroke of work. This has been imitated
by the weavers also, though not carried through the kingdom,
but confined to the places where they work." ^

We find the economic result of this tramping system
exercising the minds of the Assistant Poor Law Commissioners
of 1834. A leatherdresser "belongs to an incorporated or
combined trade ; the directors of this Combination issue
tickets to the members. These tickets are renewed from
time to time. The holder of one goes from place to place,
but must not take the same road more than once in six
months. With these intervals he is again and again
assisted. . . . This ticket is available in every part of the
United Kingdom where a club or lodge of the trade is
established. The individual in question might have had
work 2X £\ per week, but he refused to take it, or indeed
30s. per week ; nothing under £2 would satisfy him ; and
when pressed for reasons to account for his refusing such
offers — when asked whether it would not be better to get
£\ per week than to trust to casual sources of support, he

1 A Short Essay upon Trade in General, by a Lover of his Country (London,
1741), quoted in the History of the Worsted Mamifadure in England, by John
James (London, 1S57). How the employers felt the independence thus given to
the workers may be inferred from the following advertisement in the Leicester
Hej-ald, of June 1792: — "To Master Woolcombers. The Journeymen Wool-
combers in Kendal have left their work, and illegally combined to raise their wages
which are already equal to what is paid to the Trade in any part of the Kingdom :
they have also granted blanks, or certificates, to E. Hewitson, apprentice to Mr.
Pooley ; T. Parkinson, to Mr. Barton ; and W. Wilkinson, to Mr. Strutt, who
without such blanks or certificates must have remained with their masters.''''

The Method of Mutual Insurance 163

replied that he should not like to be ' turned black ' (query —
' returned black ') which would be the case if he worked under
price." ^

Gradually the Trade Unions themselves make clear the
real object of this system of mutual insurance. In 1844
the vSpring Knife Grinders' Protection Society of Sheffield
declare that the " object to be accomplished is to grant relief
to all its members that are out of work ; that none may
have the painful necessity of applying for relief from the
parish, or comply with the unreasonable demands of our
employers or their servants!^ ^ The Flint Glass Makers
express the same idea. " Our wages depend on the supply
of labor in the market ; our interest is therefore to restrict
that supply, reduce the surplus, make our u7iemployed com-
fortable, witJiout fear for the morrow — accomplish this, and we
have a command over the surplus of our labor, and we need
fear no unjust employer." ^ Four years later the Delegate
Meeting of the Amalgamated Engineers resolved to extend
by nine weeks the period during which a member was allowed
to receive continuously the Out of Work allowance. It was
successfully argued that " when bad trade did arrive ... it
brought with it the absolute necessity of a continuous dona-
tion ; for men, who were unemployed for so long a time as
to run through their donation altogether, would be compelled
either to seek parish relief, or take situations on terms injurious
to the trade. In the event of their doing the latter, the
Society would exercise but little control over them if it
did not entitle them to some benefit. For the protection of
the trade, then, it was stated to be absolutely necessary to make
the donation continuous, so that the members of the Society
should be able to resist the inducement of acting contrary to
tJie general rules of a District!' ^ Finally, we may cite the

1 Report of Poor Law Commission of 1834 ; Appendix, p. 900 a.

2 Manuscript Rules of the Spring Knife Grinders' Protection Society of Sheffield
in old account book, dated 1844.

3 Flint Glass Makers' Magazine, opening editorial, No. I, Sept. 1850.

* Minutes of the Second Delegate Meeting of the Amalgamated Society of
Ettgineers, p. 38 (London, 1854). The Constitution and Rules of the Associated

164 Trade Union Function

case of the Associated Shipwrights' Society, which has only
within recent years systematically adopted regular Out of
Work payments. The argument, used by the general
secretary at the Delegate Meeting in 1885, which finally
decided the matter, was as follows : " It is utterly impossible,"
Mr. Wilkie told his members, " to secure trade protection
when a third or a half of your trade are walking about idle
and starving. And unless members of the trade were pre-
pared to buy up, more or less, its surplus labor in the market,
it never could have the actual trade protection desired." ^

This historical explanation of the underlying object of
the Out of Work benefit is borne out by the actual practice
of to-day. Whilst all the members of a Trade Union are
enjoined to do their utmost to find situations for their unem-
ployed brethren, and whilst these are forbidden, under severe
penalty, to " refuse work when offered," yet this is always
subject to a fundamental condition, so obvious to the Trade
Union mind as to need no explicit statement in the rules.
A member is not only permitted to refuse job after job,
if these are offered to him below the " Standard Rate " of
remuneration, or otherwise in contravention of the normal
terms : he is absolutely forbidden to accept work on any
but the conditions satisfactory to his branch. The visitor
at a branch meeting of the Engineers or Carpenters will
hear members, in receipt of Out of Work pay, report to the
branch that they have been offered situations on such and
such terms, and ask whether it is considered right that they
should accept them. The branch will discuss the question

Ironmoulders of Scotland (Glasgow, 1892) explicitly recognise the use of the
Out of Work Benefit as a means of maintaining their standard of wages. " Any
member leaving for want of work . . . shall be paid idle benefit . . . but,
if leaving on own accord, he shall have no claim to benefit. The phrase
' want of work ' shall refer to all kinds of dismissal without fault of the member
— slackness, utiderpayment, resisting a reduction of wages, or icnjustijiable abuse or
ill-treatment from employer or foremati. . . . ' Own accord ' shall mean all kinds
of dismissal for irregularity, absence without leave except from illness, in-
sobriety, and captious or voluntary dismissal." (Rule 30, sec. 4.)

1 Address of General Secretary at Delegate Meeting of Associated Shipwrights''
Society, 1885.

The Method of Mutual Insurance 1 65

from the point of view of the probable effect on the Standard
'Rate ; and whilst they may permit a maimed or aged member
to accept five shillings a week less than the normal wage of
the district, they will prefer to keep a fully competent and
able-bodied man " on donation," rather than sanction any
departure from the Common Rule.^

Here we are outside the domain of actuarial science.
Even if it should prove possible to reduce to an arithmetical
scale of contributions and benefits the loss of income caused
by mere slackness of trade, it must always be out of the ques-
tion to determine what rate of Out of Work benefit can safely
be awarded in return for a given subscription, if the accept-
ance of employment depends on the policy of the society
with regard to its Standard Rate. Such a condition takes
us out of the category of insurance as provisionally defined
above. As understood and administered by all Trade Unions,
the Out of Work benefit is not valued exclusively, or even
mainly, for its protection of the individual against casualties.
In the mind of the thoughtful or experienced Trade Unionist
its most important function is to protect the Standard Rate
of wages and other normal conditions of employment from
being "eaten away," in bad times, by the competition of
members driven by necessity to accept the employers' terms.

The reader will now understand why this Mutual Insur-
ance must be regarded, not as the end or object, but as one
of the Methods of Trade Unionism. At first sight nothing
could appear more simple than the mutual provision of
support in order to enable a man to seek work elsewhere,
and not be under an absolute compulsion to accept whatever
terms an employer may offer. In its economic effect upon
the labor market it seems no more than would result from
the existence of individual savings in a savings bank. But

^ The Rules to be observed by the members of the Bury and District Tape-
size)'S Friendly Protective Society (Bury, 1 888) provide (p. 7) that "if any member
who is out of work and receiving pay make application for a situation or be sent
for, and he is offered a less rate of wage than he has been paid before, he shall
be at liberty to take it or not, and if he refuse to take it he shall not have his pay
stopped."

1 66 Trade Union Ftmction

Trade Unions, as Fleeming Jenkin pointed out, are far more
potent in this respect than any savings bank, " because they
enable the community of workmen to acquire wealth. . . .
The individual workman knows that his reserve fund will be
nearly useless unless his neighbour has a reserve fund also.
If each workman in a strike trusted to his own funds only,
the poorer ones must give in first ; and these would secure
work, while the richer, after spending a part of their reserve,
would find themselves supplanted by the poorer competitors,
and the sacrifice made uselessly. A combined reserve fund
gives great power by insuring that all suffer alike. The
Trade Union, therefore, has a permanent action in raising
wages, because it enables men to accumulate a common
fund, with which they can sustain their resolution not to work
unless they obtain such pay as will give increased comfort." ^
If this collective reserve fund coexists with a common
understanding as to the terms without which no member
will accept employment, it is obvious that we have a deliberate
and conscious use of Mutual Insurance, not to relieve indi-
vidual distress, but to enforce a Trade Union Regulation.

The Method of Mutual Insurance is pursued, more or
less consciously, by every union that gives benefits at all.
Until Collective Bargaining was permitted by the employers,
and before Legal Enactment was within the workmen's reach.
Mutual Insurance was the only method by which Trade
Unionists could lawfully attain their end. Hence its high
favor with the group of astute officials who led the work-
men between 1845 and 1875. Dunning, in fact, expressly
gives it as the main method of Trade Unionism. " Singly
the employer can stand out longer in the bargain than the
journeyman ; and as he who can stand out longest in the
bargain will be sure to command his own terms, the work-
men combine to put themselves on something like an equality
in the bargain for the sale of their labor with their employer.
This is the rationale of trade societies. . . . The object in-

1 " Graphic Representation of the Laws of Supply and Demand," by Fleeming
Jenkin, in Recess Studies (Edinburgh, 1870), pp. 183-4.

The Method of Mutual Insurance 1 6 7

tended is carried out by providing a fund for the support of
its members when out of employ, for a certain number of
weeks in the year. TJiis is the usual and regular way in
luhich the labor of the members of a trade society is protected,
that the man's present necessities may not compel him to
take less than the wages which the demand and supply of
labor in the trade have previously adjusted." ^

The same view was expressed by William Allan, the
first secretary of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers.
" We are very little engaged in regulating " rates of wages, he
told the Royal Commission in 1867, "they regulate them-
selves, if I may use the expression. If a member believed,"
he continued, "that he was not getting a proper rate of
wages, the society would encourage him in objecting, that is
to say, would pay him his benefit while out of employment.
. . . The man would go to the branch to which he belonged,
and would there state that he was only receiving a certain
rate of wages ; if he wished to leave his employment he
would ask the question whether under the circumstances he
would be entitled to what we call donation, that is Out of
Work Benefit, if he left the situation ; and in all probability
the society would say, you can leave and we will pay you
the benefit. Or they might say, we believe you are getting
as much as you ought to expect." ^

In some small and highly organised trades of skilled
handicraftsmen, this method of enforcing Trade Union
regulations by Mutual Insurance has tacitly elaborated into
an effective weapon, not only of defence, but also of aggres-
sion. We may instance the Spanish and Morocco Leather
Finishers' Society, a small but powerful union, practically
co-extensive with the craft, which has not for fifty years

^ T. J. Dunning, Trades Unions and Strikes : their Philosophy and Intention
(London, i860), p. 10. See also Dunning's articles on "Wages of Labour and
Trade Societies," in the second, third, and fourth numbers of the Bookbinders'"
Trade Circular {\Z^i) ; History of Trade U7iionisin, p. 179.

^ First Report of the Commissioners appointed to enquire into the Organisation
and Rules of Trades Unions and other Associations (London, 1867). Evidence of
VV. Allan, Questions 787-789.

1 68 Trade UnioJt Function

ordered a formal strike, or in any way overtly " intervened
between employer and employed." Nevertheless, it has
known how to enforce a detailed uniform price-list in every
centre, new or old, in which the trade is carried on ; it has
maintained this piece-work list practically unaltered for fifty
years, notwithstanding many improvements in processes ; it
has, consequently, kept up its members' earnings to certainly
more than £2 per week ; and it has successfully enforced a
rigid limitation of apprentices, there being nowhere more
than one to seven journeymen. Yet no overt collective
movement is ever made. If any employer refuses to conform
to the regulations, even in the slightest degree, the members
leave him one by one, and receive Out of Work benefit, which
may continue for thirty-nine weeks.^ It is usually found, we
are told, that an employer remedies any grievance after he
has had to put up with a new man every week or two for a
few months. In 1845 the Old Smiths' Society, which had
suffered severely between 1827 and 1844 from numerous
small strikes, removed from their rules all provision for these
pitched battles with their employers, in favor of this more
silent form of pressure. The preamble to the rules, drawn up
by the Delegate Meeting of 1845, adds, "Disputes . . . can
only be settled by friendly consultations between both master
and man, imbued with the spirit of mutually imparting facts,
with a view to render assistance to each other ; if this, in con-
nection with the efforts of mutual and disinterested friends,
cannot be accomplished, we say then let men and masters
part ; offer no opposition ; the men, however great or small
their number, to be supplied with means of existence until
they obtain other situations of work from the funds of the
society ; and the employers to obtain other men as best they
may ; and we contend that this unassuming quiet plan of
operations is, according to its number of members, accom-
plishing, and will continue to accomplish, infinitely more real
good to the trade in all its ramifications, at a minimum

1 Rules to be obserued by the Members of the Leeds Friendly Society of Sfanish
and Morocco Leather Finishers (Leeds, 1879).

Tke Method of Mtitual Insu7^ance 169

expense to its members, than any other plan of operation by
any other society." ^ The same position was aimed at by
the Flint Glass Makers in 1850, when their magazine was
advocating the use of this nameless weapon which we have
christened, for our own convenience, the " Strike in Detail."
" As man after man leaves, . . . then it is that the proud
and haughty spirit of the oppressor is brought down, and he
feels the power he cannot see." ^

This application of mutual insurance may be made the
method of enforcing any Common Rule whatsoever ; and a
very effective instrument it is. An employer whose workmen
leave him one by one, after due notice, may find little diffi-
culty in filling their places. But if the new-comers, after a
brief stay, one by one give notice that they, too, will leave,
he is placed in a serious difficulty. He cannot close his
doors and appeal for support to his fellow-employers, as
there is no strike, and no refusal on the part of the Trade
Unionists to accept his terms. Nevertheless, his constant
inability to retain any workman for more than a week or
two, may easily become so harassing that he will be forced
to inquire carefully in what respect his employment falls
below the standard of the trade, and to conform to it. The
Trade Union, on the other hand, runs no risk of retaliation,
and, as only a few men are on the books at any one time,
incurs the minimum of expense. As a deliberate Trade
Union policy, the Strike in Detail depends upon the extent
to which the union has secured the adhesion of all the com-
petent men in the trade, and upon their capacity for
persistent and self-restrained pursuit of a common end. It
could, accordingly, never become the sole method of any but
a small, wealthy, and closely knit society ; but in such a
society it may easily, in its coercive effect on the employer,
surpass even an Act of Parliament itself.

^ Report on Trade Societies' Rules by Mr. (now the Rt. Hon.) G. Shaw
Lefevre in Social Science Association's Report on Trades Societies atid Strikes
(London, iS6o).

2 Flint Glass Makers'' Alagazine, July 1850.

I yo Trade Union Fimction

The Strike in Detail is only a more deliberate and
self-conscious application of the method of maintaining the
standard of life by Mutual Insurance customary among all
Trade Unionists. It is impossible to draw any logical dis-
tinction between the action of the little union of Leather
Finishers and that of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers,
as explained by William Allan and T. J. Dunning, or indeed
any union which maintains a member in idleness rather than
allow him to accept work " contrary to the interests of the
trade." The persistent adhesion of Trade Unionists to the
Out of Work benefit, and their secondary adoption of what
we have called the friendly society business, appear as a
perfectly consistent, homogeneous policy the moment the
true Trade Union point of view is caught. Any provision
which secures the members of the trade against destitution
prevents an employer taking advantage of their necessities.^
Not Out of Work benefit alone, but also sick pay, grants to
replace tools or property lost or burnt, burial money for wife
or child, and especially accident benefit and superannuation
allowance, all serve to enforce the claim of the workman " to
be dealt with as an intelligent being, and not merely as a
bale of goods or article of merchandise. This," emphatically
declares the Friendly Society of Ironfounders, " is, then, the
main and central pillar of our organisation. Around it are
clustered those monetary benefits that are stated above, and
it is from this grand standpoint those benefits must all be
estimated : for from this point only it is at all possible to
come to a right and fair conclusion as to their real value to
individual members." ^

1 We may cite a curious small case among the Curriers. The London
journeymen curriers have always strenuously resisted the employers' attempts to
make them take out shoe hides at an average weight, instead of weighing each
one separately. In 1854 certain members represented to the union that their
employer had taken advantage of the slackness of work in the winter season to
try to enforce this practice upon them ; and that if the union would make them
each a loan, they could dispense with sending in their bills to their employer for
that week, which would have a good effect as demonstrating their power to stand
out. The union readily agreed to lend each man a pound on condition that he
drew no wages that week. MS. Minute Book, 1854.

2 Preface to Rules to bd observed by the Members of the Friendly Society of

The Method of Muttial Insztrance 1 7 1

Mutual Insurance, even when considered purely as a
Method of Trade Unionism, is by no means beyond criticism.
The lack of legal or financial security of the friendly benefits
may be worth tolerating by a wage-earner for the sake of the
trade as a whole ; but it is none the less an evil on that
account. And even the successful Strike in Detail of the
Leather Finishers has grave drawbacks, from its own stand-
point. No Trade Unionist would deny that the deliber-
ately concerted Common Rules, to which workmen and
employers must alike conform, ought to be framed after
consideration, not of the desires of one class alone, but from
all points of view. The method of Mutual Insurance leaves
no place for discussion with the employers. Each party
makes up its own mind, relies on its power of holding out,
and leaves the issue to depend merely on secret endurance.
Frank and full discussion might have revealed facts previously
unknown, which would have altered the views of the parties.
It might have been discovered that some points most keenly
insisted on by one side were regarded as unimportant by the
other. The influence of public opinion would have moderated
the negotiations. These tendencies make, in Collective Bar-
gaining, for a compromise often representing a real gain to
both parties. For all this, the Method of Mutual Insurance
allows no place. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that
the most highly developed and successful modern organisa-
tions make little use of Mutual Insurance as a method of
industrial regulation. Among the Coalminers and Cotton
Operatives, who together comprise a fifth of the Trade
Union world, friendly benefits, and even Out of Work
donation, play only the most trifling part. And it is sig-
nificant that the United Society of Boilermakers, in many

Ironfounders (London, 1891). It is interesting to find that this use of Mutual
Insurance among workers was elaborately explained and defended in 1S19 by
the well-known Baptist minister, the Reverend Robert Hall ; see his pamphlets,
An Appeal to the Public on the Subject of the Framework Knitters' Fund (Leicester,
181 9), and A Reply to the Principal Objections advanced by Cobbett and others
against the Framework Knitters Friendly Relief Society (Leicester, 1S21), b(;th
included in his Works (London, 1832), vol. iii.

172 Trade Union Function

respects the most successful of the great unions, whilst
utilising to the full a most elaborate system of Mutual
Insurance, keeps the provision against unavoidable casualties
entirely distinct from its trade objects. For all that concerns
the maintenance and improvement of the conditions of em-
ployment the Boilermakers, like the Coalminers and the
Cotton Operatives, resort to one or other of the alternative
Methods of Trade Unionism, Collective Bargaining, or Legal
Enactment.

CHAPTER II

THE METHOD OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

The nature of the Method of Collective Bargaining will be
best understood by a series of examples.

In unorganised trades the individual workman, applying
for a job, accepts or refuses the terms offered by the employer,
without communication with his fellow-workmen, and with-
out any other consideration than the exigencies of his own
position. For the sale of his labor he makes, with the
employer, a strictly individual bargain.^ But if a group of
workmen concert together, and send representatives to con-
duct the bargaining on behalf of the whole body, the position
is at once changed. Instead of the employer making a
series of separate contracts with isolated individuals, he meets
with a collective will, and settles, in a single agreement, the
principles upon which, for the time being, all workmen of a
particular group, or class, or grade, will be engaged. For
instance, in a cabinet-making shop, if a new pattern is
brought out, the men in the shop hold a brief and informal
meeting to discuss the price at which it can be executed, the

^ The phrase "Individual Bargaining" is used incidentally by C. Morrison
in his Essay on the Relations between Labour and Capital (London, 1S54), as
equivalent to " what may be called the commercial principle," according to which
"the workman endeavours to sell his labor as dearly and the employer to pur-
chase it as cheaply as possible" (p. 9).

We are not aware of any use of the phrase "Collective Bargaining" before
that in The Cooperative Movement in Great Britain (London, 1891), p. 217. by
Beatrice Potter (Mrs. Sidney Webb), where it is employed in the present sense.

1 74 Trade Union Ftuiction

rough basis being whether, taking into account the un-
famiharity of the work, and the nature of the task, they can
make no less net wages per hour than they have been
hitherto earning. The foreman has meanwhile been estimat-
ing the job in his own way, on much the same basis as the
men, but probably arriving at a slightly lower figure. The
men's representative talks the matter over with the foreman,
and some compromise is come to, the job standing at that
price for the whole shop. This process differs from that of
a series of individual bargains with the separate workmen, in
that the particular exigencies of each are ruled out of con-
sideration. If the foreman had dealt privately with each
man, he might have found some in such necessity that he
could have driven them to take the job practically at any
price rather than be without work for even half a day.
Others, again, relying on exceptional strength or endurance,
would have seen their way to make the standard earnings at
a piecework rate upon which the average worker could not
even subsist. By the Method of Collective Bargaining the
foreman is prevented from taking advantage of the competi-
tion of both these classes of men to beat down the earnings
of the other workmen. The starving man gets his job at
the same piecework rate as the workman who could afford
to stand out for his usual earnings. The superior crafts-
man retains all his advantages over his fellows, but without
allowing his superiority to be made the means of reducing
the weekly wage of the ordinary worker.

This example of the Method of Collective Bargaining is
taken from the practice of a " shop club " in a relatively
unorganised trade. The skilled artisans in the building
trades afford a typical instance of the second stage. The
" shop bargain " of such a trade as the cabinet-makers merely
rules out the exigencies of the particular workmen in a
single establishment. But this establishment is exposed to
the undercutting of other establishments in the same town.
One employer might have to give exceptional terms to his
" shop club " in a sudden rush of urgent orders, whilst the

The Method of Collective Bargaining 1 75

workmen in other firms might be virtually at the masters'
mercy owing to bad trade. Directly a Trade Union is
formed in any town, an attempt is made to exclude from
influence on the terms, the exigencies of particular employers
no less than those of particular workmen. Thus in the
building trades we find the unions of Carpenters, Bricklayers,
Stonemasons, Plumbers, Plasterers, and sometimes those of
the Painters, Slaters, and Builders' Laborers obtaining formal
" working rules," binding on all the employers and work-
men of the town or district. This Collective Bargaining,
arranged at a conference between the local master builders,
and the local officials of the national unions, settles, for a
specified term, the hours of beginning and ending work, the
minimum rate of wages, the payment for overtime, the age
and number of apprentices to be taken, the arrangements as
to piecework, the holidays to be allowed, the notice to be
given by employers or workmen terminating engagements,
the accommodation to be provided for meals and the safe
custody of tools, and numerous allowances or extra payments
for travelling, lodging, " walking time," " grinding money,"
etc. These elaborate codes, unalterable except by formal
notice from the organisations on either side, thus place on a
uniform footing as regards the hiring of labor the wealthiest
contractor and the builder on the brink of bankruptcy, the
firm crowded with orders and that standing practically idle.
On the other hand, the superior workman retains his freedom
to exact higher rates for his special work, whilst the employer
of superior business ability, or technical knowledge, and the firm
enjoying the best machinery or plant, preserve, it is claimed,
every fraction of their advantage over their competitors.^

^ The number of these " working rules " in force in the United Kingdom
has never been ascertained, but it must be very large, there being scarcely any
town in which one or other of the building trades has not obtained a formal
treaty with its employers. Our own collection of these treaties, in the building
trades alone, numbers several hundreds. Specimens will be found in the Labour
Gazette of the Board of Trade for November 1 894 ; and in Le Trade Unionisvie
en Aiigleierre, edited by Paul de Rousiers (Paris, 1897), pp. 68-70. The British
Library of Political Science, 10 Adelphi Terrace, London, contains these and
other Trade Union documents.

176 Trade Union Function

The building trades, in which one town does not
obviously compete with another, have hitherto stopped at
this stage of Collective Bargaining. Where the product of
different towns goes to the same market, we see, in the best
organised industries, a still further development. The great
staple trades of cotton-spinning and cotton-weaving have
ruled out, not merely the exigencies of particular workmen
in one mill, or of particular mills in one town, but also those
of the various towns over which the industries have spread.
The general level of wages in all the cotton-spinning towns
is, for instance, settled by the national agreements between
the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners
and the Master Cotton-spinners' Association. No employer,
and no group of workmen, no district association of em-
ployers, and no " province " of the Trade Union, can propose
an advance or accept a special reduction from the estab-
lished level of earnings. General advances or reductions are
negotiated at long intervals, and with great deliberateness,
between the national representatives of each party. Thus
we see ruled out, not merely all personal or local exigencies,
but also the temporary gluts or contractions of the market,
whether in the raw material or in the product. All firms
in a district, and all districts in the industry being, as far as
possible, placed upon an identical footing as to the rate at
which they obtain human labor, their competition takes, it is
contended, the form of improving the machinery, getting the
best and cheapest raw material, and obtaining the most
advantageous market for their wares.

A similar series of collective agreements exists in some
other industries. Among the iron-shipbuilders, for instance,
a gang of platers will bargain, through their first hand, as to
the exact terms upon which they will undertake a job in the
building of an iron ship. But the foreman cannot offer, or
the men accept terms which in any way conflict with the
" district by-laws " — a detailed code regulating hours, over-
time, extra allowances, and often also the piecework rates
for ordinary work, formally agreed to by the district com-

The Method of Collective Bargaining 1 7 7

mittee of the Trade Union and the local association of
employers. Moreover, the district by-laws, unalterable for
a fixed term, exclude the influence of any sudden glut or
famine in the labor market, or any temporary fluctuation of
the trade of the port. But this is not all. The district
by-laws are themselves subject to the formal treaties on such
matters as apprenticeship and the standard level of wages
concluded between the United Society of Boilermakers and
Iron-shipbuilders and the Employers' Federation of Ship-
building and Engineering Trades. These treaties, settling
certain questions for the whole kingdom, rule out on those
points the exigencies of particular localities, and place all
ports upon an equality. Thus the collective bargain made
by the group of platers on a particular job in one establish-
ment of a certain town imports a hierarchy of other collective
bargains, concluded by the representatives of the contracting
parties in their gradually widening spheres of action.

This practice of Collective Bargaining has, in one form
or another, superseded the old individual contract between
master and servant over a very large proportion of the
industrial field. " I will pay each workman according to
his necessity or merit, and deal with no one but my own
hands," — once the almost universal answer of employers —
is now seldom heard in any important industry, except in
out-of-the-way districts, or from exceptionally arbitrary
masters.^ But it is interesting to notice that Collective
Bargaining is neither co- extensive with, nor limited to.
Trade Union organisation. A few old -standing wealthy
unions of restricted membership have sometimes preferred,
as we saw in the last chapter, to attain their ends by the
Method of Mutual Insurance, whilst others, at all periods,
have been formed with the express design of attaining their
ends by the Method of Legal Enactment. On the other

1 Mr. Lecky observes [Detnocracy aftd Liberty, vol. ii. p. 361) that collective
agreements "are becoming, much more than engagements between individual
employers and individual workmen, the form into which English industry is
manifestly developing. "

VOL. I N

lyS Trade Union Function

hand, whole sections of the wage-earning class, not included
in any Trade Union, habitually have their rate of wages and
often some other conditions of their employment settled by
Collective Bargaining. We do not here refer merely to such
cases as the " shop-bargain," which we have just described.
The historic strikes of the London building trades in 1859,
and the Newcastle engineers in 1871, were both conducted
by committees elected at mass meetings of members of the
trade, among whom the Trade Unionists formed an insig-
nificant minority.^ In the history of the building and
engineering trades there are numerous instances of agree-
ments being concluded, on behalf of a whole district, by
temporary committees of non - unionists, and where the
Trade Unions themselves initiate and conduct the negotia-
tions the agreements arrived at habitually govern in these
industries, not the members alone, but the great bulk of
similar workmen in the district. Here and there an
eccentric employer may choose to depart from the regular
terms, but the great majority find it more convenient to
comply with what becomes, in fact, the " custom of the
trade." So thoroughly has the Collective Bargaining been
recognised in the building trades, that county court judges
now usually hold that the " working rules " of the district
are implied as part of the wage- contract, if no express
stipulation has been made on the points therein dealt with.
Collective Bargaining thus extends over a much larger
part of the industrial field than Trade Unionism. Precise
statistics do not exist, but our impression is that, in all
skilled trades, where men work in concert, on the employers'
premises, ninety per cent of the workmen find, either their
rate of wages or their hours of work, and often many other
details, predetermined by a collective bargain in which they
personally have taken no part, but in which their interests
have been dealt with by representatives of their class.

But though Collective Bargaining prevails over a much
larger area than Trade Unionism, it is the Trade Union

^ History of Trade Uniotiistn, pp. 210, 299; compare pp. 302, 305.

The Method of Collective Bargaining 1 79

alone which can provide the machinery for any but its most
casual and limited application. Without a Trade Union
in the industry, it would be almost impossible to get a
Common Rule extending over a whole district, and hopeless
to attempt a national agreement. If therefore the collective
bargain aims at excluding from influence on the bargain, the
exigencies of particular firms or particular districts, and not
merely those of particular workmen in a single establishment.
Trade Union organisation is indispensable. Moreov-er, it is
the Trade Union alone which can supply the machinery for
the automatic interpretation and the peaceful revision of the
general agreement. To Collective Bargaining, the machinery
of Trade Unionism may bring, in fact, both continuity and
elasticity.

The development of a definite and differentiated
machinery for Collective Bargaining in the Trade Union
world coincides, as might be expected, with its enlargement
from the workshop to the whole town, and from the town to
the whole industry. As soon as a Trade Union properly so
called comes into existence with a president and secretary,
it becomes more and more usual for these officers to act as
the workmen's representatives in trade negotiations. This is
the stage in which we find nearly all the single-branched
unions, such as those of the Sheffield trades, the Dublin
local societies, the Coopers, Sailmakers, and other small and
compact bodies of workmen all over the kingdom. Even
where the growth of a local union into a national society
has necessitated the appointment of a salaried general
secretary, giving his whole time to his duties, it is exceptional
to find him conducting all, or even the bulk of the negotia-
tions of its members with their employers. In the United
Operative Plumbers' Association, for instance, practically the
whole of the Collective Bargaining is still conducted by the
branch officials, or by representative workmen specially selected
as delegates. A further stage is marked by the creation of
permanent committees, unconcerned with the ordinary branch
administration, to deal solely with local trade questions.

i8o Trade Union Fu7iction

Thus the bulk of the Collective Bargaining of the members
of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers was, until 1892,
conducted by the society's district committees, each acting
for the whole of a local industrial district, in which there
are often many branches. These negotiators are, like the
branch officials, men working at their trade, and only spas-
modically engaged in special business of industrial nego-
tiation. Even disputes of such national importance as the
costly and disastrous strikes of the Tyneside engineers of
1 89 1, were initiated and managed by the local district
committees and their officials, that is to say, by workmen
called from the workshop only for the time required by the
society's business. Over more than one-third of the Trade
Union world, including such old established and widely
extended unions as the Friendly Society of Operative Stone-
masons, the Friendly Society of Ironfounders, and the
Operative Bricklayers' Society, the workmen have not
developed any more specialised machinery for Collective
Bargaining than the branch or district committee of men
working at their trade, meeting representative employers
when occasion arises. This primitive machinery, although a
great advance on the " shop-club," has manifest disadvantages.
If, as often happens, a personal quarrel or local bitterness is
at the bottom of the dispute, the prominent local workman
who represents his fellows can hardly escape its influence.
And, apart from personal antagonisms and questions of
temper, the fact that it is the conditions of his own life that
are involved does not conduce to that combination of
courage and reasonableness most likely to lead to a lasting
settlement. If the negotiator himself is fortunately placed,
or would personally be much injured by a strike, he will
be tempted to acquiesce in conditions not advantageous to
the whole trade. In the reverse case — perhaps the more
common — the energetic and active-minded workman, whom
his fellows choose to represent them, is apt to find, in the
joy of the fight, a relief from the monotony of manual
labor. If a strike ensues, it brings to him at any rate the

The Method of Collective Bargaining 1 8 1

compensation that for a few weeks, or perhaps months,
he becomes the paid organiser of the union, overwhelmed,
it is true, with anxious and harassing work, but temporarily-
exchanging a position of passive obedience for one of active
leadership.

But, apart altogether from the disturbing influence of the
" personal equation," it is obvious that the manual workers
will stand at a grave disadvantage if they do not command
the services of an expert negotiator. Unfortunately for his
interests, the workman has an inveterate belief in what he
calls a " practical man " — that is, one who is actually working
at the trade concerned. He does not see that negotiation
is in itself a craft, in which a man must have had a special
training before he can be considered a " practical " man for
the business in hand. The proper adjustment of the rate
of remuneration in a given establishment requires, to begin
with, a wide range of industrial and economic knowledge.
Unless the workman's negotiator is accurately acquainted
with the rates and precise conditions prevailing in other
establishments and in other districts, he will be unable to
criticise the statements which will be made by the employer,
and incapable of advising his own clients whether their
demand is a reasonable one. Without some knowledge of
the economic conditions of the industry, the state of trade,
the number of orders in hand or to be expected, and the
condition of the labor market, his judgment of the opportune-
ness or strategic advantage of the men's demand will be of
no value. The mechanic kept working for fifty or sixty
hours a week at one narrow process in a single establishment
would be an extraordinary genius if he could acquire this
information. Nor would a knowledge of the facts alone
suffice. The best kit of tools will not make a man a good
carpenter without that training in their use which experience
alone can give. The quick apprehension and mental agility
which make up the greater part of the art of using facts are
not fostered by days spent in physical toil. Finally, the
perfect negotiator, like the perfect carpenter, attains his

1 82 Trade Union Function

expertness only by incessant practice of his art. Here again,
the workman is at a special disability compared with the
captain of industry. The making of bargains and agree-
ments, which occupies only an infinitesimal fraction of a
workman's life and thought, makes up the daily routine of
the commercial man.

These considerations have slowly overcome the work-
man's objections, and have, in the most powerful unions,
together comprising over a third of the aggregate member-
ship, caused the bulk of the Collective Bargaining to be
gradually transferred from the non-commissioned officers to
the salaried civil service of the movement. Especially in
the piecework trades has the amateur negotiator most clearly
demonstrated his inefficiency. When the workman's re-
muneration depends on a combination of many different and
constantly changing factors — the novelty of the pattern, the
character of the material, the variations in the machinery,
the speed of the engine — success in bargaining demands, in
addition to all the other qualifications, a special aptitude for
quickly seizing the net result of proposed changes in one or
more of the factors. It is in the piecework trades therefore
that we find the machinery for Collective Bargaining in its
most highly developed form. The great staple industries of
cotton, coal, and iron, together with boot and shoe-making,
and the hosiery and lace trades, have especially developed
elaborate and complicated organisations for Collective Bar-
gaining which have excited the admiration of economic
students all over the world.

We must here plunge into a maze of complicated
technical detail relating to these industries, each of which
has developed its machinery for Collective Bargaining in its
own way, and we despair of making the reader understand
either our exposition or our criticism unless he will keep
constantly in mind one fundamental distinction, which is all-
important. This vital distinction is between the making of
a new bargain, and the interpreting of the terms of an
existing one. Where the machinery for Collective Bargaining

The Method of Collective Bargaining i8

o

has broken down, we usually discover that this distinction
has not been made ; and it is only where this fundamental
distinction has been clearly maintained that the machinery
works without friction or ill-feeling. Let us consider first
the interpretation of an existing bargain. Directly a general
agreement or formal treaty has been concluded in any trade
between the general body of employers, on the one hand,
and the general body of workmen on the other, there arises
a practically incessant series of disputes as to the applica-
tion of the agreement to particular cases. Thus, as we shall
see, the highly elaborate and precisely detailed lists of the
English Cotton-spinners do not prevent, in one or other of
the thousands of mills to which they apply, the almost
daily occurrence of a difference of opinion between employer
and operative as to the wages due. Similarly the unanimous
agreement of a " uniform statement " in the boot and shoe
trade leaves open endless. questions as to the classification of
the ever-changing patterns called for by the fashion of each
season. The determination of the " county average " of the
Northumberland or Durham coalminer leaves it still to be
determined what tonnage rate should be fixed for any
particular seam, in order that the workmen may earn the
normal wage. The point at issue in these cases is not the
amount per week- which the workmen in any particular
establishment should be permitted to earn — for that has, in
principle, already been settled — but the rate at which, under
the actual conditions of that establishment, and the class of
goods in question, the piecework price must be computed in
order that the average earnings of a particular section of
workmen shall amount to no more and no less than the
agreed standard. This, it will be seen, is exclusively an
issue of fact, in which both the desires and the tactical
strength of the parties directly concerned must be entirely
eliminated. For conciliation, compromise, and balancing of
expediencies, there is absolutely no room. On the other
hand, it is indispensable that the ascertainment of facts
should attain an almost scientific precision. Moreover, the

184 Trade Union Function

settlement should be automatic, rapid, and inexpensive.
The ideal machinery for this class of cases would, in fact,
be a peripatetic calculating-machine, endowed with a high
degree of technical knowledge, which could accurately
register all the factors concerned, and unerringly grind out
the arithmetical result.

When we come to the settlement of the terms upon
which a new general agreement should be entered into, an
entirely different set of considerations is involved. Whether
the general level of wages in the trade should be raised or
lowered by 10 per cent ; whether the number of boys to
be engaged by any one employer should be restricted, and if
so, by what scale ; whether the hours of labor should be
reduced, and overtime regulated or prohibited, — are not
problems which could be solved by even the most perfect
calculating-machine. Here nothing has been decided, or
accepted in advance by both parties, and the fullest possible
play is left for the arts of diplomacy. In so far as the issue
is left to Collective Bargaining there is not even any question
of principle involved. The workmen are frankly striving to
get (for themselves the best terms that can permanently be
exacted from the employers. The employers, on the other
hand, are endeavouring, in accordance with business prin-
ciples, to buy their labor in the cheapest market. The issue is
a trial of strength between the parties. Open warfare — the
stoppage of the industry — is costly and even disastrous to
both sides. But though neither party desires war, there is
always the alternative of fighting out the issue. The
resources and tactical strength of each side must accordingly
exercise a potent influence on the deliberations. The pleni-
potentiaries must higgle and cast about to 'find acceptable
alternatives, seeking, like ambassadors in international con-
ference, not to ascertain what are the facts, nor yet what
is the just decision according to some ethical standard or
view of social expediency, but to find a common basis which
each side can bring itself to agree to, rather than go to war.
Finally, however wise may be the decision come to, the

The Method of Collective Bargaining 1 85

acceptance and carrying out of the collective bargain
ultimately arrived at, depends upon the extent to which the
negotiators express the feelings and command the confidence
of the whole class affected. All these considerations must
be taken carefully into account in the formation of successful
machinery for Collective Bargaining.

The most obvious form of permanent machinery for
Collective Bargaining is a joint committee, consisting of
equal numbers of representatives of the employers and work-
men respectively. This may almost be called the " orthodox "
panacea of industrial philanthropists. For over thirty years,
since the experiments of Sir Rupert Kettle and Mr. Mun-
della, employers and workmen have been persistently urged
to adopt the form of a " board of arbitration and concilia-
tion," consisting of representatives of each side, and with or
without an impartial chairman or an umpire. Such a joint
committee, it has been supposed, could thrash out in friendly
discussion all points in dispute, and arrive at an amicable
understanding. In intractable cases, the umpire's decision
would cut the Gordian knot. Readers of the History of
Trade Unionism will remember how eagerly this idea was
taken up by the organised workmen in certain great
industries, and how, in coalmining and iron and steel in
particular, it has since enjoyed the favor both of employers
and employed. We need not stop to describe all the cases
in which this form of machinery has, from time to time, been
adopted. We shall best understand its operation by con-
sidering a couple of leading instances, the " joint boards " of
the boot and shoe trade, and the " joint committees " of the
Northumberland and Durham coalminers.

The great machine industry of boot and shoe-making
has been provided, for some years past, with a formal and
elaborate constitution, mutually agreed to by employers and
employed, and expressly designed " to prevent a strike or
lock-out, and to secure the reference of all trade disputes to
arbitration." ^ The machinery for Collective Bargaining thus

1 Rules for the Prevention of Strikes and Lockouts, etc., i6th August 1892,

1 86 Trade Union Function

established puts into concrete form all the aspirations of
enthusiastic advocates of " industrial peace." We have first
a " local board of conciliation and arbitration " in every
important centre of the trade. To this board, formed of
an equal number of elected representatives of the local
employers and the local Trade Unionists, must be referred
" every question, or aspect of a question, affecting the
relations of employers and workmen individually or col-
lectively." If the board cannot agree, the question goes
to an impartial umpire, acceptable to both sides. Issues
affecting the whole industry were, until 1894, dealt with by
a national conference of great dignity and importance.
Nine chosen leaders of the federated Associations of Boot
and Shoe Manufacturers of Great Britain met, in the council
chamber of the Leicester Town Hall, an equal number of
elected representatives of the National Union of Boot and
Shoe Operatives. These elaborate debates, conducted with
all the ceremony of a State Trial, were presided over by an
eminent and universally respected solicitor, sometime mayor
of the town. If no agreement could be arrived at, the
conference enjoyed the services, as umpire, of no less an
authority than Sir Henry (now Lord) James, formerly
Attorney-General, before whom, sitting as a judge, the issue
was elaborately reargued by the spokesmen of each side.
Finally as a means of influencing the public opinion of the
trade, there were published, not only the precise and
authoritative decisions of the conference or the umpire, but
also a verbatim report of all the proceedings.^

We can imagine how this elaborate and carefully
thought out machinery for Collective Bargaining would have

appended to Report of Conference, 1892. These rules, which are signed by
three employers and three workmen, on behalf of their respective associations,
consist of fifteen clauses defining the constitution and method of working both
of the "Local Board of Conciliation and Arbitration," and of the "National
Conference." They will be found in the Board of Trade Report on Strikes and
Lockouts of 1893, C, 7566 of 1894, pp. 253-257.

2 The "transcript of the shorthand writers' notes" of the Conference of August
1S92, and the subsequent trial before the umpire, forms a volume of 152 pages
of rich material for the student of industrial organisation.

The Method of Collective Bargainmg 1 8 7

delighted the heart of the enthusiastic believers in "boards
of conciHation and arbitration." Nor need it be contested
that it has been the means of effecting many peaceful settle-
ments in the industry. But we do not think that any one
conversant with the trade, or any student of the voluminous
reports of the proceedings, will deny that the boards have
been the cause of endless friction, discontent, and waste of
energy among workmen and employers alike. Scarcely a
quarter passes without the operatives, in some district or
another, revolting against their local board ; condemning or
withdrawing their representatives ; and even occasionally
refusing to obey the award of the umpire.^ The employers
are, on their side, no better satisfied than the men, and in
1894 the national conference was brought to an end by the
secession of the federated manufacturers, and their resolute
refusal to submit the issues to arbitration. The result was a
stoppage in 1895 of practically the entire industry from one
end of the kingdom to the other, which was only brought to
an end by the half-authoritative interference of the Board of
Trade."

If we examine this general discontent we find it taking
different forms among the workmen and the employers
respectively. The operatives complain that, when a general
agreement has been concluded they cannot get any speedy
or certain enforcement of it through the local boards.
Thus, the Bristol representative at the annual delegate
meeting in 1894, complained bitterly of the dilatory way in
which his local board acted in its interpretation work.
Questions " had been hanging about from six to nine months
from the board to the umpire. Decisions had been given
by the umpire on boots after a delay of eight or nine

^ The local boards, of which twelve were in existence at the end of 1894,
date from 1875. The Stafford Board was dissolved in 187S, and the Leeds
Board in 1881. The years 1891-94 saw no fewer than seven dissolutions, and
the important centres of Stafford, Manchester, and Kingswood still remain without
boards. The National Conference, established in August 1892, met five times
in the next three years, the sittings being suspended on the withdrawal of the
employers in December 1894.

2 See the Labour Gazette, April and May 1895.

1 88 Trade Union Function

months. ... In one case in the factory where he worked a
boot was sent to the arbitration board, and thence to the
umpire. The decision arrived at by the latter was in favor
of the men. There was something Hke seven shilHngs each
due to two or three men on that particular boot. But one
of them had left the town in the interim, and the result of
the delay was that he was practically swindled out of the
seven shillings. New samples had been introduced at the
beginning of the year, and the shoes had been made under
protest, at a price the employers had quoted, till the end of
the season. Then, perhaps, when the season was ended,
they got a decision in their favor, face to face with all the
difficulties of getting back the money due to them. . . .
This continual delay sickened the whole of them in Bristol,
and although thea-e had not been a ballot taken on the
question of arbitration in Bristol, he felt sure there were over
ninety per cent of the men opposed to it." ^

The Kings wood Local Board broke up in 1894, the
umpire resigning his post in disgust. Discussion had pro-
ceeded upon a " statement " for " light " boots, and points
in dispute were submitted to the umpire by the board. The
bulk of the manufacturers thereupon flatly refused to send
any samples of the boots in question, and thus made it im-
possible for the umpire to decide the cases submitted to him.^
This produced the greatest possible irritation among the men,
who urged that, as the employers had failed to submit to the
umpire's award, the operatives' claim should be adopted.
These cases might be indefinitely multiplied from all the
centres of the industry. But delay is not the only objection
brought by the operatives against the working of the local
boards. When at last the umpire's decision has been given
it has often failed to command the assent, and sometimes
even to secure the obedience of the workmen. This arises,
we believe, from the class of umpire whom it has been

1 Report of the Edinburgh Conference, May 1894 (the delegate meeting of
the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives).

2 Shoe aitd Leather Record, 30th November 1894.

The Method of Collective Bargaining 189

necessary to choose. The questions of interpretation neces-
sarily turn, not on any general principle, but on extremely
technical trade details, which are unintelligible to any person
outside the industry.^ In the absence of any paid pro-
fessional expert, permanently engaged for precisely this
work, the umpire has in practice to be chosen from among
the employers, the board usually agreeing upon a leading
manufacturer in another district. This reliance on the
unpaid service of a non-resident increases the delay. But
what is more important is, that however generally respected
such an umpire may be, it is inevitable that, when his award
runs counter to the claim of the operatives, these should
accuse him of class bias. The alternative of choosing one
of the officials of the union would, it need hardly be said, be
equally distasteful to the employers.

The discontent of the employers is directed chiefly to
another feature of the organisation. The work of the local
boards is so laborious and incessant that the great magnates
of the industry cannot spare time to attend. On questions
of interpretation, they would be willing to leave the busi-
ness to their managers or smaller employers. But besides
questions of interpretation the local board have perpetually
brought before them disputes which turn upon the admission of
what the employers regard as " new principles." If the local
board, with the concurrence of its employer-members, decides
the issue, all the other employers in the district, some of
whom may be " captains of industry " on a huge scale, find
a new regulation made binding on them in the conduct of
what they regard as " their own business." If on the other
hand the local board remits such issues — virtually the

1 Thus the umpire for the Norwich Local Board had to award rates to be
paid in the following cases, remitted from a single meeting, (i) "A woman's
Sths if changed from self-vamp to calf vamp ; (2) a girl's 4ths if changed from
self-vamp to glace kid vamp ; (3) a woman's 4th's ditto ; (4) a girl's kid button
levant seal vamp or golosh ; (5) a girl's glace kid one finger strap ; (6) a woman's
kid elastic mock button front shoe sew-round." The award, which is equally
unintelligible to the general reader, will be found in the Shoe and Leather Record
Annual [qx 1892-93, p. 121.

iQO Trade Union Function

conclusion of new general agreements — to the national con-
ference, all the employers in the kingdom find themselves
in a similar predicament. Moreover, in a publicly conducted
national conference, formed of equal numbers from each
party, neither the representative workmen nor the representa-
tive employers dare concede anything to their opponents, or
even submit to a compromise. The result is that every
important issue is inevitably remitted by the conference to
the umpire. Lord James has accordingly found himself in
the remarkable position of imposing laws upon the entire
boot and shoe-making industry, prescribing for instance, not
only a minimum rate of wages, but also a precise numerical
limitation of the number of boy-learners to be engaged by
each employer, the conditions under which alone a wholesale
trader may give work out to sub-contractors, and the extent
to which employers shall themselves provide workshop
accommodation, and the date before which such premises
shall be in use. This, it is obvious, goes beyond Collective
Bargaining. The awards of Lord James amount, in fact,
to legislative regulation of the industry, the legislature in
this case being, not a representative assembly acting on
behalf of the whole community, but a dictator elected by the
trade.^

It is therefore not surprising to find the employers
quickly protesting against so drastic and far-reaching
an arrangement. But it was one to which they had ex-
plicitly and unreservedly pledged themselves. They had
promised, by the rules of the i6th August 1892, that
" every question or aspect of a question affecting the
relations of employers and workmen individually or collectively
should in case of disagreement be submitted for settlement,"
first to the local board, then to the national conference, and

1 It is a minor grievance of the employers that no distinguished lawyer
can be found to give the unpaid and laborious service of an umpire, who is not
also a politician. It is impossible for the employers to avoid the suspicion
that any politician will be unconsciously biassed in favor of the most numerous
section of the electors. See the significant quotation given in the footnote at
p. 240.

The MetJiod of Collective Bargaining 1 9 1

finally, if need be, to the umpire. That this promise was
not confined to questions of interpretation is made manifest
by the express mention in the same document of the settle-
ment of disputes involving " new principles." In the long
discussion \Vhich led up to the signing of the rules, they
had, in fact, successfully pleaded for adopting " honestly and
unreservedly arbitration pure and simple, and for every
dispute, and under all conditions." ^ In their anxiety to
remove every chance of a stoppage of their industry, they
had overlooked the fundamental distinction between questions
of the interpretation of an existing contract and questions
as to the terms of a new settlement. If they had listened
to the warning of the able editor of their own trade organ,
they would not have made this blunder. The very month
before the conference of 1892 he was urging exactly the
distinction upon which we insist. " Employers," he wrote,
" have never contended that arbitration would settle every
conceivable kind of dispute between capital and labor.
But they have contended that where certain established
principles are already recognised by both sides, the adjustment
of details can better be settled by arbitration than in any
other way. ... It must be obvious that, whatever the
future may bring, employers could not now prudently allow
every dispute with their workmen to be settled by a third
person. To say nothing of the question of boy labor which
is now at issue, a number of others may be mentioned
regarding which the employer could not consent to surrender
any portion of his discretion or responsibility." " The sub-
sequent events quickly proved that this view of the state
of mind of the average employer was correct, and that the
chosen representatives of the Federated Associations of Boot
and Shoe Manufacturers had failed to understand the words
which they were, with all solemnity, using. When the

^ Speech of Mr. Gale, a leading employer. Third day of Conference,
August 1S92. The men had wished to exclude any question of a general reduc-
tion of wages, whereupon the employers had insisted that no exception whatever
should be made.

2 Shoe and Leather Record, July 1892.

192 Trade Union Functio7i

workmen brought up cases of actual disputes that had arisen
about boy labor, machinery, the " team system," and the
employment of non-unionists, the employers protested that
they had never meant such questions as these to be discussed
at all. The president had, of course, no alternative but to
hold them bound to their explicit agreement, and to overrule
their protests. After prolonged ill-feeling, the associated
employers revolted, and withdrew their representatives from
the national conference, alleging first of all, that the work-
men had in some cases refused to abide by the award of
the umpire, and further, that the national conference had
become " a legislative tribunal for the trade." ^

Thus experience of the working of the elaborate machinery
for Collective Bargaining provided in the boot and shoe
industry has revealed many imperfections. Some of these
have been avoided in our second example, the conciliation
boards and the joint committees of the Northumberland and
Durham coalminers. Here we have, to begin with, a clear
distinction maintained between the machinery for interpreta-
tion and that for concluding a new agreement. The earnings
of the miners in both counties are determined ultimately by
general principles ^ applicable to the whole of each county,
w^hich are revised at occasional conferences of representative

1 Manifesto of Federated Associations of Boot and Shoe Manufacturers of
Great Britain, 20th December 1894. For documents and exact particulars of
the dispute which thereupon arose, see Labour Gazette, April and May i§95 ;
also the Shoe and Leather Record, and the Monthly Reports of the National Union
of Boot and Shoe Operatives from October 1894 to June 1895. We have here
dealt with the matter, not on its merits, but only in so far as it illustrates the
machinery for collective bargaining. The agreement brought about by the Board
of Trade on 19th April 1895, which now governs the industry, expressly excludes
four specified subjects from discussion by the local boards and makes no provision
for a national conference. But so far as we understand the document, no dis-
tinction is even now made between questions of interpretation and questions as
to the terms of a new agreement. Both kinds of questions are, as before, to be
decided where necessary by the umpire.

- These general principles include a normal standard wage, with a corre-
sponding normal tonnage rate, applicable to the whole county. This is called
the " County Average," a somewhat misleading phrase as the normal rate is not,
and has long not been, a precise "average" of the actual earnings of all the
miners in the county, and is now only a conventional figure upon which percentages
of advance or reduction are based.

The Method of Collective Bargaining 193

workmen and employers.^ Neither in Durham nor in
Northumberland has this board of conciliation anything to
do with the interpretation of the formal agreement from time
to time arrived at, or with the incessant labor involved in
its application. Its meetings, held only at rare intervals,
command the presence of the greatest coal-owners in the
county, and of the most influential miners' leaders specially
elected for the purpose. The board deliberates in private,
and publishes only its decisions. Resort to the umpire,
or in Northumberland to the casting vote of the chairman,
is rare, the usual practice being for a frank interchange
of views to go on until a basis of agreement can be
found. On the other hand, all questions of interpretation or
application are dealt with by another tribunal, which goes
on undisturbed even when one or other party has temporarily
withdrawn its representatives from the board of conciliation.
In marked distinction from the conciliation board, the " joint
committee " in each county meets frequently, and is engaged
in incessant work. But this committee is expressly debarred
from dealing with " such as may be termed county questions,
or which may affect the general trade," "- and is rigidly con-
fined to the application of the existing general agreement to
particular mines or seams.^

1 In Durham this conference is, since February 1S95, called "The Board of
Conciliation for the Coal Trade." The rules of that date provide for eighteen
representatives of each side, vi\i\\. an umpire to be mutually agreed upon, or in
default nominated by the Board of Trade. In Northumberland, the corresponding
" Board of Conciliation " now consists of fifteen on each side, with an independent
chairman having a casting vote, to be nominated, in default of agreement, by the
Chairman of the Northumberland County Council. The name and constitution
of these boards are frequently varied in minor details.

'^ Durham Miners^ Joint Committee Rules, November 1879.

3 Owing to the great differences in the ease and facilities with which the coal
is got in different mines and different seams of the same mine, it is impossible,
consistently with uniformity in the rate of payment for the whole work done, to
apply any identical tonnage rate throughout the county. When it is found that
the men in any mine constantly earn per day an amount which departs appreciably
from the normal (the so-called " County Average"), the employer or the work-
men appeal for a readjustment of the tonnage rate in that particular instance. It
must be counted as a grave defect in the miners' organisations outside North-
umberland and Durham that no systematic arrangements exist for this adjust-
ment of the standard wage to the particular circumstances of each mine or seam.
VOL. I O

194 Trade Union Ftmction

For deliberateness and impartiality this tribunal leaves
nothing to be desired. The members, all of whom are
practically acquainted with the industry, do not directly
represent either of the parties concerned in any dispute, and
have no other interest than that of securing uniformity in
the application of a common agreement. The chief dis-
advantage of the tribunal is that which we have already
seen complained of in the local boards of the boot and shoe
trade. For deciding mere issues of fact, as to the circum-
stances of a particular seam or pit, a joint committee is
necessarily a cumbrous, expensive, and dilatory machine.
Every case involves the journeying to Newcastle of witnesses
on both sides, and their examination by all the members of
the committee. This consumes so much time that cases
frequently stand in the agenda for several months before
being reached, a fact which leads to great dissatisfaction to
those concerned.^ Moreover, it is often impossible to come
to any decision without personal inspection of the seam, and
difficult cases are therefore constantly referred for decision
to one employer and one workman, with power to choose an
umpire. This results in a more precise ascertainment of
facts, but increases the delay and expense. Finally, there is
in such cases no guarantee that the decisions, arrived at by
different sets of people, will preserve that exact uniformity
which it is the special function of the tribunal to enforce.

Thus, the much-advertised expedient of a single joint
committee of employers and employed to deal with all
questions that arise between them, has not proved a wholly

In Lancashire, Derbyshire, and other districts of the Miners' Federation, for
instance, there is no better protection of the standard wage than pit-lists, pre-
scribing tonnage rates for individual collieries. No machinery exists for ensuring
uniformity (of the rate of pay for the amount of work) between these lists, or even
for revising their rates to meet the changing circumstances of particular seams.
If a miner finds he is earning a very low amount per day, he applies to his lodge
meeting for permission to leave and receive strike benefit. More or less informal
negotiations may then be opened with the mine manager, who often fixes a new
rate, in consultation either with the group of miners themselves, or with the lodge
ofiicials, or in some instances with salaried agents of the union.

1 This is especially the case in Durham, where the number of mines dealt
with is very large.

The Method of Collective Bargaining 195

satisfactory machinery for Collective Bargaining. The ex-
pediency of having separate machinery for the essentially
different processes of interpreting an existing agreement and
concluding a new one is, we think, clearly demonstrated.
For one of these two processes, the application and inter-
pretation of an existing agreement, a joint committee is a
cumbrous and awkward device. A better solution of the
problem has been found in the Lancashire cotton trade.
The cotton operatives, like the Northumberland and Durham
coalminers, have distinguished, clearly and sharply, between
the formation of a new general agreement and the applica-
tion of an existing agreement to particular cases. But they
have done more than this. Unconsciously and, as it were, in-
stinctively, they have felt their way to a form of machinery for
Collective Bargaining which uses the representative element
where the representative element is needed, whilst on the
other hand it employs the professional expert for work at
which the mere representative would be out of place.

We will first describe the machinery for the interpreta-
tion of an existing agreement. The factors which enter into
the piecework rates of the Lancashire cotton operatives are
so complicated that both the employers and the workpeople
have long since recognised the necessity of maintaining
salaried professional experts who devote their whole time to
the service respectively of the employers' association and the
Trade Union. The earnings of a cotton-spinner, for instance,
depend upon the complex interaction of such factors as the
" draw " of the mule, the number of its spindles, and the
speed with which the machinery works. To compute the
operative's earnings, even with the aid of the elaborate
printed tables known as the " List," entails no ordinary
amount of arithmetical facility. But it is especially the
custom of allowing the operative compensation for defective
material or old-fashioned machinery and the employer a
corresponding allowance for improvements, which has thrown
the collective bargaining, as regards interpretation, entirely
into the hands of professional experts. Thus, if an Oldham

196 T^'ade Union Function

operative finds his earnings falling below the current figure,
either because the raw cotton is inferior or the machinery
obsolete, or if an employer speeds up his engine or introduces
improvements, the experts on each side visit the mill, and
confer together as to the net effect of the change. If the
deficiency in earnings is considered to be due to imperfection
in the raw material, or to the old-fashioned character of the
machinery, the employer is required to add a specified per-
centage to the normal piecework rate, so that the work-
man may not suffer. On the other hand, if the employer
has effected special improvements, by which the product is
augmented, without increasing the strain on the operative,
he is allowed to deduct a corresponding percentage from the
" List " price. The cotton-weavers have what is essentially
the same machinery for calculating the characteristic technical
details of their trade.

The importance and complication of the duties thus
entrusted to the salaried officials of the cotton-spinners' and
cotton-weavers' unions has led to the adoption of an interest-
ing method of recruiting this branch of the Trade Union
Civil Service. The Cotton-weavers, in 1861, subjected the
candidates for the then vacant office of general secretary to
a competitive examination.^ This practice was adopted by
the Cotton-spinners, and is now the regular way of selecting
all the officials who are to concern themselves with the
intricate trade calculations. The branches retain the right of

1 Mr. Thomas Birtwistle, the successful candidate on this occasion, was,
after over thirty years' honorable service of his Trade Union, appointed by the
Home Secretary an Inspector in the Factory Department, as the only person
competent to understand and interpret the complicated methods of remuneration
in the w^eaving trade. His son, brought up in the Trade Union office, has since
also been appointed a factory inspector. The successful candidate at the Bolton
Cotton-spiimers' examination in 1895 was, after two years' service as Trade
Union Secretary, engaged in a similar capacity by the local Master Cotton-
spinners' Association. So far as we know, this is the first instance of a Trade
Union official transferring his services from the operatives to the employers, and it
throws an interesting light on the transformation of the "labor leader" into the
professional accountant. The bulk of the daily work of the Trade Union
officials in the cotton industry consists, in fact, in securing the uniform observance
of a collective agreement, a service which, like that of a legal or medical pro-
fessional man, could, with equal propriety, be rendered to either client.

The Method of Collective Bargaining 197

nominating the candidates, and the members, acting through
their Representative Assembly, their right of election. But
between the day of nomination and that of election all
the candidates submit to a competitive examination, con-
ducted by the most experienced officers of the unions. A
fairly stiff paper is set in the arithmetic and technical cal-
culations required in the trade, and each candidate writes
an essay. But a prominent part is played by an oral
examination, in which the examiners assume the part of
employers, cross-question the candidates one by one on the
alleged grievances of which they are supposed to have come
to complain, and do not refrain, in order to test their wits
and their good temper, from adopting the bullying manners
of the worst employers. The marks gained by all the candi-
dates are printed in full detail, the name of the glib-tongued
" popular leader " being sometimes followed by the comment
of " entirely wrong " or " not worked " in all his arithmetical
calculations, and by infinitesimal marks for spelling, writing,
and conduct under cross-examination. The result is usually
the election of the candidate who has obtained the highest
marks, but the Representative Assembly occasionally exercises
its discretion in giving a preference to a candidate of known
character or good service, who has fallen a few marks behind
the best examinee.-^

1 Operative Cotton-spinners' Provincial Association of
Bolton and District.

Offices : 77 St. George's Road, Bolton.

Examination Paper fo)- Candidates applying for situation of Gen. Sec. of the
above Association.

25th January 1895.
Subject I. — Calculations.

1. Find the number of stretches put up in a week, and the price per 100
required to produce a gross wage of ;i^3 : 9 : 7 per pair of mules, from the follow-
ing particulars : — Number of spindles in one mule, 1090. From 56^ hours,
deduct 2^ hours for cleaning and accidental stoppages, and one hour and ten
minutes for doffing. Speed of each mule, 4 stretches in 75 seconds.

2. Taking the stretches as ascertained by the previous question to be each

198

Trade U^iion Function

It is to this method of selection that we attribute the
remarkable success of the officials of the Cotton Trade Unions
in obtaining the best possible terms for their members. We
regard it as a great disadvantage to the Trade Union world
that the system has not hitherto spread to other unions.
It seems to us to combine the advantages of competitive
examination and popular selection, and it ensures the union
against the serious calamity of finding itself saddled with an
incompetent officer.

This part of the machinery for Collective Bargaining
among the Cotton Operatives — the meeting of the salaried
professional experts on each side — deals, as we have said,
only with questions of interpretation, that is, the application

64^ inches long, how many hanks would the week's production amount to, and
what price per 1000 hanks would be required to bring out the wage previously
given ?

3. Assuming the standard price paid for producing a certain count of yarn to
be I2s. 7d. per 100 lbs., what would the price be after a reduction of 7.9 per
cent, and what percentage would it require to bring back the reduced price to
the original amount ?

4. Divide .3364502 by .001645.

5. Extract the square root of So's counts to three places of decimals, and
then ascertain the required turns per inch for both twist and weft, the assumed
standard being the square root of the counts, multiplied by 3J for weft, and 3^
for twist.

6. If good fair Eg}'ptian cotton is advanced from 4^^ths to 4^d. per lb., what
would be the rate per cent of the increase ? Also what would be the amount of
the broker's commission on a sale of 1000 bales of 480 lbs. each, at one-quarter
of one per cent, and what would be the difference in his commission as between
selling at one price and the other ?

7. An upright shaft runs at the rate of So revolutions per minute, and has on
it a wheel with 70 teeth driving a wheel with 40 teeth on the line shaft. Over
each pair of mules there is on the line shaft a drum 40 inches in diameter driving
a counter pulley 16 inches in diameter. On the counter shaft is a drum 30 inches
in diameter, driving a rim-pulley 15 inches in diameter. Give the revolutions of
the rim shaft per minute.

8. Assuming a rim shaft to be making 680 revolutions per minute, with a
20-inch rim, a iij-inch tin roller-pulley, a 6-inch tin roller, and spindle wharves
J-fths of an inch in diameter, what will be the number of revolutions of the
spindles per minute, after allowing x-^'Ca. of an inch each to the diameter of the tin
roller and spindle wharves for slipping of bands ?

//. — Writing, Composition, and Spelling.

Compile an essay on Trade Unions, with special reference to their useful
features. The essays must not exceed about 1200 words, and the points taken

The Method of Collective Bargaining 199

to particular jobs, or particular processes, of the existing
general agreements accepted by both sides. When it comes
to concluding or revising the general agreement itself — a
matter in which not one firm or operative alone is interested,
but the whole body of employers and workmen — we find the
machinery for Collective Bargaining taking the form of a joint
committee composed of a certain number of representatives
of each side. Thus the Cotton-spinners, whilst leaving to
the arbitrament of the secretaries of the district union
and district employers' association all questions relating to
particular mills or particular workmen, revise the details of
their lists in periodical conferences in which the leading
employers of the district concerned arrange the matter with
the leading trade union officials and representative operatives.
And when the point at issue is not the alteration of the
technical details of the list, but a general reduction or advance
of wages by so much per cent throughout the trade, or a
general shortening of the working time, we see the matter

into consideration will be handwriting, spelling, composition, and the clear concise
marshalling of whatever facts or arguments are adduced.

///. — Oral Exa7}iination.

Each candidate will be examined separately as to his capacity for dealing
orally with labour disputes. On this point they will have to formulate what
they consider would be a complaint requiring immediate attention, and the
examiners will question them, and possibly urge some arguments against the
views advanced.

Candidates will be allowed from ten in the forenoon to five in the afternoon
to complete their examination in the two first subjects, with one hour for dinner.
Candidates will not be allowed to refer to any books or papers. The third
subject (oral examination) will not be taken until Sunday, the 27th instant, at
I o'clock.

Thomas Ashton,
Jas. Mawdsley,

> tLxamitiers.

Thirteen candidates in all entered for this examination. The examiners
allowed a maximum of 50 marks for each sum, and 100 marks each for writing,
spelling, composition, and oral examination, making 800 marks the maximum
attainable. The number of marks obtained by the candidates varied from 195
to 630. The post was finally given to the second candidate in the list (610
marks), who was an old and esteemed officer of the union, and whose second
place at the examination was chiefly due to his obtaining lower marks for hand-
writing than the most successful candidate.

200 Trade Union Function

discussed between appointed representatives of the whole
body of the employers, attended by their agents and solicitors,
and the central executive of the Amalgamated Association
of Operative Cotton-spinners as representing all the district
unions.

In the case of the English Cotton-spinners the lists of
prices have been so carefully and elaborately worked out
that even district conferences are of only occasional occur-
rence. The general policy of both employers and operatives
is against any but rare and moderate variations of the
standard earnings. Such questions as hours of labor and
sanitation do not, among the Cotton Operatives, for reasons
that we shall explain in a subsequent chapter, fall within the
sphere of the Method of Collective Bargaining. The joint
conferences of the whole trade take place therefore only in
momentous crises, and are accompanied by all the solemnity
and strenuousness of an assembly on whose decision turns
the question of peace or war.

It is interesting to see one of these momentous confer-
ences at work. The historic all-night sitting which settled
the great Cotton-spinners' dispute of 1893, and concluded
the agreement which has since governed the trade, was
vividly described by one of the leading Trade Union officials
who took part in it. The employers had demanded a
reduction of 10 per cent, whilst the men had urged that it
would be better to reduce the number of hours worked per
week. The stoppage had lasted no less than twenty weeks,
practically every mill in the whole industry being closed.
Feeling on both sides had run high, but after frequent
negotiations and incessant newspaper comment, the points
at issue had been narrowed down, and both parties felt the
need of bringing the struggle to an end. To escape the
crowd of reporters the place of meeting was kept secret, and
fixed for 3 P.M. at a country inn, to which the whole party
journeyed together in the same train.

" On the employers' side was Mr. A. E. Rayner, looking
all the better for his holiday at Bournemouth. With him

The Method of Collective Bargaining 201

were some sixteen or seventeen others, amongst whom were
Mr. Andrew, Mr. John B. Tattersall, and Mr. James Fletcher
of Oldham. There was also Mr. John Fletcher, Mr. R. S.
Buckley, and Mr. Smethurst of the Ashton district, who
took with them Mr. Dixon to keep them in countenance.
Mr. Sidebottom of Stockport also gave a kind of military
flavor to his colleagues, whilst Mr. John Mayall of Moseley
attended to look in and lend some dignity to the occasion,
in which he was assisted by Mr. W. Tattersall, secretary of
the federation. On the opei-atives' side Mr, Ashton, Mr.
Mellor, and Mr. Jones did duty for Oldham ; Mr. Wood, Mr.
Rhodes, and Mr. Carr represented the Ashton district ; whilst
the general business was attended to by Mr. Mullin, Mr.
Mawdsley, Mr. Fielding, and some dozen others, whilst Mr.
D. Holmes, Mr. Wilkinson, and Mr. Buckley had a watch-
ing brief for the winders and reelers. Perhaps we ought not
to omit mentioning that the employers had brought with
them Mr. Hesketh Booth, clerk to the Oldham magistrates,
who was counterbalanced by Mr. Ascroft, another Oldham
solicitor, who had accompanied the cardroom hands.

" Those whose names we have mentioned, with others,
made up a party of between thirty and forty, and after taking
a few minutes to straighten themselves up after leaving the
train, they settled down to business. Mr. A. E. Rayner was
unanimously voted to the chair. . . . Both sides had prepared
and got printed a series of proposals, and the employers had
. . . them printed side by side on the same sheet. In many
of them there was nothing to differ about except the word-
ing, as the idea aimed at was the same in both cases. But
the clause dealing with the reduction was the first, and in
their sheets the employers had left the amount out, whilst
the operatives had put in 2\ per cent. The employers wished
the discussion on this point to be deferred to the end of the
meeting, but feeling that unless a settlement could be arrived
at on this, the whole of the time spent on the other clauses
would be wasted, the operatives insisted it should be taken
first. The employers then retired, and after being absent some

202 Trade Union Function

time, returned and offered to accept a reduction of 3 per
cent. The operatives then retired, and after a prolonged
absence, offered to recommend the acceptance of sevenpence
in the pound.^ Then came an adjournment for tea, and
further discussion on the same subject followed, which was,
however, carried on by means of deputations from one section
to the other, as it was found that much better progress was
made by this system than by all being together, with its
concomitant long speeches, which generally came to nothing.
This point ultimately disposed of in favour of the sevenpence,
some minor clauses were got through, the next discussion
being on the arrangement of intervals between the times
when wages can be disturbed. This discussion brought up
the time to after ten o'clock, and everybody was tired and
anxious to be going home. . . . But as there seemed to be
every prospect of being able to ultimately agree, it was con-
sidered that they should not run the risk of rendering the
meeting useless by separating. In order to give the jaded
men an opportunity for freshening up, an adjournment for
half an hour was therefore agreed to, during which cold
remains of the tea vanished. This, combined with a smoke
and a stroll in the open air, put everybody right, and when
business was resumed it went on swimmingly. There was
little said by the employers over their clause, that union
operatives must work amicably with non-union men, and
another affirming that in any proposal to change the rate of
wages the state of trade for the three previous years must be
taken into account. . . . When this work was done the
remaining clauses which affirm the desirability of (employers
and operatives) working together for the promotion of
measures conducive to the general interests of the trade, were
soon gone through, and at nearly four o'clock in the morning
the jaded disputants rushed off to get a little change of air
whilst the agreement was being picked out from piles of
papers and put together in proper form. At this stage a
little diversion was occasioned by the arrival of a cab con-

1 Equal to 2.916 per cent.

The Method of Collective Bargaini7ig 203

taining a reporter of one of the Manchester papers, who,
after hunting all over South-east Lancashire for the meeting-
place, had at last found the right spot. This bit of enterprise
having been rewarded by about six lines of something, he
rushed off back to catch his paper. Just after five (after
fourteen hours) the documents were in shape, and the
requisite signatures attached, and with a few, evidently heart-
felt congratulatory remarks from the chairman, and a vote of
thanks having been given to him, the proceedings closed." ^

The machinery for Collective Bargaining developed by
the Cotton Operatives, in our opinion, approaches the ideal.
We have, to begin with, certain broad principles unreservedly
agreed to throughout the trade. The scale of remuneration,
based on these principles, is worked out in elaborate detail
into printed lists, which (though not yet identical for the
whole trade) automatically govern the actual earnings of
the several districts. The application, both of the general
principles and of the lists, to particular mills and particular
workmen, is made, not by the parties concerned, but by the
joint decision of two disinterested professional experts, whose
whole business in life is to secure, not the advantage of
particular employer or workmen by whom they are called in,
but uniformity in the application of the common agreement
to all employers and workmen. The common agreements
themselves are revised at rare intervals by representative
joint committees, in which the professional experts on both
sides exercise a great and even a preponderating influence.
The whole machinery appears admirably contrived to bring
about the maximum deliberation, security, stability, and
promptitude of application. And whilst absolutely no room
is left for the influence upon the negotiations of individual
idiosyncrasies, temper, ignorance of fact, or deficiency in
bargaining power, whether on the side of the employer or

1 "How matters were arranged," Cotton Factory Times, 31st J^Iarch 1893;
see Labour Gazette, May 1893. The formal treaty, known as the " Brooklands
Agreement," will be found in the Board of Trade Report on lVa:;es ajzd Hours
of Labour, Part II., Standard Piece Rates, 1894, C, 7567, p. 10.

204 Trade Union Function

the operative, the uniform application of an identical method
of remuneration throughout the whole trade leaves the able
capitalist or energetic workman free to obtain for himself the
full advantage of his superiority.^

The reader who has had the patience to follow the fore-
going exposition will have seen that, taking the Trade Union
world as a whole, the machinery for Collective Bargaining
must be regarded as extremely imperfect. We do not here
discuss whether Collective Bargaining is, or is not, economi-
cally advantageous to the workmen or to the community.
We may, however, assume that it is desirable, if it exists,
that it should be carried on without friction. And if for the
moment we take the Trade Union point of view, and assume
the expediency of a Common Rule, excluding the influence
of particular exigencies, it is essential that this Common
Rule should be wisely and deliberately determined on,
uniformly applied, and systematically enforced. This de-
mands machinery which, over the greater part of the Trade
Union world, has not yet been developed. Throughout the
great engineering and building trades, and indeed, in nearly all
the timework trades. Collective Bargaining, though practically
universal, is carried on in a haphazard way with the most
rudimentary machinery, and usually by amateurs in the craft
of negotiation. The piecework trades have, in the main,
been forced to recognise the importance of commanding the
services of salaried professionals to deal with their complicated
lists of prices. Only among the Cotton-spinners and Cotton-
weavers, however, do we yet find any arrangement for
ensuring, by a technical examination, for continuity of expert

1 The United Society of Boilermakers, whose hierarchy of agreements we
have described, has, in effect, similar machinery for Collective Bargaining. New
agreements are concluded at meetings with the employers, in which the expert
salaried officials are associated, at any rate in form, with representative workmen.
The machinery for interpretation consists, in effect, of a joint visit by salaried
officials representing respectively the associated employers and the Trade Union.
"They had tried a joint committee on the Tyne," said Mr. Robert Knight, "but
the employers could not spare the time, for all their local disputes mostly required
visiting, and so they came to prefer a reference to a delegate who was their
representative, and he met the men's delegate with the best results." — Newcastle
Leader "■Extra" on Conciliation in Trade Disputes (Newcastle, 1894), p. 15.

The Method of Collective Bargaining 205

services. Finally, we see the whole machinery for Collective
Bargaining seriously hampered, except in two or three trades,
by the failure to make the vital distinction between inter-
preting an existing wage contract, and negotiating the terms
upon which a new general agreement should be entered into.
We must, in fact, conclude that, among the great unions
only the Cotton-spinners, Cotton-weavers, and the Boiler-
makers, and, to a lesser extent, the North of England and
Midland Iron-workers ^ and the Northumberland and Durham

1 For the rules, history, and working of these Boards, %&& Industrial Conciliation,
by Henry Crompton ; Industrial Peace, by L. L, F. R. Price (London, 18S7) ;
Sir Bernhard Samuelson's paper in February 1876 before the British Iron Trade
Association ; the evidence before the Royal Commission on Labor, 1892,
particularly that of Messrs. Whitwell and Trow, Group A, 14,974 to 15,482 ;
and the summary of the rules at p. 368 of the Parliamentary Paper, c. 6795, xii.
Reports of their proceedings are given in the monthly Ironworkers'' Journal, the
organ of the Iron and Steel Workers of Great Britain. Though these Boards
have repeatedly been described, their observers have, in our opinion, dealt rather
with the formal than with the real constitution, and with the aspirations rather
than with the actual results of the organisation. An important but scarcely
noticed element in the problem is the fact that a certain proportion of the work-
men are themselves employers of subordinate labor. Exactly what classes of
workmen — puddlers, millmen, mechanics, enginemen, laborers, etc. — are entitled
to vote in the election of representatives, and how effectively all the different
grades are actually represented on the Boards, has never been described. It is
reported that a large number of the cases dealt with by the Midland Board at
any rate, concern differences, not between a firm and its wage-earners, but
between a manual-working sub-contractor and his subordinates, the latter not
being represented on the Board. With regard to the actual results of the Boards,
the student would have to investigate whether the rates fixed from time to time
did not operate rather as maxima than as minima ; whether, that is to say, the
incompleteness and lack of authority of both the employers' and the workmen's
organisations did not lead to many firms taking advantage of the awards of the
Board to stave off larger demands from their workmen, whilst at other times
using their own strategic position to compel the men to accept lower terms than
the Board was awarding. In January 1893, for instance, one of the union
officials deplored, in a meeting of the members, " the private reductions which
they had submitted to all round," in contravention of the rates fixed by the
Midland Board (Ironworkers^ Journal, January 1894). Some years later the
men's dissatisfaction led to the following manifesto: "Amongst large numbers
of the workmen there is a growing opinion that the Board is unsatisfactory, and
that it would be to the workers' interests to dissolve it. It is stated that
employers only appeal to the Wages Board when it suits them, and that they
ignore its principles and rules, when by so doing they can take undue advantage
of their workmen, so that the maintenance of the Wages Board is only beneficial
to the employer and prejudicial to the interests of the workmen. . . . Even the
employer section fear to enforce adherence to its rules because of giving offence
to those employers who simply look upon the Board as a convenience for imposing

2o6 Trade Union Function

Miners, can be said to be adequately equipped with efficient
machinery for Collective Bargaining.

The foregoing analysis of the Method of Collective
Bargaining, and of the machinery by which it is carried out,
will have revealed to the student two of its incidental charac-
teristics, which to some persons appear as fatal evils, and to
others merely as the " defects of its qualities." The keen
Individualist will scent an element of compulsion in the
so-called " voluntary " agreements governing the conditions
of a whole trade. The ardent advocate of " industrial peace"
will fail to discover any guarantee that the elaborate nego-
tiations between highly-organised classes will not end in a
declaration of war instead of a treaty of agreement.

That some measure of compulsion is entailed by the
Method of Collective Bargaining no Trade Unionist would
deny. Trade Unionists, as we have explained, value Collec-
tive Bargaining precisely because it rules out of account the
particular exigencies of individual workmen or establishments.
With this exclusion of exigencies there comes necessarily
a certain restriction on personal idiosyncrasy, which some
would describe as a loss of liberty. When, for instance, the
employers and workmen in a Lancashire town collectively
settle which week shall be devoted to the annual " wake,"
even the exceptionally industrious cotton-spinner or weaver
finds himself bound to keep holiday, whether he likes it or
not. It is impossible to make common arrangements for
numbers of men without running counter to the desires of
some of them. The wider the range of the Common Rule,
and the more perfect is the machinery for its application and
enforcement, the larger may be the minority which finds
itself driven to accept conditions which it has not desired.
It follows that the Trade Union must provide, in its consti-

unjust conditions upon their workmen." (Official Circular from the Executive
Council of the Associated Iron and Steel Workers of Great Britain, loth August
1896, in Ironworkers' Journal, September 1896). For analogous cases under
the North of England Board, the student should investigate the action of the
Stockton Malleable Iron Company (see Ironworkers Journal^ January 1894),
and that of the Barrow Steel Works {Ibid. January 1896).

The Method of Collective Bargaining 207

tution, some means of securing the obedience of all its
members to the regulations decided upon by the majority.
The rules of all unions, from the earliest times down to the
present day, contain clauses empowering the fining of dis-
obedient members, the alternative to paying the fine being
expulsion from the union. We have already pointed out
that the development of the friendly society side of Trade
Unionism incidentally makes this sanction a penalty of very
real weight, and one which can be easily enforced. To this
pecuniary loss may, moreover, be added the incidents of
outlawry. When a union includes the bulk of the w^orkmen
in any industry, its members invariably refuse to work along-
side a man who has been expelled from the union for
" working contrary to the interests of the trade." In such a
case expulsion from the union may easily mean expulsion
from the trade. But whilst the Trade Union has thus most
drastic punishments at its command, the individual member
is habitually protected from tyranny or caprice by an elab-
orate system of appeals, which ensure him against condemna-
tion otherwise than according to the positive laws of his
community. This disciplinary system is, of course, usually
applied to men who deliberately undermine the Common
Rule by accepting lower terms than those collectively agreed
to.^ But it is also used against workmen w^ho break the
agreement in the other direction. " To give one illustration,"
said the general secretary of the United Society of Boiler-
makers, to the Royal Commission on Labor, " we had a case

1 The Trade Unionist feeling against men who work "under price" is
expressed in the following quotation from the Amended General Laws of the
Amalgamated Society of Cordwainers (London, 1867), one of the most ancient
of unions : —

" A scab is to his trade what a traitor is to his country, and though both
may be useful to one party in troublesome times, when peace returns they are
detested alike by all ; so when help is wanted a scab is the last to contribute
assistance, and the first to grasp a benefit he never labored to procure ; he cares
only for himself, but he sees not beyond the extent of a day ; and for momentary
and worthless approbation would betray friends, family, and country. In short,
he is a traitor on a small scale — he first sells the journeymen and is himself after-
wards sold in his turn by his master, until at last he is despised by both and
deserted by all. He is an enemy to himself, to the present age, and to posterity."

2o8 Trade Union Function

at Hartlepool a short time since, where a vessel was in for
repairing, and the men knew that the vessel was in a hurry,
and thought there was a very good chance to get an advance
in their wages, so they went to their foreman, and made a
demand for 2s. a week advance. The foreman, knowing the
arrangement between our association and the employers'
association, refused to give the advance, and at once wired to
me at Newcastle, and by the orders of the council I sent back
to say that the employer was to give the men the advance
as asked for, because we did not want to stop the work, as
the ship was in a hurry, and we wanted to get her off. The
employer gave the men the advance as asked for, and we at
once sent to the firm requesting the firm to tell us the
amount of money they had paid to the men as advances of
wages on that job. When the job was completed those
particulars and details were sent to us at Newcastle, and also
the names of the men who were engaged upon the job, and
who had made the demand. As soon as that was done our
council ordered the members who received the money to
refund that again to the Society, and we sent a cheque from
the head office to that firm equal to the amount of the
advances given." ^ In another case men knowing that their
employer was under a time limit for the completion of a
ship made a sudden demand for a rise. Precisely the same
action was taken by the union, and the men were also fined
" for dishonorable behaviour to employer under contract to
deliver."

^ Royal Commission on Labor, Group A, Question 20,718. The frequency
with which this disciplinary power is exercised may be judged from an extract
from the Monthly Report for May 1897, referring only to a single district. The
list is not usually published.

" The following members have been dealt with by the committee during
April : —

F. F., foreman, holding two jobs at Heyes, 40s.

T. B., rivetter, doing plater's work, los.

E. T., plater, neglecting his work through drinking, lOs.

J. J., rivetter, doing plater's work, 20s.

H. R., excessive overtime, 30s.

T. C, using abusive language to Strike Secretary, los.

R. D., using disgusting and obscene language to Mr. W. H., foreman, lOs."

The Method of Collective Bargaining 209

In the world of modern industry this submission of the
personal judgment to the Common Rule extends far beyond
the range of those who, by Trade Union membership,
may be considered to have agreed to forego an individual
decision. When the associated employers in any trade
conclude an agreement with the Trade Union, the Common
Rule thus arrived at is usually extended by the employers,
as a matter of course, to every workman in their establish-
ments, whether or not he is a member of the union.^ This
universal application of a collective bargain to workmen
who have neither personally nor by representatives taken
any part in it, is specially characteristic of the Sliding Scale.
In the ironworks of the North and Midlands the awards
of the accountants engaged by the joint committees of
employers and workmen habitually govern every wage
contract in the establishments concerned, however distaste-
ful the whole proceeding may be to a particular section of
workmen. The position of the South Wales coalminers is
even more striking. Not a third of the 120,000 men are
even professedly members of any Trade Union, or in any way
represented in the negotiations, and of the organised work-
men a considerable proportion, forming three separate unions,
each covering a distinct district, expressly refused to agree
to the 1893 Sliding Scale, and withdrew their representatives
from the joint committee. Nevertheless, the whole of the
120,000 men, with infinitesimal special exceptions, find
their wages each pay-day automatically determined by the
accountant's award. In this case the associated employers,
in alliance with a minority of the workmen, enforce, upon

* This practice has recently received authoritative official confirmation. Certain
boot manufacturers in Bristol and Northampton, whilst holding themselves bound
to give to members of the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives the terms
specified in the collective agreements, claimed the right to pay what they liked to
the non-unionists they employed. On the issue being referred, at the instance of
the Trade Union, to the Permanent Secretary of the Board of Trade as umpire,
he decided that the decisions of the Local Boards were, unless expressly re-
stricted, applicable to unionists and non-unionists alike, although the latter were
in no way parties to the agreement. See Award of 6th May 1896, in Labour
^azette. May 1896.

VOL. I P

2 I o Trade Union Function

an apathetic or dissentient majority, under pain of exclusion
from the industry or exile from the district, a method of
remuneration and rates of payment which are fiercely
resented by many of them. In instances of this kind it is
the employers who are the instruments of coercion. In
other industries we find the Trade Union, acting in alliance
with the Employers' Association, putting its [own forms of
pressure on dissentient employers, who refuse to join the
association, or to conform to the arrangements agreed to
by the industry as a whole. The records of the local
boards in the boot and shoe trade contain many appeals
from the representatives of the Associated Employers to the
National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives, in which the
union is incited to use all its influence to compel rival firms
to conform to the trade agreements. Here a majority of
workmen, at the instance of, and in alliance with a majority
of employers, practically force a minority of both masters
and men to accept the Common Rules which have com-
mended themselves to the main body of the trade. In
short, experience shows that any successful attempt to
arrange common terms in a highly - developed modern
industry, inevitably leads, however " voluntary " may be
the basis of the associations concerned, to a virtually com-
pulsory acquiescence in the same terms, if not throughout
the whole trade, at any rate by many firms and many work-
men who have in no sense willingly agreed to them.

This compulsion takes a more obvious form when it is a
question of providing the cost of the machinery by which the
common arrangements are made and applied. In the South
Wales coalfield, where, as we have seen, the Sliding Scale is
practically universal, a compulsory deduction of sixpence
per annum is made by the employers from the earnings of
about 40,000 men, whether or not they individually agree
with the Sliding Scale, or are members of any Trade Union.
In the Rhondda Valley, and in a few other districts, the
compulsion goes a step farther. The employers com-
pulsorily deduct a few pence per month from their work-

The Method of Collective Bargaining 211

men's earnings, as the contribution to the Trade Union. A
certain agreed percentage is retained by the employer and
his clerks for their trouble, and the balance is handed over
to the agents of the men's unions. By far the largest and
most important miners' union in South Wales has no other
subscription than this compulsory deduction in the em-
ployer's pay office, and is without any lodges, branch
officials, or other organised machinery. To all intents and
purposes, therefore. Trade Union membership, summed up,
as it is, in this enforced contribution to maintain officials
with whom the employers can negotiate, is, over a large
part of the South Wales coalfield, absolutely compulsory.^

But whilst the compulsory Trade Unionism of the
South Wales coalfields, as enforced by the employers,
extends to the collective arrangements, and to payment
for their cost, it makes no provision for ensuring that the
apathetic or dissentient workers shall have any opportunity
of expressing their desires, or of taking any part in con-
trolling their own side of the business. As most of the
men from whom the Sliding Scale pence are deducted are
not even nominally on the roll of any Trade Union, they
are never troubled to vote on any question, and the work-
ing-men members on the Sliding Scale committee, repre-
senting the small minority of men on the books of the

1 A similar compulsory membership characterises the manufactured iron
trade. The Midland Iron and Steel Wages Board decided that employers should
compulsorily collect from all their operatives the contribution due in respect of
the men's share of the Board's expenses. Some employers neglected to do this,
and on complaint made by the Operatives' Secretary, the Chairman of the Board
held that all employers were bound to make the deduction {Ironworkers' Journal,
March 1895). The North of England Manufactured Iron Board adopts the
same practice. The Truck Act of 1896 forbids any such deduction, and, in
order to enable it to be continued, Mr. Trow, the Operatives' Secretary, moved
and carried a resolution that the Home Secretary should be asked to make an
order excluding their trade from the scope of the Act {Iro7tworkers' Journal,
March 1897). The Midland Board unanimously joined in the application on
the express ground, as stated by the Chairman, that the Act " might have the
effect of preventing them deducting the contributions of the men to the Wages
Board" \lromvorkers' Journal, April 1897). It will be interesting to see
whether the Home Secretary extends his sanction to the principle of compulsory
contribution, by complying with the request, and issuing an order exempting
the whole trade from the Truck Act.

212 Trade Union Function

several unions, conclude such agreements with the employers,
and make such disposition of the compulsory deductions, as
seem best in their own eyes, or in those of their immediate
constituents. We have, in fact, in this remarkable case,
an instance of collective administration without democratic
control. In another case in the same industry, where
collective action and compulsory payment is enforced by
the law, provision is at least made for a ballot to be taken.
We have described elsewhere ^ how long and persistently
the Miners' Trade Unions have fought to obtain the right
to have their own agent at the pit mouth, to see that their
members are not defrauded in the computation of their
tonnage earnings ; and we have also pointed out how in-
valuably these checkweighers have served as union officials.^
By the Coal Mines' Regulation Act of 1887 it was enacted
that, whenever a mere majority of the workers in any coal
pit, to be ascertained by a ballot vote, decided to appoint a
checkweigher, the amount of his wages should be shared
among all the workers in the pit who were paid according
to the weight of coal gotten, and that it should be com-
pulsorily deducted from their earnings, whether they voted
for the appointment or against it.

More generally, however, it is left to the Trade Union
to take such steps as it can to enforce the common trade
agreements, and to collect for itself the expenses involved.
This may be effected in two ways. Following the example
of the South Wales Coal-owners, the Trade Union may
enforce, throughout the whole trade, an agreement concluded
between a section of the employers and the employed,
levying a compulsory tax for the purpose upon all persons

1 History of Trade Unionisni, pp. 289, 453-

2 Among the amendments of the law now sought by the Miners' Federation
is one enabling the hewers in any mine to appoint an assistant checkweigher, at
the expense of the whole pit, to act whenever " the said checkweigher is acting in
any other capacity for or on behalf of the workmen of the colliery." "What
they wanted to do," explained the Yorkshire representatives at the Miners'
Conference in 1896, "was to make it so that the men employed at any colliery
could appoint an assistant checkweigher to look after the work when the weigher
was away on association business."

The Method of Collective Bargaining 213

at work. Thus the old close corporation of Dublin Coopers,
whilst allowing strangers to work, does not admit them to
membership, but insists that they shall obey all the regula-
tions of the union, and contribute weekly to its funds so
long as they work in the town. But this " taxation without
representation " is alien to working class sentiment, and the
almost universal practice of Trade Unionism is to expect
every member of the trade to bear his share, not only in the
cost of its administration, but also in the work of its govern-
ment. " We contend," declare the Flint Glass Makers,
"that it is the imperative duty of men who live by a trade
to support, protect, and keep it in a respectable condition.
Men who refuse to subscribe to the funds of a Trade Union
never can be looked upon by those who are members of
such a union with that feeling of satisfaction and respect
which makes one happy in the thought that unity of action
is the aim of all for the good of each other." ^ Hence we
have, not only compulsory acceptance of the trade customs
but also compulsory membership of the Trade Union con-
cerned. In old days, when any Trade Union action was
a criminal offence, this compulsion easily passed into per-
sonal violence.^ But British Trade Unionists now content
themselves with the more peaceful method practised by the
employers. An employer habitually refuses to engage any
workman who does not agree to his workshop rules, or to those
adopted by the employers' association. In the same way,
the Trade Unionist will, if he can, refuse to accept work in
an establishment where he is obliged to associate with non-
unionists ; " working beside a non-unionist," say the Flint

^ Address of Central Committee, Flint Glass Makers^ Magazine, May 1889.

^ In the History of Trade Unionism we have described the practice of
"rattening," for which some of the Sheffield trade clubs were, up to 1867, un-
happily notorious. In the early part of the century the trade clubs of Dublin
and Glasgow had an equally evil reputation for personal violence (see History of
Trade Unionism, pp. 3, 31, 79, 149, 154, 242). With the growth of legal
freedom for Trade Unions to employ peaceful, and really more effective, sanctions,
this resort to summary lynch law has died out. We know personally of no
instance in which, during the present generation, physical violence has been used
to compel Trade Union membership.

2 1 4 Trade Union Function

Glass Makers, " is bad enough to a man of brain and
principle, without having to suffer the indignity of being
compelled to assist him in his labor. . . . This being so
we do not hesitate to say that before an employer engages
a unionist, he ought to clear all the non-unionists off the
premises. Where we have demanded this, it has been
done." This is put even more definitely by the Coal-
miners. The minutes of the Derbyshire Miners record, for
instance, under date of 1892, "that this Executive Com-
mittee recommend our members, where the majority are
union men, to use every legal effort to induce others to
join, and failing this we advise our members neither to
work nor ride with them, but that due notice of their
intention to take such actions be given to the management
in each case before being put into practice." ^

There is a strange delusion in the journalistic mind that
this compulsory Trade Unionism, enforced by refusal to work
with non-unionists, is a modern device, introduced by the
"New Unionists" of 1889. Thus Mr. Lecky states as a
fact ^ that the establishment of monopolies, and the exclusion,
" often by gross violence and tyranny," of " non-unionists
from the trades they can influence " is specially marked
" among the New Unionists." But any student of Trade
Union annals knows that the exclusion of non-unionists is,
on the contrary, coeval with Trade Unionism itself, and that
the practice is far more characteristic of its older forms than
of any society formed in the present generation. The trade
clubs of handicraftsmen in the eighteenth century would
have scouted the idea of allowing any man to work at their
trade who was not a member of the club. And at the

1 Minutes of Executive Meeting, Derbyshire Miners' Association, July 1S92.
It is an incident of this refusal, on the part of the employer or on that of the
wage-earner, to consent to work with persons of whose conduct he disapproves,
that employers seek to insist on "character notes," workmen classify firms into
"fair" and "unfair," and the associations on both sides circulate to their
members "blacklists" of the men who have made themselves objectionable,
towards the employers in the one case, and towards their fellow workmen in the
other.

^ Democracy and Liberty, vol. ii. p. 34S.

The Method of Collective Bargaining 2 1 5

present day it is especially in the old-fashioned and long-
established unions that we find the most rigid enforce-
ment of membership. Among the Coalminers it is the
men of Northumberland, Durham, and the West Riding
of Yorkshire, strongly combined for a whole generation,
who have set the fashion of absolutely refusing to "ride"
(descend in the cage) with non-unionists/ In the best
organised industries indeed, whether great or small, such as
the Boilermakers, Flint Glass Makers, Tape-sizers, or Stuff-
pressers — the very aristocracy of "Old Unionists" — the
compulsion is so complete that it ceases to be apparent. No
man not belonging to the union ever thinks of applying for
a situation, or would have any chance of obtaining one. It
is, in fact, as impossible for a non-unionist plater or rivetter
to get work in a Tyneside shipyard, as it is for him to take
a house in Newcastle without paying the rates. This silent
and unseen, but absolutely complete compulsion, is the ideal
of every Trade Union. It is true that here and there an
official of an incompletely organised trade may protest to
the public, or before a Royal Commission, that his members
have no desire that any workman should join the union
except by his own free will. But, however bond fide may
be these expressions by individuals, we invariably see such
a union, as soo t as it secures the adhesion of a majority of
its trade, adopting the principle of compulsory membership,

1 For an extreme instance of this boycott of non-unionists, see the remarkable
letter of William Crawford, the leader of the Durham miners, given in full, at
p. 280 of the History of Trade Uniottism, and written, we believe, about 1870.
"Regard them," said Crawford, "as unfit companions for yourselves and your
sons, and unfit husbands for your daughters. Let them be branded, as it were,
with the curse of Cain, as unfit to mingle in ordinary, honest, and respectable
society." But this extension of the ostracism from the workplace to the home,
from industrial relations to social life, is repugnant to British working-class senti-
ment, and has never extensively prevailed. However illogical may be the dis-
tinction, there is a general feeling, now spreading, we think, to other classes of
society, that it is inexpedient to extend social ostracism beyond the sphere of
the offence. Business men habitually deal with others of known bad character in
private life, so long as their commercial dealings are unobjectionable. On the
other hand, English society does not refuse to meet at dinner statesmen of good
private character, whose public acts it deems in the last degree unscrupulous.
The more logical policy advocated by Crawford is regarded as fanaticism.

2i6 Trade Union Function

and applying it with ever greater stringency as the strength
of the organisation increases.

Whatever we may think of these various forms of com-
pulsion, it is important to note that they are in no way
inconsistent with the old ideal of " freedom of contract " —
the legal right of every individual to make such a bargain
for the purchase or sale of labor as he may think most
conducive to his own interest, — and that they are, in fact,
a necessary incident of that legal freedom.

When an employer, or every employer in a district, makes
the Sliding Scale a condition of the engagement of any work-
man, the dissentient minority are " free " to refuse such terms.
They may, in the alternative, break up their homes and leave
the district, or learn another trade. The wage-earners can-
not be denied a similar freedom. When a workman chooses
to make it a condition of his acceptance of employment
from a given firm, that he shall not be required to asso-
ciate with colleagues whom he dislikes, he is but exercis-
ing his freedom to make such stipulations in the bargaining
as he thinks conducive to his own interest. The employer
is " free " to refuse to engage him on these terms, and if the
vast majority of the workmen are of the same mind, he is
" free " to transfer his brains and his capital to another trade,
or to leave the district. But to any one not obsessed by
this conception of " freedom," it will be obvious that a mere
legal right to refuse particular conditions of employment is
no safeguard against compulsion. Where practically all the
competent workmen in an industry are strongly combined,
an isolated employer, not supported by his fellow capitalists,
finds it absolutely impossible to break away from the " custom
of the trade." The isolated workman who objects to Trade
Unionism finds himself in the same predicament. The coal-
hewer in a Northumberland village has no more real freedom
of choice as to whether or not he will join the union than a
Glamorganshire miner has about working under the Sliding
Scale. The workmen's case for Trade Unionism and the
employers' case against it both proceed on the same assump-

The Method of Collective Bargaining 2 1 7

tion,-^ Wherever the ecoyiomic cojtditiojis of the parties concerned
are unequal, legal freedom of contract merely enables the
superior in strategic strength to dictate the terms. Collective
Bargaining does not get rid of this virtual compulsion : it
merely shifts its incidence. Where there is no combination
of any kind, the strategic weakness of the individual wage-
earner, unable to put a reserve price on his labor, forces
him to accept the lowest possible terms. When the work-
men combine the balance is redressed, and may even incline,
as against the isolated employer, in favor of the wage-earner.
If the employers meet combination by combination, the com-
pulsion exercised upon individual capitalists or individual
wage-earners may become so irresistible as to cease to be
noticed. In the most perfected form of Collective Bargaining,
compulsory membership becomes as much a matter of course
as compulsory citizenship.

If, indeed, we examine more closely the common argu-
ments against this virtual compulsion, we shall see that the
customary objection is not directed against the compulsion
itself, but only against the persons by whom it is exercised,
or the particular form that . it takes. The ordinary middle-
class man, without economic training, is wholly unconscious
of there being any coercion in an employer autocratically
deciding how he will conduct " his own business." ^ But the
very notion of the workmen claiming to decide for themselves
under what conditions they will spend their own working
days strikes him as subversive of the social order. The
ardent Trade Unionist, on the other hand, resents the
" tyranny " of the employer's workshop rules, but sees no
harm in a strong union relentlessly enforcing its will on the
capitalists, without deigning to consult with them beforehand.

^ This assumption is examined in detail in our chapter on "The Higgling of
the Market."

2 "The capitalists or master class . . . think the internal arrangements of
their establishments, hours, mode of payment or contract no more the affairs of
the public than the routine of a man's own household." — " Trade Unions and their
Tendencies," by Edmund Potter, F.R.S., Social Science Association Transactions,
i860, p. 755.

2i8 Trade Union Function

The modern compromise between these diametrically opposite
views, and one now attracting a growing share of public
approval, is the settlement of the conditions, neither by the
workmen nor by the employers, but by collective agreement
between them. It is this feeling that accounts for the ever-
increasing favor for Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration
and joint committees of all sorts. Public opinion, that is to
say, accepts as inevitable the submission of the individual to
the Common Rule, and seeks merely to ensure that this
submission should be based upon due representation of the
persons directly concerned. The most fervent advocates of
this Collective Bargaining between the representatives of
employers and employed welcome, in the interests of In-
dustrial Peace, the application of these collective agreements
over whole districts of an industry, and for specified long
terms, though this necessarily involves the compulsory
acquiescence of individual firms and individual workmen
who would have preferred to make separate bargains. And
thus we come, step by step, to the remarkable proposal of
the Chairman of the Royal Commission on Labor, the Duke
of Devonshire, himself a great employer, concurred in by
seven other eminent members, that Trade Unions and
Employers' Associations, extending over whole trades, should
be encouraged to become definitely incorporated bodies,
expressly authorised to conclude collective agreements for
their constituents, and empowered to secure the compliance
of all their members with these new trade laws by legally
enforcible penalties, " every member of a (duly registered)
association being during membership held to be under a
contract with the association for observance of the collective
agreement," the association being given " the right to recover
damages from those of its members who infringed the collec-
tive agreement." ^

1 See the Report, signed by the Duke of Devonshire, the Right Honorable
Leonard Courtney, M.P., and six other members, C, 7421, p. 117. This pro-
posal is further examined in our chapter on "The Implications of Trade
Unionism."

The Method of Collective Bargaining 2 1 9

But the essential reasonableness of English public opinion
sets limits to all these forms of legal freedom of contract and
economic compulsion, whether it is the capitalist's " freedom
of enterprise," the wage-earner's " freedom of combination,"
or the freedom of representative joint committees to decide
what shall be the customs of the trade. When it becomes
obvious that individual capitalists are using their strategic
advantage to compel the wage-earners to accept conditions
patently dangerous to life, health, or character, middle-class
opinion supports legislation to curb their greed. When a
group of workmen strike against machinery, or to enforce
some obviously anti-social regulation, they find themselves
deserted by the general body of Trade Unionists, frequently
thwarted by other members of their trade, and even con-
demned by the executive of their own union. And when
the Duke of Devonshire and Mr. Leonard Courtney pro-
posed, in the Royal Commission on Labor, to give increased
power of trade regulation to free associations of employers
and employed, they were met by the objection that such
joint agreements in particular trades might easily become
prejudicial to the interests of other industries or of the general
body of consumers. At the root of all these instinctive
qualifications of logical doctrines, there lies a half-conscious
admission that neither employers nor employed are morally
free to ignore the interest of the community as a whole.
This reveals to us an inherent shortcoming of every attempt
to determine the conditions of industry by mere contract
between capitalists and workmen. Even in the most per-
fected forms of Collective Bargaining, when each of the
parties is fully represented, and the agreement arrived at
really expresses the combined desires of both, there is no
guarantee that the terms are such as will be conducive to
the welfare of the community.

We have left to the last what is usually regarded as the
capital drawback to the Method of Collective Bargaining,
even in its most perfect development. In the machinery
adopted by the Lancashire Cotton Operatives, for instance,

2 20 Trade Union Function

there is no provision for the contingency of a failure to come
to an agreement. In such a contingency the bargaining
simply comes to an end, and we have that deliberate collec-
tive refusal on the part of the employers to give work, or
on the part of the operatives to accept work, which is known
as a " lock-out " or a " strike." These cessations of work
are, in our view, necessarily incidental to all commercial
bargaining for the hire of labor, whether individual
or collective, just as the customer's walking out of the
shop, if he does not consent to the shopkeeper's price, is
incidental to retail trade.^ This, we need hardly observe,
is a very different matter from the ignorant assumption that
there is some necessary connection between strikes and
Trade Unions. We have already noted the existence of
Trade Unions which prefer the Method of Mutual Insurance
to that of Collective Bargaining, and do not therefore engage
in strikes at all ; and we shall elsewhere instance Trade
Union organisations whose operation is confined to the
Method of Legal Enactment. On the other hand, long
before a Trade Union comes into existence in any industry,
Collective Bargaining, as we have already explained, prevails
in a more or less elaborate form ; and, with Collective Bar-
gaining, the inevitable resort to concerted refusal to work.
It is a matter of simple history that strikes have been far
more numerous in industries which have practised Collective
Bargaining without Trade Unionism, than in those in which
durable combinations have existed.^ The influence of Trade
Unions on strikes is indeed exactly similar to their influence
on Collective Bargaining. The elaboration of the " shop

1 The bitterest opponents of Trade Unionism admit this. " Strikes, I con-
sider," said a leading employer in i860, "as the action and the almost inevitable
result of commercial bargaining for labor. They will always exist." — "Trade
Unions and their Tendencies," by Edmund Potter, F.R.S., Social Science Associa-
tion Transactions, i860, p. 756.

2 We need only remind the reader of the incessant " pit strikes " of the
Northumberland and other coalfields prior to the miners' organisation in per-
manent Trade Unions ; of such angry insurrections as those of the Luddites in
18 II and the "plug riots" of 1842 ; and of the perpetual series of "shop dis-
putes " that still go on among those handicrafts which have not advanced in
organisation beyond the "shop bargain."

The Method of Collective Bargaining 2 2 1

bargain " into the local " working rules," and of these again
into the national agreement has naturally been accompanied
by a similar extension of the " shop dispute," into a local
strike, and of this again into a general stoppage of the
industry. In this connection we may quote the Royal Com-
mission on Labor, " that when both sides in a trade are
strongly organised and in possession of considerable financial
resources, a trade conflict, when it does occur, may be on a
very large scale, very protracted and very costly. But just
as a modern war between two great European States, costly
though it is, seems to represent a higher state of civilisation
than the incessant local fights and border raids which occur
in times or places where governments are less strong and
centralised, so, on the whole, an occasional great trade con-
flict, breaking in upon years of peace, seems to be preferable
to continued local bickerings, stoppages of work, and petty
conflicts." ^

But whether or not we accept this flattering analogy,
it is impossible to deny that the perpetual liability to
end in a strike or a lock-out is a grave drawback to the
Method of Collective Bargaining. So long as the parties to
a bargain are free to agree or not to agree, it is inevitable
that, human nature being as it is, there should now and again
come a deadlock, leading to that trial of strength and endur-
ance which lies behind all bargaining. We know of no
device for avoiding this trial of strength except a deliberate
decision of the community expressed in legislative enact-
ment. One favourite panacea, incidentally referred to in our
account of the boot and shoe trade — the reference of the
dispute to an impartial arbitrator — we reserve for a separate
chapter.

1 Fifth and Final Report of the Royal Commission on Labor, 1894, C, 7421,
p. 36. Mr. Lecky echoes this report. " There can be little doubt that the
largest, wealthiest, and best-organised Trade Unions have done much to diminish
labor conflicts." — Democracy and Liberty, vol. ii. p. 355.

CHAPTER III

ARBITRATION

The essential feature of arbitration as a means of determin-
ing the conditions of employment is that the decision is not
the will of either party, or the outcome of negotiation between
them, but the fiat of an umpire or arbitrator. It is dis-
tinguished from that organised negotiation between Trade
Unions and Employers' Associations which we have termed
Collective Bargaining, in that the result is not arrived at by
bargaining at all, the higgling between the parties being, in
fact, expressly superseded. On the other hand, it is not
Legal Enactment, though it bears some resemblance to this
form, because the award is not obligatory on either of the
parties. Their refusal to accept it, or their ceasing to obey
it, even if they have promised to do so, carries with it no
coercive sanction.

These characteristics of arbitration, as a method of
settling the conditions of employment, come to the front on
every typical occasion. We see the employers and workmen
at variance with each other. Negotiations, more or less
formally carried on, proceed up to a point at which a dead-
lock seems inevitable. To avert a stoppage of the industry,
both parties agree to " go to arbitration." They adopt an
impartial umpire, either to act alone or with assessors
representing each side. Each party then prepares an
elaborate " case," which is laid before the new tribunal.
Witnesses are called, examined, and cross-examined. The

A rbitration 223

umpire asks for such additional information as he thinks
fit. Throughout the proceedings the utmost latitude is
allowed. The " reference " is seldom limited to particular
alternatives, or expressed with any precision.^ The umpire,
in order to clear up points, is always entering into conversa-
tion with the parties. Practically no argument, however
seemingly irrelevant, is excluded ; and evidence may be
given in support of claims founded on the most diverse
economic theories. Finally, the umpire gives his award in
precise terms, but usually without stating either the facts
which have influenced him or the assumptions upon which
he has made up his mind. The award — and this is an
essential feature — carries with it no legal sanction, and may
at any moment be repudiated or quietly ignored by any
capitalist or workman.^

1 Thus the operatives may be asking for an Eight Hours' Day, the dismissal
of an unjust foreman, and the abolition of sub-contracting, whilst the employers
urge a reduction of wages and the more regular attendance of the men. The
umpire's award may include any or all of these points, and might conceivably
decide all in favour of the respective claimants.

2 A list of the prmcipal works on arbitration will be found at p. 323 of our
History of Trade Unionism. Mention should have been made among them of
the report on Industrial Conciliatiott and Arbitration prepared by Carroll D.
Wright for the Massachusetts Labor Bureau (Boston, 1881); and J. S. Jeans's
Conciliation and Arbitration in Labour Disputes (London, 1894) can now be
added. The most important recent publications have been made on the Conti-
nent. We may cite, in particular, the bulky volume of the French "Office du
Travail," entitled De la Conciliation et de F arbitrage dans les Confiits Collectifs
entre patrons et ouvriers en France et d. Vitranger (Paris, 1893) ; the numerous
reports and pamphlets by Julien Weiller of Mariemont, Belgium ; and Conseils de
rifzdustrie et du travail by Charles Morisseaux (Brussels, 1890). The English
experience is well discussed by Dr. von Schulze-Gaevernitz in Zum Socialen
Frieden (Leipzig, 1890), translated as Social Peace (London, 1893).

The student should note that there has been, until quite recently, no clear
distinction drawn between Collective Bargaining, Conciliation, and Arbitration.
Much of what is called Arbitration or Conciliation in the earlier writings on the
subject amounts to nothing more than organised Collective Bargaining. Thus,
the classic work of Mr. Henry Crompton {htdustrial Conciliation, London, 1876)
describes, as "conciliation," the typical cases in which representative employers
and workmen meet to bargain on behalf of the trade. The Nottingham hosiery
board, established in i860, often described as a model of arbitration, was, in
effect, nothing more than machinery for Collective Bargaining, no outsider being
present, the casting vote being given up, and the decisions being arrived at by
what the men called " a long jaw." In 1868 Mr. Mundella observed in a lecture,
" It is well to define what we mean by arbitration. The sense in which we use
the word is that of an arrangement for open and friendly bargaining ... in

2 24 Trade Union Function

Yet arbitration has one characteristic feature in common
with the higgling of employers and workmen which it super-
sedes. The arbitrator's award is a general ordinance, which,
in so far as it is accepted, puts an end to Individual Bargain-
ing between man and man, and thus excludes, from influence
on the terms of employment, the exigencies of particular
workmen, and usually also those of particular firms. It
establishes, in short, like Collective Bargaining, a Common
Rule for the industry concerned. We can therefore under-
stand why the Trade Unionists from 1850 to 1876 so
persistently strove for arbitration, and so eagerly welcomed
the gradual conversion of the governing classes to a belief in
its benefits. At a time when the majority of employers
asserted their right to deal individually with each one of
their "hands," habitually refused even to meet the men's
representatives in discussion, and sought to suppress Col-
lective Bargaining altogether by the use of ambiguous
statutes and obsolete law, it was an immense gain for the
Trade Unions to get their fundamental principle of a Common
Rule adopted.^ During the last twenty years arbitration has
greatly increased in popularity among the public, and each
ministry in succession prides itself on having attempted to
facilitate its application. Whenever an industrial war breaks
out, we have, in these days, a widespread feeling among the
public that both parties should voluntarily submit to the
decision of an impartial arbitrator. But however convenient
this solution may be to a public of consumers, the two
combatants seldom show any alacrity in seeking it, and can

which masters and men meet together and talk over their common affairs openly
and freely." — Arbitratio7i as a Means of Preventing Sti-ikes, by A. J. Mundella
(Bradford, 1868).

^ Arbitration was accordingly opposed by the more clear-sighted of the
opponents of Trade Unionism. " Our main objection," said one of the leading
critics, "both to arbitration and conciliation, as palliatives of Unionism, is that
they sanction, nay necessitate, the continuance of the system of combination, as
opposed to that of individual competition. ... In so doing we lend the
authority of public recognition to the pestilent principle of combination, and
sanction the substitution of an artificial mechanism for that natural organism
which Providence has provided for the harmonious regulation of industrial
interests." — Trade Unionistii, by James Stirling (Glasgow, 1869), p. 50.

A rbitration 225

rarely be persuaded to agree to refer their quarrel to any
outside authority. Although arbitration has been preached
as a panacea for the last fifty years, the great majority of
" captains of industry " still resent it as an infringement of
their right to manage their own business, whilst the leaders of
the organised workmen, once enthusiastic in its favor, now
usually regard it with suspicion. The four years, 1891-95, saw,
in Great Britain, four great industrial disputes in as many
leading industries. But neither in cotton manufacture nor in
coal-mining, neither in the great machine industry of boot-
making nor in engineering, could the capitalists and workmen
agree to let their quarrels be settled by an impartial umpire.
What happened in each of these instances — and they were
typical of many others — was the breaking off of Collective
Bargaining, a prolonged stoppage and trial of endurance,
ending, not in arbitration but in a resumption of Collective
Bargaining, and the conclusion of a fresh agreement under
new and more favorable auspices.

At first sight this disinclination of workmen or employers
to submit their claims to an impartial tribunal appears per-
verse and unreasonable. Business men, it is said, almost
invariably refer disputes between themselves to more or less
formal arbitration, and would never dream of stopping their
own Industry, or drying up the source of their own profits,
merely because they could not agree upon an impartial
umpire. And if this be true in commercial transactions,
where the alternative is nothing worse than an action at law,
how much stronger the need must seem when the alternative
may easily involve the bankruptcy of capitalists, the semi-
starvation of thousands of operatives, and the temporary
paralysis, if not the permanent injury, of an important
national industry ? Unfortunately this taking analogy,
drawn from the arbitration between business firms, rests on
the old confusion between interpreting an existing agree-
ment and concluding a new one. Commercial arbitrations
are Invariably concerned with relations already entered into,
either by existing contracts or under the law of the land.
VOL. I Q

2 26 Trade Union Function

No business man ever dreams of submitting to arbitration
the terms upon which he shall make new purchases or future
sales,^ Arbitration in commercial matters is therefore strictly-
confined to questions of interpretation, both parties resting
their claims on a common basis, the existence of which is
not in dispute between them. Now, issues of interpretation
of this kind are incessantly occurring between employers and
employed, even in the best-regulated industries. In these
cases, as we shall hereafter point out, whilst there is no in-
superable objection to arbitration, there is no real necessity
to resort to it. Nor is it for this class of disputes that
arbitration is usually proposed. The great strikes and lock-
outs which paralyse a whole industry almost invariably arise
not on issues of interpretation, but on the proposal of either
workmen or employers to alter the terms upon which, for
the future, labor shall be engaged.

The position of the employers who object to the fixing
of the terms of the wage contract by the fiat of an arbitrator
has, from the first, been logical and consistent. In a weighty
article which appeared, twenty years ago, in the official organ
of the National Association of Employers of Labor, we find
the case stated with perfect lucidity : —

" The sphere of arbitration in trade disputes is strictly
and absolutely limited to cases of specific contract, where the
parties differ as to the terms of the contract, and are willing,
for the sake of agreement and an honorable fulfilment of
their engagements, to submit the points in dispute to
competent men mutually chosen. Where there is a basis
and instrument of agreement by the parties to which they

1 The frequently cited "Conseils de Prud'hommes " of France (established
first at Lyons in 1808, and since greatly developed in all industrial centres) are
strictly confined to the settlement of disputes arising out of existing contracts, or
(as regards minor matters) the application of the law. In no case do they presume
to fix the rate of wages for future engagements. They are indeed merely cheap and
convenient legal tribunals, which make efforts to compose a dispute before pro-
ceeding to pronounce judgment upon it. For a useful account of these councils,
see E. Thomas, Les Conseils des Prud'kommes, leur Histoire et leur Organisation
(Paris, 1888). We understand that this is the character also of the similar
tribunals which exist in various German States and elsewhere.

A rbitration 227

wish to adhere, and on which arbiters have something
tangible to decide upon, it is seldom difficult for impartial
men to elicit an adjustment fair and equitable to both sides.
Arbitration is thus constantly of use in business matters on
which differences of view have arisen, and is as applicable to
questions between workmen and employers where there is a
specific contract to be interpreted as in any other branch of
affairs. It is better than going to law, much better than
running away from the contract, striking, coercing, and fall-
ing into civil damages or criminal penalties, and raising on
the back of such unfortunate consequences a blatant and
endless protest against ' the labor laws.' But cases in which
there are specific contracts absolutely define the sphere
of arbitration. To apply the term ' arbitration ' to the rate
of wages for the future, in regard to which there is no ex-
plicit contract or engagement, and all the conditions of which
are unknown to employers and employed, is the grossest
misnomer that can be conceived. It is certain that neither
workmen nor employers could be bound, nor would consent
to be bound, even were it possible to bind them, by such
arbitrary decrees ; and that the law, therefore, can never give
such decrees even any temporary force, unless we are to fall
back into the long obsolete tyranny of fixing the rate of
wages by Act of Parliament, or by ' King in Council,' or
by 'Communal Bureau of Public Safety,' or whatever the
supreme power may be." ^

Thus, from the employers' point of view, the supersession
of the higgling of the market by the fiat of an arbitrator
is, on its economic side, as indefensible an interference with
industrial freedom as a legal fixing of the rate of wages.
But an arbitrator's award has additional disadvantages.
A law would at any rate be an authoritative settlement,
which disposed of the question beyond dispute or cavil. An
arbitrator's award, on the other hand, even if it is accepted
by the Trade Union, may not commend itself to all the
workmen. The employers who accept it may not unnaturally

^ Capital and Labour, 1 6th June 1875.

2 28 Trade Union Function

feel that they have surrendered their own freedom, without
securing any guarantee that the workmen, or some indispens-
able sections of them, will not promptly commence a new
attack on which to provoke a stoppage of the industry. A
law, moreover, is a Common Rule, enforced with uniformity
on all alike. The arbitrator's award, on the other hand,
binds only those firms and those workmen who were parties
to it. In almost all industries there are some establishments,
and often whole districts, which remain outside the employers'
association, and in which masters and men persist in conduct-
ing their businesses in their own way. And there is no
guarantee that some firms will not break away from the
association, and join the ranks of these unfettered outsiders.
If the arbitrator's award has secured better terms to the
operatives than the masters are unanimously willing to
concede, the good and honorable employers are penalised
by their virtue. The proceedings of the " Boards of
Conciliation and Arbitration " of the boot-making industry
contain many complaints by employers that the awards are
not enforced on rival firms, who are consequently undercut-
ting them in the market. If our factory or mines legislation
had been enforced only on specified good employers, and had
left untouched any firm who objected to the regulations, so
intolerable an injustice would quickly have led to a repudiation
of the whole system.

If we turn from the employers to the Trade Unionists,
we find a steadily increasing disinclination among workmen
to agree to the intervention of an arbitrator to settle the
terms of a new wage contract. This growing antipathy ^ to

1 We may cite as evidence of this antipathy some recent declarations made in
the names of the three most powerful organisations in the United Kingdom. It
is expressly stated (for instance, in the Derbyshire Miners' Executive Council
Minutes of the 2nd of June 1891) that it was the idea that the Royal Commission
on Labor was intended to introduce a ' ' huge arbitration system " that determined
the whole Miners' Federation steadfastly to refuse to have anything to do with
that inquiry. " We are opposed to the system altogether," declared Mr. Mawdsley
before that Commission (Group C, Answer 776), on behalf of the Lancashire
cotton operatives. And Mr. Robert Knight, giving evidence on behalf of the
United Society of Boilermakers (Group A, Answer 20,833), definitely negatived
the idea of arbitration, explaining as follows: " I speak from long experience of

Arbitration 229

arbitration is, we think, mainly due to their feeling of
uncertainty as to the fundamental assumptions upon which
the arbitrator will base his award. When the issue is whether
the " standard earnings " of the Lancashire Cotton-spinners
should or should not be decreased by ten per cent, there
is no basis accepted by both parties, except the vague
admission that the award should not be contrary to the
welfare of the community. But this offers no guidance to
the arbitrator. Judge Ellison, for instance, acting in 1879
in a Yorkshire coal -mining case, frankly expressed the
perplexity of an absolutely open-minded umpire. "It is
[he said] for {the employers' advocate) to put the men's wages
as high as he can. It is for {the men's advocate) to put them
as low as he can. And when you have done that it is for
me to deal with the question as well as I can ; but on what
principle I have to deal with it I have not the slightest idea.
There is no principle of law involved in it. There is no
principle of political economy in it. Both masters and men
are arguing and standing upon what is completely within their
rights. The master is not bound to employ labor except
at a price which he thinks will pay him. The man is not
bound to work for wages that won't assist (subsist) him and
his family sufficiently, and so forth. So that you are both
within your rights ; and that's the difficulty I see in dealing
with the question," ^

But this cold-blooded elimination of everything beyond
the legal rights of the parties is neither usual in a wages
arbitration, nor acceptable to either side. Each of the parties
implicitly rests its case on a distinct economic assumption,
or even series of assumptions, not accepted by the other side,

the working of this large organisation that I represent here to-day, and I say that
we can settle all our differences without any interference on the part of Parliament
or anybody else." The same feeling is shared by smaller societies. "Our
experience of arbitration," states the secretary of the North Yorkshire and Cleve-
land (Ironstone) Miners' Association, " was that we always got the worst of it, and
so since 1877 '^^ has been firmly refused." — ^Joseph Toyn, in Newcastle Leader
^^ Extra" on Conciliation in Trade Disputes (Newcastle, 1894), p. 9.

^ Report of South Yorkshire Collieries Arbitration (Sheffield, 1S79), p. 49.
The umpire was the Judge of the Sheffield County Court.

230 Trade Union Fimction

and often not expressly stated. The employers will often
hold that, in order to secure the utmost national prosperity,
wages should rise and fall with the price which they can
obtain for their product. Or it may be urged that the wage
bill must, under no circumstances, encroach upon the parti-
cular percentage of profit assumed to be necessary to prevent
capital from leaving the trade.^ These assumptions would,
at one time, have been acquiesced in by many leading
workmen, although, perhaps, not by the rank and file. But
during the last twenty years, the leaders of the most power-
ful organisations have definitely taken up the view that con-
siderations of market price or business profit ought, in the
interests of the community, to be strictly subordinated to
the fundamental question of " Can a man live by the trade ? "
It is urged that the payment of " a living wage " ought, under
all circumstances, to be a " first charge " upon industry, taking
precedence even of rents or royalties, and of the hypothetical
percentage allowed as a minimum to capital in the worst
times. The skilled mechanic moreover will claim that the
length of his apprenticeship warrants him in insisting, like
the physician or the barrister, on a minimum fee for his
services below which he cannot be asked to descend. The
arbitrator's award, if it is not a mere " splitting the difference,"
must be influenced by one or the other of these assumptions,
either as a result of the argument before him, or as the
outcome of his education or sympathies. However judicial
he may be in ascertaining the facts of the case, the relative
importance which he will giv^e to the rival assumptions of
the parties can scarcely fail to be affected by the subtle

^ Mr. Mawdsley (Amalgamated Association of Cotton-spinners) is very emphatic
on this point. " If we had arbitration we should have much less wages than we
are getting now. Arbitrators generally go in for a certain standard of profit for
capital — generally speaking, it has been 10 per cent. Mr. Chamberlain has
always said that capital ought to have 10 per cent. If the arbitrator went in
for 10 per cent in the cotton trade, we should have a very big reduction of wages;
and we are not going to have it." — Evidence before Royal Commission on
Labor, Group C, Answer 774. We believe the case to which Mr. Mawdsley
referred is Mr. Chamberlain's award in the South Stafibrdshire Iron Trade in

Arbitration 231

influences of his class and training. The persons chosen
as arbitrators have almost invariably been representative of
the brain -working class — great employers, statesmen, or
lawyers — men bringing to the task the highest qualities of
training, impartiality, and judgment, but unconsciously imbued
rather with the assumptions of the class in which they live
than with those of the workmen. The workmen's growing
objection to arbitration is, we believe, mainly due to their
deeply -rooted suspicion that any arbitrator likely to be
accepted by the employers will, however personally impartial
he may be, unconsciously discount assumptions inconsistent
with the current economics of his class.^

There is, however, one industry in which, for eight-and-
twenty years, arbitration has been habitually resorted to, for
the settlement of the terms of new wage contracts. This
one exception to the usual dislike of arbitration will, we
think, prove the correctness of the foregoing analysis. " The
Board of Conciliation and Arbitration for the Manufactured
Iron Trade of the North of England," which has existed since
1869, has long been the classical example of the success
of arbitration. Besides providing by the machinery of a
standing committee for the settlement of interpretation
differences, and by half-yearly board meetings for discussing
general questions, the rules direct the reference of intractable
disputes to an outside umpire. On twenty separate occasions

1 We have collected particulars of no fewer than 240 cases of industrial
arbitration, ranging from 1803 to the present day. Excluding mere questions
of interpretation, and disputes between workmen themselves, we have found only
one case in which, in an arbitration for a new agreement between employers and
employed, any person of the wage-earning class has been accepted as umpire.
In May 1893 the Northampton Board of Arbitration for the Boot and Shoe
Trade appointed Mr, F. Perkins, a working laster, as umpire. (Monthly Report
of the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives, May 1893),

The arduous and often thankless task of acting as umpire or sole arbitrator is
usually undertaken without fee or reward of any kind. Lord James has long
given his invaluable services to the boot and shoe trade without | remuneration.
Dr. Spence Watson, who lately completed his fiftieth arbitration, told us that he
had only thrice received any payment whatever, once his railway expenses, once
a small fee, and in one case, which involved several weeks' labor, a more substantial
payment. The barrister-umpire, called in, in some sense as a professional expert
to unravel an intricate case, is occasionally paid.

232 Trade Union Function

during the last twenty-eight years this provision has come
into operation with regard to the settlement of the con-
ditions of future wage contracts ; and on every occasion the
arbitrator's award has been accepted by both employers and
employed.

It is an interesting confirmation of the view we have
taken that, in this one industry in which arbitration has
achieved a continued success, we find the workmen and the
employers agreeing in the economic assumptions upon which
wages should be fixed, and upon which, therefore, the arbitrator
is asked to proceed. It has for more than a generation been
traditional among ironmasters that the wages of the opera-
tives ought to vary with the market price of the product.^
Since the formation of the Board, in 1869, this assumption
has been accepted by both parties as the main, and often as
the exclusive, rule for the settlement of wages. In the reports
of the arbitration proceedings we find both parties constantly
reaffirming this principle, each in turn resorting to other
considerations only for the sake of argument when the main
assumption is for the moment calculated to tell against them.
" We entirely agree," declare the operatives in 1877," that our
wages should be regulated by the selling price of iron."" Next
time it is the employers who assert the same rule. " The
eight years sliding-scale arrangement," states their spokesman
in 1882, "we believe was the principle of determining wages
by the selling price of iron, and it would be extremely diffi-
cult, if not dangerous, permanently to depart from that."^
There is, in fact, as a careful student observes, " a general
understanding running throughout the cases and pleadings,
both of masters and men, that wages should follow the

^ See the illustration quoted at pp. 484-486 of the History of Trade Unionism.
" Old Thorneycroft's Scale," by which puddlers' wages advanced or receded one
shilling for each pound sterling per ton in the price of "marked bars," dates, it
is said, from 1841 ; see Mr. Whitwell's evidence before Royal Commission on
Labor, 1892, Group A.

2 Report of Arbitration before Mr. (now Sir David) Dale, July 1877, Indus-
trial Peace, p. 63.

3 Report of Arbitration before Mr. (now Sir J. W.) Pease, April 1882, Ibid.
P- 63.

Arbitration 233

selling prices of iron." -^ This was expressly stated by Dr. R.
Spence Watson in the letter which accompanied his fifth
award as arbitrator for this board. Whilst observing that
" the wages paid in the Staffordshire district, which competes
with the North of England in the employment of ironworkers,
as well as to some extent in the trade itself, is a factor which
cannot be disregarded, [he declares that] in the course of the
arguments it was admitted on both sides that . . . the realised
price of iron, as shown by the figures taken out by the
accountant to the board, may be considered the principal
factor in the regulation of wages. ... It is upon this state-
ment [he continues] and these admissions that I am called
upon to give my award." ^

It will be apparent that arbitration on issues of this
kind comes really within the category of the interpretation
or application of what is, in effect, an agreement already
arrived at between the parties. The question comes very
near to being one of fact, answered as soon as the necessary
figures are ascertained beyond dispute. It is therefore not
surprising to learn that, during eight of the twenty-eight
years of the Board's existence, variations of wages were
automatically determined by a formal sliding scale, and that
even during the intervals in which no definite scale was
adopted the Board itself was able, on eight separate occa-
sions, to agree to advances or reductions without troubling
the arbitrator at all. We need not discuss whether the
acceptance by employers and operatives alike of the
assumption that wages must follow prices is, or is not,
advantageous to the workmen, or to the industry as a
whole. But it is evident that the continued success of
arbitration in the North of England Iron Board, dealing, as
it does, mainly with the interpretation or application of an
existing common basis of agreement, affords no guide to
other trades in which no such common basis is accepted,

1 Industrial Peace, p. 90.

2 Letter and award of the 28th November 1888 ; Report of Wages Arbitration
before Ji. S. Watson, Esq., LL.D. (Darlington, 18SS).

234 Trade Union Function

and in which the claims of the respective parties rest on
opposite assumptions.^

But the success of the North of England Manufactured
Iron Board, and the more qualified results of similar
tribunals in the Midland iron trade, and the Northumber-
land and Durham coal-mining industry, whilst they give no
real support to arbitration as a panacea for strikes, seem at
first to open up a new field of usefulness for the arbitrator
in the settlement of issues of application or interpretation.
These questions of interpretation or application to particular
cases are always arising, even in the best-regulated trade,
and to provide machinery for their peaceful and indisputable
decision is of great importance. Here we have not merely
identical assumptions by the two parties, but a precise
bargain by which both agree to be bound. Unfortunately
it is just in these issues, for which arbitration seems a
natural expedient, that its adoption has been found, in
practice, most difficult. The application of a general agree-
ment to the earnings of particular individuals, or to the

^ The Midland Iron and Steel Wages Board, which has had an intermittent
existence since 1872, was formed on the model of the North of England Board,
which it closely resembles. Owing to the inferior organisation of the workmen
in Staffordshire and Worcestershire, it has not always worked smoothly, but
wage variations have almost always been made by the Board according to a
sliding scale, formal or implied, whilst a standing committee applies the general
principles to "local questions." See the evidence of Mr. (now Sir B.) Hingley
before the Royal Commission on Labor, 1892, and the references given in the
preceding chapter.

Among the Northumberland and Durham coalminers, though arbitration as
to the terms of new agreements has been repeatedly resorted to, it has been only
partially successful in preventing strikes. The Northumberland Miners' Mutual
Confident Association went to arbitration on five occasions between 1873 and
1S77. But in 1S78 the owners forced a reduction without submitting to arbitra-
tion, the result being a nine weeks' strike. Between 1879 and 1886 the level of
wages was automatically regulated by a sliding scale. In 1S87 the employers
again insisted on a special reduction, the result being a disastrous strike of
seventeen weeks. Since that date alterations in the level of wages have been
mutually agreed to by the joint "Wages Committee" without resort to arbitra-
tion. The Durham Miners' Association (established 1869) had four arbitrations
between 1874 and 1876, and worked under a sliding scale from 1877 to 1889.
This did not prevent a six weeks' strike in 1879, terminated by another arbitra-
tion. Variations in wages between 1889 and 1892 were mutally agreed to, but
in 1892 there ensued the longest and most embittered dispute ever known in the
trade.

A rbitration 235

technical details of particular samples or processes, is at
once too complicated, and of too little pecuniary importance,
to make it possible to call in an outside arbitrator.^ The
intractable questions, to take one trade as an example,
which perplex the local boards in the boot and shoe
industry relate only to a few shillings, and frequently
concern only one or two workmen. For such issues it is
obviously impossible to obtain, either for love or money, the
services of any personality eminent enough to command the
respect of the whole body of employers and workmen.
Where the standard of earnings of large bodies of men, or
the prevention of a serious industrial war, are concerned,
public spirit will induce men of the calibre of Lord James
or Dr. Spence Watson to spend whole days, without fee or
reward, in bringing about an adjustment. In commercial
arbitrations which involve considerable sums, recourse is had
to eminent lawyers, who are paid large fees for mastering
the intricate details of each case. This sort of arbitrator is
far too expensive a person to be available for the applica-
tion of general wage contracts to particular cases, and the
statesman or philanthropist cannot spare the time. On the
other hand, if, as in the boot and shoe trade, recourse is had
to some one engaged in the industry, it is difficult to avoid
the suspicion of class bias. The big employer from another
district, whose services are usually called in, can hardly be
expected to content the workmen. The employers, on the

^ Thus, when in 1S91, in an arbitration between the West Cumberland Iron
and Steel Company and their workmen, the arbitrator (Dr. Spence Watson) was
asked to fix the actual rates at which particular men were to be paid, he declined
the task as one outside the possible capacity of any arbitrator. " What has
always happened," said Dr. Spence Watson, "in every arbitration I have had
hitherto ? There has been a general question of percentage. . . . The principle
of the thing is the thing to leave to arbitration. The detail of the thing, as to
how it is to affect this or that or the other, never can be left to arbitration. . . .
Already over this matter I have given up several nights to go through these
papers and work them in this way and that way, but I have not the knowledge,
and you cannot give me the knowledge. . . . Surely the question of individual
payment is a question for the manager of the works and the men of the works,
and not for a third party." — MS. proceedings. We are indebted to Dr. Spence
Watson for permission to examine these and other papers, and for many valuable
suggestions and criticisms.

236 Trade Union Function

other hand, will not consent to be bound by the decision of
an operative.

It is, fortunately, unnecessary for the employers and
workmen to get into this dilemma. The correct analogy
from the commercial world for all these issues of interpreta-
tion is, not the elaborate and costly reference to arbitration,
but the simple arrangements for taking an inventory, in
connection with a contract of purchase or hire. Instead of
calling in an outside authority, eminent enough to be known
and trusted by both sides, each party is represented by an
inexpensive expert habitually engaged on the particular
calculations involved. The two professional men seldom
find any difficulty in agreeing upon an identical award.
This corresponds exactly to the machinery which is em-
ployed with such success in the Lancashire cotton trade.
The two secretaries who visit the mill in which any question
of interpretation has arisen correspond in all essentials to
the two house-agents employed respectively by the owner
and the incoming tenant of a furnished house. In the
interpretation of wage contracts there is even more justifi-
cation for this method than in taking an inventory. The
object of the house-agent on either side is to get the best
terms for his client. But the professional experts who visit
a cotton mill, in response to a complaint from operative or
employer, are not employed by^^or responsible to either of
the parties directly concerned. And though one represents
the associated employers, and the other the combined work-
men, both are retained and paid to secure an identical
object, namely, absolute uniformity between mill and mill.
So far as regards the application to the particular cases of
existing general contracts between employers and workmen,
arbitration, though possible, is therefore but a clumsy device.
The only way of getting an efficient umpire for such
technical work would be permanently to employ a pro-
fessional expert of high standing to give his whole time to
the business. But directly an industry is sufficiently well
organised to afford the expense of an efficient paid umpire,

Arbitration 237

it can find in the joint meeting of tlie salaried experts of
both sides a far more speedy, economical, and uniform
method of settling questions of interpretation than any
arbitration could provide.^

The reader is now in a position to estimate how far
arbitration is likely to serve as a panacea against strikes or
lock-outs, or even to become a permanent feature of the
most highly organised machinery for Collective Bargaining,
In the really crucial instances — the issues relating to the
conclusion of a new agreement — habitual and voluntary
recourse to an umpire may be expected, we think, only in
the unlikely event of capitalists and workmen adopting
identical assumptions as to the proper basis of wages. We
have seen how unreservedly the best-educated workmen of
the North of England accepted, between 1870 and 1885,
the capitalists' assumption that it was only fair that wages
should vary with the selling price of the product. For
twenty years the miners of South Wales have acquiesced in
the same doctrine. If this view were to become accepted in
other trades, it is conceivable that arbitration would become
more popular among them. On the other hand, there is
growing up among workmen a strong feeling in favor of a
fixed minimum Standard of Life, to be regarded as a first
charge upon the industry of the country, and to be deter-
mined by the requirements of healthy family life and
citizenship. If the capitalists should accept this view,
arbitrations might become common, the explicit reference
in every case being what conditions were required in the
industry to enable the various grades of producers to lead
a civilised life. But no such agreement on fundamental
assumptions is at present within view. We are therefore

^ In the rare cases in which the two house-agents fail to agree, we understand
that the practice is for them privately to refer the matter to another professional,
whose decision they both adopt as their own. If in the Lancashire cotton trade,
the employers' and workmen's district secretaries do not agree upon an issue of
interpretation, it is, in practice, referred to the joint decision of the central
secretaries. But on such issues of fact, if identical principles are thoroiighiy
accepted by both sides, there is seldom any intractable difference of opinion between
professional experts.

238 Trade Union Function

constrained not to place any high expectations upon the
fiat of an umpire as a method of preventing disputes as to
future conditions of labor. Nor can we estimate very
highly the practical value of arbitration in the application
to particular cases of existing general agreements. In
promptitude, technical efficiency, and inexpensiveness the
" impartial outsider " is inferior to the joint meeting of the
salaried secretaries of either side.

But although arbitration is not likely to supersede
Collective Bargaining, or to prevent the occasional breaking
off of negotiations, it has great advantages, in all but the
best-organised trades, as a means of helping forward the
negotiations themselves. The first requisite for efficient
Collective Bargaining is for the parties to meet face to face,
and in an amicable manner to discuss each other's claim.
But this initial step is often one of difficulty. We are apt
to forget, in view of the regular negotiations in such highly
organised trades as the Cotton Operatives, the Boilermakers,
and the Northumberland and Durham Coalminers, how new
and unusual it still is for capitalists and workmen to meet
on an equal footing, to recognise each other's representative
capacity, and to debate, with equal good temper, technical
knowledge, and argumentative skill, upon what conditions
the employer shall engage " his own hands." Even to-day,
in the great majority of trades, the masters would think it
beneath their dignity voluntarily to confer with the Trade
Union leaders on equal terms ; and they would resent as
preposterous the idea of disclosing to them their profit and
loss accounts, or even the prices they are obtaining for their
product. Yet it is upon these facts that they base their
demand for a reduction of wages, or their refusal of an
advance. The workmen, on the other hand, especially in
such half-organised trades, are full of prejudices, misconcep-
tions of the facts, and Utopian aspirations. Under these
circumstances, even if the employers consent to meet the
men at all, there can be no frank interchange of views, no
real understanding of each other's position — in short, no

Arbitration 239

effective negotiation. Recourse to an impartial umpire is
one way out of these difficulties. The employer's dignity is
not offended by appearing before an eminent jurist or states-
man, sitting virtually in a judicial capacity. It is regarded
as only natural that the arbitrator should ask for the
statistical facts upon which each party bases its case. The
mere fact of each having to set forth its claims in pre-
cise terms, in a way that can be maintained under cross-
examination, is already a great gain. But if the arbitrator
is tactful and experienced, he can do a great deal more
to bring the parties to agreement. He discovers, by kindly
examination, what precisely it is that each party regards as
essential, and persuasively puts on one side any irritating
reminiscences of past disputes, or theoretic arguments going
beyond the narrow limits of the case. In friendly conversa-
tion with each side in turn, he draws out the really strong
arguments of both, restates them in their most effective form,
and in due course impresses them, in the most conciliatory
terms, on the notice of the opponent. Those who have read
the proceedings before such an experienced arbitrator as Dr.
Spence Watson, will, we are sure, agree with us in feeling
that his wonderful success as an umpire is far more due to
these arts of conciliation than to any infallibility in his
awards. In case after case we have been struck by the fact
that, long before the end of the discussion, many^of the issues
had already been disposed of, the points remaining in dis-
pute being so narrowed down by a mutual recognition of
each other's case that when the award is at last given each
party is predisposed to accept it as inevitable.

In this patient work of conciliation lies the real value of
arbitration proceedings. There is no magic in the fiat of an
arbitrator as a remedy for strikes or lock-outs. If either
party really prefers fighting to conceding the smallest point
to its adversary — that is, in those cases in which either em-
ployers or the workmen have an overwhelming superiority
in strength — there will be no submission to arbitration. If
both parties are willing to bargain, and are sufficiently well

240 Trade Union Function

organised and well educated to be capable of it, no outside
intervention v/ill be needed. In those industries, however,
where organisation has begun, but has not yet reached the
highest form ; where the employers are forced to recognise
the power of the men's union, but have not yet brought
themselves to meet its officials on terms of real equality ;
where the workmen are strong enough to strike, but do not
yet command the services of experienced negotiators, the
intervention of an eminent outsider may be of the utmost
value. It is of small importance whether his intervention
takes the form of " arbitration " or " conciliation " — that is
to say, whether he is empowered to close the discussion by
himself delivering an " award " as umpire, or whether he
must wait until he can bring the parties to sign an " agree-
ment" drawn up by himself as chairman. In either case
his real business is not to supersede the process of Collective
Bargaining, but to forward it. And in view of the usual
impossibility of agreeing upon any common assumption as
to the proper basis of wages ; in face of the workman's
suspicion of the brainworker's training, and the employer's
fear ^ of electioneering considerations ; and having regard to
the importance of securing universal concurrence in the
result, we are inclined to believe that the intervention of the
" eminent outsider " will, as a rule, be at once more accept-
able and more likely to be successful if he avowedly acts
only as a " conciliator." "

This inference is supported by the events of the last few
years. On three notable occasions outside intervention has
been evoked to settle a serious industrial conflict. In 1893
Lord Rosebery, at the express desire of the Cabinet, settled
a dispute which had for sixteen weeks stopped the coal

^ Thus, in the draft rules of a Foreman's Benefit Society, established by some
of the leading Tyneside employers, there is a provision for referring to arbitration
any dispute between the society and a member. The draft rule significantly
adds : " The following cannot be selected as arbitrator : Persons either candi-
dates for or holding political, municipal, or other positions acquired by votes ;
ministers of religion."

2 "In conciliation the disputants endeavour to convince each other, in arbi-
tration to convince a third party. As in the first case, both sides have equal

A rbitration 241

trade of the Midlands of England. In 1895 Sir Courtenay
Boyle, Permanent Secretary of the Board of Trade, drew
up the agreement which terminated the great strike in the
boot trade. And Lord James, a distinguished member of
the Conservative Ministry of the day, in January 1896
brought about, after protracted negotiations, a settlement
of the dispute between the Clyde and Belfast shipbuilders
and their engineers. But notwithstanding the official posi-
tion of these magnates, it is significant that in no case were
they asked, and in no case did they attempt, to cut the
Gordian knot by the judicial decree of an umpire or arbi-
trator. It was not their business to inquire into the merits
of the case. They were not called upon to make up their
minds whether the employers or the workmen were in the
right. They had not even to choose between the rival
economic assumptions on which the parties rested their
respective claims. Their function was to persuade the
representatives of both sides to go on negotiating until a
basis was discovered on which it was possible for them to
agree.

This work of conciliation is, we believe, destined to play
a great and for many years an increasing part in the labor
struggles of this country. In the present state of public
opinion the intervention of an outside " conciliator " is, as
regards the imperfectly organised trades, a precursor of
regular Collective Bargaining. In many trades the em-
ployers themselves are not united in any association : in
many others they still haughtily refuse to discuss matters
with their workmen. In prolonged disputes public opinion
now almost forces the parties to resume negotiations ; and

knowledge of the matter in hand, they must endeavour to show clearly the strong
points of the case, and those only. Any attempt at simple advocacy would be
thrown away. The appeal must be to acknowledged facts. But, in the second
case, advocacy is necessary, and all its many devices — the undesirable as well as
the undeniably good. There is a strong antagonism throughout. Arbitration is
better than striking or locking out, but inferior to conciliation. Industrial peace
in any form is better than industrial war." — " Compulsory or Voluntary Concilia-
tion," by R. Spence Watson, Ironworkers' Journal, June 1895.

VOL. I R

242 Trade Union Function

the intervention of an eminent outsider is found the best
lever for Collective Bargaining. His social position or official
status secures for the proceedings, even among angry men,
a certain amount of dignity, order, and consideration for
each other's feelings, whilst it prevents any hasty rupture
or withdrawal. So long as Lord Rosebery was willing to
go on sitting, it was practically impossible for either the
coalowners or the coalminers to stop discussing. But pro-
longed discussion does not lead to agreement unless the
parties get on good terms with each other, and are brought
into a friendly mood. It is the conciliator's business to see
that this atmosphere of good humour is produced and main-
tained. The excellent luncheon which Lord Rosebery pro-
vided for owners and workmen alike was probably more
effective in creating harmony than the most convincing
arguments about " the living wage." All this, however, is
but preliminary to the real business. We have already
described the important part played by a tactful and ex-
perienced arbitrator in drawing out the best points in each
party's case, restating them in the most persuasive form, and
eliminating from the controversy all unnecessary sources of
irritation or non-essential differences. The ideal conciliator
adds to this a happy suggestiveness and fertility in devising
possible alternatives. Throughout the discussion he watches
for the particular points to which each party really attaches
importance. He has a quick eye for acceptable lines of
compromise. At the right psychological moment, when
discussion is beginning to be tedious to both sides, he is
ready with a form of words. This is the crisis of the pro-
ceedings. If the parties are physically and mentally tired,
and yet pleased with themselves and no longer angry with
their opponents ; if the conciliator is adroit in his drafting,
and finds a formula which, whilst making mutual concessions
on minor points, includes, or seems to each party to include,
a great deal of what each has been contending for, the
resolution will be agreed to, if not by acclamation, at
any rate after a few minor amendments to save the dignity

Arbitration 243

of one side or the other ; and almost before some of the
slower-minded representatives have had time to think out all
the bearings of the compromise the agreement is signed, and
peace is secured.

We see, therefore, that outside intervention in wages
disputes may be of the highest value, and we anticipate that
it will, for many years to come, in all but the best-organised
trades, play a great, and even an increasing, part. But its
function will not be that of " arbitration," properly so called,
but rather that of " conciliation," though this will continue
to be sometimes carried on under the guise of arbitration.
Instead of aiming at superseding Collective Bargaining, the
arbitrator will more and more consciously seek to promote
it. In fact, so far from being the crown of industrial organ-
isation, the reference of disputes to an impartial outsider is
a mark of its imperfection. Arbitration is the temporary
expedient of incompletely organised industries, destined to
be cast aside by each of them in turn when a higher stage,
like that of the Cotton Operatives or the Boilermakers, is
attained. The Government of 1896, therefore, did well to
cut down its arbitration bill to a modest " Conciliation Act."
The pretentious legislation of 1867 and 1872, from which
so much was expected, is now simply repealed. The Board
of Trade is empowered, in case of an industrial dispute, " to
inquire into the causes and circumstances of the difference."
It may intervene as the friend of peace, to persuade the
parties to come to an agreement. If a conciliator is desired,
it may appoint one. Finally, if both parties join in asking
that the settlement shall proceed in the guise of arbitration,
and wish the Board of Trade to select the arbitrator for them,
the Board of Trade may accede to their request, as it might
have done without any Act at all ! ^

1 The report of the first year's working of this Act, presented to Parliament
in July 1897, shows that 35 applications were made to the Board of Trade. In
7 cases the Board refused to intervene. Of the other 28 cases, 18 were settled
by more or less formal conciliation, and 5 by arbitration, one of which was a
demarcation dispute between different bodies of workmen, and the other 4 were
small local disputes, all in badly-organised trades or districts. Three cases,

244 Trade Union Function

The conclusion will disappoint those who see in arbitra-
tion, not a subordinate and temporary adjunct to Collective
Bargaining, but a panacea for stoppages of industry. The
popularity of arbitration has deep roots. At the back of
the peremptory public demand for the settlement of any
strike or lock-out, there lurks a feeling that in the interests
of the whole community neither employers nor workmen
ought to be allowed to paralyse their own industry. If one
side or the other persists in standing out, we have a clamour
for " compulsory arbitration " : that is, the intervention of
the power of the State. We need not enter into the numer-
ous suggestions that have been made for " State Boards of
Arbitration," authoritative intervention by the Board of
Trade, or the deposit, by both parties, of sums of money
to be legally forfeited upon breach of the award. The
authors of such suggestions always find themselves in a
dilemma. If resort to this kind of arbitration is still to
be voluntary, the liability to penalties or legal proceedings
is not calculated to persuade either employers or workmen
to come within its toils.^ If, on the other hand, it is to be
compulsory, it will amount to legal enactment of a novel
kind. It may well be argued that the community, for the
protection of the public welfare, is entitled to step in and

including the notorious strike at Lord Penrhyn's slate quarries, and that of the
boot operatives at Norwich, remained intractable, owing to arbitration being
refused, twice by the employers and once by both parties.

1 The following extract from a recent report of so experienced and well-
informed a society as the United Textile Factory Workers' Association is
significant : " Boards of Conciliation. — Any number of Bills are constantly being
introduced on this question, but your Council do not see that any useful purpose
can be served by their becoming law. The assumption on which all these
proposals are based is that . . . when the return goes down the wages of labor
and the profits of capital should go down together. . . . The umpire is never a
workman, but always a member of the upper class, whose sympathies and interest
lie in the direction of keeping wages down. , . . They believe that the Bills
now being brought forward are meant as so many traps with which to catch a
portion of the workers' wages, and they have consequently opposed them "
{Report of the Legislative Council of the United Textile Factory Worker^ Associa-
tion for 1893-94, p. 14). See also the reports of the conferences between the
Miners' Federation and the leading coalovsTiers during 1896, in which the work-
men's representatives throughout opposed any arbitration scheme by which, as they
repeated, " a man can come in and settle what we could not settle among ourselves. "

A rbitration 245

decide the terms upon which mechanics shall labor, and
upon which capitalists shall engage them. In such a case
the public decision could perhaps best be embodied in the
award of an impartial arbitration tribunal, invested with all
the solemnity of the State. But here we pass outside the
domain of " arbitration " properly so called. The question
is then no longer the patching up of a quarrel between
capitalists and workmen, but the deliberate determination
by the community of the conditions under which certain
industrial operations shall be allowed to be carried on.
Such an award would have to be enforced on the parties
whose recalcitrance had rendered it necessary. This does
not imply, as is sometimes suggested, that workmen would
be marched into the works by a regiment of soldiers, or that
the police would open the gates (and the cashbox) of stubborn
employers. All that the award need decree is, that if
capitalists desire to engage in the particular industry they
shall do so only on the specified conditions. The enforce-
ment of these conditions would become a matter for official
inspection, followed by prosecutions for breaches of what
would in effect be the law of the land. Here, it is true,
we do find an effective panacea for strikes and lock-outs.
Although industrial history records plenty of agitations and
counter-agitations for and against the fixing by law of various
conditions of employment, there has never been either a
lock-out or a strike against a new Factory or Truck Act.
But by adopting this method of avoiding the occasional
breaking off of negotiations which accompanies Collective
Bargaining, we should supersede Collective Bargaining alto-
gether. The conditions of employment would no longer
be left to the higgling of masters and men, but would be
authoritatively decided without their consent in the manner
which the community, acting through an arbitrator, thought
most expedient. " Compulsory arbitration " means, in fact,
the fixing of wages by law.^

1 Such a form of compulsory arbitration is contained in the Factories and
Shops Act of 1896 of the Colony of Victoria, which provides (sec. 15) that, "in

246

Trade Union Function

order to determine the lowest price or rate which may be paid to any person for
wholly or partially preparing or manufacturing either inside or outside a factory,
or workroom, any particular articles of clothing, or wearing apparel, or fuVniture,
or for breadmaking, or baking, the Governor in Council may, if he think fit,
from time to time appoint a special Board," to consist half of representatives of
employers and half of employed. The Board may then prescribe the minimum
rates to be paid for particular articles, by piecework for home work, and by either
time or piece for factory work. Any employer paying less than the minimum
thus fixed is made liable to a fine, and, on a third offence, the registration of his
factory or workroom (without which he cannot carry on business) " shall, without
further or other authority than this Act, be forthwith cancelled by the Chief
Ofiicer." The working of this virtually legal fixing of a minimum wage will be
watched with interest by economists. Under the New Zealand Act of 1894,
passed by the Hon. W. P. Reeves, now Agent-General for the Colony in London,
labor disputes in which Trade Unions are concerned may be referred, first to
Public Conciliation Boards, and, failing a settlement, to an Arbitration Court,
composed of a Judge of the Supreme Court, with two assessors. This Court
may, at its discretion, make its award enforceable by legal process. A fuller
account of this Act will be found in our final chapter. The Conciliation and
Arbitration Acts of New South Wales (1892) and South Australia (1894) have
been practically unsuccessful. ("Quelques experiences de la Conciliation par
I'Etat en Australasie," by Anton Bertram in Revue d^^conomie Politique,
July 1S97.)

CHAPTER IV

THE METHOD OF LEGAL ENACTMENT

We do not need to remind the student of the History of
Trade Unionism that an Act of Parliament has, at all times,
formed one of the means by which British Trade Unionists
have sought to attain their ends. The fervor with which
they have believed in this particular Method, and the extent
to which they have been able to employ it have varied
according to the political circumstances of the time. The
strong trade clubs of the town handicraftsmen, and the
widely extended associations of woollen workers of the
eighteenth century relied mainly upon the law to secure the
regulation of their trades. So much was this the case that
the most celebrated student of eighteenth -century Trade
Unionism declares that " the legal prosecution " of trans-
gressors of the law was the chief object ^ of these combina-
tions, and that, in fact, English Trade Unionism " originated
with the non-observance of" the statutes fixing wages and
regulating apprenticeship. Its fundamental purpose, says Pro-
fessor Brentano, was " the maintenance of the existing legal
and customary regulations of trade. As soon as the State
ceased to maintain order it stepped into its place." ^ It is
true that later investigation has brought to light some ancient
unions, which, springing out of sick clubs, or impetuous

^ Brentano's' Cj'/ifj and Trade Ufuons (London, 1870), p. clxxiv. (or p. no
of reprint).

- Ibid. p. clxxvii. (or p. 113 of reprint).

248 Trade Union Functioji

strikes, adhered to the rival Methods of Mutual Insurance
and Collective Bargaining. But Dr. Brentano's generalisa-
tion as to the objects and methods of eighteenth-century com-
binations has, in the main, been confirmed and strengthened.
It would have been remarkable if the Trade Unions had not
taken this line. Even before the stringent act of 1799
against all workmen's combinations, the very idea of Col-
lective Bargaining was scouted by employers, and strongly
condemned by public opinion. On the other hand, the
majority of the educated and the governing classes regarded
it as only reasonable that the conditions of labor should be
regulated by law. Accordingly we find the operatives who
objected to the innovations threatening their accustomed
livelihood, confidently appealing against their new employers,
to Quarter Sessions, Parliament, or the Privy Council. We
see the Trade Unions forming committees to put the law in
force ; maintaining solicitors to fight their cases in the law
courts ; expending large sums in preparing tables of rates,
to be enforced by the magistrates ; marshalling evidence
before Quarter Sessions in support of these lists ; appearing
by counsel at the bar of the House of Commons and before
the House of Lords Committees in quest of new legislation,
or in opposition to bills of the employers ; and finally organ-
ising all the machinery of political agitation, with its showers
of petitions, imposing demonstrations in the streets. Parlia-
mentary lobbying, and occasionally, where the members
happened, as freemen, to possess the franchise, the swaying
of elections.^

With the adoption, by Parliament and the law courts,
of the doctrine of laisser /aire, all this machinery fell into
abeyance. It soon came to be waste of money to organise
petitions, to send up delegates and witnesses, or to pay the
fees of solicitors and counsel, only to be met by a doctrinaire
refusal to go into the merits of the case. From 1800
onward we find every Committee of the House of Commons

^ Illustrations of all these forms of Trade Union activity during the eighteenth
century will be found in the History of Trade Unionism, pp. 27, 33, 34, 40-54.

The Method of Legal Enactment 249

reporting in the same strain. " They are of opinion that no
interference of the legislature with the freedom of trade, or
with the perfect liberty of every individual to dispose of his
time and of his labor in the way and on the terms which
he may judge most conducive to his own interest can take
place without violating general principles of the first import-
ance to the prosperity and happiness of the community,
without establishing the most pernicious precedent, or even
without aggravating, after a very short time, the pressure of
the general distress, and imposing obstacles against that
distress being ever removed." ^ Debarred alike from overt
Collective Bargaining and from Legal Enactment, the Trade
Unions of the first quarter of the century fell back on the ^
Method of Mutual Insurance, largely tempered by the use
of secret coercion. Those who refused to work " contrary
to the interests of the trade " were supported with enthusi-
astic generosity, whilst " knobsticks " were boycotted, and
even assaulted. When employers retaliated by criminal
prosecution, or dismissal of Trade Unionists, the operatives
broke out into sullen strikes or angry riots, accompanied by
machine breaking and crimes of violence. It was largely
the hope of putting an end to this veiled insurrection that
induced a landlord Parliament to repeal the Combination
Laws, and thus, for the first time, enabled the Trade Unions
openly to carry on negotiations with their employers.

Throughout the next quarter of a century Trade Union
activity was mainly devoted to building up the machinery
for Collective Bargaining.^ This is easily explained. Whilst
the Philosophic Radicals, and indeed much of the educated

^ Report of Committee on Petitions of Artisans, 13th June l8ll ; History of
Ti-ade Unionism, p. 54.

2 The fact that it was at this stage in their history that the working class
combinations forced themselves on the attention of Political Economists and the
press, goes far, we think, to account for the common idea that Trade Unionism
consists exclusively of Collective Bargaining, with its accompaniments of " sticks
and strikes." Between 1824 and 1869, practically all the criticism or de-
nunciation of Trade Unionism took the form of homilies about the futility of
Collective Bargaining and the wickedness of strikes. Even the Political Econo-
mists seem to have been unaware either of the history of the combinations which

250 Trade Union Function

public opinion of that generation, worked with the unions in
widening and safeguarding their resort to the Method of
Collective Bargaining, any idea of regulating by law the
conditions of labor of the ordinary workman was regarded
by a middle-class electorate as out of the question. Those
industries in which there was (owing to the attention of
philanthropists or the existence of peculiar grievances) any
chance of obtaining special legislation still strove to enforce
their Common Rules by the Method of Legal Enactment.
The reader of the History of Trade Unionism will re-
member how vigorously and effectively the unions of textile
workers supported, between 1830 and 1850, the various
" Ten Hours' " bills advocated by Robert Owen and Lord
Shaftesbury, The combinations of the coalminers, basing
their claims on the unknown horrors of underground life,
were even more insistent, from 1843 onward, in demand-
ing successive Mines Regulation Acts. The Hand-loom
Weavers and the Stocking -frame Workers long continued
pathetically to urge the old arguments in favor of a
legal rate of wages, whilst all sections of organised workmen
spasmodically attempted to get legal protection for their
earnings by an effective prohibition of " truck." But with a
House of Commons dominated by employers of labor, the
operatives in trades employing only adult males, and free
from exceptional grievances, for the most part laid aside
their traditional method.

With the enfranchisement of the town artisan in 1867,
and the county operative and miner in 188 5,. we see the
relative preference between the three methods again shifting.
The case for the legal limitation of the hours of work of
adult men was, for instance, explicitly stated at the beginning
of the Cotton-spinners' agitation for the Nine Hours' Bill.
" We are often told," declared their official manifesto in 1 87 1,
" that any legislative interference with male adult labor is

they were criticising, or of the nature and variety of their objects and methods.
This lop-sided appreciation of Trade Union purposes and Trade Union methods
still lingers in leading articles and popular economic text-books.

The Method of Legal Enactvieiit 251

an economic error, and it is further urged that as the labor
of the working man is his only capital, he should not be
restrained in the use or application of it. . . . Now, though
at first sight the above reasoning, if reasoning it may be
called — seems plausible enough, yet there is a lurking fallacy
in it all the more dangerous because of the artful manner in
which it is attempted to place the Legislature and the work-
ing population in a false position in relation to each other.
... It is a sound principle of universal law established by
the wisdom of more than two thousand years that where in
the necessary imperfection of human affairs the parties to a
contract or dealing do not stand on an equal footing, but one
has an undue power to oppress or mislead the other, law
should step in to succour the weaker party. ... It behoves
us as working men to inquire what is wrong in the present
factory system, and, if need be, ask the legislature to interfere
in our behalf . . . whether the time has not arrived when
Parliament should be appealed to to secure a curtailment of
the hours of factory labor. ... If some of our legislators
should manifest a disposition to abdicate their legislative
functions so far as we are concerned, it may be well to
remind them that election day will again come round when
their abdication v/ill be accepted." ^

This change of political conditions explains, not only the
increasing demand for new Factory and Mines Acts, addi-
tional Railway and Merchant Shipping regulations, and the
prevention of accidents and truck, but also the upgrowth,
since 1868, of such exclusively political Trade Union organi-
sations as the United Textile Factory Workers' Association,
and such predominantly political associations as the Miners'
Federation of Great Britain, together with the formation of
a general political machinery throughout the Trade Union

1 Circular signed by the general secretary of the Amalgamated Association of
Operative Cotton-spinners, "on behalf of " the delegate meeting, nth December
1871 ; History of Trade Unionism, pp. 295-96. It will be remembered that
this Trade Union has always consisted exclusively of men. In our History of
Trade Utiiotiisnt we have pointed out how the Nine Hours' agitation was event-
ually conducted to a successful issue " behind the women's petticoats."

252 Trade Union Function

world, in the form of Trades Councils, the Trade Union
Congress, and the Parliamentary Committee.

It is probable that no one who is not familiar with Trade
Union records has any adequate conception of the number
^ and variety of trade regulations which the unions have
sought to enforce by Act of Parliament. The eighteenth-
century combinations seem to have limited their aspirations
to the fixing of a minimum rate of wages, the requirement
of a period of apprenticeship, and the determination of the
proper proportion of apprentices to journeymen. With the
advent of manufacture on a large scale we see the factory
operatives and miners taking up the subjects of sanitation
and overcrowding, safety from accidents, and the length of
the working day. Besides the universal demand that em-
ployers should be made liable for accidents, and forbidden to
make any deductions from wages, we have large sections of
the Trade Union world demanding an Eight Hours' Day, the
prohibition of overtime, and the specifying of definite holi-
days ; others insisting on the weekly payment of wages, the
disclosure of the " particulars " on which the piecework wage
is based, and the abolition of all fines and deductions what-
soever. The National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives
ask for the exclusion of alien immigrants, and the compulsory
provision of workshop accommodation by the employers ;
whilst the Amalgamated Society of Tailors will be content
with nothing short of the legal abolition of home work. The
Carmen seek, year after year, for an Act of Parliament to
enforce their rule that one man shall not be put in charge of
two carts ; the Boilermakers, Enginemen, and Plumbers ask
that none but certificated craftsmen shall be allowed to hold
certain positions ; the Textile Workers want to regulate the
temperature and humidity of the spinning-mills and weaving
sheds ; whilst the Seamen have a lengthy code of their own
extending from an amendment of the laws of marine in-
surance to the qualifications of a sea-cook, from an improved
construction of sea-going vessels to increasing the sum allowed
on advance notes, from the enactment of a fixed scale of

The Method of Legal Enactment 253

manning to the inspection of the ship's medicine chest. Nor
does this enumeration by any means exhaust the list. Every
Parliament sees new regulations of the conditions of employ-
ment embodied in the already extensive labor code, whilst
each successive Trade Union Congress produces a crop of
fresh demands.^ Whether for good or for evil, it appears
inevitable that the growing participation of the wage-earners
in political life, and the rising influence of their organisations,
must necessarily bring about an increasing use of the Method
of Legal Enactment.

But a resort to the law as a means of attaining Trade
Union ends has, from the workmen's point of view, certain
grave disadvantages. Its chief drawback is the prolonged
and uncertain struggle that each new regulation involves.
Before a Trade Union can get a Common Rule enforced by
the law of the land, it must convince the community at large
that the proposed regulation will prove advantageous to the
state as a whole, and not unduly burdensome to the con-
sumers. The workmen's grievance has, therefore, to be
published to the world, to bear discussion in public meetings,
and to meet the criticism of the newspapers. Members of
Parliament must be persuaded to take the matter up, and
made so far to believe in the justice of the claim as to be will-
ing to importune r^inisters or bore the House of Commons
with the subject. In due course a Royal Commission is
appointed, which hears evidence, collects statistics, and makes
a report. Presently a new Factory or Mines Bill is drafted
by the Home Secretary, and, on the combined advice of

^ See the reports of the various Trade Union Congresses, especially since
1885. It is to be observed that, under the Constitution of the United States,
most of the statutes thus desired by English Trade Unionists, like much of the
legislation already in force, might be held void, as violations of the constitutional
right of freedom of contract. Among the American statutes already disallowed
by the courts on this ground are truck acts, acts requiring weekly or fortnightly
pays, or forbidding coalowners to compute their tonnage rates of wages on
screened coal only, acts prohibiting employers from discharging men merely
because they are Trade Unionists, and a factory act limiting the hours of labor
of adult women. See Handbook to the Labor Law of the United States (New
York, 1896), by F. J. Stimson.

y

/

2 54 Trade Union Fztnction

Government inspectors, medical experts, sympathetic em-
plo}'ers, and, perhaps, a few representative workmen, some
kind of clause is inserted to effect, usually not what the
Trade Union has been asking for, but the minimum which,
in the light of all the evidence, seems indispensable to avert
the grossest of the evil. At the committee stage in the
House of Commons the clause is pulled to pieces by the
spokesmen of the employers on the one hand, and by those
of the workmen on the other. But the great majority of the
members have, like the minister himself, no direct interest on
either side, and speak rather for the general public of con-
sumers anxious to " keep trade in the country " and foster
cheapness, than with a view to secure exceptional advan-
tages for the particular section concerned. Thus each step
has to be gained by a process of persuasion. To win over
in succession the electors, the Members of Parliament, the
Ministers of the Crown, and — most difficult task of all — the
permanent professional experts, requires, in the officers of a
Trade Union, a large measure of statesmanship, and, in the
rank and file of the members, a combination of wise modera-
tion, dogged persistency, steadfast loyalty to leaders, and
" sweet reasonableness " at a compromise, not usually charac-
teristic of popular movements. At its best the process is
a slow one. The Lancashire " Nine Hours' Movement," for
instance, attained, perhaps, a more rapid and complete success
than any other agitation for factory legislation. Yet it cost
the Cotton-spinners four years' expensive and harassing work
before the bill reducing the factory day was wrung from a
reluctant legislature.^ On the other hand, the " Nine Hours'
Day" of the engineers, gained in 1871 by the Method of
Collective Bargaining, was won within six months of the first
negotiations with the employers.^ Nor is the victory ever
complete. What Parliament ultimately enacts is never the
full measure of what has been asked for. The Cotton
Operatives, for instance, did not get their Nine Hours' Day,

^ History of Trade Unionisi?i, pp. 295-298.
2 Ibid. pp. 299-302.

v^

The Method of Legal Enactment 255

but only a 56^ hours' week. By the Method of Collective
Bargaining,* on the other hand, Trade Unions have not
infrequently gained from employers, at times of strategic
advantage, not only the whole of their demands, but also con-
ditions so exceptional that they would never have ventured
to embody them in a legislative proposal. We shall here-
after see how this consideration deters strong Trade Unions,
like the United Society of Boilermakers and Iron Ship-
builders, from going to Parliament about such unsettled
problems as Demarcation of Work or the Limitation of
Apprentices, on which they feel that they can exact better
terms than would be conceded to them by the community
as a whole. But taking merely the hours of labor we may
note how, whilst Parliament has not yet been converted even
to an Eight Hours' Day for Miners, the coal-hewers of North-
umberland and Durham have long since secured by Collective
Bargaining a working day for themselves of less than 7 hours,
and a working week which never exceeds 37 hours.

At first sight, it may seem strange that, in face of all
these difficulties and disadvantages, the Trade Unions should
so persistently, and even increasingly, seek for legislative
regulation of their respective industries. The explanation y
is that, however tedious and difficult may be the process of
obtaining it, once the Common Rule is embodied in an Act of
Parliament, it satisfies more perfectly the Trade Union aspira-
tions of permanence and universality than any other method.
It is, as we have shown, as yet rare for a Trade Union to have
been able to establish by the Method of Collective Bargain-
ing anything like uniform conditions throughout the whole
country. Such prominent and wealthy unions, for instance,
as the Amalgamated Society of Engineers and the Amal-
gamated Society of Carpenters, find themselves compelled
to recognise hours of labor varying, in different towns, from
48 to 57 per week in the one case, and from 41 to 60 in
tlie other.^

^ The Grays and Woolwich Arsenal branches of Engineers among others,
stand at 48 hours, whilst the Vale of Leven branch works 57. Among the

256 Trade Union Fmiction

But even where any Trade Union rule exists, either
national or local, there are, as we have mentioned, always
some extensive districts, and some important establish-
ments, in which the rule is either not recognised at all, or
is systematically evaded. An Act of Parliament, on the
contrary, applies uniformly to all districts, whether the Trade
Union is strong or non-existent, and to all employers,
whether or not they belong to the Employers' Association.
It corresponds, in fact, to the ideal form of Collective
Bargaining, a National Agreement made between a Trade
Union including every man in the trade, and an Employers'
Association from which no firm stands aloof. Like such an
agreement it excludes, from influence on the wage-contract,
the exigencies, not only of particular workmen or particular
establishments, but also those of particular districts. But it
goes a stage farther in this direction. A National Agree-
ment, however stable, is always liable to be changed, in
accordance with the relative strength of employers and
employed, at each of the successive inflations and depressions
which characterise modern industry. The Cotton-spinners,
for instance, whose standard earnings are determined by an
exceptionally stable National Agreement, have, during the
last twenty years, agreed to twelve alterations of this standard,
five times upward and seven downward. But once any part
of the conditions of employment has been deemed of suffi-
cient importance to the community to be secured by law, it
is beyond the reach of even the most extreme commercial
crises. In the blackest days of 1879, when many cotton
manufacturers were reduced to bankruptcy and the operatives
suffered a reduction of twenty per cent of their wages, no
one ever suggested that the expensive statutory requirements
as to the sanitation of the factory, or the fencing of dangerous

Carpenters, taking the mid-winter hours, the Middleton branch works 41^ hours,
the Bury branch 43^^, and those of Prestwich and Radcliffe 44, whilst Yarmouth,
Yeovil, and many Irish branches are still at 60. See Statistics of Rates of Wages,
etc., published by the A.S.E. in 1895, and the Annual RepO}-t of the Amalgamated
Society of Carpenters for 1 894. Compare, too, the Reports on Wages and Hours
of Labour, published by the Board of Trade, C, 7567, 1894.

The Method of Legal Enactment 257

machinery should be relaxed. In our History of Trade
Unionism we have shown ^ how seriously, in these years, the
Nine Hours' Day of the engineering and building trades
secured by Collective Bargaining, was nullified by the
practice of systematic overtime. But neither inflation nor
depression has, as a matter of fact, led to any alteration
since 1874 in the length of the Cotton-spinners' Normal Day,
which the Factory Act in effect prescribes. The Common
Rule embodied in an Act of Parliament has, therefore,
the inestimable advantage, from the Trade Union point
of view, of being beyond the influence of the exigencies of
even the worst times of depression. And, if we may judge
from the history of the last fifty years, such a rule is more
apt to " slide up " than to " slide down." Once any regula-
tion has been adopted, it becomes practically impossible
altogether to rescind it, whilst the movement of public
opinion, notably on such matters as education, sanitation,
safety, and shorter hours of labor, has been steadily in
favor of increased requirements in the normal Standard of
Life.2 These characteristics of the Method of Legal Enact-
ment have, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, an
important bearing on the kind of Regulations which the
Trade Unionists seek to enforce by this particular Method.
But before we consider the rules themselves, we have first to
describe the nature and extent of the Trade Union machinery
for using the method.

The Trade Unions have not yet developed, for their
application of the Method of Legal Enactment, even so
much formal machinery as they possess for the Method of
Collective Bargaining. This backwardness, is, in the main,
to be attributed to the difficulty of the task. The dominant
tendency in Trade Union history is, as we have seen, to

^ Page 333.

2 This " partiality," however, is not an inherent attribute of the Method of
Legal Enactment. Its existence during the present generation is, we hold, due
to the shifting of political power from the middle class, who had become opponents
of any restriction of competition, to the wage-earners, who have continued to
believe in regulation.

VOL. I c

258 Trade Union Function

make the trade throughout the country the unit of organ-
isation. But to bring any proposal effectively before the
legislature, that is to say, to persuade members of Parliament
to take the matter up, Trade Union leaders must convert,
not the employers and workmen in their own industry
wherever carried on, but the electors of particular con-
N stituencies, to whatever trade they belong. An organisation
according to localities has, therefore, to be superposed upon
an organisation according to trades.

Two great industries — cotton and coal — have been able
to surmount this difficulty, and these alone have as yet
developed any effective political machinery. The powerful
unions of Cotton Operatives, for instance, three-fourths of
whose 132,000 members are to be found in ten constitu-
encies within twenty miles of Bolton, have, during the past
twenty- five years, constructed a special organisation for
obtaining and enforcing the legislative regulations which
they desire. The five societies of Spinners, Weavers, Card-
room Operatives, Beamers, and Overlookers are federated
in the United Textile Factory Workers' Association, which
carries on no Collective Bargaining, and possesses no insur-
ance side, but has for its sole object " the removal of any
grievance . . . for which Parliamentary or Governmental
interference is required." ^ The Representative Assembly ^
of this federation, consisting of nearly 200 delegates from
a hundred local branches, amalgamates all sections of the
Cotton Operatives into one solid union for their common
political purposes. But it is the Federal Executive,^
appointed annually by this Representative Assembly, that
governs the Parliamentary policy and organises the political
force of the Trade. This Cabinet, composed in the main of
the salaried officials of the separate unions, meets regularly
throughout the year, exclusively for political business. At
these private meetings, held in the parlor of a Manchester

1 Rules of 1890.

2 Called the " General Council."

3 Called the "Legislative Council."

The Method of Legal Enactment 259

public-house, all rhetoric and formality is banished, and the
complaints of the constituents are discussed with cynical
shrewdness. If they appear to admit of any legislative or
administrative remedy, the president and secretary — who
are invariably leading officials of the Spinners and the
Weavers respectively — are directed to take the matter up.
These officers are wise enough to call in expert assistance.
There is usually some eminent lawyer representing a
Lancashire constituency, who is glad to put his brains freely
at the disposal of so influential an organisation. A clause
or a bill is drafted, and communications are opened up with
the Home Office. Once certain of the technical accuracy
and administrative feasibility of the proposals, the Federal
Executive opens a vigorous political campaign. " Public
meetings are organised, at which the local members of
Parliament, or in default, the opposition candidates, are
impartially invited to preside. By these meetings not only
the 300,000 persons employed in or about the cotton mills,
but also the other electors, and the Parliamentary candidates
themselves, are patiently educated. It is no small help in
this process that the Cotton Operatives have what is virtually
their own organ in the press, and that their leading officials
write, in addition, much of the " labor news " in the provincial
newspapers. When the Parliamentary session opens, the
struggle is transferred to the lobby of the House of Commons.
It is perhaps a fortunate chance that the present general
secretary of the Spinners belongs to the Conservative party,
whilst the general secretary of the Weavers is a staunch
adherent of the Liberals. No member for a cotton con-
stituency, to whichever party he may belong, escapes the
pressure. Meanwhile, in order to smooth the way for
legislation, the employers will have been approached with
a view to arriving at some common policy which the trade,
as a whole, can press on the Government. The millowners,
for instance, will be persuaded not to oppose increased
factory regulation, on consideration of the operatives joining
them to stop a threatened Indian import duty, or combining

y

26o Trade Union Function

in support of " the rehabilitation of silver." When a general
election comes near an urgent appeal is issued to all the
132,000 members, reminding them that they should vote
only for those candidates, of whatever political party, who
promise to support the trade programme. No one can read
the frequent circulars, the minutes of the conferences with
employers and members of Parliament, the reports of the
public meetings, dinners to factory inspectors and deputa-
tions to the Home Office, the leading articles in the Cotton
Factory TimeSy and the " questions to candidates " for election
in Lancashire constituencies, without admitting that the
Cotton Operatives have known how to construct a political
machine of remarkable efficiency. The result is that the
legislative regulation of the Cotton trade has been carried
to a point far in advance of any other industry, whilst the
law is enforced with a stringent regularity unknown in other
districts.^

In the case of the Cotton Operatives the close observer
may suspect that the pt)litical machinery is better than the
material out of which it is made. Absorbed in chapels and
co-operative stores, eager by individual thrift to rise out of
the wage-earning class, and accustomed to adopt the views
of the local millowners and landlords, the Cotton Operatives,
as a class, are not remarkable for political capacity. In the
interest that they take in public affairs they are behind the
coalminers of the North and Midland districts of England.
Among these underground workers the instinct for democratic
politics is so keen that they have, for over twenty years, sent
their own officials to represent them in the House of Commons.
Like the Cotton Operatives they have exceptional political
opportunities, four -fifths of the whole membership being
massed in a relatively small number of Parliamentary con-
stituencies. These advantages are, however, largely neutral-
ised by the fact that they are, for political purposes, divided

1 The meetings of the United Textile Factory Operatives' Association were
temporarily suspended in 1896, the officials stating that the time was inopportune
for any further extension of factory legislation.

The Method of Legal Enactment 261

into two hostile factions, the Miners' Federation on the one
hand, and the county unions of Northumberland and Durham
on the other.

The miners of Northumberland and Durham were, for
over a generation, the pioneers and energetic leaders of the
movement in favor of the legal regulation of the conditions
of labor in the mine. We need not again describe the
machinery of the active legal and Parliamentary campaigns
between 1843 ^"^ 1887. From the appointment of the
" Miners' Attorney-General " down to the death of Alexander
Macdonald, the promoters of the successive Mines Regulation
Acts drew their strongest support from the two Northern
counties. We have described elsewhere '^ the curious com-
bination of industrial circumstances and economic theories
which have brought the Northumberland and Durham unions
to a standstill as regards the legal regulation of their trade.
They still nominally retain a separate political machinery'
under the name of the National Union of Miners.^ But the
effective political influence of the miners of these counties is
now expressed mainly by their three officials having seats in
the House of Commons. These members, in conjunction
with the leading local officials of the Northumberland and
Durham Unions, object to the extension of legal regulation,
and actively oppose the Eight Hours' Bill.

The great bulk of the miners have, however, retained
their belief in the Method of Legal Enactment, and are to-day
even more persistent than their fathers in demanding its
further application. The Miners' Federation of Great Britain
(established 1887, ^'^^ r^ow counting 200,000 members),
which we described in our chapter on " The Unit of Govern-
ment," is essentially a political organisation. It deals, it is
true, also with Collective Bargaining, in so far as anything

^ History of Trade Unionism, pp. 284-292, 377-380.

2 This federal body, formed by Alexander Macdonald exclusively for Parlia-
mentary purposes, once included practically all the miners' unions in the kingdom,
and was, in its time, the most influential political organisation in the Trade
Union world. To-day it is confined to the two unions of Northumberland and
Durham, and retains only a shadowy separate existence.

262 Trade Unio7t Function

approaching to a National Agreement is concerned. But all
the ordinary business of Mutual Insurance and Collective
Bargaining is performed by the separate county unions, and
nine-tenths of the federal work relates, like that of the United
Textile Factory Workers' Association, to matters in which
legislative or governmental interference is required. Like the
Cotton Operatives, too, the Miners' Federation acts through a
Representative Assembly and an Executive which is virtually
a cabinet of the salaried officials of the constituent Unions.
It is a matter of common knowledge that this organisation
exercises great political power, and it is, in Parliamentary
influence, second only to the United Textile Factory Workers'
Association. In one respect it is even stronger. Owing to
the loyalty of the miners to their leaders, and to their demo-
cratic fervor, the Parliamentary and local elections in mining
constituencies may be said to be entirely controlled by the
miners' organisations. No candidate can be elected who
does not support their programme. It is in the manipula-
tion of both political parties in the House of Commons that
the Miners fall behind the Cotton Operatives. The Miners'
Federation has, in the first place, to struggle against the very
serious obstacle presented by the resolute hostility of the
Northumberland and Durham unions. In the Parliament of
1892-95 if Mr. Pickard or Mr. Woods proposed some measure
desired by the Miners' Federation, he was pretty sure to be
answered not by an employer, but by Mr. Burt or Mr.
Fenwick, speaking for the miners of the two Northern
counties. The fact too, that all the miners' representatives
in the House of Commons are loyal supporters of one political
party interferes, to some extent, with their influence both with
that party and with its opponents. And although this great
federation can count among its officials men of ability,
experience, and unquestioned integrity, we are inclined to
doubt whether the general level of technical and economic
knowledge among them is quite as high as that of the staff
of the Cotton Operatives, recruited as the latter is by
competitive examination. It is, perhaps, due to this fact that

The Method of Legal Enactment 263

the Miners' officials do not as yet realise the necessity of
expert legal and Parliamentary counsel in their deliberations,
and make far less use than the Cotton Operatives of outside
help. They have no intercourse with the Government Mines
Inspectors, and, unlike the Cotton Operatives, they do not
enjoy the advantage of constantly meeting, on terms of easy
equality, the salaried officers of the employers' associations.
Moreover, they have no organ of their own in the press, and
they seldom contribute to other newspapers. Strong in their
numbers and their concentrated electoral power, the Miners
have, in fact, hitherto somewhat suffered from their isolation.
But notwithstanding all these drawbacks, the steady improve-
ment and progressive elaboration of the Mines Regulation
Acts, in the face of powerful capitalist opposition, bears
eloquent testimony to the past and present effectiveness of
the Miners' political organisations.

No trade society other than those connected with cotton
and coal has developed any effective machinery for obtaining
the legal regulations which are demanded by its members.
This is, in some cases, to be attributed to the absence, among
the rank and file, of any keen desire for special Acts of
Parliament. Some powerful unions, like the United Society
of Boilermakers, which enforces a rigid limit on the number
of apprentices, are comparatively indifferent to the law as an
instrument for obtaining the conditions of labor that they
desire. But there are other trades which feel, even more
strongly than the Cotton Operatives and Miners, their
dependence on the Method of Legal Enactment as the only
effective way of securing what they consider fair conditions
of employment. Not to mention such modern organisations
as those of the Gasworkers and Seamen, whose objects are
mainly legislative, we watch old-established unions like the
Amalgamated Society of Tailors, the several societies of
cutlery workers of Sheffield, and the Hosiers of the Midland
Counties all basing their aspirations on the legal regulation
of homework, and the prohibition of insidious forms of
" truck." Typical " old unionists " like the Ironfounders,

264 Trade Union Ftmction

Stonemasons, and Engineers are constantly voting by large
majorities in favor of drastic legal enactments providing for
the better sanitation of their workplaces, for additional pre-
cautions against accidents, for the compulsory compensation
of those who suffer through negligence, for the adoption in
all public contracts of the Standard Rates of Wages, and last,
but in recent years not least, for the suppression of overtime,
and the maintenance of a Legal Day. And yet it is not too
much to say that, as regards all these points, the organised
Trade Unions, with their hundreds of thousands of electors,
exercise, to-day, practically no appreciable influence on the
House of Commons and, unlike the Cotton Operatives and
Miners, have not learnt either to supplement the efforts of
sympathetic philanthropists, or to strengthen the hands of
willing politicians. The problem of superposing an organisa-
tion according to locality upon one according to trades, has,
in fact, proved too complicated for Trade Union statesman-
ship.

We shall best understand this failure by considering first
the difficulties that prevent any single trade from attaining
political influence, and then the kind of organisation by which
such difficulties might be overcome. The typical Trade
Union has its, members scattered in small groups, each of
which makes up a tiny fraction of an electoral constituency.
The adult male Cotton Operatives of Oldham practically
dominate the local electorate, but the Oldham Plumbers
number only 69, and the Oldham Carpenters only 152
— contingents too small to be able to impress their views
on Parliamentary candidates. At Morpeth again, the Coal-
miners have, for over twenty years, been able to actually
return one of their own officials as the member. But the
Morpeth Tailors number only five, and are thus practically
helpless. Even in London, where the Amalgamated Society
of Tailors dominates its own skilled branch of the trade, its
two thousand members are spread over sixty constituencies.
It is evident that the only way by which the men engaged
in such widely dispersed industries as building and tailoring

The Method of Legal Enactment 265

can force their grievances on an ignorant public or a reluctant
Parliament, is by combined action among the different trades
of each constituency. Even the Engineers, who are in certain
centres aggregated in large numbers, are politically weakened
in their own strongholds by their division into sectional
societies. And joint action is even more clearly necessary
in the case of the great number of little local trades, which
have not the compensation of numerous branches and a large
aggregate membership. Now, the long and varied experience
of the Cotton Operatives and, to a lesser extent, that of the
Coalminers prove that if a political federation is to be
successful, three conditions are absolutely indispensable.
There must, in the first place, be a vigorous central executive,
to which is entrusted the entire direction of all the pro-
ceedings. In effective connection with this central committee,
there must be local organisations in the various constituencies,
always prompt to obey the directions of the leaders, and to
subordinate other interests to the main object. Finally, the
central committee must not only have in its service an
adequate staff of able men as officials, but must also know
how to command, either for love or money, and be willing
frequently to use, the professional advice of trained experts in
law, in Parliamentary procedure, in administration, and in
what may be called general politics.

It may at first be thought that, in the annual Trade
Union Congress, the Parliamentary Committee, and the local
Trades Councils, the Trade Union world possesses a political
machinery fulfilling these elementary conditions. There is a
Representative Assembly, to which nearly every organised
trade sends delegates. This assembly has nothing to do
with Mutual Insurance or Collective Bargaining, and deals
exclusively with the political interests of the Trade Union
world. It elects a Cabinet of thirteen members, on which
sit some of the ablest salaried officers of the movement.
The duty of this " Parliamentary Committee " is expressly
defined to be " to watch all legislative measures directly
affecting the question of Labor, to initiate such legislative

266 Trade Union Function

action as Congress may direct, and to prepare the programme
for the Congress." ^ Finally there exist, in over a hundred
towns, which together elect a third of the House of Commons,
joint committees of the local Trade Union branches, formed
" to watch over the general interests of Labor — political and
social — both in and out of Parliament."^ But a short
examination of the constitution and working of this organ-
isation will, we think, make clear that, whatever outward
resemblances to an effective political machine it may pos-
sess, it lacks all the essential conditions of efficiency and
success.

Let us, to begin with, take the Parliamentary Committee,
upon which, to follow the analogy of the Cotton Operatives,
should fall the duties of formulating a national Trade Union
programme, of guiding the deliberations of the Trade Union
Congress, of directing the necessary political campaign
throughout the constituencies, and finally, of conducting the
desired measures through Parliament. But the Parliamentary
Committee has, for the last twenty years, had practically no
means of fulfilling these functions. The central executives
of the unions, from whom alone any responsible statement of
the trade grievances and proposals can be obtained, seldom
dream of communicating their desires to the Parliamentary
Committee, This has naturally followed from the fact that
there is no central staff able to cope with such proposals as
have from time to time come in.^ For all the Parliamentary
and other business of the Trade Union world as a whole,
there is provided only a single secretary, who is usually one
of the " Labor Representatives " in the House of Commons,

1 Amended Standing Orders, drawn up by Parliamentary Committee,
November 1894.

2 Rules of the London Trades Council, revised March 1895. The Manchester
and Salford Trades Council (established 1S66) declares that its objects are "to
watch over the social and political rights and interests of Labor, local and'
national, but not of party political character. Its duties shall be to direct the
power and influence possessed by its constituents, in promoting and supporting
such measures as may appear likely to increase the comfort and happiness of the
people, and generally to assist in securing the ends for which Trade Unions were
called into existence." (Report for 1890.)

3 HisUry of Trade Unionism, pp. 356-358, 470-474.

The Method of Legal Enactment 267

with prior duties to his own constituency. For the last five
years the occupant of the post has been a salaried official of
his own union, busily occupied with its particular sectional
interests. The Parliamentary Committee admittedly pays
only for the leavings of his time and attention, a large part
of the salary of ;^200 ^ going, in fact, to the son or friend
who does the routine office work during his frequent absences
from London, It is therefore impossible for the Parlia-
mentary Committee to investigate grievances, or to form an
independent judgment on technical proposals. The members
of the Committee are, no doubt, severally quite competent to
deal with their own trades, but for the Committee as a whole
to act on this assumption necessarily means its implicit
acceptance of the technical proposals of any one of its
members. As regards the vast majority of unrepresented
trades the Committee has absolutely no means of ascertaining,
either what is complained of, or what remedies are practicable.
Nor does it ever occur to the Parliamentary Committee to
attempt to make up for this deficiency by seeking expert or
professional advice, for which Congress has never been asked
to provide funds. We despair of making any middle-class
student realise the strength and persistency of this disinclina-
tion of Trade Unionists to call in outside counsel. A Board
of Railway Directors or a Town Council do not imagine
that they are bartering their independence or impairing their
dignity when they consult an engineer or a solicitor, or when
they employ an actuary or a Parliamentary draughtsman.
Though they are themselves what the Trade Unionists would
call " practical men " they invariably commit even their own
proposals to professional experts to be critically examined
and put into proper form. But owing, we believe, to a
combination of sturdy independence, naive self-complacency,
and an extremely narrow outlook on affairs, the Parliamentary
Committee, like most Trade Union organisations, apparently
regard themselves as competent to be their own solicitors,
their own actuaries, and even their own Parliamentary

* Raised, in 1896, 10^300.

268 Trade Union Function

draughtsmen.^ It is unnecessary to add that, in each
capacity, they attain the proverbial result.

Any idea of intellectual leadership of the Trade Union
world has accordingly long since been abandoned by the
Parliamentary Committee. This has entailed the degenera-
tion of the Trade Union Congress. The four or five hundred
members coming from all trades and parts of the kingdom
are largely unknown to each other and new to their work.
Each delegate brings to the meeting his own pet ideas and
legislative projects. In order to make such a Representative
Assembly into a useful piece of democratic machinery, the
first requisite is a strong " Front Bench " of responsible
leaders, who have themselves arrived at a definite and con-
sistent policy. But this, as we have seen, is beyond the
capacity of the Parliamentary Committee in its present lack
of information, staff, and expert counsel. What happens, in
fact, is that a few stock resolutions are moved by members
of the Committee, but nine-tenths of the time of Congress is
given to the casual proposals sent in by the rank and file.
These are not examined or reported on by the Parliamentary
Committee, or even referred for consideration to special
committees elected for the purpose. They appear higgledy-
piggledy in the agenda of the Congress sitting as a whole,
the order in which they are discussed being decided by lot.^
The bewildered delegates, fresh from the bench or the mine,
find themselves confronted with a hundred and fifty hetero-
geneous proposals, some containing highly technical amend-
ments of the statutes relating to particular trades, others
being mere pious aspirations for social amelioration, and
others, again, involving far-reaching changes in the economic
and political constitution of the country. All these come
before Congress with equal authority ; are explained in five-

^ We have already mentioned that the United Textile Factory Workers'
Association is honorably distinguished among Trade Unions for its freedom from
this defect. The Co-operative and Friendly Society Movements have, to a large
extent, learnt a similar lesson.

2 Some improvement has been made in this respect during the last year or
two, the notices of motion being now classified according to their subjects.

The Method of Legal Enactuient 269

minute speeches ; and as regards four out of every five, get
passed without inquiry or discrimination.^ Instead of a
dehberative assembly checking and ratifying a programme
prepared, after careful investigation, by a responsible Cabinet,
the Trade Union Congress is now an unorganised public meet-
ing, utterly unable to formulate any consistent or practical
policy.

In the absence alike of an effective central executive, and
of any definite programme, it is of minor import that the
joint committees which should act in the several constituencies
are themselves inefficient, and completely divorced from the
other parts of the machine. We do not need to repeat our
detailed description and working of the Trades Councils.^ It
is obvious that if such Councils are to be of any use in
influencing the constituencies, they must receive the confidence
and support of the central executive of each trade, and
strictly co-ordinate all their political action with that of the
Parliamentary Committee. But for reasons on which we
have elsewhere dwelt, the central executives of the national
trade societies view with suspicion and jealousy the very
existence of local committees over whose action they have
no control. The Parliamentary Committee, which ought to
exercise that control, has, in the absence of a real programme
and of anything like an office staff, for many years given up
all attempts to direct, or even to influence, the bodies through
which alone it could conduct an effective electoral campaign.
Without leadership, without an official programme, and without
any definite work, the Trades Councils have become, in effect,
microscopic Trade Union Congresses, with all the deficiencies
of unorganised public meetings. Their wild and inconsistent
resolutions, no less than their fitful and erratic action, have
naturally increased the dislike of the central executives, and
of the salaried officials who dominate the Parliamentary
Committee. Since 1895 they have even been excluded
from participation in the Trade Union Congress. Thus

^ History of Trade Unionism, pp. 467-470.
2 Ibid. pp. 440-444, 466, 467.

270 Trade Union Function

there is now no working connection between the central com-
mittee and the organisations in the several constituencies.

We see therefore that, notwithstanding a great parade of
political influence, the Trade Union world, as a whole, is
really without an organised machinery for using the Method
of Legal Enactment. This outcome of thirty years' effort
may well lead to doubts whether it is practicable to construct
efficient machinery for the political business of the whole
Trade Union world. Some persons may suggest that the ex-
perience of the Cotton Operatives and the Coalminers points
rather to the development of separate political machinery
for each great group of industries. On this assumption
we should have political federations of the Engineering and
Shipbuilding trades, of the various branches of the Clothing
Trade, of the Building and Furniture Trades, and perhaps
even of the Transport Workers and the General Laborers.
But whether the machinery for using the Method of Legal
Enactment covers the whole Trade Union world, or is con-
fined to particular sections, it will not be possible for it to
obtain even such success as has been won by the Cotton
Operatives and the Coalminers without a radical change in
spirit, if not also in form. It may safely be predicted that
no Parliamentary organisation of the Trade Union world will
be politically effective until the narrow limits of its action are
definitely recognised, and until the separate functions of the
Central Federal Executive, the Representative Assembly,
and the Local Councils are clearly understood, and placed in
proper co-ordination with each other.

Let us first consider the importance of recognising the
narrow limits within which such political influence must be
exercised. We have here, in fact, a particular application
of the principles upon which, as we showed in our chapter
on " Interunion Relations," any combined action must be
based. The paramount condition of stable federation is, as
we have suggested, that the constituent bodies should be
united only in so far as they possess interests in common,
and that in respect of all other matters they should retain

The Method of Legal Enactment 271

their independence. The Trade Union Congress is a federa-
tion for obtaining, by Parliamentary action, not social reform ^
generally, but the particular measures desired by its constituent
Trade Unions.^ These all desire certain measures of legal
regulation confined to their own particular trades, and they
are prepared, if this limitation is observed, to back up each
other's demands. On many important subjects, such as Free-
dom of Combination, Compensation for Accidents, Truck, Sani-
tation, " the Particulars Clause," the weekly payment of wages,
and the abolition of disciplinary fines, they are united on
general measures. But directly the Congress diverges from
its narrow Trade Union function, and expresses any opinion,
either on general social reforms or party politics, it is bound ■^'
to alienate whole sections of its constituents. The Trade
Unions join the Congress for the promotion of a Parlia-
mentary policy desired, not merely by a majority, but by all
of them ; and it is a violation of the implied contract between
them to use the political force, towards the creation of which
all are contributing, for the purposes of any particular political
party. The Trade Unionists of Northumberland and Durham
are predominantly Liberal. Those of Lancashire are largely
Conservative. Those of Yorkshire and London, again, are
deeply impregnated with Socialism. If the Congress adopts
the Shibboleths, or supports the general policy of any of
the three parties which now — on questions outside Trade
Unionism — divide the allegiance of British workmen, its
influence is at once destroyed. The history of the Trade
Union Congress during the last twenty years emphatically
confirms this view. Whether it is " captured " by the
Liberals (as in 1878-85) or by the Socialists (as in 1893-94);
whether it is pledged to Peasant Proprietorship or to Land
Nationalisation ; whether it declares in favor of Bimetal-
lism or the " Nationalisation of the means of production,

1 In the course of our subsequent analysis of the Trade Union Regulations
themselves, and in our final survey, we shall discover the political programme for
the Trade Union world. See the chapters on " The Economic Characteristics
of Trade Unionism " and " Trade Unionism and Democracy."

272 Trade Union Function

distribution, and exchange," it equally destroys its capacity
for performing its proper work, and provokes a reaction
which nullifies its political influence.

Once this limitation were understood and definitely
recognised, it would become possible to weld the separate
parts of the existing Trade Union organisation into a political
machinery of considerable influence. The first requisite
would be a central federal committee, meeting exclusively
for the definite political purposes which we have indicated.
To this Parliamentary Committee the central executive of
each national trade would bring its particular grievances,
with the remedies proposed, just as the Weavers' executive
submits to the United Textile Factory Workers' Association
its objections to over- steaming and its proposals for the
abolition of this practice. On no account must any proposal
be taken up by the Parliamentary Committee which had not
received the express endorsement of the central executive of
the trade concerned. Any departure from this rule would
bring the federal committee into conflict with its real con-
stituents, and deprive it of all guarantee that the proposal
had been accepted by the bulk of the members most directly
to be affected. But this endorsement would not in itself
suffice. The Parliamentary Committee, acting in conjunction
with the officers of the trade concerned, would have to take
expert advice as to the extent of the grievance, the practica-
bility of the remedy proposed, and the best form in which it
could be put. The approved legislative proposals of the
several trades could then be marshalled into a precise and
consistent Parliamentary programme, from which all vague
aspirations or rhetorical claptrap would be excluded. When
the programme for the year had, after careful investigation
and thought, at last been framed, it would have to be pre-
sented to a Representative Assembly of all the trades. In
emphatic contrast with the practice of the present Trade
Union Congress, it should be made a cardinal rule that no
proposition for political action should be brought before the
Assembly, unless it had first been submitted to the Parlia-

The Method of Legal Enactment 273

mentary Committee for investigation and report. With such
a rule the delegates from each trade would find before them
the proposals which had been sent up by their executives,
couched in the best possible language, and recommended to
the delegates of the other trades by the cumulative authority
of the officials of the industry concerned, the skilled political
staff of the Parliamentary Committee itself, and the legal and
administrative experts who had been consulted. At this
stage, discussion by all the trades would serve to reveal any
latent divergence of interest or policy which would militate
against the electoral success of even a perfectly devised
programme. But such an assembly would fulfil a much
more important purpose than merely amending and ratify-
ing an official programme. It would enable the leaders to
explain the several items, and demonstrate to the whole
Trade Union world their necessity, adequacy, and consistency
with the common interests of all Trade Unionists.

The programme once settled, the work of political
agitation would begin. Here the Parliamentary Committee ^
would have to be supplemented by a local federation in each
constituency. This local body would naturally be formed,
like the present Trades Councils, of representatives from all
the Trade Union branches in the constituency, or in the
town. It would be vital to its efficiency and success that
the central executives of the several trades should regard its
constitution as of national importance to them ; urge their
branches to elect their most responsible members ; and give
them every encouragement to contribute their quota of the
local expenses from the society's funds. It goes without
saying that these local councils must, no less strictly than
the Trade Union Congress, avoid all bias in favor of one or
other political party, and confine themselves rigidly to Trade
Union objects. But their proceedings must be subject to a
yet narrower limit. Unlike the existing Trades Councils,
they must realise that it is no part of their business to
frame the Parliamentary programme even in matters on
which all their constituent branches are unanimous. This
VOL. I T

274 Trade Union Function

follows from the fact that each trade must be dealt with as a
national unit. Before the Engineers or the Tailors can hope
to get any amendment of the law relating to their trade, all
the branches from one end of the kingdom to the other must
be prepared to back up an identical demand ; and the
demand must be formulated in terms capable of being
pressed upon Ministers and the administrative experts.
This identity and precision can only be secured by central
action. The work of the local Trades Councils must, there-
fore, as regards all Parliamentary action, be executive only.
Both in order to retain the confidence of the central executive
of each trade, and to function properly as a part of the
political machine, the local councils would have rigidly to
confine themselves to pushing the official Trade Union
programme for the time being. If any of their members
wanted this programme altered, he could bring his proposal
forward in the local branch of his own union, have it voted
upon by his fellow-tradesmen, and get it sent up to his own
central executive. If it was not a matter on which his own
Trade Union could be induced to take action, it would most
assuredly not be fit for adoption by a federation of Trade
Unions. The local Trades Council would, without inter-
fering with general policy, find abundant occupation in
organising and educating the local Trade Unionist electors ;
in carrying out the frequent instructions received from the
skilled political staff of the Parliamentary Committee in
watching and criticising the action of the Parliamentary
representatives of the constituency, to whatever party they
belonged ; in supplementing and supervising the local work of
the mines, factory, and sanitary inspectors ; and, wherever it
was thought fit, in conducting a municipal campaign. For
all elections to local bodies, it could, of course, frame its
own programme. Here it would have to act as its own
Representative Assembly. Like the Trade Union Congress
the Trades Council would have to elect and to trust a
responsible cabinet ; to restrict it to a Trade Union as dis-
tinguished from a general political programme ; to provide it

The Method of Legal Enactment 275

with officers and funds adequate to its task ; to expect that
it should act only after inquiry and expert or professional
advice ; and above all, to insist that it should keep itself free
from suspicion of acting in the interests of any particular
party.

We are thus brought back, at each stage of the organ-
isation, to the paramount need of intellectual leadership.
Without concerted federal action between the trades, no
progress can be made in carrying out their desires for the
use of the Method of Legal Enactment. Without a central
committee really directing and concentrating the action of
the local councils, no electoral campaign can ever be effec-
tive. Without a " Front Bench " of responsible leaders, no
Representative Assembly can ever formulate a consistent
programme, or rise above the dignity of a public meeting.
The great officials of the leading trades must realise that it
is their duty, not merely to stir up their own branches to
feeble and fitful agitation for the particular legal reforms that
they desire themselves, but to get constructed the federal
organisation which alone can secure their accomplishment.
In this federal organisation they must themselves take the
leading part. For this work they are at present, with all
their capacity and force, usually quite unfit. Each man
knows his own trade, and the desires of his own union, but
is both ignorant and indifferent as to the needs or desires of
every other trade. Before they can form anything like a
Cabinet with a definite and consistent policy, they must
learn how to frame a precise and detailed programme which
shall include the particular legislative regulations desired by
each trade, whilst avoiding the Shibboleths of any political
party. Nor is this an impossible dream. At one period, as we
have elsewhere described,^ the Trade Union world possessed,
in " the Junta " and their immediate successors, an extremely
efficient Cabinet, which both led the Trade Union Congress
and directed the action of the Trades Councils. In close
communication with the executives of the great trades, and

^ History of Trade Unionism, pp. 215-283.

276 Trade Union Function

making unstinted use of expert counsel, this Junta prepared
a reasoned and practicable programme ; explained it to
representative gatherings by which it was ratified ; and
enlisted the Trades Councils in an organised electoral
campaign in its support. The result was seen in the
memorable Parliamentary triumphs of 1871 and 1875.
With the passing away of the Junta, and the breach between
the Parliamentary Committee and its unpaid counsellors,
this effective leadership came insensibly to an end. If the
machinery is again to become effective, the Parliamentary
Committee must realise that its duty is to lead both the
Trade Union Congress and the Trades Councils ; to
formulate its own policy ; to provide itself with an adequate
salaried staff; and, above all, to make the fullest possible
use of professional experts. With the creation of a
strongly centralised, and thoroughly equipped political
federation confining its work exclusively to Trade Union
objects, the organised trades might reasonably hope to obtain
the same measure of success in the detailed legal regulation
of the conditions of their labor, as that achieved by such
" old Parliamentary hands " as the Coalminers and the
Cotton Operatives, whilst these latter unions would find
their power to obtain further regulation in their own trades
indefinitely increased by the effective support of the whole
Trade Union world.^

^ The degeneration of the whole political machinery has, during the last
few years, become so obvious to the leading Trade Unionists, that spasmodic
attempts at reform have been made. We cannot, in this analytical volume, go
into the details of the story of how the Parliamentary Committee of 1895, by the
casting vote of its chairman, imposed a brand new constitution on the Trade
Union Congress. We need only remind the reader that by the new Standing
Orders, which were held to govern the Cardiff Congress before they were
adopted, the Parliamentary Committee brought in three important innovations.
No Trade Unionist could be elected as a delegate unless he was either a paid
official of his own union, or else still working at his original trade. The Trades
Councils were excluded from all representation or participation in the Congress.
And, most important of all, the method of voting in Congress was changed from
the ordinary practice of Representative Assemblies to a system of voting by
trades. These alterations, it will be seen, do not proceed along the lines which
we have suggested. There is no proposal to increase the efficiency or strengthen
the staff of the Parliamentary Committee, or to co-ordinate the several parts of

The Method of Legal Enactment 277

the political machine. Instead of intellectual leadership being provided, we see
an attempt merely to silence or exclude the troublesome elements. We need
not dwell upon the first of the alterations, aimed, as it was, merely at one or two
influential delegates whose exclusion was desired by the dominant officials. By
abruptly turning out the Trades Councils, who actually initiated the Congress
twenty-seven years before, and had ever since taken a vigorous part, the
Parliamentary Committee cut adrift the very bodies upon which any effective
Trade Union campaign in the constituencies must depend. The Trades Councils,
thus *' outlawed " from the Trade Union world, are now centres of bitter hostility
to the salaried officials of the great trades ; sources of dissension and political
weakness, instead of being valuable supports and allies. But the most important
and, as we think, most injurious change was that effected in the method of
voting. Prior to 1895, though the Unions were allowed to send delegates in
proportion to their membership and contribution to the Congress funds, each
delegate had an individual vote, and no proxy voting was allowed. In this
way, the larger unions could, if they chose to send their full number of dele-
gates, exercise their due proportion of voting power. But the officials of some
powerful societies found the arrangement inconvenient. In some cases their
societies demurred to the expense of sending more than three or four delegates,
and thus failed to secure a proportionate influence. In other cases when the full
number of delegates was sent, some of these insisted on exercising an independent
judgment, and voted according to their own political sympathies, or in response
to appeals from the smaller trades. In the absence of any leadership of the
Congress as a whole, independence degenerated into anarchy. To the practical
officials of the Coal and Cotton industries, the flighty and irresponsible behaviour
of the Congress appeared likely to militate against the success of the particular
technical measures promoted by their own unions. It does not seem to have
occurred to them that it might be their duty to put their brains into the
business ; to come forward as the Cabinet of the Congress, formulating a con-
sistent policy for the Trade Union world as a whole ; and boldly to appeal for
the confidence and the pecuniary support by which alone any policy could be
carried into effect. The investigation and co-ordination of the needs of the
several trades would have involved, instead of an occasional pleasant jaunt to
London, a good deal of hard thinking, and many tedious consultations with
experts of all kinds. It was easier to put themselves in a position mechanically
to stop the passing of any resolution which seemed likely to be injurious to their
trades. The four representatives of the coal and cotton industries on the
committee, therefore, insisted on the adoption of the so-called " proxy voting "
used by the Miners' Federation in their own conferences. Under this system
each trade as a whole is accorded the number of votes to which its aggregate
membership entitles it, but is not required to send more than a single delegate.
If more than one are sent, they may decide among themselves how the vote of
the trade shall be cast, and may even entrust their voting cards to one among
their number, and leave the Congress. It is obvious that this mechanical system
of voting tends to throw the entire power in the hands of the officials. In fact,
already at the Congress of 1895, one society, enjopng forty-five votes, sent only
its general secretary to represent it, and as this economical practice leaves the
voting power of the union unimpaired, it will certainly be adopted by others.
By this system the officers of the great unions have secured their own permanent
re-election on the Parliamentary Committee, and, whenever needed, the power
to reject any proposal before Congress, without incurring either the " intolerable
toil of thought," which due consideration of the needs of the smaller trades would
involve, or the trouble of any intellectual leadership of the Congress as a whole.

278

Trade Union Function

It will henceforth be less than ever necessary for the officials of the great trades
to intervene in the debates, or to seek to guide the less experienced sections of
the Trade Union world. Already at Cardiff signs were not wanting that in
future Congresses we shall see the big officials, holding the pack of voting cards
allotted to their own unions, listening contemptuously to the debating of the
smaller trades, and silently voting down any proposition which displeases them.

But the new Standing Orders do more than destroy the value of the Trade
Union Congress as a deliberative assembly, and deprive it of its functions as
a representative gathering through which the policy and programme of the
Parliamentary Committee might be explained to the Trade Union world. The
new system of voting contravenes, in the worst possible way, the principles of
representation which we have, in our chapter on " Interunion Relations,"
deduced from the nature of federal association, and is therefore fraught with
the gravest danger to the stability of the Congress. The Congress, including as
it does, many divergent, and even opposing interests, can never be more than a
loose federation for the limited purposes which its several sections have really in
common. Its decisions ought therefore to be arrived at, not by mere majority
vote, but by consultation between the sections, with a view of discovering the
"greatest common measure." But under the present system the Miners' Federa-
tion and the United Textile Factory Workers' Association together number a
third of the membership represented at the Congress, whilst so long as they act
in conjunction with the Amalgamated Societies of Engineers and Carpenters, and
the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives, they constitute an absolute
majority of any possible Congress. To give to five trades an absolute majority
over the combined forces of all the rest, must, if persisted in, either extinguish
any chance of energetic political co-operation by the others, or else lead to these
formins: a new federation of their own.

CHAPTER V

THE STANDARD RATE

Among Trade Union Regulations there is one which stands
out as practically universal, namely, the insistence on pay-
ment according to some definite standard, uniform in its
application. Even so rudimentary a form of combination as
the " shop club " requires that all its members shall receive,
as a minimum, the rate agreed upon with the foreman for
the particular job. The organised local or national union
carries the principle further, and insists on a Standard Rate
of payment for all its members in the town or district. The
Standard Rate, it should be observed, is only a minimum,
never a maximum. The Friendly Society of Operative
Stonemasons, for instance, agrees (1897) with the London
Central Master Builders' Association that all its able-bodied
members shall receive not less than tenpence halfpenny per
hour. But the Society has no objection to an employer
offering a particular stonemason, whose skill or character
is valued, any higher rate that he may choose. The
Amalgamated Society of Tailors, in conjunction with the
Master Tailors' Association of the particular town, settles a
" log " fixing the payment for each kind of garment. But
this does not prevent West End master tailors, with the full
sanction of the union, paying some members far above the
London log rates. In fact, though there are certain seeming
exceptions with which we shall deal separately, we know of
no case in which a Trade Union forbids or discourafjes its

28o Trade Union Function

members from receiving a higher rate of remuneration, for
the work actually performed, than the common Standard
Rate fixed for the whole body.

But although the Standard Rate is a minimum, not a
maximum, the establishment of this minimum necessarily
results in a nearer approximation to equality of rates than
would otherwise prevail. Trade Union officials who have had
to construct a piecework list, or to extend such a list from one
shop to the whole town, or from one town to the whole
trade, know that, in order to secure a standard list of prices,
they have had to pare down the rates hitherto enjoyed by
particular shops or even particular towns. It is exactly
this willingness on the part of the more fortunately situated
sections of the trade to forego, for the sake of a Standard
Rate, the higher rates which happen, by some accident, to
have become current for a particular line of work, that makes
uniformity possible. We have already cited, in describing
how Trade Unionism breaks down local monopoly, the case
of the Cotton-weavers, who discovered that, in order to secure
a uniform list of piecework prices — meaning, to the majority
of members, an advance of wages — one or two districts had
to consent to a positive reduction of the rates they had
hitherto enjoyed.^ The powerful society of Flint Glass
]\Iakers has recently afforded us an even more striking
example. When in 1895 the Flint Glass Makers concerted
with their employers a uniform " catalogue of prices " for all
the glass works in Yorkshire, the York branch, which enjoyed
higher rates than any other in the county, at first vehemently
protested. A uniform list, they urged, "was impracticable,
unless by some section of us making enormous sacrifices " ;
and its enforcement would involve the "edifying spectacle of
a Trade Union compelling its members to work at a reduced
wage, when neither they nor the employer desired it." ^
Notwithstanding this protest, the members of the union

1 See the chapter on "The Unit of Government."

' Letter from T. Mawson, a member of the York branch, in the Flint Glass
Makers' Magazine, October 1895 ; vol. ii. No. 8, pp. 427, 428.

The Standard Rate 281

approved the preparation of the uniform list, which was
submitted to general meetings of all the Yorkshire branches.
The issue was thus put before the York members, and though
it was made clear that the new list would involve a reduction
of their own earnings, the feeling in favor of uniformity was
so strong that, as the general secretary records, out of a total
of eighty-four members in the branch at the time, " the vote
against the catalogue was only the miserable total of nine." ^

This conception of a Standard Rate is, as we need hardly
explain, an indispensable requisite of Collective Bargaining.
Without some common measure, applicable to all the work-
men concerned, no general treaty with regard to wages
would be possible. But the use of a definite standard of
measurement is not merely an adjunct of the Method of
Collective Bargaining. It is required for any wholesale
determination of wages upon broad principles. The most
autocratic and unfettered employer spontaneously adopts
Standard Rates for classes of workmen, just as the large
shopkeeper fixes his prices, not according to the higgling
capacity of particular customers, but by a definite percentage
on cost.^ This conception of a consistent standard of
measurement the Trade Union seeks to extend from
establishments to districts, and from districts to the whole
area of the trade within the kingdom.

This Trade Unionist insistence on a Standard Rate has
been the subject of bitter denunciation. The payment of "bad
and lazy workmen as highly as those who are skilled and indus-
trious," ^ " setting a premium on idleness and incapacity,"

^ Address of the Central Secretary of the Society, in the Flint Glass Makers^
Magazine, October 1895 ; vol. ii. No. 8, pp. 447-451.

^ Practical convenience and the growth of large establishments have, no
doubt, much to do with the adoption of uniformity. The little working master,
or small employer, could know personally every workman, and adjust without
much difficulty a graduated rate of wages. But the modern employer of labor
on a large scale cannot be bothered with precisely graduated special rates for
each of his thousand " hands." It suits him better to adopt some common
principle of payment, simple of application by his clerks and easily comprehended
by the workmen.

3 Measures for putting an End to the Abuses of Trade Unions, by Frederic
Hill (London, 1868), p. 3. So persistent is this delusion that Mr. Lecky, writing

2'82 Trade Union Function

"destructive to the legitimate ambition of industry and merit,"
that " worst kind of Communism, the equal remuneration of
all men," are only samples of the abusive rhetoric of capitalists
and philosophers on the subject Even as lately as 1871
a distinguished economist poured out the following tirade
against the assumed wickedness of the Trade Unions in
this respect : " Not yet, but in course of time, as economic
principles become popularly understood, we shall see Trade
Unions purged of their most erroneous and mischievous
purpose of seeking an uniform rate of wages without regard
to differences of skilly knowledge, industry, and character.
There is no tenet of Socialism more fatal in its consequences
than this insidious and plausible doctrine — a doctrine which,
if acted upon rigidly for any length of time by large classes
of men, would stop all progress. Put in plain language it
means that there shall not be in the world any such thing as
superior talent or attainment ; that every art and handicraft
shall be reduced to the level of the commonest, most
ignorant, and most stupid of the persons who belong to it." ^

Such criticisms are beside the mark. A very slight
acquaintance with Trade Unionism would have shown these
writers that a uniform Standard Rate in no way implies
equality of weekly wages, and has no such object. For
good or for evil, the typical British workman is not by any
means a Communist, and the Trade Union regulations are,
as we shall see, quite free from any theoretic " yearnings for
equal division of unequal earnings."

The misapprehension arises from a confusion between
the rate of payment and the amount actually earned by the
workman. What the Trade Union insists on, as a necessary
condition of the very existence of Collective Bargaining, is a
Standard Rate of payment for the work actually performed.
But this is consistent with the widest possible divergence

in 1896, naively echoes the charge against the Trade Unions by implying that
"they insist on the worst workman being paid as much as the best." — Detno-
cracy atid Liberty, vol. ii. p. 385.

^ Presidential Address of William Newmarch at Social Science Congress of
1871 {Transactions of Social Science Association, 1871, p. II7)'

The Standard Rate 283

between the actual weekly incomes of different workmen.
Thus we have the significant fact that the Standard Rate
insisted on by the great majority of Trade Unionists is, not
any definite sum per hour, but a list of piecework prices.
The extent to which these piecework lists prevail throughout
the country is seldom realised. Even those who have heard
of the elaborate tonnage rates of the Ironworkers, Steel-
smelters, and Coalminers, and the complicated cotton lists,
which together govern the remuneration of a fourth of the
Trade Union world, often forget the innumerable other
trades, in which (as with the Tailors, Bootmakers, Com-
positors, Coopers, Basketmakers, Brushmakers) lists of prices,
signed by employers and employed, and revised from time to
time, date from the very beginning of the century.^ When,
as in all these cases, the Standard Rate takes the form of a
schedule of piecework prices, it is clear that there can be no
question of equalising the actual earnings of different work-
men. One basketmaker or one coalminer may be earning
two pounds a week, whilst another, receiving the same
Standard Rate and working the same number of hours,
may get less than thirty shillings ; and another, putting in
only half-time, may have only ten or fifteen shillings for his
week's income.

Nor can it be assumed that in the industries in which
the Trade Union rate is not based on piecework, but takes the
form of a definite standard wage per hour, this necessarily
implies equality of remuneration. Even where workmen in
such trades put in the same number of hours, their weekly
incomes will often be found to differ very materially. Thus,
whilst ordinary plumbing, bricklaying, and masonry is paid
for at uniform rates per hour, directly the job involves any
special skill, the employer finds it advantageous to pay a
higher rate, and the Trade Union cordially encourages this
practice. The superior bricklayer, for instance, is seldom

^ These piecework lists can now be conveniently studied in the admirable
selection published by the Labor Department of the Board of Trade as Part II.
of the Report on Wages and Hours of Labor, 1S94 [C, 7567,-1].

284 Trade Union Function

employed at the Standard Rate, but is always getting jobs
at brick-cutting (or " gauge work "), furnace-building, or sewer
construction, paid for at rates from ten to fifty per cent
over the standard wage. In all industries we find firms with
special reputations for a high class of production habitually
paying, with full Trade Union approval, more than the
Trade Union rate, in order to attract to their establishment
the most skilful and best conducted workmen. In other
cases, where the employer rigidly adheres to the common
rate, the superior workman finds his advantage, if not
actually in higher money earnings, in more agreeable
conditions of employment. In a large building the
employer will select his best stonemasons to do the carving,
an occupation not involving great exertion and consistent
with an occasional pipe, whilst the common run of workmen
will be setting stones under the foreman's eye. The best
carpenters, when not earning extra rates for " staircasing "
or " handrailing," will get the fine work which combines
variety and lightness, and is done in the workshop, leaving
to the rougher hands the laying down of flooring and other
heavy mechanical tasks. These distinctions may seem
trivial to the professional or business man, who to a large
extent controls the conditions under which he works. But
no workman fails to appreciate the radical difference in
net advantageousness between two different jobs, one in-
volving exposure to the weather, wear and tear of clothing,
monotonous muscular exertion, and incessant supervision,
and the other admitting a considerable share of personal
liberty, agreeably diversified in character, and affording scope
for initiative and address. Though there may be in such
cases equality in the number of shillings received at the end
of the week, the remuneration for the efforts and sacrifices
actually made will have been at very different rates in the
two cases.

We do not wish to obscure the fact that a Standard
Rate on a timework basis does, in practice, result in a nearer
approach to uniformity of money earnings than a Standard

The Standard Rate 285

Rate on a piecework basis. Nor is there any doubt that a
considerable section of the wage-earning class have a deeply-
rooted conviction that the conscientious, industrious, and
slow mechanic ought in equity to receive no less pay than
his quicker but equally meritorious neighbour ; more
especially as the normal earnings of even the quickest
mechanic do not amount to more than is demanded for
the proper maintenance of his household. It is often
assumed that this conviction has produced, in the Trade
Union world, a fundamental objection to piecework. Had
this been the case, it would have been strange that we
should have had to quote, as typical instances of Unions
strongly enforcing a Standard Rate, so many trades in
which piecework universally prevails. The annexed table
will show that, whilst certain important trades enforce time
wages, a large majority of organised trades either insist on,
or willingly accept, piecework remuneration.^ By an analysis
of this table we shall prove that this remarkable divergence
of view arises, almost exclusively, from the character of
the operations performed. What the Trade Unionists are
aiming at, in the one case as in the other, is, as we have
explained, uniformity in the rate of remuneration. In some
industries this can be maintained only by insisting on time
wages. In others, covering, as it happens, a far larger
number of organised workmen, time wages would produce
just the opposite result, and the Trade Unionists accordingly
insist, with equal determination, on payment by the piece.

* Though payment by the piece is as old as the relation of employer and
wage- earner, the first serious study of this method of remuneration appears to be
that of Marx {Capital, part iv. ch. xxi. ), who draws attention, as usual, to the
valuable glimpses of its working afforded by the official reports of the Inspectors
of Factories and the Children's Employment Commission. For further informa-
tion see the careful analysis of Mr. D. F. Schloss, in his Methods of hidiistrial
Remuneration (London, ist edition, 1891 ; 2nd edition, 1894); and his
exhaustive Reports to the Labor Department of the Board of Trade on Profit-
sharing, Gain-sharing, and Co-operative Contracts respectively. But neither
Karl Marx nor Mr. Schloss, nor any other writer known to us, seems to have
perceived the explanation of the difference in the attitude towards piecework
between the different Trade Unions.

286

Trade Union Function

Tables showitig with regard to all the Trade Utiions in the United
Kingdom havitig more than looo members {those of unskilled
laborers and transport workers being omitted)^ whether they
systematically enforce piecework or time wages respectively, or
whether they willingly recognise both tnethods of remuneration.^

I. — Trade Unions which insist on Piecework

Coalminers (including Miners' Federation, Durham, Northum-
berland, South Wales, Forest of Dean, and West
Bromwich) .....

Cleveland Ironstone Miners ....

Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners

Northern Counties Association of Cotton-weavers

Amalgamated Society of Lacemakers, Nottingham

Amalgamated Society of Tailors (and Scottish ditto)

National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives

Amalgamated Society of Boot and Shoe Makers

Associated Iron and Steel Workers

Flint Glass Makers' Society

Yorkshire Glass Bottle Makers

Sheffield File Cutters

Amalgamated Wire Drawers

British Steel Smelters

South Wales Tinplate Workers

Staffordshire Hollow Ware Pressers

Kidderminster Carpet Weavers

Hosiery Workers' Federation

Felt Hat Makers

Cigar Makers

United Society of Curriers

1 6 other Societies

49 Trade Unions

(Potters)

Membership
in 1804.

322,000

3,700

18,250

83,600

3,500

19,500

44,000

4,300

6,700

2,150

2,450

1,700

1,600

2,400

6,000

1,350

1,400

3,900

3,150

1,250

1,100

39,000

573,000

^ The printed table is summarised from one including every Trade Union in
the United Kingdom which has as many as 1000 members (omitting those of
general laborers and transport workers). Its total of 1,003,000 represents nine-
tenths of the Trade Union world (with the same omission), the remaining tenth,
which is dispersed in hundreds of tiny unions, being similarly divided. Of the
III principal organisations we see that 49, having 57 per cent of the aggregate
membership, actually insist on piecework, whilst "j^ o^' of '^he ill, having 71 per
cent of the aggregate membership, either insist on piecework, or willingly recog-
nise it. The unions which fight against piecework number 38, having only 29
per cent of the aggregate membership.

It is interesting to compare this analysis of Trade Union artisans with the rough
estimate made by the Labor Department for the whole wage-earning population.

The Standard Rate

287

II. — Trade Unions which willingly recognise, in various
Departments, both Piecework and Timework

United Society of Boilermakers and Iron-shipbuilders . 39,650

Associated Shipwrights' Society . . . • 13)75°

Amalgamated Brassworkers' Society . . . . 5)1°°

Associated Blacksmiths' Society . . . .2,350

Sailmakers' Federation . . . . . i)2 5o

Spindle and Flyer Makers, Lancashire . . . 1,150

Amalgamated Card and Blowing Room Operatives . . 22,200

Typographical Association, London Society of Compositors,

Scottish and other Compositors' Unions . . 31,000

Bookbinders (two societies) ..... 4,3 50
Mutual Association of Coopers .... 6,000

Cabinetmakers (three societies) . . . .7,100

Six other Societies . . . . . .6,100

24 Trade Unions .... 140,000

III. — Trade Unions which insist on Timework

Amalgamated Society of Engineers .... 78,450

Friendly Society of I ronfounders .... 15,200

United Pattern-makers' Association . . . .3,150

United Society of Brassfounders .... 2,750

Amalgamated Society of Carpenters (and two other societies) 58,000
Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons (with Scottish ditto) 25,000
Operative Bricklayers' Society (and another society) . . 26,700

National Union of Operative Plasterers . . . 8,500

United Society of Operative Plumbers . . , 8,150

Amalgamated Society of Lithographic Printers . . 2,550

Bradford Dyers . . . . . .2,700

Bakers (English, Scottish, and Irish) . . . 8,950

United Kingdom Society of Coachmakers . . . 5, 700

18 other Societies ...... 44,200

38 Trade Unions .... 290,000

The first thing we notice in these tables is that, among
the trades in which piecework is either insisted on by the

Excluding agriculture and domestic service, about 33 per cent of the male wage-
earners in the United Kingdom are supposed to be engaged in piecework trades,
and 67 per cent in timework trades. It seems probable, therefore, that
among Trade Unionists a larger percentage work by the piece than among the
workers in unorganised trades.

288 Trade Union Function

men, or readily accepted by them, we find the largest and
the most powerful Trade Unions. The Miners and Cotton
Operatives, who would instantly strike against any attempt to
introduce time wages, are only paralleled in the strength and
extent of their Trade Unions by the Boilermakers and Iron-
shipbuilders, who adopt piecework as the basis of the greater
part of their wage contracts. And so far is piecework from
being objected to by Trade Union officials, that we find, in
these trades, that the preponderating part of the Trade
Union machinery, including the ablest and most influential
officials, has been called into existence for the express purpose
of dealing with piecework lists. The district delegates of
the Boilermakers, the secretaries of the Cotton Operatives,
the investigators of the Boot and Shoe Operatives, and the
checkweigh-men of the Coalminers spend their whole lives in
arranging remuneration on a piecework basis.

On the other hand, though the time workers are in the
minority, we have among them some very strong unions,
such as the Stonemasons, the Bricklayers, and the Plumbers,
who have always vehemently denounced piecework as the
bane of their trades. How can we explain this divergence ?

On asking a leading official of the Cotton-spinners' union
why he objected to time wages, he replied that, in his
opinion, it was only the system of piecework remuneration
that had saved his trade from the evils of sweating. The
work of a cotton-spinner, he explained, varies in intensity
(and his product in quantity) according to the number of
spindles which he has to attend to, and the speed at which
the machinery runs, conditions over which the operative has
no control. Owing to the introduction of mules bearing an
increased number of spindles, and the constant " speeding
up " of the machinery, the amount of work placed upon the
operative is steadily, though often imperceptibly, increased.^

1 "It would be a mistake if we imagined that labor had become easier com-
pared with former times. As far as a comparison can be made, the opposite is
the case. A handloom weaver can work 1 3 hours per day ; to let a six-loom
weaver work 13 hours is a physical impossibility. The nature of the work has
entirely changed. In place of muscular exertion there is now the minding of the

The Standard Rate 289

If he were paid by the hour or the day, he would need, in
order to maintain the same rate of remuneration for the
work done, to discover each day precisely to what degree
the machinery was being " speeded up," and to be perpetually
making demands for an increase in his time wages. Such
an arrangement could not fail to result in the employer
increasing the work faster than the pay.

Under a system of payment by the amount of yarn spun,
the operative automatically gets the benefit of any increase in
the number of spindles or rate of speed. An exact uniformity
of the rate of remuneration is maintained between man and
man, and between mill and mill. If any improvement takes
place in the process, by which the operative's labor is
reduced, the onus of procuring a change in the rate of pay
falls on the employer. The result is, that so effectually is
the cotton-spinner secured by his piecework lists against
being compelled to give more work without more pay, that
it has been found desirable deliberately to concede to the
employers, by lowering the rates as the number of spindles
increases, some share of the resulting advantages, in order
that the Trade Union may encourage enterprising mill-owners
in the career of improvement. The cotton -weavers have a
similar experience. The weaver's labor depends upon the
character of the cloth to be woven, involving a complicated
calculation of the number of " picks," etc. Time wages
would leave them practically at the employers' mercy for all
but the very easiest work. But by a highly technical and
complex list of piecework rates, every element by which the
labor is increased effects an exactly corresponding variation
in the remuneration. Only under such a system could any
uniformity of rate be secured.

In another great class of cases piecework is preferred by

machine, i.e. mental strain. Those who have observed the mulespinner in
Oldham in the midst of the whirling of 2500 spindles, or the female worker in
Burnley environed by four or six shuttles, working at the speed of 200 picks per
minute, know what a higher degree of mental application is here demanded." —
The Cotton Trade in Englattd atid on the Continent, by Dr. G. von Schulze-
Gaevernitz (London, 1895), PP- 126, 127.

VOL. T U

290 Trade Union Function

the workmen, with the same object of securing a Standard
Rate, but under entirely different conditions. The coal-
miners have, in some counties, had a long experience of
both time wages and piecework, with the result that, where-
ever there is a strong Trade Union, piecework is insisted on for
all hewers. The explanation is to be found in the circum-
stances under which the work is done. Employers have
found it impossible to supervise by foremen or managers the
numerous hewers scattered in the recesses of the mine. The
only possible alternative to paying the hewers at piecework
rates, was to let out the different parts of the mine to
working contractors, who engaged hewers by the hour to
work alongside them. This was the notorious " Butty
System," against which the organised hewers have persistently
struggled. It was found that, whatever was the customary
standard of daily time wages, the " Butty Master," who set
the pace, was always increasing the quantity of work to be
done for those wages by himself putting in an unusual
intensity of effort. It is obvious that, under this system, the
ordinary hewer lost all security of a Standard Rate. It paid
the Butty Master to be always " speeding up," because he
received the product, not of his own extra exertion alone,
but of that of all his gang. The only method by which the
ordinary hewers could secure identity of rate was to dispense
with the Butty Masters, and themselves work by the piece.

We shall find exactly the same preference for piecework
wages in other trades among men who work under a sub-
contractor, or in subordination to another class of workmen
paid by the piece. The strikers, for instance, who work with
smiths paid by the piece, were themselves formerly paid time
wages. In most parts of the country they have now been
successful in obtaining the boon of a piecework rate pro-
portionate to that of the smiths, so that they are secured
extra remuneration for any extra spurt put on by the smith.
Another large class of workmen in a somewhat similar
position have not been so fortunate. The shipyard " helpers,"
who work under the platers (iron-shipbuilders), are paid by

The Standard Rate 291

the day, whilst the platers receive piecework rates. The
first object of any combination of helpers has always b^en
to secure piecework rates, in order that their remuneration
might bear some proportion to the rapidity and intensity of
work, the pace being set by the platers. But owing to the
strength of the Boilermakers' Union, to which the platers
belong, the helpers have never been able to attain their
object.^ The iron and steel industries afford numerous other
instances in which workers paid by the day are in sub-
ordination to workers paid by the piece. In all these cases,
the subordinate workers desire to be paid by the piece, in
order that they may secure a greater uniformity in the rate
of payment for the work actually done.

Coming now to the trades in which piecework is most
strongly objected to by the operatives, we shall find the
argument again turning upon the question of uniformity of
the rate of remuneration. The engineers have always protested
that the introduction of piecework into their trade almost
necessarily implied a reversion to Individual Bargaining. The
work of a skilled mechanic in an engineering shop differs
from job to job in such a way as to make, under a piece-
work system, a new contract necessary for each job. Each
man, too, will be employed at an operation differing, if only
in slight degree, from those of his fellows. If they are all
working by the hour, a collective bargain can easily be made
and adhered to. But where each successive job differs from
the last, if only in small details, it is impossible to work out
in advance any list of prices to which all the men can agree
to adhere. The settlement for each job must necessarily be
left to be made between the foreman and the workman
concerned. Collective Bargaining becomes, therefore, im-
possible. But this is not all. The uncertainty as to the

1 See, for the Boilermakers' or Platers' Helpers, the paper by J. Lynch, in
the Report of the Industrial Remuneration Conference (London, 1885), and the
discussion at the Trade Union Congress of 1S78. Many of the helpers are now
members of the National Amalgamated Union of Labor and other laborers'
unions ; see the evidence given on their behalf before the Royal Commission on
Labor, 17th May 1892, Group A.

292 Trade Union Function

time and labor which a particular job will involve makes
it impossible for the foreman, with the best intentions in the
world, to fix the prices of successive jobs so that the workman
will obtain the same earnings for the same effort. And
when we remember the disadvantage at which, unprotected
by collective action, the individual operative necessarily
stands in bargaining with the capitalist employer, we shall
easily understand how the Amalgamated Society of Engineers
should have been led to declare that, under this system of
settling a special price for each job, " it is well known that
piecework is not a bargain, but a price dictated by the
employer and lowered at will." And the report adds that
" the system has often been made the instrument of large
reductions of wages, which have ended in the deterioration of
the conditions of the workmen. ... If an expert workman,
by his skill and industry, earns more than his neighbour, and
much more than his daily wages come to, a reduction is at
once made, and made again until eventually the most expert
is only able, by intense application and industry, to earn a
bare living, whilst the less skilful is reduced below living
prices." ^

We could cite from the reports of the great national
unions of the Engineers, Ironfounders, and Carpenters innu-
merable similar protests against piecework in their trades,
all based upon the proved impossibility of maintaining a
Standard Rate, if each job has to be separately priced. It

1 Abstract Report of the CouttciPs (of the A. S. E.) Proceedings, September
1S60 to April 1862, pp. 24-26.

This process of fixing a piecework rate for all the men, by the speed of an
exceptionally expert workman under special pressure, has been more than once
unconsciously revealed by employers. Already in 1727, in a manual entitled
The Duty of a Steward to his Lord, by Edward Laurence, naive directions are
given how to achieve this object. ' ' Also if any new sort of work is to be done,
not mentioned in the following particulars, the Steward's best way is to hire a
good labourer and to stand by him the whole day to see that he does a good day's
work, and then to measure the same, in order to know what it is worth." The
efficacy of piecework, as an expedient for reducing wages was described in a letter
to the Tijjies in 1852 by Charles Walker and Sons, an engineering firm. " When
work which has been done daywork is put on the piece, the employer usually
regulates the piecework price a little imder the price of it at daywork, knowing

The Standard Rate 293

is, however, more interesting to watch the same conviction
being gradually borne in upon the mind of an exceptionally-
able employer. In 1876, William Denny, the well-known
Clyde shipbuilder, who had put his whole establishment on
piecework rates, delivered a remarkable lecture on the
advantages of this method of remuneration, alike to the
employer and to the workmen, specially commending the
intensity of competition which it secured. He was utterly
unable to understand why the workmen objected to a system
which, in giving an "increase of from 25 to 50 per cent in
his wages — and this increase my experience confirms as a
rule — puts at once within his power a more comfortable and
easy style of living, combined with an opportunity of saving,
which, if he is a sober and careful man, will enable him to
enjoy a pleasant old age, and even to lay by sufficient money
to enable him to refuse on his own account any rate of
payment which he deems insufficient." ^

Notwithstanding all these allurements, the Trade
Unions persisted in their objection. After ten years' further
experience of the working of piecework, William Denny at
last perceived the real root of the men's protest. In an
interesting letter written in 1886 he describes his own
conversion : —

At the time I published my pamphlet The Worth of Wages^ I was
under the impression piecework rates would regulate themselves as I
then assumed time wages did. A larger experience of piecework has
convinced me that, excepting in cases where rates can be fixed and made

how production is increased by it. But he finds that men do work in quantity
far beyond what they have been doing day work, earning often los. per day, when
at daywork they had done much less than half the work at 5s. 6d. per day. So
much, indeed, is this the case, that manufacturers have made it a private rule that
men for their extra work should earn 'time and quarter' or 'time and third,'
and have reduced the price accordingly ; that is, where 5 s. was the man's day pay,
the price should be so arranged that ultimately he should earn 6s. 3d. or 6s. 8d.
per day. This method we do not quite agree with, and we believe it has made
men complain" {Times, 9th January 1852). Thus the employer not only gets
the advantage of an increased output upon the same fixed capital, but actually
contrives also insidiously to alter, to his own profit, the proportion between the
muscular energy expended by the workman and the amount of food which the
latter obtains.

1 The Worth of Wages, by William Denny (Dumbarton, 1876).

294 Trade Union Fu7iction

a. matter of agreement between the whole body of the men in any works
and their employers, piecework prices have not a self-regulating power,
and are liable, under the pressure of heavy competition, to be depressed
below what I would consider a proper level. You must understand
there is a broad and very real distinction in piecework between the kind
of work which can be priced in regular rates and that in which contracts
are taken by the men for lump jobs of greater or less extent. In the
former kind of piecework it is easily possible for the rates to be effectively
controlled by the joint efforts of the employers and the workpeople, as
it is in the case of time wages. In the latter, owing to there being no
definite standard, it is quite possible that the prices may be raised too
high for competitive efficiency, or depressed to too low a point to recoup
the workmen for the extra exertion and initiative induced by the very
nature of piecework. In such work as that of rivetters, iron fitters, and
platers and in much of carpenters' work standards of price or rates can
be arranged or controlled, and the workers are not likely to endure any
arrangement they may consider inequitable. They are indeed much
more likely by insisting on uniform rates for a whole district to do
injustice to the more intelligent and energetic employers, who, by
introducing new machinery and new processes, are directly influential
in drawing work to their districts. It is evident that if piecework rates
are not reduced so as to make the improvements in machinery and
methods introduced by such employers fully effective in diminishing cost
of production, there will be a tendency on their part to abandon these
attempts, with diminished chances of work for their districts. In the
case of such improvements it is possible to reduce rates without in any
way reducing the effective earnings of the work-people. I may say that
in our own experience we have almost invariably found our workers
quite willing to consider these points fairly and intelligently. Frequently
they themselves make such suggestions as materially help us to reduce
cost of production. Such cases of invention and helpfulness on their
part are rewarded directly through our awards scheme of which you have
particulars.

In the second kind of piecework, involving contracts which cannot
be arranged by rates and controlled by the whole body of the workers,
the prices are necessarily a matter of settlement between individual
workmen and small groups of workmen and their foreman. Here it
depends upon the control exercised by the heads of the business whether
this kind of piecework drifts into extravagances, or into such reductions
of contract prices as either to reduce them to less than the value of time
wages or to so little above time wages that they do not compensate the
men for their extra exertions. We have found in testing such piecework
that the best method is to compare the earnings made by these piece-
workers in a given period with the time wages which they would have
received for the same period ; and it is the duty of one of our partners
to control this section of the work, and he does it almost invariably to

The Standard Rate 295

the advantage of the men. Our idea is that the men should be able to
average from 25 to 50 per cent more wages on such piecework within
a given time than their time wages would amount to. There are
occasional and exceptional cases where the results are less or more
favourable. Where they are less favourable, we consider them to be
not only a loss to the men, but disadvantageous to ourselves ; and our
reason for this is very clear, as unless the men feel that their exertions
produce really better wages, and that increased exertions and better
arrangements of work will produce still further increases of wages, there
is an end to all stimulus to activity or improvement.

I know an instance in which a well-meaning foreman, desirous of
diminishing the cost of the work in his department, reduced his piece-
work prices to such a point that he not only removed all healthy stimulus
to activity from his workmen, but produced among them serious discon-
tent. Our method of piecework analysis and control enabled us to
discover and remedy this before serious disafifection had been produced.
I know another instance in which a foreman, while avoiding the mistake
I have just mentioned, gave out his contracts in such small and scattered
portions, and under such conditions as to the way in which the work
was to be done and as to the composition of the co-partneries formed
by the men, that he not only reduced their earnings to very nearly time
rates, but created very serious disaffection among them. He was in the
habit of forcing the men to take into their co-partneries personal
favourites of his own, who very naturally became burdens upon those
co-partneries. As soon as our returns and inquiries revealed to us these
facts, we insisted that the contracts entered into with the men should be
of a sufficient money amount to enable them to organise themselves and
their work eflficiently. We removed the defective arrangements above
referred to, and laid down the principle that their co-partneries were to
be purely voluntary. We were enabled by these means, and without
altering a single price, to at once raise their earnings from a level a little
above what they could have made on time wages to a very satisfactory
percentage of increase and to remove all discontent. These two in-
stances will show you how necessary it is in this kind of piecework that
there should be a direct control over those who are carrying it out.
When the heads of a business are absentees or indifferent the most
effective way in which the workmen can control such piecework would
be by taking care that the standard of time wages was always kept
perfectly clear and effective, and that regular comparisons per hour on
piecework were made. Such comparisons would immediately enable
them to arrive at a correct conclusion as to whether the prices paid them
were sufficiently profitable.

There is besides a mixed kind of piecework in which skilled work-
men employ laborers at time wages to do the unskilled portion of their
work for them. Here, too, some kind of control is required, as instances
occasionally occur in which the skilled workmen treat their laborers,

296 Trade Union Function

either intentionally or unintentionally, with harshness. I have even
known an instance in which such piecework contractors reduced their
laborers' time wages on the pay day without having given them any
previous notice. On the other hand, there are instances in which these
laborers behaved in an unreasonable and unfair spirit to the skilled work-
men who employ them.

In conclusion, I would say that the method of piecework is one
which cannot be approved or condemned absolutely, but is dependent
upon the spirit and the way in which it is carried out for the verdict
which should be passed upon it. It is imperative in such kinds of
piecework as by their nature cannot be reduced to regular rates that
either the employer should take the responsibility of safeguarding his
workmen's interests, or that the workmen themselves should, by such a
method as I have suggested, obtain an effective control over them.

There are besides conditions in which even piecework rates of a
general nature may become instruments of very great hardship. I mean
instances in which the workers are incapable of effective resistance, and
in which employers are either themselves ground down under the force
of a competition with which they are unable to cope, or in which, while
the employers possess extreme powers of position and capital, they are
deficient in any corresponding sense of responsibility to their workpeople.
I hope the day is not far distant in which an absentee employer would
be looked upon with as much contempt and disapproval as are absentee
landlords. If such a healthy public opinion should ever become domi-
nant, it is to be hoped it will be most active in influencing those employers
whose works are conducted in great part or wholly upon the piecework
method.^

We have, in this able explanation, a frank admission of
the whole case of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers
against the introduction of piecework into their trade. No
Trade Unionist could have expressed more forcibly than
Denny has done the impossibility of a uniform rate under
a system of individual piecework bargains. It is true that
Denny trusted to the personal intervention of an enlightened
and benevolent employer to mitigate the evil. But we need
not wonder that the workmen have hesitated to admit a
system which avowedly involves the complete surrender of
their position. Moreover, it is at least doubtful whether the
good employer, who protected his workmen against his own

^ Life of William Denny, by A. B. Bruce (London, 1889), p. 113 ; see the
article on Denny (who lived from 1847 to 1887) in the Dictionary of Political
Economy.

The Standard Rate 297

foreman's zeal to lower the expense of production, would long
survive in competition with his less scrupulous rivals, who
drove the sharpest possible bargain with their hands.

It is interesting to observe that the hint thrown out by
William Denny, as to the importance of workmen systemati-
cally checking all the piecework earnings by the standard
time rate, has since been followed up by the Amalgamated
Society of Engineers. In some cases, piecework is now
recognised by the union, even in highly organised districts,
on the understanding that every man in the shop shall draw
every week time and a quarter wages, whatever his production
has been. If at the end of a job there is a balance due to
him, he is allowed to receive it. Now, it is obvious that
under this arrangement it is possible to maintain something
like a uniform rate. The natural tendency of the foreman
to reduce the rates is checked by his knowledge, first, that in
no case will it profit him to make the piecework price work
out at less than time and a quarter, even for the slowest men
in the shop ; and secondly, that, unless the piecework prices
work out sufficiently above that minimum to^ furnish a real
incentive for extra exertion, the operatives, secure in any
event of time and a quarter wages, would quietly drop back
to time-work speed. Such a method of remuneration can-
not, however, be classed as piecework proper. It is rather a
high scale of time wages, with a bonus on extra output.-^

The considerations which converted William Denny
from his enthusiasm for competitive piecework apply, not
only to the various departments of the engineering and ship-
building trades, but also to the work of carpenters, plumbers,
stonemasons, and bricklayers. In all these trades there is so
much difference between job and job that piecework is
inconsistent with Collective Bargaining. The work of the
plumber engaged to lay pipes, of varying sizes, in all kinds
of situations, can obviously be estimated only by the time

^ For other varieties of "bonus on output," see the acute discriminations of
Mr. D. F. Schloss in The Methods of Industrial Renmneration, 2nd ed. (London,
1894).

298 Trade Union Fimction

employed. The masons, chiselling stones of varied hardness,
different shapes, and more or less free from troublesome
flaws, could not possibly frame a list of piecework rates
which would yield identical wage to identical effort. The
same is true of the multifarious work of the carpenter and
joiner. When we come to the actual erection of houses, in
brick or stone, it may, at first sight, seem as if uniformity
was more possible. But if we watch the line of bricklayers
or stonemasons working side by side at building a wall, or
putting up the carcase of a house, we shall see that it would
be impossible precisely to reckon up the work accomplished
by any individual among them. Nor has this ever been
attempted by the most exacting employer. " Piecework," in
putting up walls or houses, has, indeed, been the subject of
long and bitter controversy among the bricklayers. But
piecework in this trade has always meant, not the payment
of each individual workman by the piece, but the letting out
of a sub-contract for the whole job to a " piecemaster," who
gets it done by bricklayers at time wages. This system of
sub-contract, mistermed " piecework " to the confusion of
outsiders, is objected to for the same reason as the coal-
miners allege against the " Butty System." The working
sub-contractor forces the pace in order to gain the advantage,
not of his own extra exertion alone, but also that of his
gang. It is, in fact, a fraudulent attempt to obtain piece-
work exertion whilst paying only time wages. And as the
system, in the opinion of the experts, almost inevitably tends
to the " scamping " of the work by the sub-contractor or piece-
master, it has long since been given up by respectable builders,
and is now usually prohibited in architects' specifications.

In marked contrast with the Trade Unions, such as the
Cotton Operatives and Coalminers, which insist on piece-
work, and with those, such as the Bricklayers and Stone-
masons, which insist on timework, stand those societies which
accept with seeming indifference either method of remunera-
tion. The various Trade Unions of the compositors, in all
parts of the country, have, for over a century, formally

The Standa7'd Rate 299

recognised both the " scale " of piecework rates and the
" stab " or time wages. In the numerous revisions of the
collective agreements between employers and employed, the
compositors have constantly striven to maintain a standard
rate. " Speaking generally," reports the Revision Sub-
Committee to the London Society of Compositors in 1890,
" our desire has been to so amend the scale as to place all
compositors as far as possible on an equality, no matter what
class of work they may be engaged upon, or whether employed
as piece or 'stab hands — allowance, of course, being made for
the varying capabilities of those employed." -^ Although the
work of a compositor includes many different varieties, these,
unlike certain engineering operations, are all capable of fairly
precise enumeration in a " scale" extending to between 30 and
40 pages octavo. Thus, piecework is in no way inconsistent
with Collective Bargaining, or the maintenance of a Standard
Rate, and is therefore not objected to. On the other hand,
the compositor is not liable to be " speeded up," nor yet over-
driven by machinery or a zealous foreman, so that there is no
reason to object to time wages, if the employer prefers this
system.^ As a matter of fact most straightforward setting-up

1 Report of Sub-Committee appointed to revise the London Scale of Prices,
1890.

2 The system of payment by the piece was apparently universal in British
printing offices in the eighteenth century. The introduction of " establishment,"
or time wages, was an innovation of the employers at the beginning of the present
century, consented to by the operatives with much reluctance, and denounced by
some of them as leading to reduction of rates. (See Place MSS. 27,799-99/103.)
The acceptance of both systems of remuneration has involved the enactment of
various subsidiary rules to check unfair wages calculated to depress rates. Thus
employers are not allowed to change from one system to another without due
notice, as otherwise the operative would be required to do all difficult composition
by the piece, the "fat" (or profitable work) being given out at time wages.
Elaborate arrangements are made for the fair distribution of " the fat," the
"clicker" who hands out the "copy" to the different compositors being
appointed and frequently paid by the "chapel," the ancient organisation of the
workmen in each printing office. Many disputes have arisen from employers
attempting to withhold "the fat" from the piecework compositors; or, on the
other hand, to use the pieceworkers to force the pace of the timeworkers.
Compositors' unions therefore prefer that the employer should confine himself to
one syst^^m or the other.

In 1876 a joint committee of the Glasgow master printers and their com-
positors decided that the "clicking system," or fair sharing of the "fat," was

300 Trade Union Function

of ordinary book matter and daily newspaper work is done
by the piece, whereas corrections and special jobs difficult of
calculation are done by " stab " men.

The other leading instance of an impartial acceptance
of both piecework and time wages is offered by the United
Society of Boilermakers and Iron-shipbuilders. Here the
bulk of the work in building new ships is done by the piece,
at rates settled, as we have already mentioned, between the
district committee of the union and the particular firms or
the local employers' association. On the other hand, repair-
ing work, which cannot be classified in advance, is done at
time wages. Thus the by-laws for the Mersey district
declare that " piecework of any description is not allowed on
repair jobs in either wet or dry docks ; and no man shall be
in any way compelled to put in any given number of rivets,
or tasked as to other work, which he shall do during the
day ; but in all cases, the principle of a fair day's work for
a fair day's pay be faithfully and honorably carried out by
every member of this Association." ^ We see the same
distinction unconsciously influencing another trade, the Tin-
plate Workers, who, less fortunate than the Boilermakers,
have not succeeded in organising their whole trade into a
single society. The General Union of Tinplate Workers,
with Liverpool for its headquarters, whose work is mainly
connected with shipbuilding, and is so diverse as to render it
difficult, if not impossible, to construct any piecework list,
insists on time wages. On the other hand, the National
Amalgamated Tinplate Workers' Union, with its headquarters
at Wolverhampton, which comprises mainly the artificers
of sheet metal pots and pans, has a regular list of prices, and
prefers to work by the piece. So closely does this difference
of policy coincide with difference of work that the Manchester
Branch of the General Union (the shipyard society), which

equivalent to an addition to a farthing per looo, this advance being conceded to
the compositors in shops where that system did not prevail. — MS. Minutes of
Glasgow Typographical Society, 1 2th December 1876.

1 By-laws for the Mersey District United Society of Boilermakers and Iron-
shipbuilders (Liverpool, 1889).

The Standard Rate 301

finds itself by exception employed in the fashioning of pots
and pans, refuses to abide by the principle of time work
followed by the port branches, and elects to work by the
piece. In both cases the aim is the same, namely the main-
tenance of a Standard Rate. But the difference of policy
between the two societies, arising, as can be seen, from the
difference in their respective tasks, is not clearly understood
by either, and is the subject of constant friction between
them. And so it happens that (forgetting the example of
its own Manchester Branch) the General Union of Tin-
plate Workers accuses the National Amalgamated Tinplate
Workers' Union of betraying the central position of Trade
Unionism by not insisting on time wages. On the other
hand, the latter society, confident in its piecework lists, sees
no reason why it should not establish branches of piece-
workers in the ports, where time work has hitherto prevailed,
and where piecework would probably break down all Collec-
tive Bargaining.

This instance indicates how unconscious particular Trade
Unions may be of the principles upon which their empirical
action has really been based. The same unconsciousness
sometimes leads to a persistence in whichever method of
remuneration has been customary, long after the circum-
stances have changed. Thus the Cabinetmakers, among
whom Collective Bargaining in any elaborate form has prac-
tically disappeared, might possibly have maintained their
organisation if they had, like the Bricklayers and Stone-
masons, insisted on reverting to time wages. At the begin-
ning of this century, the Cabinetmakers had elaborate lists
of prices, collectively agreed to between employers and
employed ; and we have ample evidence of the efficiency
with which the contemporary cabinetmakers' unions conducted
their Collective Bargaining. In consequence of the great
changes in and multiplication of patterns, and the alteration
of processes, the lists have long since been obsolete, and no
one has yet found it possible to classify the innumerable jobs
now involved in the manufacture of furniture. " Estimate

302 Ti'ade Union Ftniction

work," " lump work," and other forms of the individual bargain
accordingly prevail. So strong, however, has been the tradi-
tion and custom of piecework in the trade that none of the
various unions which have from time to time arisen during
the last half century have been able to stand out for time
wages. Collective action accordingly now seldom rises higher
than the " shop bargain," and even this frequently breaks
down.

Another instance of a customary adherence to a tradi-
tional method of remuneration is to be found in the Iron-
founders' and Engineers' rigid refusal to recognise piecework
even on those jobs which involve the constant repetition of
precisely the same operation. We have already explained
why the bulk of the work in an engineering shop cannot be
done at piecework rates consistently with Collective Bargain-
ing. But with the enormous expansion of the trade, and the
application of machinery to particular processes, a considerable
section of engineers and " machine moulders " have long found
themselves turning out a constant succession of identical
articles for which it would be quite practicable to frame a
uniform piecework list which would allow of Collective
Bargaining. So strong, however, was the traditional feeling
of the mechanics against piecework (meaning " estimate work "
and Individual Bargaining) that the Amalgamated Society
of Engineers positively refused, down to 1892, to allow any
employer to introduce any piecework whatsoever, with the
consequence that establishment after establishment became
closed to the union. At last, at their quinquennial " Parlia-
ment "in 1892, the Engineers decided to permit the formation
of piecework lists, in the cases in which they were practicable,
and appointed salaried officers to carry out this new form of
Collective Bargaining. The Friendly Society of Ironfounders
still refuses to take this step, with the result that the auto-
matic machine process of casting has fallen to a separate
class of workmen, who are not eligible for membership to
this old-established union.

We are now in a position to come to some general con-

The Standard Rate 303

elusion as to the attitude which Trade Unions take up with
regard to piecework and time work. It is not true that
Trade Unions object to piecework as such ; in fact, a majority
of Trade Unionists either wilHngly accept, or else positively
insist on, that system of remuneration. Nor is it true that
employers universally prefer piecework. The members of
the great race of sub-contractors in all industries are always
trying to employ time workers, in order to obtain for them-
selves the fullest possible advantage of their own driving
power. In the same way, employers whose machinery is
rapidly improving complain of the inequity of the piecework
system, as being apt to deprive them of part of the advantage
of an increase in the speed of working. What the capitalist
seeks is to get more work for the old pay. Sometimes this
can be achieved best by piecework, sometimes by time work.
Workmen, on the other hand, strive to obtain more pay for
the same number of working hours. For the moment, at
any rate, the individual operative can most easily secure this
by piecework. But not even for the sake of getting riiore
pay for the same number of hours' work will the experienced
workman revert to the individual bargain, with all its dangers.
Accordingly the Trade Unions accept piecework only when
it is consistent v/ith Collective Bargaining, that is, when a
standard list of prices can be arrived at between the em-
ployers on the one hand, and the representatives of the whole
body of workmen on the other. As a matter of fact this is
practicable, so far as concerns anything above mere unskilled
laboring, in a majority of the organised industries, in which,
therefore, piecework prevails by consent of both masters and
men. It is, indeed, impossible to decide whether Trade
Unionism has, on the whole, favored or discouraged the
substitution of piecework for time wages. On the one hand,
every increase in Trade Union organisation, and especially
every extension of the class of salaried Trade Union officials,
has made more possible the arrangement of definite piecework
lists. This process is now extending from trade to trade.
The very establishment of these lists has, on the other hand,

304 Trade Union Fitnction

lessened the employers' desire to introduce piecework, whilst
to any method of remuneration involving individual bargain-
ing, such as " estimate " or " lump " work, the Trade Unions
have shown implacable hostility.

And just as the fundamental idea of the Standard Rate
has enabled us to understand the Trade Union attitude
towards piecework, so, too, we shall find it throwing light
upon various minor regulations of particular Trade Unions.
Various unions of operatives working at time wages have from
time to time attempted to secure a real, as distinguished from
a nominal identity in the rate of remuneration, by fixing, not
merely the minimum money wage, but also the maximum
amount of work to be done for that wage. Some of these
rules have obtained notoriety as classic instances of the folly
and perversity of Trade Unions. The fifth by-law of the
Bradford Lodge of the Laborers' Union of 1867 was quoted
before the Trade Union Commission as follows : " You are
strictly cautioned not to outstep good rules by doing double
the work you are required, and causing others to do the same,
in order to gain a smile from the master." ^ And the fol-
lowing rule of the Leeds Lodge of the Bricklayers' Laborers'
Union was at the same time given : " Any brother in the
Union professing to carry any more than the common
number, which is eight bricks, shall be fined one shilling, to
be paid within one month, or remain out of the benefit until
such fine be paid." ^ Nor were such rules entirely confined
to unskilled laborers. The Manchester Bricklayers' Associ-
ation were stated, in 1869, to have a rule providing that
" Any man found running or working beyond a regular speed
shall be fined 2s. 6d. for the first offence, 5 s. for the second,
I OS. for the third, and if still persisting, shall be dealt with
as the Committee think proper." ^ The Friendly Society of
Operative Stonemasons adopted, in 1865, the following rule :

1 Evidence of Mr. A. Mault, Secretary of the Manchester Builders' Associa-
tion. Q. 3120.

2 Ibid. Q. 3122.

3 W. T. Thornton, On Labour (London, 1869), pp. 350, 351.

The Standard Rate

305

" In localities where that most obnoxious and destructive
system generally known as * chasing ' is persisted in, lodges
should use every effort to put it down. Not to take less
time than that taken by an average mason in the execution
of the first portion of each description of work is the practice
that should be adopted among us as much as possible ; and
where it is plainly visible that any member or other in-
dividual is striving to overwork or ' chase ' his fellow-work-
men, thereby acting in a manner calculated to lead to the
discharge of members or a reduction of their wages, the party
so acting shall be summoned before the lodge, and if the
charge be satisfactorily proved a fine shall be inflicted." ^

These and similar regulations, widely advertised by the
Trade Union Commission of 1867-69, met with universal
condemnation. It does not seem to have been perceived
that, however bad were their secondary results, they were, in
their inception, a necessary protection of any Standard Rate
upon a time-work basis. It is a necessary incident of the
collective bargain that one man should not underbid another ;
and this underbidding can as easily take place by the offer
of more work for the same hour's wage, as by the offer of
the normal amount of work for a lower hourly wage. By
underbidding in the hourly rate, this would be lowered for
all. It follows equally that by underbidding in point of the
intensity of effort, this would, in the same way, soon be
raised for all. But the workmen's by-laws were designed
also to meet a more insidious attack. Many pushing fore-
men, in building contracts, intent on getting the utmost work
out of their men, were accustomed to bribe particular work-
men with beer, or by the promise of a slightly increased rate
of pay, to work at exceptional speed, with the object of
"pulling on" all the other workm'en to the same speed.
These " bell horses," as they were termed by the workmen,
were, in fact, used to increase the intensity of the work be-
yond the normal standard tacitly implied in the collective

1 Rule II, Class 2, p. 31, in Laws of the Friendly Society of Operative
Stonemasons (Bolton, 1867).

VOL. I X

3o6 Trade Union Function

bargain, much in the same way as the pieceworking Butty
Master forced the speed of the time-working coal hewer.
The practice was, in fact, a method of obtaining extra work
from the whole gang, whilst paying only one or two men in
the gang for the extra exertion involved. When done with-
out the men's knowledge, the practice amounted to a fraudu-
lent evasion of the bargain.

Such practices on the part of employers and their foremen
would quickly have rendered a Standard Rate and Collective
Bargaining impossible, and it was not unnatural that the
workmen should have adopted regulations in their own de-
fence. The coal hewers and the strikers, exposed, as we have
seen, to being similarly " driven," met the attack by insisting
on themselves receiving piecework rates. The cotton-spinners
and cotton-weavers protected themselves against the constant
" speeding up " of the machinery by elaborating their piece-
work lists. The builder's laborer whose fetch and carry
work could hardly be paid by the piece could find no other
expedient than fixing by collective agreement the maximum
task as well as the minimum wage.

But if the use of " bell horses " is a fraud on the men,
the regulations devised to check this practice may easily
work out so as to be a fraud on the employer. He has, in
effect, contracted for his labor at an all-round rate, on the
assumption that he receives a normal average of work. In
the group of workmen there will, of course, be some of
average speed, together with a few quicker men, and a few
slower. Any regulations which tend to restrict the quick
workers necessarily lower the average of the whole, upon
which the collective bargain has by implication been based.

This practice of " levelling down " the quantity of labor
is seen at its worst when it is used as a weapon not of
defence but of aggression. It is one thing to prohibit indi-
vidual workmen from allowing themselves to be used as a
means of exacting unpaid extra labor from their fellows. It
would be quite another matter if Trade Unions, unable to
raise the sum of their wages, advocated to all their members

The Standard Rate 307

an insidious diminution of their energy without notice to the
employer. This might be as much a fraudulent alteration of
the implied bargain as the practice of the Butty Master, We
know of one case of this nature, the so-called " go canny"
policy, adopted for a short time by the National Union of
Dock Laborers in Liverpool. The employers had stead-
fastly refused to increase the remuneration for their low-paid
work, and the men found themselves powerless to obtain
what they considered a living wage. In desperation they
adopted the expedient of not putting any energy into their
work. In this somewhat remarkable case the laborers
alleged that they were only following the practice of the
commercial man. " There is no ground for doubting," observed
the report of their executive committee, " that the real rela-
tion of the employer to the workman is simply this — to secure
the largest amount of the best kind of work for the smallest
Avages ; and, undesirable as this relation may be to the work-
man, there is no escape from it except to adopt the situation
and apply it to the common-sense commercial rule which
provides a coinniodity in accordance with the price. . . . The
employer insists upon fixing the amount he will give for
an hour's labor without the slightest consideration for the
laborer ; there is, surely, therefore, nothing wrong in the
laborer, on the other hand, fixing the amount and the
quality of the labor he will give in an hour for the price
fixed by the employer. If employers of labor or purchasers
of goods refuse to pay for the genuine article, they must be
content with shoddy and veneer. This is their own orthodox
doctrine which they urge us to study." ^

From the old standpoint of a purely competitive indi-
vidualism, it is not easy to deny the men's right to sell an
adulterated form of labor if they think it to their advantage

1 Report of Executive of the National Union of Dock Laborers in Great Britain
and Ireland, 1891 (Glasgow, 1S91, pp. 14-15). The men quoted the following
sentence from Jevons's Primer of Political Economy: " The employer, generally
speaking, is right in getting work done at the lowest possible cost ; and if there
is a supply of labor forthcoming at lower rates of wages, it would not be wise in
him to pay higher rates."

3o8 Trade Union Function

to do so. If, as in the instance cited, the men openly pro-
claim their intention, there is no question of fraud ; and they
may, from this point of view, fairly claim to be acting like
an exceptionally honest trader who, whilst selling shoddy
goods, does not pretend that they are anything else. The
employers may retaliate by dismissal. The men may, in
return, persuade their successors to adopt the same method.
The quarrel becomes a " struggle for existence," in which
the " fittest " in these arts of war may survive.

We have, however, come to believe that in such inter-
necine struggles the interests of the community as a whole
almost inevitably suffer. In spite of the protests of John
Bright, successive Parliaments have prohibited the adultera-
tion of commodities. But adulteration of labor is infinitely
more injurious to the community. We have, in fact, in this
case a striking illustration of the utter fallacy of the statement
that " labor is a commodity, ... an article saleable and pur-
chaseable," which could not logically be treated " as any-
thing else." ^ We cannot separate the quantity or quality of
the day's work from its effect upon the health and character of
the human being who is rendering it. The sub-contractor's
practice of " driving," the constant pressure upon a man to
work always at the very top of his speed, will quickly break
down the health of the worker, and impoverish the nation by
producing premature old age. On the other hand, systematic
loitering will destroy the character and efficiency of even the
most resolute worker. In adulterating the product, you
adulterate the man. To the unskilled laborers of a great
city, already demoralised by irregularity of employment and
reduced below the average in capacity for persistent work,
the doctrine of " go canny" may easily bring about the final
ruin of personal character. It was an instinctive apprecia-
tion of this truth which led the responsible Trade Union
officials unhesitatingly to denounce the new departure of the

1 Speech of the well-known capitalist opponent of Trade Unions, Edmund
Potter of Manchester, Social Science Association's Report on Trade Societies and
Strikes, i860, p. 603.

The Standard Rate 309

Liverpool dock laborers. It remains, so far as we know, a
unique instance in Trade Union annals. ^

When we turn from time workers to pieceworkers, we
find the subsidiary regulations called into being to defend the
Standard Rate wholly free from any objectionable character,
beyond a certain inevitable complexity. The first series of
these is concerned with accuracy of measurement. Employers
have always claimed the right of making, by their agents or
themselves, all the calculations involved in preparing their
pay sheets, and they have expected the operatives implicitly
to accept their figures. Against this contention the Trade
Unions have persistently and successfully struggled. In all
the cases in which the operative is unable easily to check
the computation, it is obvious that such an arrangement left
the Standard Rate entirely at the master's mercy. "In weigh-
ing how was the collier to obtain justice ? He was at the
bottom of the pit, and could not see the master's nominee at
the top — and so again there arose the cry of being cheated
in weight. For years this was a bone of contention ; and
in revising the Inspections (Mines Regulation) Act of i860,
the delegates of the men prevailed upon the Government to
insert a clause, ordering that coal should be duly weighed
by a just steelyard at the pit's mouth, and that the men
might, at their own cost, appoint a checkweigh-man who
should not further interfere with the working but to see and
take an account of the men's work. Opposition to this clause
was strongly offered by the delegates of the employers . . .
the masters did not want a weighing clause at all. ... A
compromise was submitted to. The weighing clause was
incorporated with another clause — the 29th — with a rider

1 It is only fair to Trade Union officials to say that the two enthusiasts who,
in despair of otherwise benefiting the unfortunate laborers, initiated this policy,
did not belong to the ranks of the workmen — a fact which the reader of their
able and ingenious argument will already have perceived. They were shortly
afterwards formally excluded, as middle-class men, from the Trade Union Con-
gress at Glasgow in 1892. When, in 1896, it was suggested that a similar policy
should be adopted by the International Federation of Ship, Dock, and River
Workers, it was opposed by such leaders as Ben Tillett, and rejected by the
members' vote.

3IO Trade Union Ftindion

added to it by the employers, viz. that the checkweigh-man
should be selected from persons employed at that colliery," ^

Without casting any special imputation on coalowners,
it may be said that the miners' suspicions have been so far
borne out by evidence that Parliament has progressively
strengthened the clause thus adopted in i860. As the law
now stands, a simple majority of the miners in any one pit
can decide to have a checkweigh-man elected by the pit, and
paid by a compulsory stoppage from the earnings of every
pieceworker employed, including even those who voted against
the proposal. Any person who is or has been a miner may
be elected to the post, whether the employer likes it or not,
and the law courts insist that he shall be allowed free access
to the weighing machines, and given every facility for check-
ing the weights.

A further step in the same direction has been taken at
the instance of the powerful unions of cotton operatives.
What the coalminers have obtained is the right to have the
employers' calculations checked by the men's official. The
textile operatives have obtained, not only the publication in
advance by the employer of the exact particulars on which
he will calculate the piecework earnings, but have also secured
the appointment of a Government officer specially charged
with seeing that these particulars are correctly stated.^ The
"particulars clause," adopted for cotton -weavers in the
Factory Act of the Conservative Government of 1891, and
extended to all textile workers by the amending Act of the
Liberal Government of 1895, will, in all probability, be
applied, within a few years, to all piecework trades in which
the computation of earnings lends itself to mistake or fraud.^

1 Transactions and Results of the National Association of Coal, Lime, and
Ironstone Miners of Great Britain (London, 1863), p. vii.

2 It is much to the credit of the North- East Lancashire Operative Weavers'
Association, and to the fair-mindedness of the leading employers, that the veteran
official of the weavers' union, who had for a generation fought the men's battles,
was, by common consent, marked out as the fittest person to hold this important
new office. ]\Ir. T. Birtwistle has fully justified his appointment, and has given
universal satisfaction to all parties.

2 The Factoiy Act of 1895 empowers the Home Secretary to apply this

The Standard Rate 311

By this clause the employer is required to state in writing,
before the job is begun, all the particulars (including the rate
of payment) required for the precise computation of the
operatives' earnings.

But there are other ways of defrauding the pieceworker
besides inaccurate calculations. The weight of coal hewn by
each miner may be accurately measured at the pit's mouth,
but if he is sent to work in a distant or difficult seam, the
standard tonnage rate may be very far from securing identical
pay for identical effort. The cotton-spinner finds his list of
prices a delusion if his mules have to be frequently stopped
to repair breakages caused by the bad quality of the raw
cotton. And even those who are aware of the coalminers'
" county basis," and of the elaborate " cotton lists," seldom
realise how technical and how minute are the adjustments
which are necessary to attain this end, or how manifold and
incessant are the complaints requiring attention. The best
way of bringing the facts home to the general reader will,
we think, be to give a few extracts from actual proceedings.
Thus, the Joint Committee of the Northumberland Coal-
owners and Miners settled, in a single day, the following as
well as many other cases : —

Burradon. — Agreement confirmed. Yard Seam, East Side, until
end of current quarter, is. 7^d. per ton ; afterwards is. 6|d. per ton.

Cramlington, Amelia Pit. — Agreement confirmed : {a) Yankee Jack
system shall be abolished whenever the owners find it convenient to do
so, and upon such abolition the hewing prices in the Low Main and Yard
Seams shall be advanced 9 per cent. In the case of the Main Coal
Seam the unscreened hewing prices shall be 63 per cent of the present
round coal hewing prices, and upon such abolition they shall be advanced
9 per cent.

Walker. — Agreement confirmed. Beaumont and Brockwell Seams.
Long wall or broken hewing price shall be paid when 40 yards from
commencement of long wall, i.e. 40 yards from fast wall side.

New Backworth. — Men request payment for lamps when I'equired to
use them in the whole. To be paid extra id. per ton in bord and pillar

clause, by mere administrative order, to any piecework trade, and it was so
applied in 1897 to manufacturies of handkerchiefs, aprons, pinafores, and blouses ;
and to those of chains, anchors, and locks.

312 Trade Union Function

whole workings, in accordance with county arrangement, when required
to use lamps.

Seaton Burn. — Owners desire hewing price for long wall in Bowes'
coal in Low Main Seam to be fixed. That standard prices now being
paid be reduced 3d. per ton.^

Even more diversified are the adjustments of the cotton
operatives. Here are some extracts from the diary of the
secretary of the Bolton spinners : —

January 5th, 1892. — Mr. Pennington, of the Hindley Twist Com-
pany, Hindley, called here this morning. He agreed to weekly pays,
and to discontinue the system of one spinner to two pairs of mules. I
am to go through the mills on Monday next, and if spinning is not satis-
factory, will be made so ; and we are to see in what way the mules can
be speeded up so as to give better wages. Work is to be resumed on
Thursday morning.

January 6th. — Went to Peake's Place Mill (Messrs. Tristram's),
Halliwell, and arranged that the men on the three pairs of mules
spinning coarse counts shall receive 2S. 6d. a week extra, until certain
alterations and repairs to the mules shall have been made.

January 6th. — Accompanied by Mr. Percival (the secretary of the
employers' association), I went to Mr. Robert Brierclifife's Mill, Moses
Gate. They have no less rims in stock, so it was agreed that the prices
per 100 lbs. for spinning in No. i Mill shall be increased 6d. for one
month during which the work is to be made satisfactory. The firm
have likewise conceded the request of their men, and will adopt payment
by indicator. The notice to leave work is consequently withdrawn.

January 8th. — Complaints are to hand from Messrs. M'Connell and
Co.'s Sedgwick Mill, Manchester, of bobbins breaking ; being short of
doffing tins ; and of the men on six pairs of mules being unable to earn
the basis wages.

January 12th. — From our men at Waterloo Mill, Bolton, comes a
complaint of the rooms being too cold, and also irregular running of the
engine.

January 19th. — Have tested the counts at Melrose Mill, and found
the average 2^^ hanks wrong. The men are to leave work at breakfast
time to-morrow if counts are not put right.

April 7th, 1893. — Mr. Percival and myself, at the request of Messrs.
James Marsden and Sons, went through their No. 4 Mill to look at the
spinning on the counts complained of on Tuesday. We found it below
the usual standard at this firm, and Mr. Joseph Marsden undertook to
see to its rectification.

^ Proceedings of Joint Committee on 14th November 1S91 [Noj'thumberland
Aliners' Mhuites, 1891).

The Standard Rate 313

April loth. — Want of window blinds is the complaint from our men
at the Parkside Mill, Golborne.

April 1 8th. — Our members at Messrs. Robert Haworth, Ltd., Castle
Hill Mill, Hindley, complain of the overbearing conduct of their over-
looker. On investigation, found that they were more to blame than
the overlooker.

May 9th. — The drosophore humidifier at Robin Hood, No. 2 Mill,
is so detrimental to the health of the men that I am to request the firm
not to use it further.

June 1 2th. — Mr. Percival, Mr. Robinson, and myself went to Howe-
bridge Mills to test counts in No. 2 Mill. We found them fully one
hank finer than are paid for. The firm promise to put them right, but
that is not sufficient for us, as they will be wrong again before the week
end. We suggested they should adopt payment by indicator, and the
firm subsequently agreed to try a few pairs. ^

We see the same determination to obtain identical pay-
ment for identical effort in the Trade Union regulations
enforcing specific additions for extra exertion or incon-
venience. Hence the " Working Rules," drawn up in almost
every town by the master builders and the several sections
of building operatives, include, besides the standard rate
for the normal hours and ordinary work, determinate charges
for " walking time " beyond a certain distance, and " lodging
money" when sent away from home.^ In trades in which
men provide their own steel tools-, " grinding money " is a
usual extra.^ When any class of work involves special un-
pleasantness or injury to clothing, " black money " or " dirty
money " is sometimes stipulated for. Thus, the boilermakers
and engineers receive extra rates for jobs connected with
oil-carrying vessels. " Men working inside the ballast-tanks or
between the deep floors under the engine-beds, after the vessel
has been regularly employed at sea, to receive one quarter

^ These diaries are printed in the Annual Reports of the Bolton Operative
Cotton-spinners' Provincial Association.

2 See, for instance, the Local Code of Rziles for the Guidmice of Masons,
signed by the Central Association of Master Builders of London and the Friendly
Society of Operative Stonemasons, 23rd June 1892.

2 " Pattern-makers, millwrights, and machine joiners on dismissal must receive
two hours' notice, so as to grind their tools, or be paid two hours in lieu thereof."
London By-laws of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, April 1894, clause iv.
Rule vi. p. 7.

314 Trade Union Function

day, or two and a quarter hours extra for each full day or night,
as compensation for the very dirty work." ^ The foregoing are
all instances of " extras " charged by Trade Unions of time-
workers. But we find a similar list put forward by Trade
Unions on a piecework basis. The National Union of Boot
and Shoe Operatives prescribes, in minute and technical
detail, for a long list of extra pieces of work, to be specially
paid for. And a large part of the length and complication
of the well-known " scale " of the Compositors is due to their
insistence on explicitly defined extra rates for every kind
of composition involving more labor than " common matter."
It is impossible to convey any adequate idea of the number
and variety of the " extras " thus formally agreed to between
employers and employed : " bottom notes," " side notes,"
" under runners," " small chases," " large pages," " pamphlets,"
" catalogues," " undisplayed broadsheets," " table work,"
" column work," "parallel matter," "split fractions," "superiors,"
" inferiors," " slip matter," " interlinear matter," " prefatory
matter," " indices," " appendices," and what not. Finally, as
if to discourage vain learning, Hebrew, Arabic, and Syriac,
and similar languages, together with " pedigrees," are " to be
paid double the price of common matter." ^

We do not think that, after so long and detailed an
examination of the Standard Rate, we need weary the reader
by any lengthy exposition of the Trade Union regulations
prohibiting arbitrary fines and deductions, or any form of
" truck." It may seem unreasonable for the workmen to
object to the employer's system of maintaining discipline in
the factory. But if that system takes the form of imposition
of fines for minor offences, and, as is usually the case, the
employer puts the fines into his own pocket, it is clear that
the average amount of the fines per week is, in effect, an
exactly proportionate reduction of the Standard Rate. An
employer using this method of enforcing the necessary

^ Rule VI. of By-laws for the Mersey District, United Society of Boiler-
makers. 1889.

2 The London Scale of Prices for Compositors' Work. 1891.

The Standard Rate

o^D

discipline finds himself buying his labor cheaper than his
competitors, by an amount varying precisely in proportion
to the frequency and severity of the penalties which he him-
self imposes.^ The same arbitrary character attaches to the
once universal system of making the operatives pay for minor
breakages, or for incidental requirements of their work. " In
the good old times of low wages, irregular work, and poor
living," ironically writes an official of the Cotton-spinners,
" operatives used to have to pay for broken bobbins, gas,
new brushes, find their own oil-cans, renew parts of their
machines that got broken, and no end of other nice little
things that made a fair hole in their wages." " Against all
these practices the Cotton-spinners have long since made
good their protest. The Cotton-weavers, of whom a large
majority are women, are still occasionally imposed upon, and
the rules of their unions accordingly still include a peremptory
injunction against submitting to any such deductions. " Never
pay, or agree to pay," say, for instance, the Preston rules,
" for any shuttles, forks, brushes, or any piece of machinery,
matter, or thing belonging to the master, or used in his
business in any way whatsoever, except what you may have
by sheer negligence wilfully or maliciously broken or de-
stroyed ; and if they stop it from your wages, bring the case
before the Committee at their next meeting." ^ But it is not

1 A system of fines may be less objectionable if the money goes to the
operatives' sick club, or some other fund for their common benefit. But sick
clubs or superannuation funds connected with particular establishments, especially
if membership is compulsory, are objectionable from the Trade Union point of
view on other grounds, notably that of diminishing the operative's independence.
This subject is further examined in the chapter on " The Implications of Trade
Unionism."

2 Cottott Factory Times, 22nd July 1892.

3 Rules of the Prestoti and District Power Loom Weavers' Association (Preston,
1891), p. 20.

In piecework trades, the employer seeks to escape paying for any but perfect
articles, and usually claims the right to reject, without appeal, any that he chooses.
This has led to a whole series of conflicts in different industries. The Trade
Unionist contention has been ( i ) that the operative should not be made to suffer
for failures due to the imperfection of material, or defects in the process ; (2) that
in any case, if the employer refuses to pay anything for the work on the ground
of its imperfection, he should not retain the article for his own profit, but destroy

3i6 Trade Union Function

only such arbitrary charges as fines and deductions, which
necessarily vary from mill to mill, that are fundamentally
inconsistent with the collective settlement of a Standard
Rate. Even such uniform, regular, and definite payments
as the " loom rent " of the hand-working weaver of cotton,
silk, or carpets, the frame rent of the hosiery worker, and the
trough or wheel rent of the Sheffield cutler, have been found,
by long and painful experience, to be equally destructive of
any definite standard of earnings. This arises from their
being continuous and calculated by time, whilst the operative's
work is irregular and paid for by the piece. In all these
cases rent of the machine is exacted by the employer whether
the operative is given work or not. Thus, as the framework
knitters allege, when they paid rent for their frames, the
employers were tempted to spin out the work over much
longer periods than was necessary, doling it out in very small
portions in order to keep them paying rent as long as

it ; and (3) that there should be some means of appeal against the employer's
arbitrary judgment in his own cause. Thus the Potters have fought a long battle
for the last sixty years against the condition termed "good from oven," by which
the workman is only paid for such articles as come out perfect from the firing
oven. As he has no power to select material, and no control over the firing of
the oven, this condition throws upon him not only the cost of his own negligence,
but also that due to imperfection of raw material, defects of fixed plant, and care-
lessness of foremen or other operatives. It is a further aggravation that the
employer arbitrarily decides which articles should be rejected as imperfect, and
was formerly even free to retain and sell those which he had thus escaped paying
for. After the great strike of 1836 the Staffordshire Potters succeeded in
remedying the latter grievance. It was agreed that articles rejected as imperfect
should be broken up, a great temptation being thus removed from unscrupulous
employers. But "good from oven " still remains the basis of payment, the
Trade Union demand of "good from hand "being still resisted by the employers.
In the same way the Glass Bottle Makers, who have several rules in their agree-
ments with their employers defining minutely the circumstances under which
men may or may not be charged for spoiled work, have one declaring "that
bottles picked out (as spoiled) be not broken down until the men have had an
opportunity of inspecting them, but in no case shall they be kept beyond the
following day." Article 10 of the Agreement for 1895 , . . between the York-
shire Glass Bottle Manufacturers' Association, and the Glass Bottle Makers of
Yorkshire United Trade Protection Society (Castleford, 1895).

A particularly aggravated form of the same grievance is resisted by the
Friendly Society of Ironfounders, whose members are all paid by time. Not-
withstanding this, and the fact that they neither choose the raw material nor
direct the process, attempts are from time to time made by employers to make
deductions for castings which turn out badly.

The Standard Rate 317

possible. And the Macclesfield silk-weavers complain that
they are kept always half employed, the giver-out of work
finding his advantage in getting it done on as many separate
looms as possible, from each of which a full weekly rent is
derived. It is easy to see how such a system may open a
way for personal tyranny and exaction. It is more to our
immediate purpose to notice how incompatible it is with
Collective Bargaining and a Standard Rate. If the employer
can give out work in unequal quantities to different operatives,
but deduct from each an equal sum at the end of the week,
no fixed piecework list will secure identical pay for identical
work. If A is given thirty pieces to weave, and B only
fifteen, both may be paid at the same rate of a shilling per
piece, and both may pay the same loom rent of five shillings
per week. Yet at the end of the week the net remuneration
for weaving one piece will have been to A tenpence and to
B eightpence. Thus the rate of payment for identical work
will vary from operative to operative, from week to week,
and even from firm to firm, according to the way in which,
at the uncontrolled discretion of the employers, the work is
distributed.^ A similar objection applies, it will be seen, to
the whole system of " truck," or the compulsory purchase by
the operatives of commodities or materials supplied by the
employers.^ This is resisted by the unions on the larger

^ Many minor payments similar in principle to loom rent exist in various
industries. Where the operatives are unorganised, and especially if they are
women or girls, employers are apt to attempt to charge them for some part of the
manufacturing process, or for incidental stores or material. This is sometimes
done to avoid the cost and trouble of proper supervision to prevent waste and
breakages. In other cases it arises as an incident of a growing specialisation of
function. Thus, cotton-weavers used to oil their own looms, but the employers
found that it was better done by a professional oiler, who was thereupon
employed. Any attempt to deduct even a penny per week per pair of looms to
pay his wages is peremptorily stopped by the Weavers' union. Similar develop-
ments of specialisation in cotton-spinning might be cited — the uprise of the
'* strap-piecer " and the "bobbin-carrier" for instance. But no deduction for
their wages is permitted by the Cotton-spinners' unions {^Cotton Factory Times,
lOth June 1892). Women woollen weavers are, however, still made to pay the
"tuner" of their looms, his work of "setting " the warp and weft being done by
the male weavers for themselves.

2 The Miners' Conference in 1863 made this a special subject of complaint.
"The truck system still prevails in Scotland and Wales, despite of both equity

o

1 8 Ti'ade Union Function

ground that it amounts to an insidious enslavement of the
wage-earner and his family. But it is also inconsistent with
any uniformity in the net rate at which employers obtain
their labor, and with definite standard of real income of the
wage-earner under such a system, notwithstanding a nominal
uniformity of rate, both labor cost and real wages will vary
according to the extent of the truck business in each firm,
the economy and ability with which this subsidiary store-
keeping is managed, and the profit or " loading " which each
employer chooses to exact, the latter amounting, in effect, to
a fraud upon the workman.^

We see, therefore, that the adoption of a Standard Rate
— that is, of payment for labor according to some definite
standard, uniform in its application — is not by any means
so simple a matter as would at first sight appear. Whether
we accept payment by the hour or payment by the piece,
so great are the complications of modern industry, and so
ingenious are the devices for evasion, that a long series of
subsidiary regulations is found necessary to defend the main
position. The whole argument for this series of subsidiary

and law. That no man should be forced, as a condition of work, to spend his
money on necessaries for the benefit of his employer is both law and reason. In
Scotland . . . the men are only paid by the fortnight, the month, or longer ;
and in the interim tickets for food or clothing are furnished, by which, at certain
shops, articles are furnished at an enormous overcharge above a fair market
average of cost. In some cases the poor collier rarely sees current coin, all being
forestalled betwixt the term of pay and work. . . . Allied to this, in Stafford-
shire and elsewhere, the butties and doggies, or middlemen, still continue to
influence and compel the colliers to spend part of their wages in drink, as a
condition of employment. In other cases, in Yorkshire, candles and powder
must be purchased of the steward, or some other man, at exorbitant prices above
the market rate of profit." — Trarisactions ar.d Remits of the National Association
of Coal, Lime, and Irciistonc Miners of Great Britain (London, 1863), p. xi.

These practices have now been stopped by the miners' unions in all well-
organised districts. Similar grievances are, however, still complained of in some
other trades, where the operatives are powerless to insist on the Truck Acts being
obeyed in spirit as well as in the letter.

1 "^Mierever the workmen are paid in goods, or are compelled to purchase
at the master's shop, the evils are ver}- great ; much injustice is done to tlie men,
and much misery results from it. "Whatever may have been the intentions of the
master in such a case, the real effect is to deceive the ivorkman as to the amount
he receives in exchange for his labor.''' — On the Economy of Machinery and
Manufactures, by Charles Babbage (London, 1S32), p. 255.

The Standard Rate 3 1 9

regulations rests, it is clear, upon the principal contention.
It seems, therefore, worth while to rehearse the Trade
Unionist's argument. We have seen that it is a fundamental
article of the Trade Union faith that it is impossible, in a
system of competitive industry, to prevent the degradation
of the Standard of Life, unless the conditions of labor are
settled, not by Individual Bargaining, but by some Common
Rule, But, without the uniform application of some common
standard, collective settlement of these conditions, whether
by bargain, arbitration, or law, is plainly impossible.^ Where
employer is competing with employer, each will claim that,
if he must forego the chances of Individual Bargaining, he
should at any rate be made to pay no more for his labor
than his rivals. With this contention the Trade Unionist
heartily agrees, and thus we get admitted, as the basis of the
Common Rule, the principle of identical pay for identical
effort, or, as it is usually termed, the Standard Rate. This,
as we have seen, is the very opposite to equality of wages.
How accurately this principle of identical pay for identical
effort can be applied to the varying capacities of different
workmen, or to the varying difficulties of particular tasks,
whether it can be most precisely carried into effect by
payment by time or payment by the piece, depends upon the
character of the process and the intelligence and integrity of
the parties. But it is obviously futile to settle, by collective
regulation of any kind, a Standard Rate of identical pay for
identical effort, if an unscrupulous employer is free to evade
this by demanding extra work or additional wear and tear ;
by deducting anything from the wage agreed upon ; or by

^ The dependence of combination among workmen upon the existence of a
Standard Rate was well expressed, from the employer's point of view, by
Alexander Galloway, the well-known engineer, and friend to Francis Place. " I
have always found that in those employments where the wages were uniform . . .
there have always been combinations among those men. Now in all those trades
where the men have made their own individual engagements, we never see any-
thing like combinations. . . . That which has struck most effectually at the
root of all combination among workmen is to pay every man according to his
merit, and to allow him to make his own agreement with his employer." — Evidence
in First Report of Committee on Artisans and Machinery, 1S24, p. 27.

320 Trade Union Fimction

obtaining, at the cost of his workmen, by any transaction
with them, any other monetary advantage whatever. In
short, if the fundamental object of Trade Unionism, the
enforcement of a Common Rule, has any justification at all,
the principle of the Standard Rate must be conceded, and
if a Standard Rate is admitted, the subsidiary regulations
which we have described follow as a matter of course.

This general conclusion in favor of a Standard Rate —
a point on which every Trade Unionist would unhesitatingly
agree — leaves many questions with regard to wages unsettled.
One of these is, on what principle, and to what extent, the
Standard Rate should, in the same industry, vary from town to
town. The employers in the out-of-the-way districts are apt
to contend that the workman must put up with a low rate,
because of the inferiority of their machinery, their heavy
charges for freight, and other local disadvantages. But there
seems no reason why the workman should lower his standard
of life, and forego his claim to identical pay for identical
effort, merely because the capitalist chooses to carry on his
business amid unprofitable surroundings. Whether Trade
Unionists should go in for equality of nominal wages (a
uniform national standard rate), or, making allowance for
difference in the cost of living, claim only equality of real
wages (involving varying local rates), has never been settled
in principle. There are obvious practical difficulties in
carrying out the latter idea, as it is impossible to measure
with any precision differences in the cost of living in different
districts. Accordingly we find most of the " county " unions,
especially those of the cotton operatives and coalminers,
aiming at a uniform county rate, irrespective of local circum-
stances. Similarly, the strong old union of hand paper-
makers, working entirely in a few small provincial towns,
easily maintains a uniform rate for the whole industry.^ But

^ A uniform Standard Rate is said to have formed one of the principal demands
of the great French strike of 1791, which extended to many trades and to all
parts of France (Du Cellier, Histoire des Classes Laborieuses en France, pp. 320
322 ; Decree of the National Assembly of 14th June 1791).

The Standard Rate 321

directly the cost of living becomes appreciably different, even
the strongest unions admit variations in local rates. The
Journeymen Hatters' Fair Trade Union of Great Britain and
Ireland, the old-established society of silk hat makers, has a
uniform price list, but allows its London branch to add 10
per cent to the general rates. When we come to the larger
and more widely distributed unions, we see the widest
possible divergence. Thus the 631 branches of the Amal-
gamated Society of Carpenters in Great Britain and Ireland
recognise no fewer than twenty rates, varying from 5d. per
hour in Truro to lod. per hour in London. Here, as in
many other cases, we may well doubt whether even equality
of real wages has been attained. Not only has there been
no attempt by any large union to secure a national uniform
rate, but there is a tendency for officers and executive
committees to be apathetic with regard to the process of
" levelling up," which would be necessary to obtain equality
of real wages. The result is that Trade Unionism cannot be
said yet to have progressed beyond the securing of a local
Standard Rate. This leaves the workmen exposed to the
constant attempts of employers to " level down " the rates in
the better-paid districts, in order, as they assert, to meet the
competition of the lower -paid districts. Our own idea is
that the assumed differences in the cost of living, taking one
thing with another, resolve themselves practically into differ-
ences in the rent of a workman's dwelling. The expedient of
the Hatters seems, therefore, the most practical thing to aim at.
There would be many advantages in the enforcement of a
uniform Standard Rate in all districts of an industry, treating
all provincial towns and urban districts on an equality, but
adding a percentage for the exceptional high rents payable
in London, and, if necessary, deducting a percentage in
respect of the very low rents in a purely agricultural district,
in the cases in which, as in the building trades, the industry
comprises both town and country. These percentages could
be calculated on easily ascertained and undisputed facts.^
1 Instead of a uniform Standard Rate for all the establishments in each town
VOL. I Y

32 2 Trade Union Function

A more obvious problem with regard to wages must be
deferred to a subsequent chapter. We can imagine that the
reader has had in his mind an uneasy feehng that we are
evading what he conceives to be the crucial point, namely,
the share of the joint product to be allotted for the remunera-
tion of the manual labor. But the Trade Union Regulation
with which we are dealing — the insistence on a Standard
Rate — is not an end but a means : not any particular sum
of money per week, but a device for obtaining for the whole
body of competitors something better than they would
get by Individual Bargaining. Thus the Sheffield Fork-
grinders, the Dock Laborers, the Engineers, and the Steel
Smelters all insist on the Standard Rate. But if we look at
the weekly earnings for which each trade is fighting, we find

or district, we occasionally find attempts to enforce two or three different rates for
what are assumed to be different grades of work. Thus the Scottish Tailors
recognise in m^y towns two, and in Glasgow and Edinburgh three classes of
shops, those requiring a better quality of tailoring being compelled to pay a half-
penny or even a penny per hour more than the lowest Trade Union rate. The
custom is for the employers to classify themselves, the union objecting if any
attempt is made, for instance, to get "dress goods" (superfine black broadcloth)
made at the second-class rate, or (in Edinburgh and Glasgow) "tweeds" at the
third class. In so far as these different rates correspond to real and ascertainable
differences in the class of work, they are, it is clear, not inconsistent with the
principle of a uniform Standard Rate. In some cases, however, the different
rates depend more on the custom and tradition of the various shops than upon any
definite difference in the work done. Thus the London branch of the National
Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives has long recognised three different
" Statements," applying respectively to firms deemed first, second, or third class.
An establishment which has hitherto paid the first-class "Statement" is not
allowed to do any work at a lower "Statement," for fear this should lead
insidiously to the reduction of the rates of the first-class men. On the other hand,
there is nothing to prevent a firm, hitherto classed as third or second class, from
making at these lower rates goods nearly identical with those usually produced at
the first-class "Statement." The result is that the first-class firms are always
finding themselves undersold (or at any rate, believing themselves to be under-
sold) by enterprising firms on the second-class statement. The employers and
the experienced officials of the union have, for ten years, been urging the
abolition of these separate " Statements," and the preparation of the uniform list
for all London firms, with carefully giadated piecework rates for every kind of
boot. Hitherto all attempts at uniformity have broken down, owing mainly to
the rooted belief of the union that no reduction of existing rates ought anywhere
to be conceded. As a consequence, the first-class employers are said to find a
constantly increasing difficulty in maintaining their position in London. The
controversy can be best followed in the Shoe and Leather Record for the last ten
years.

The Standard Rate 323

this varying from twenty-four shillings a week up to three
times that amount. One thing will be clear, even to the
most superficial observer. There is, in the Trade Union
world of to-day, absolutely no trace of any desire for
equality of wages. The cardroom operatives in a Lanca-
shire Cotton mill, earning from ten to twenty shillings a
week, will unhesitatingly come out on strike to assist the
cotton-spinners to maintain a Standard Rate, paid out of
the products of the combined labor of the two sections,
averaging forty shillings a week. The local federations of
the building trades, whose members work side by side
at the same job, collectively insist, in their treaties
with the employers, on half a dozen different rates per
hour for the different crafts, the Stonemason habitually
getting fifty per cent more than the Builders' Laborer, and
the rates, in the present generation, showing no tendency
to approximate. Unanimity of Trade Union policy
does not, in fact, extend beyond the use of a common
device. How much money each trade will claim, no less
than how much each will actually receive, depends, in
practice, on the traditions, customs, and present opportunities
of the particular trade and section concerned. The ex-
pectations and aspirations of the operatives, the arguments
adduced in justification of their demands, and, to some
extent, the particular Trade Union Method employed
to enforce them, will, as we shall show in our chapter on
the Assumptions of Trade Unionism, depend principally
on the Doctrine or Doctrines as to social expediency by
which the policy of the particular union is, for the time
being, directed.

CHAPTER VI

THE NORMAL DAY

After the Standard Rate, the most universal of the Trade
Union Regulations is what we have termed the Normal
Day, the determination of a uniform maximum working
time for all the members of a craft.^ This claim to fix the
limits of the working day is peculiar to the manual-working
wage -earner. Corporations of lawyers, doctors, architects,
and other professional brainworkers insist, with more or less
stringency, on scales of minimum fees, below which no
practitioner is allowed to undertake work. But the con-
ception of a precise Common Rule as to the hours during
which an individual shall work is foreign both to the pro-

^ By the term "Normal Day" we mean the "maximum working day" of
Schaffle {Theory and Practice of Labour Protection, London, 1893) ^^^'^
Frankenstein {Der Arbeiterschutz, Leipzig, 1896), not the elaborately equated
"normal day" of Rodbertus {Der Normalarbeitstag, Berlin, 187 1), varying
according to the assumed intensity of labor in different occupations. The latter
academic conception has never penetrated to the minds either of English Trade
Unionists or German Social Democrats.

From the economic standpoint there has been as yet little scientific investi-
gation of the results of fixing the maximum working day. The Eight Hours
Day, by Sidney Webb and Harold Cox (London, 1891), and E. L. Jaeger's
Geschichte und Literatur des Normalarbeittages (Stuttgart, 1892) give the
principal references, to which may now be added Hadfield and Gibbins' A
Shorter Working Day (London, 1892) ; C. Deneus, La Journie de Huit
Heures (Ghent, 1893); H. Stephan, Der Normalarbeitstag (L&i'^zig, 1893);
Professor L. Brentano's Ueber das Verhaltniss von Arbeitslohn und Arbeit szeit
zur Arbeitsleistung (Leipzig, 1893), translated as Hours and Wages in Relation
to Production (London, 1894); John Rae, Eight Hours for Work (London,
1S94) ; and Maurice Ansiaux, Heures de Travail et Salaires (Paris, 1896),

The Normal Day 325

pertied and to the brain-working class. Nor has it always
characterised the wage -earners. The trade clubs of the
eighteenth century claimed a legal rate of wages, or a standard
list of prices, they insisted on a limitation of apprentices, or
sought to enforce the Elizabethan Statutes ; but not until
the close of the century do we find any widespread com-
plaints of the length or irregularity of the working day.
From the beginning of the present century the demand for
a deliberately fixed limit of hours for each day's work, to
be arranged either by Collective Bargaining or by Legal
Enactment, has spread from one occupation to another,
until to-day the great majority of the Trade Unions make
the regulation of working hours one of their foremost objects.
Nevertheless, there exist even to-day small sections of the
working class world who resist any Common Rule as to
their hours, and prefer that each individual should be free to
labor when and for as long as he may choose. We have,
therefore, to seek some explanation, not only of the present
popularity of the idea of a Normal Day, but also of its
comparatively modern growth, and of its rejection by certain
sections of Trade Unionists.

In modern industry the settlement of the hours of labor
differs in an essential particular from that of the rate of
payment for the work done. In the absence of any form
of collective regulation, the rates of wages are determined
by Individual Bargaining between the capitalist employer
and his several " hands " ; and a distinct and varying
agreement as ,'to the amount of remuneration is made with
each operative in turn. This is seldom the case with
regard to the length and distribution of the working day.
In all the numerous industries in which work is not done
on the employer's premises, but is still " given out " to be
done at home, the manual worker, paid " by the piece," is as
free as the author, doctor, or conveyancer, to fix the number
of hours, and the exact part of the day or week or year,
that he chooses to spend in labor. He has, of course, like
the professional man, to suit the convenience of his clients.

326 Trade Union Ftmction

He must be on the spot to receive work when it comes, and
he must finish it by the time it is required. He must be
willing to do extra work in the busy season, and even to
turn night into day to cope with a special rush of orders.
But subject to this condition, each man can settle for him-
self the exact hours at which he will begin his work, and the
intervals he will allow himself for meals and rest. Unless he
is driven, by reason of the low rate at which he is paid, to
work " all the hours God made " in order to get bare
subsistence, he may break off when he likes to gossip with
a friend or slip round to the public-house ; he may, in the
intervals, nurse a sick wife or child ; and he can even
arrange to spend the morning in his garden, or doing odd
jobs about the house. No one acquainted with the daily
life of the home-working, skilled craftsman, earning " good
money," will ignore the large use that such a man makes of
his freedom. For good or for evil his working hours are
determined by his own idiosyncrasies. Whether he desires
to earn much, or is content with little ; whether he is a slow
worker or a quick one ; whether he is a precise and punctual
person governing himself and his family by rigid rules, or
whether he is " endowed with an artistic temperament,"
and needs to recover on Monday and Tuesday from the
"expansion" of the preceding days — these personal character-
istics will determine the limits and distribution of his working
time.^

1 The injurious effect upon the personal character of the " average sensual
man " of this freedom to stop working whenever he feels inclined, is referred to
in our chapter on " The Implications of Trade Unionism." The axiom that the
vast majority of the manual workers, like other men, are the better for a certain
degree of discipline, would not find ready acceptance among the rank and file of
Trade Unionists, and, therefore, can hardly be given as a Trade Union argument
in favor of a Normal Day. But the more thoughtful workmen would concur
with the dictum of an early admirer of the factory system, that when operatives
were " obliged to be more regular in their attendance at their work, they became
more orderly in their conduct, spent less time at the ale-house, and lived better
at home" (^Memoirs of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society,
Second series, London, 181 9, vol. iii. p. 129, in a paper "On the Rise and
Progress of the Cotton Trade," read in 1S15 by John Kennedy). "I always
observed," wrote an old compositor in 1859, "that those trades who had settled
wages, such as masons, wrights, painters, etc., and who ^vere obliged to attend

The Normal Day 327

Very different is the position of the factory operative.
Instead of each individual being able to work as he chooses,
the whole establishment finds itself, by the nature of things,
subject to a Common Rule. In a textile mill, a coal mine, a
shipbuilding yard, an engineering firm, or a great building
operation it is economically impossible to permit the individual
workman to come or go as he feels inclined. Each worker
forms part of a complex co-operative process, needing for its
proper fulfilment an exact dovetailing of the task of every
machine and every " hand " in the work as a whole. To
arrange particular hours of labor to suit the varying
desires, capacities, and needs of the different operatives,
.would be obviously incompatible with the economical use
of steam power, the full employment of plant, or the highly
organised specialisation brought about by division of labor.
There is no longer a choice between idiosyncrasy and uni-
formity. A common standard, compulsory in its application,
is economically inevitable. The only question is how and
by whom the uniform rule shall be determined. In the
absence of collective regulation, whether in the form of Legal
Enactment or Collective Bargaining, this uniform rule is
naturally made by the employer.-^ And it is a special
aggravation of this subordination, that, under the circum-
stances of the modern capitalist industry, the employer's
decision will perpetually be biassed in favor of lengthening
the working day. With regard to his domestic servants,
the capitalist is free to determine the amount of toil solely
with a view of keeping them in the highest possible efficiency.
But the same man investing capital in expensive machines,
worked by power, finds, even when he pays by the piece, a

regularly at stated hours, were not so much addicted to day drinking as printers,
bookbinders, tailors, shoemakers, and those tradesmen who generally were on
piecework, and not so much restf-icted in regard to their attendance at work except
when it was particularly wanted." — Scottish Typographical Circular, March
1859.

^ " It should always be remembered," remark the Cotton-spinners in i860
•'that anterior to the introduction of factory legislation, the employers dictated
the hours of labor to their work-people." — Rtiles of the Afnalgamated Association
of Operative Cotton-spinners, edition of i860, preface.

328 Trade Union Function

positive profit in every additional moment that his costly
plant is being employed. Competition is always forcing
him to cut down the cost of production to the lowest
possible point. Under this pressure other considerations
disappear in the passion to obtain the greatest possible
" output per machine." ^

Between these two historic types of the domestic handi-
craftsman and the factory operative, there are various
intermediate forms in which Individual Bargaining as to the
hours of labor is as possible as Individual Bargaining with
regard to the rate of payment. In occupations such as
agriculture, and even in special departments of the great
industries, it is at any rate practicable for an employer to
vary the hours of his several workpeople, or, in other words,
to make, if he likes, a bargain with each according to his
capacity, just as the ordinary capitalist claims to be allowed
to pay each man " according to his merit." Where this is
the case, the workman's need for a Normal Day depends
on considerations strictly analogous to those which cause
him to need a Standard Rate. If each workman is free to
conclude what bargain he chooses with regard to his working
hours, the employer will, it is contended, be able to use the
desires or exigencies of particular individuals as a means of
compelling all the others to accept the same longer working
day.

So far we have considered the Trade Union demand for
a Normal Day only in relation to the personal freedom of
the operative to take such leisure as he may deem necessary

^ "The great proportion of fixed to circulating capital . . . makes long
hours of work desirable. . . . The motives to long hours of work will become
greater, as the only means by which a large proportion of fixed capital can
be made profitable. When a laborer," said Mr. Ashworth to me, "lays
down his spade, he renders useless for that period a capital worth eighteenpence.
When one of our people leaves the mill, he renders useless a capital that has
cost ^100." — Nassau Senior, Letters on the Factory Act (London, i337),
pp. I1-14.

" Hence that remarkable phenomenon in the history of modern industry, that
machinery sweeps away every moral and natural restriction on the length of the
working day." — Marx, Capital, Part iv. ch. xv. sec. 3 (vol. ii. p. 406 of
Ejtglish Translation of 1S87).

The Normal Day 329

or desirable. But to the Trade Unionist, as to the rank and
file of the manual working class, the length of the day's work
and the amount left over for leisure is of secondary import-
ance beside the vital question of the sum earned. Keen as
is the average workman to secure more time to himself, he
is far keener to obtain more money to spend. In all time-
work trades in which Trade Unionism exists the operative
gets extra pay for extra hours, usually at a higher rate,
whilst the whole race of pieceworkers obviously increase
their earnings by working overtime.^ Every progressive
lengthening of the working day would therefore seem to
bring with it, as a compensating advantage, a corresponding
increase in the weekly income of the wage-earner.^

1 In certain unorganised occupations men, and especially women, are still
required to work longer hours to cope with a press of orders without getting any
additional payment for the extra labor. But this is seldom the case in trades in
which there is any kind of organisation.

2 This is exactly how it appears to the well-to-do literary man. Thus, Mr.
Lecky is much concerned at the diminution of earnings which he supposes to
be caused by the Factoiy Acts. " Take, for example, the common case of
a strong girl who is engaged in millinery. For, perhaps, nine months
of the year her life is one of constant struggle, anxiety, and disappoint-
ment, owing to the slackness of her work. At last the season comes
bringing with it an abundant harvest of work, which, if she were allowed
to reap it, would enable her in a few weeks to pay off the little debts
which weigh so heavily upon her, and to save enough to relieve her from all
anxiety in the ensuing year. She desires passionately to avail herself of her
opportunity. She knows that a few weeks of toil prolonged far into the night
will be well within her strength, and not more really injurious than the long
succession of nights that are spent in the ball-room by the London beauty whom
she dresses. But the law interposes, forbids her to work beyond the stated hours,
dashes the cup from her thirsty lips, and reduces her to the same old round of
poverty and debt. What oppression of the poor can be more real and more
galling than this?" — Democracy mrd Liberty (London, 1896), vol. ii. p. 342.

It is interesting to contrast with this imaginary instance the reports of the
responsible women officials who are in actual contact with facts, and conversant
with the views of the operatives. Writing in 1894, Miss May Abraham (the
Senior Woman Factory Inspector) reports that " by dressmakers and milliners . . .
legal overtime is almost universally condemned. A dressmaker's assistant, whose
legal working day had, for a considerable period, lasted from 8 A.M. to 10 P.M.,
said to me in the presence of her fellow-workers, ' The overtime exception just
spoils the Factory Act.' The chorus of approval with which her remark was
endorsed was a clear indication of general discontent, and further experience
showed that this had been but one expression of an almost universal feeling. . . .
In factories where the payment is by piecework, or in some districts, as in
Dublin, where a stipulated sum is allowed for overtime, the weight of hostile

330 Trade Union Function

Now, if Trade Unionists believed that this apparent
result was the real result, — that freedom to work longer hours
invariably, or even usually, meant a corresponding increase
of income, — we doubt whether there would have arisen any
general movement in favor of limiting the hours of labor.
But, rightly or wrongly. Trade Unionists are convinced that
irregular or unlimited hours have an insidious influence upon
wages, first upon the Standard Rate and ultimately upon
the amount earned by each man per week.

This conviction springs from the personal experience of
the manual working wage-earner. At any Trade Union
meeting where the hours of labor are discussed, it may
happen that a young and energetic member will suggest
that he would prefer a larger income to increased leisure.
But one old member after another will get up and explain
that as a young married man he had felt the same, but that
experience of workshop life had taught him that " what was
gained in hours was lost in rates " — an assertion which finds
immediate and unhesitating confirmation from the bulk of
the meeting. If after the meeting the visitor argues the
point with the leading men, and suggests that their personal
experience may not warrant so large a generalisation as that
a lengthening of hours will necessarily lead to a reduction
of the rate of payment per hour or per piece, they will
retort by asking, why it is that Royal Commissions and
official statistics are always laying bare this almost universal
coincidence between long and irregular hours, low rates of
pay, and small weekly earnings. Nor will they fail to give
an explanation, based on actual experience. " Our members,"

opinion is not so pronounced ; but even here, with the inducement of a supple-
mentary wage, it is only the most unthinking of the workers who favor the
system. . . . The consequent effect on the health of the workers is exceedingly
injurious ... I believe . . . that by the workers [the abolition of all over-
time] would be welcomed with feelings of the warmest gratitude " {Report of the
Chief Inspector of Factories for 1893, C. 736S of 1894, p. 11). This and other
reports contain abundant confirmation of Miss Abraham's view. "Could a
secret ballot be taken," says Mr. Cramp, one of the Superintending Inspectors,
" of all the workers affected by the overtime clauses of the Factory and Workshop
Acts, I am convinced that very few would be found voting for its continuance."
— Ibid. p. 299.

The Normal Day 3 3 1

they will say, " look on thirty shillings as a fair week's wage.
If they make it, they are content ; if they don't make thirty
shillings, they come to the branch and complain. When
a master increases the hours, say from fifty-four to sixty, it
seems at first a clear gain to the men, who make more money.
Presently, on some excuse, the foreman announces a ten per
cent cut in rates. The men grumble, but as most of them
will still make thirty shillings a week, they put up with a
reduction against which they would certainly have come out,
if it had meant their only making twenty-seven shillings.
After a time the weaker men find they can't keep up their
output for such long hours. In a few months, the average
weekly earnings of the shop will have dropped, and the men
will be wearing themselves out for even less money at the
end of the week than they had before. Again and again
we have seen this happen, and no amount of middle-class
theory will make us believe it is not so."

The Trade Union official who has read his economic text-
book will put the argument in more systematic form. When
an employer engages a laborer at so much a week, the
length of the working day clearly forms an integral part of
the wage-contract. A workman who agrees to work longer
time for the same money underbids his fellows just as
surely as if he offered to work the same time for less money.
He sells each hour's work at a lower rate. Among all time-
workers, therefore, who are paid by the day, week, or month,
the insistence on a Normal Day is a necessary element in
the maintenance of their Standard Rate.

Where piecework prevails, or where the time-worker is
paid by the hour, the case is, to the Trade Unionist, no less
clear. At first sight it would seem that liberty to work for
longer hours leaves the Standard Rate unaffected, whilst it
increases the amount of the weekly earnings of industrious
men. This seems so obvious to the middle-class mind that
employers have for generations been honestly unable to
understand why a pieceworking Trade Union should concern
itself about the hours of labor at all. According to the

332 Trade Union Function

Trade Unionists, this is to ignore the plain teaching of
economics, as well as the experience of practical men. To
them it seems obvious that the actual earnings of any class
of workers are largely determined by its Standard of Com-
fort, that is to say, the kind and amount of food, clothing,
and other commodities to which the class has become firmly
accustomed.^ It would not be easy to persuade an English
engineer to work at his trade for thirteen shillings a week,
however excessive might be the supply of engineers. Rather
than do such violence to his own self-respect, he would work
as a laborer, or even sweep a crossing. On the other hand,
however much in request a Dorsetshire laborer might find
himself it would not enter into his head to ask two pounds a
week for his work. There is, in fact, the Trade Unionist
asserts, in each occupation a customary standard of livelihood,
which is, within a specific range of variation, tacitly recognised
by both employers and employed. Upon this customary
standard of weekly earnings, the piecework or hour rates
are, more or less consciously, always based .^ If there is no
limit to the number of hours that each rnan may work or the
employer may require, some exceptionally strong men, able,
if only for a few years, to work unceasingly from morning
till night, will earn an income far beyond the customary
standard of their class. In any bargaining about the Piece-
work List these large earnings will be quoted by the employer
as typical of what every workman might do if only he were
industrious, and will be urged as grounds why a reduction

1 This assumption — that the rate of wages of any race or class of wage-earners
is largely determined by the standard of expenditure — enunciated by Adam Smith
and generally accepted by later economists, will be further examined in our
chapter on *' The Higgling of the Market " ; and the argument that the bulwark
against competitive pressure afforded by this instinctive Standard of Life is
enormously strengthened by the Methods and Regulations of Trade Unionism,
will be elaborately analysed in the chapter on "The Economic Characteristics of
Trade Unionism."

2 " A price list has always implicitly (and as will be seen sometimes explicitly)
a time-basis, i.e. it is generally understood that the piece-rates agreed on are such
as to enable the average worker with average exertion to earn a certain weekly
wage." — Board of Trade (Labor Department) Report on ]Vages and Hours of
Labour^ Fart IT., Standard Piece Rates, C. 7567. — I. 1S94, p. vii.

The Normal Day 333

in the rate is only reasonable.^ Nor is this merely a ques-
tion of successful argument. The exceptional men them-
selves will not be inclined to hazard, by any dispute, what
is to them ample livelihood, and will oppose any attempt
on the part of the Union to resist reductions or apply for
advances. The hours thus exceptionally worked tend, there-
fore, insidiously to become customary for the whole trade,
and the piecework rates are gradually lowered so as to yield,
on the longer hours, a weekly income corresponding to the
standard of expenditure to which the class is accustomed.
The ultimate result upon the Standard Rate of leaving the
hours of labor unlimited is accordingly the same in the case
of payment by the piece or hour as it is in the case of pay-
ment by the day or week. If, as the Trade Unionists con-
tend, unrestrained competition among the individual operatives
tends to lengthen the working day for all alike, it also insidi-
ously lowers the rate of remuneration for the work done.
The men who have started longer hours gradually find
themselves earning no more than they had formerly done in
the customary day, whilst all the rest discover that they can
only maintain their old wages by similarly increasing their
working time. Thus the whole class gives in return for its
customary livelihood increased labor and energy, involving
greater wear and tear, and the weaker members, unable to
keep up the strain, are forced down to a lower level of sub-
sistence. The same arguments, therefore, which lead the
Trade Unionist to insist on a definite Standard Rate, impel
him, quite apart from any advantage to be gained from
increased leisure and irrespective of the system under which
he is paid, vigorously to uphold the Normal Day."

1 See the instances cited by the Shipwrights and Coopers in the subsequent
note.

2 It might, indeed, be urged that the Trade Unionist argument in favor of
collective regulation of the hours of labor, considered merely as a means of keeping
up the price at which the wage-earner sells each unit of energy^ has a broader
psychological basis than the argument for a Standard Rate itself. If it be true,
as is always asserted both by employers and by Trade Union officials, that the
individual manual worker is far keener to maintain and add to his income than
to preserve or increase his leisure, it seems to follow that a Trade Union which

334 Trade Union Function

The Trade Unionist position with regard to the Normal
Day is therefore extremely compHcated. So long as we fix
our attention solely on the proportion between work and
leisure, the wage-earners fall, as we have seen, into three
classes. To the " hands " employed in a co-operative process,
involving the use of costly plant and machinery, and carried
on upon a large scale, the fixing of a Normal Day appears
the only alternative to leaving their working hours to be
determined, and in all probability gradually lengthened,
according to the autocratic judgment of their employer. To
the domestic handicraftsman, on the other hand, working in
his own garret, any collective regulation of the hours of work
is a distinct curtailment of his personal liberty, an evil in
itself requiring considerable justification before he will be
persuaded to adopt it. For the workmen in the intermediate
class of industries, in which the length and distribution of
the working day can practically vary from individual to
individual, the question will depend partly on the extent to
which hours of leisure offer any attraction to them, and partly
upon the degree to which they realise the perils of Individual
Bargaining. Assuming the Trade Unionist position that the
wage-earners can obtain better conditions by collective action,
all the workmen in the industries standing between the
domestic handicraft and the factory system, who desire to
protect or increase the amount of their leisure, will naturally
come more and more to insist on a Normal Day as a neces-
sary condition of this collective action. But this simple
classification by no means disposes of all the variations.
With all classes of workers a second and usually more potent
consideration enters into the argument, namely, the result of
irregular or unlimited hours of labor upon the weekly earn-
ings. To the time-worker paid by the day, week, or month,
the Normal Day is obviously a part of his bargain for a

insisted on a rigid limitation of working time whilst leaving the rate of pay to the
chances of Individual Bargaining, would, in the end, secure for its members a
higher level of remuneration for a given expenditure of energy, than a Trade
Union which insisted on a Standard Rate, but left the length and intensity of the
day's labor to individual agreements.

The Normal Day 335

Standard Rate. The worker by the piece or by the hour
will be more or less disposed to insist on Common Rules
fixing working time, in the degree that the circumstances of
his industry and his personal observations convince him that
unregulated hours of labor tend to lower the rate of remunera-
tion of the whole class.-'

This elucidation of the Trade Union argument gives us
the necessary clue both to the historical development of the
Hours' Movement and to its present position in the Trade
Union world. During the eighteenth century the predomi-
nant type of Trade Unionist was the handicraftsman working
as an individual producer. The weavers and frame -work
knitters, whose combinations to enforce a Standard Rate
date from the very beginning of that century, worked in their
own homes. Out - work prevailed, too, alongside of the
employers' workshop in many other of the organised trades,
such as the shoemakers, cutlers, woolcombers, and hatters.
And even where workshop industry was the rule the familiar
relations between the master workman and the journeymen,
the absence of machinery and motive power, and the general
slackness of discipline enabled the members of such trade
clubs as the sailmakers, coopers, curriers, and calico block-
printers to put in attendance at irregular intervals. This
practical freedom to leave off at any particular moment,
though it was not incompatible with what we should now
consider excessive hours of toil, gave the operative a sense of
personal liberty which naturally disinclined him to suggest
any collective regulation of his working day. Eighteenth-
century attempts to impose a Common Rule fixing the hours

^ It will be needless to remind the historical student of the numerous gild
ordinances by which the independent master craftsmen of the Middle Ages, though
individually at liberty to leave off when they chose, deliberately sought to fix the
maximum hours of labor of each trade, mainly in order, as we think, to prevent
the working time being insidiously lengthened, and the standard rate of payment
undermined, by unfettered competition. Thus the Spurriers, in 1345, fix the
maximum working day from dawn to curfew ; the Hatters, Pewterers, and many
others in the fourteenth century prohibit night- work ; and the Girdlers, in 1344,
forbid work "after none has been wrung" on Saturdays or festival eves. —
Afemoj-ials of London and London Life, by H. T. Riley (London, 1S6S).

336 Trade Union Function

of labor for all the members of a craft are accordingly con-
fined to operatives paid by the day or week, and working on
the premises of their employers. Thus, the establishment of
a maximum day of fourteen hours (less meal-times) was a
leading demand of that combination of " the Journeyman
Taylors in and about the Cities of London and Westminster,"
which we have cited as one of the earliest Trade Unions. " 'Tis
certain," runs the workmen's petition, " that to work fifteen
hours per day is destructive to the men's health, and especially
their sight, so that at forty years old a man is not capable
by his work to get his bread." And from the masters'
petition we learn that the men " insist upon and have twelve
shillings and ninepence per week (instead of ten shillings and
ninepence per week, the usual wages), and leave off work at
eight of the clock of night (instead of nine, their usual hour,
time out of mind)," ^ And turning to other trades, it is
significant that while there is, during the whole of the
eighteenth century, no trace of any hours' movement among
the pieceworking coopers of London, the day-working coopers
of Aberdeen are found, as early as 1732, " entering into
signed associations among themselves, whereby they become
bound to one another under a penalty not to continue in their
masters' service, or to work after seven o'clock at night,
contrary to the usual practice." " The only other cases of
eighteenth-century movements that we know of for regular
or shorter hours occurred amonsf the saddlers and bookbinders

^ An Abstract of the Master Taylors Bill before the Honourable House
of Commons; with the Journeymen's Observations on each Clause of the
said Bill (London, 1720). Similar movements are recorded among the tailors
of Aberdeen in 1720 and 1768 (Bain's Merchant and Craft Gilds, p. 261),
and those of Sheffield in 1720 {Sheffield Iris, 8th August 1820). See, for
all these instances, the interesting collection of original Doctanents Illustrating
the History of Trade Unionism, No. I. The Tailoring Trade, by F. W.
Galton, published by the London School of Economics and Political Science
(London, 1896).

2 Bain's Merchant and C^-aft Gilds of Aberdeen, p. 246. A similar distinction
may be drawn between the pieceworking hatters, who continued to work unlimited
hours in their own homes, and the London hat-finishers, who, working by time
on the employers' premises, struck in 1777 for a reduction of hours. — House of
Commons Journals, vol. xxxvii. p. 192 (i8th February 1777).

The Normal Day ^iZI

in the last years of the century/ who at that time worked
by the day and were in the employers' workshops.

The isolated and exceptional cases of the tailors, hat-
jfinishers, saddlers, and bookbinders emphasise the general
indifference relating to the hours of labor which marks
eighteenth-century Trade Unionism.^ This indifference was
not wholly due to the greater laxity with regard to hours
and workshop discipline possible under a system of individual
production. For the protection of their Standard Rate the
eighteenth -century handicraftsmen were able to resort to
methods no longer open to the modern Trade Unionist. The
clubs of town artisans sought to protect their position by the
stringent enforcement of the laws requiring a seven years'
apprenticeship, and imposing a limit on the number of persons
learning the craft. The home-working weavers petitioned
Parliament, in some cases successfully, for the legal enforce-
ment of their customary rates of payment. The position of
the eighteenth-century Trade Unionist was in many respects
analogous to that of the modern solicitor or doctor, who,
maintaining his Standard Rate by high educational tests
and the exclusion of unauthorised competitors, is unable to
understand what justification can be urged for the imposition
of a uniform Normal Day.

Very different is the record of the nineteenth century.
With the introduction of machinery moved by power, and
the rapid development of the factory system, the operatives
in the new textile industries lost all individual control over
their working day. " Whilst the engine runs," wrote an
acute observer of the new industry, "the people must work.
Men, women, and children are yoked together with iron and
steam. The animal machine — breakable in the best case,

^ See the Saddlers' "Addresses," preserved in the Place MSS., 27,799-112,
114; and Dunning's "Account of the London Consolidated Society of Book-
binders," in the Social Science Association Report on Trade Societies and Strikes,
i860, p. 93.

- Adam Smith, as Marx pointed out, habitually treated the working-day as a
constant quantity. — Capital, Part IV. ch. xix. (vol. ii. p. 552 of English trans-
lation of 1887).

VOL. I Z

338 Trade Union Function

subject to a thousand causes of suffering, changeable every
moment — is chained fast to the iron machine, which knows
no suffering and no weariness." Accordingly we find the
combinations of the Cotton-spinners, from the very begin-
ning of their history, eagerly supporting the efforts of phil-
anthropists to obtain from Parliament a legal regulation
of the hours of labor. The successive Factory Acts thus
obtained applied in terms, it is true, only to women and
children. But it was obvious to contemporary observers that
the whole strength of the agitation came from the men's
desire for a legal restriction of their own working day.^ In
1867 the leaders of the Lancashire Cotton-spinners' unions
summoned a delegate meeting expressly " to agitate for such
a measure of legislative restriction as shall secure a uniform
Eight Hours' Bill in factories, exclusive of meal -times, for
adults, females, and young persons ; and that such Eight
Hours' Bill have for its foundation a restriction on the moving
power." ^ It was, however, impossible to induce the Parlia-
ment of these years even to listen to the idea of a direct
legal limitation of the hours of adult male workers ; and
when, in 1872-74, the Lancashire operatives successfully
agitated for a further reduction of the working day, they were
astute enough to couch their demand in terms of a mere
amendment to the Ten Hours' Act of 1847. Twenty years
later we find the recognised organ of the same union declar-
ing that " now the veil must be lifted and the agitation
carried on under its true colours. Women and children
must no longer be made the pretext for securing a reduction
of working hours for men. The latter must speak out and
declare that both they and the women and children require

1 Thus, R. H. Greg, citing the Report of the Royal Commission on Factories,
vol. i. p. 47 of 1837, observes : "It is obvious, therefore, that the condition of
children has been only the cloak for an ulterior object, which object is now
frankly avowed to be the same for which the agitation of 1833 took place, namely,
the attainment of the Ten Hours' Bill, or a Bill for preventing any factory from
working more than ten hours in any one day." — The Factory Question Considered
in Relation to its Effects on the Health and Morals of those employed in Factories,
etc. (London, 1S37), p. 17.

2 Beehive, 23rd February 1867 ; History of Trade Unionism, p. 295.

The Normal Day 339

less hours of labor in order to share in the benefits arising
from the improvements in productive machinery. The work-
ing hours cannot be permanently reduced by Trade Union
effort. ... It is only by the aid of Parliament that work-
ing hours can be made somewhat uniform." ^ In another
great industry the operatives had found themselves equally
at the mercy of their employer's decision as to the working
day. The coalminers, working underground, can descend
and ascend only when the mine manager chooses to leave
the shaft free from coal-drawing, and set the men's cage in
motion. Hence the coalminers, as soon as they were effectively
organised, began to agitate for a fixed working day. Already
in 1 844-47 we find Martin Jude, the miners' leader, making
" an Eight Hours' Bill " one of the foremost objects of the
Miners' Association of Great Britain and Ireland, which in
those years covered all the English coalfields. From 1863
to 1 88 1 it was, as we have described,^ an important plank
in the programme of Alexander Macdonald. Finally, in
1885 we find the Lancashire Miners' unions expressly
insisting that the legal limit should apply to men and
boys alike — a demand which was quickly taken up by all
the miners' unions except those of Northumberland and
Durham,^

Meanwhile the transformation of the building and
engineering industries was causing the clubs of artisans and
mechanics to insist on a definite limit to the working day
also in these trades. The growth of large machine-making
establishments, and the coming in of the general " con-
tractor" for building operations, both dating from the first
quarter of the present century, resulted in the supersession
of the small working master, and the massing together of
large numbers of workmen, using expensive machinery and
plant, and co-operating under strict discipline in a single
undertaking. In the great upheaval of the Building Trades
in 1833-34, the prohibition of overtime appears as one of

^ Cotton Factory Times, 26th May 1893.
- History of Trade Unionism, pp. 284-289. 3 /^/(/_ pp_ ^78, 379.

340 Trade Union Function

the men's demands, and the Builders' Laborers, in particular,
insisted on extra pay for working beyond their regular hours
on Saturdays.^ In 1836 we discover the London Engineers
engaged in an eight months' struggle with their employers for
the establishment by mutual agreement of a definite Normal
Day for the whole trade ; a struggle which ended in the
fixing of a Sixty Hours' week, and, for the first time in the
engineering trade, the penalising of overtime by extra rates.
Before this strike, though the day's work was nominally ten
and a half hours, the constant prevalence of overtime, without
any extra rate of payment, gave the men no protection what-
ever against the systematic lengthening of hours by any
individual employer." How soon the building operatives
secured the same hours is not recorded, but already in 1846
we find the Liverpool Stonemasons demanding a Nine
Hours' Day. From this time forward the records of both the
engineering and building Trade Unions show the movement
for the more strict observance and progressive shortening
of the Normal Day to have been continued without inter-
mission. The elaborate treaty concluded in 1892 between
the London Building Trade Unions and the associated
Master Builders, by which the working time for all building
work within twelve miles of Charing Cross was fixed for

^ See the Masters' Address, 12th June 1833, in An Impartial Statement of
the proceedings of the members of the Trades Union Societies and of the steps taken
iti consequence by the Master Tradesmen of Liverpool (Liverpool, 1833). Also
the Statement of the Master Builders of the Metropolis in explanation of the
differences betiveen them and the workmen respecting the Trades Unions (London,
1834). It may be mentioned that the minute books of the Glasgow Joiners,
whose secretary was a leading Owenite, contain, between 1833 and 1836, frequent
regulations intended to secure the Normal Day. At the general meeting in March
I S3 3, for instance, they formally adopted the working rules of the Scottish
National Union, which penalised overtime by " time and a half" rates. In
1836 we find the Society, after a successful strike, insisting, not only on a
standard wage of 20s. a week, but also on the total prohibition of overtime for
that season. From 1834 onward they were waging constant war on the practice
of working by artificial light, securing its prohibition in 1836 after a prolonged
strike.

2 Article by Mr. John Burnett in the Newcastle Weekly Chronicle, 3rd July
1875 ; Paper read by William Newton on behalf of the Executive of the Amal-
gamated Society of Engineers at the Dublin Meeting of the Social Science
Association, 1S61.

The Nor77tal Day 341

every week in the year, with extra rates intended to penalise
all overtime, is only one of the latest of a practically unbroken
series of collective agreements.

But though the conception of a Common Rule as to the
hours of labor has now spread to all classes of Trade
Unionists, whether paid by time or by the piece, handi-
craftsmen or factory operatives, there is, among the different
trades, a marked difference in the intensity with which the
demand is pressed upon the employers and the public. Here
again our analysis of the Trade Union argument helps us to
understand the facts. The Cotton Operatives and Coal-
miners are the most strenuous advocates of definitely limited
and uniform hours of labor. This is not surprising when
we remember that, in both these industries, the beginning
and leaving ofT of work depends, not on the will of the
operative but on the starting and stopping of the engine ;
when we realise further that in both cases the trades are
" open " to all comers, and that the Standard Rate is pro-
tected neither by the Limitation of Apprentices nor the
exclusion of laborers from other occupations. The engineer-
ing and building operatives follow at some distance the
textile operatives and miners in demanding a strictly defined
working day. Almost invariably paid by time, they have
recognised that some collective agreement as to the hours of
work is a necessary part of their bargain for the sale of their
labor.^ But the economic necessity for uniform hours is

1 We are able to watch the growth of the conception of the Normal Day in
some of the handicrafts gradually passing into the system of capitalist establish-
ments carried on upon a large scale. Thus, the Provident Union of Shipwrights
of the Port of London, an old trade club which emerged into publicity when the
Combination Laws were repealed, resolved, on the 4th of October 1S24, "that every
member of this Union will not engross a greater share of work than what he can
accomplish by working regular hours, viz. : not before six o'clock in the morning,
nor later than six in the summer evening ; and that no candle work be performed
after the people on the outside have left work, so that every opportunity may be
given to those out of employ." And it is instructive to notice that the men's
main reason for this innovation was declared to be "that it was necessary to
regulate a day's work in consequence of the masters stating, when a man had
worked for fourteen or sixteen hours, that they earned los. per day, although
there was one-half as regarded the number of hours." The same motive shortly
afterwards impelled the London Coopers, who are pieceworkers, to make a

342 Trade Union Function

with them neither so obvious nor so absolute as in the mine
or the cotton-mi] I ; and in both these industries the unions
have reHed, for the protection of their Standard Rates, on
their traditional policy of insisting on a period of apprentice-
ship, limiting the number of boys, and excluding " illegal men."
With the disuse of apprenticeship, and the impracticability
of maintaining a policy of exclusion, the engineering and
building Trade Unions are insisting, with ever-increasing
urgency, on the rigid enforcement of a definitely limited
Normal Day. Where, on the other hand, the unions still
rely for the defence of their Standard Rate upon such
apprenticeship regulations as are enforced by the United
Society of Boilermakers, and, less universally, by the various
unions of Compositors, their policy with regard to the Normal
Day is more uncertain. In both these trades, as we have
seen, timework and piecework are equally recognised by the
union. In both cases the union unhesitatingly insists on a
definite Normal Day for all work paid for by time. But
owing to the existence of other defences of the Standard
Rate, and of the practical freedom of these hand workers to
arrange their own rate of speed, and the details of their
working time, their faith in any uniform Normal Day for
pieceworkers partakes rather of the nature of a pious
opinion.

With archaic trades this lukewarmness passes into in-
difference, if not even hostility. The most important, and
in many respects the most typical union of this class, is the
Amalgamated Society of Boot and Shoe Makers. This
small and highly skilled class of handicraftsmen, some of
whom still work in their own homes, have been strongly

similar regulation. Hitherto, as the secretary of the union explained, no limits
had been set to the working day, and "some strong young men will work from
three in the morning till nine at night." The result was that the men "found
there was advantage taken by their employers ; and that where there was a differ-
ence that was resorted to." And the London Compositors expressly stipulated
in the Scale of Prices accepted by the employers in 1810, that the time of begin-
ning work should be formally agreed upon between the master and the " com-
panionship " ; that it should be uniform for all the men ; and that night or
Sunday work should be paid for at higher rates.

The Normal Day 343

combined for more than a century, and have, from the first,
strictly maintained a Standard List of prices. But working
invariably by hand, paid by the piece, and enjoying a
customary privilege of coming in and out of the employer's
workshop as they thought fit, they have never troubled to
settle a Normal Day. Although the trade has been, for
half a century, steadily declining before the competition of
the machine-made product, the workmen have not been
driven to consider the effect of their irregular hours upon
their Standard Rate. In olden times they enforced a strict
limitation of apprentices, and during the present generation
the number of boys who have learnt the trade has been so
small 1 that the highly skilled bootmaker, supplying the
perfect workmanship called for by a class of rich customers,
has maintained what are really monopoly earnings. A some-
what analogous case is that of the United Society of Brush-
makers, a strong organisation of skilled handworkers, whose
printed lists of prices have been accepted by the employers from
1805 downwards. In this trade, where handwork has always
prevailed, the operatives, who are individual producers, have
from time immemorial gone in and out of the employer's work-
shop when they chose. For the protection of their Standard
Rate they have clung to their old limitation of apprentices,
and have never yet sought to enforce a Normal Day. But
it is the Sheffield trades which furnish the great majority of
unions indifferent to the Normal Day. Here we have a
system of individual production which dates, as regards its
main features, from the last century. The employer gives
work out, to be done by the operative, either on his own
" wheel " at home, or on one temporarily rented in a public
" tenement factory." The unions, unable properly to control
the Individual Bargains made by their members, who receive
and return their work alone, and at irregular intervals,

^ This is due, we think, partly to the current impression that hand shoemaking
is rapidly d3ring out, partly to the abnormal demand for boys at relatively good
wages in the enormously expanding machine bootmaking industry, and partly to
the relatively high degree of technical proficiency now required to obtain employ-
ment at the handmade trade.

344 Trade Union Function

struggle fitfully to maintain a Standard Rate by the most
archaic regulations on apprenticeship. The practical failure
of these regulations, and the constant degradation of the
rates, leads the more thoughtful workmen to denounce the
whole system of individual production, and to urge its super-
session by the factory system, where collective regulation,
both of wages and hours, would become possible. But the
average Sheffield cutler, accustomed to the apparent personal
liberty of his present life, is as yet proof against the economic
arguments of his leaders.

The demand for a Common Rule determining the work-
ing hours for all the members of a trade is therefore, even in
the Trade Union world of to-day, neither so universal nor
so unhesitating as the insistence on a Standard Rate of pay-
ment. On the other hand, the regulation of hours is less
complicated and more uniform than the regulation of wages.
The most rigid enforcement of an absolutely uniform
Standard Rate is not inconsistent, in well-organised trades,
with a very large elasticity, specially devised to meet the
highly complex conditions and varying circumstances of
modern industry. Any such elasticity with regard to the
hours of labor is fatal to the maintenance of a Normal Day.
We see this illustrated by the actual working of Trade
Union agreements with regard to " Overtime." As soon as
the employer was precluded from requiring the attendance
of his workmen for as long as he might choose, he very
naturally made it a stipulation, in conceding a customary
fixed working day, that some provision should be made for
emergencies. It might any day become important to him,
owing to a sudden rush of pressing orders or similar causes,
that some or all of his operatives should give more than the
usual hours of work. The Trade Union leaders found no
argument against this claim. Moreover they saw their way,
as they thought, to making the privilege a source of extra
wages to their members. It was generally agreed that the
overtime so worked should be paid for at a higher rate —
frequently " time and a quarter," or " time and a half" This

The Normal Day 345

arrangement appeared a reasonable compromise, advantageous
to both parties. The employers gained the elasticity which
they declared to be necessary to the profitable carrying on
of their business, and were able, moreover, to take full
advantage of a busy season. The workmen, on the other
hand, were recompensed by a higher rate of payment for the
disturbance of their customary arrangement of life, and the
extra strain of continuing work in a tired state. The con-
cession involved a deviation from the Normal Day, but the
exaction of extra rates would, it was supposed, restrict over-
time to real emergencies. For a whole generation accord-
ingly, both employers and workmen regarded the arrangement
with complacency.

Further experience of these extra rates for overtime work
has convinced nearly all Trade Unionists that they afford
the smallest degree of protection to the Normal Day, whilst
they are productive of evil consequences to both parties. In
spite of the extra rates, employers have, in many trades,
adopted the practice of systematically working their men
for one or two hours a day overtime, for months at a stretch,
and, in some cases, even all the year round. In the engin-
eering and shipbuilding trades in particular, the desire for
prompt delivery, in years of good trade, appears to be so
great, and the competition for orders is at all times so keen,
that each employer thinks it to his advantage to promise to
complete the machine, or launch the vessel, at the earliest
possible date. The result is that the long hours become
customary, and subject to alteration at the will of the em-
ployer. Nor has the individual workman any genuine
choice. An establishment in which it is a constant practice
to work ten or twenty hours a week overtime, does not long
retain in employment a workman who prefers his leisure to
the extra payment, and who therefore leaves his bench or
his forge vacant when the clock strikes.

Whilst the practice of systematic overtime deprives the
workman of any control over his hours of labor, the Trade
Unionists are beginning to realise that it insidiously affects

346 Trade U^iion Ftinction

also the rate of wages. If there is any truth in the
economists' assumption that it is the customary standard
of Hfe of each class of workers which, in the long run, subtly
determines their average weekly earnings, systematic overtime,
if paid for as an extra, must, it is clear, tend to lower the
rate per hour. That frequent opportunities are afforded for
working overtime is, in fact, often given by employers as an
excuse for paying a low rate of weekly wages. Where pay-
ment is made by the piece, it is usually impossible in practice
to distinguish between " time " and " overtime," ^ and in such
cases a promise of systematic overtime, enabling the men to
make up their total earnings to the old standard, is a common
inducement to them to submit to a reduction of their piece-
work rates. But the timeworker is, in reality, as much at
the mercy of the employer as the pieceworker. The promise
of "time and a quarter" for the extra hours is a powerful
temptation to the stronger men to acquiesce in a reduction
of the Standard Rate of payment for the normal working day.
Moreover, when bad times come, and the demand for a
particular kind of labor falls off, there is an almost irre-
sistible tendency for the amount of the overtime to increase.
The employers see in it a chance of reducing the cost of
production by spreading the heavy items of rent, interest on
machinery, and office charges over more hours of work.

^ A firm desiring to work overtime has thus a special inducement to introduce
payment by the piece, and this has led, in some districts of the engineering trade,
to the total destruction of Collective Bargaining. — The Report specially prepared
by the Af?ialgamated Society of Engineers for the Royal Commission on Labor
(London, 1892), which gives the result of an inquiry made of the branches as to
the relative prevalence of Overtime and Piecework in the several towns of the
kingdom. It is significant that it is the machine-making centres, Keighley, Col-
chester, Gainsborough, Ipswich, Lincoln, and Derby that stand out as having the
lowest Standard Rates (27s. to 29s. per week). Every one of these branches
reports the prevalence of systematic overtime to a large extent, and of piecework.
The case would be even stronger if statistics could be obtained from unorganised
districts and non-union firms, where competitive piecework and systematic over-
time are the invariable accompaniments of low rates. "For many years past,"
writes Mr. Tom Mann, "it has been the deliberate practice in some of the
agricultural machine shops to run a quarter [day] overtime five nights in the
week, and in consequence of this the Standard Rate is very low, and the actual
working day is one of twelve hours." — Amalga7nated Engineers' Monthly Join-nal,
January 1897, p. 12.

The Normal Day 347

The workmen are tempted to make up, by extra labor, their
drooping weekly earnings. Exactly at the moment when
the community needs, perhaps, ten per cent less work from
its engineers or its building operatives, a large number of
these are pressed and tempted to give ten per cent more
work — to the end that nearly twenty per cent of the trade
can find no employment whatever ! The barrister or the
medical man, when the demand for his labor is slack, is not
expected or desired to work more hours in the day. The
old-fashioned handicraftsman equally reduced his working
hours in slack times, and increased them when trade was
brisk. In the case of the great machine industries the tend-
ency is, in the absence of a precisely fixed and rigid Normal
Day, all in the contrary direction. It is impossible to con-
vince the Trade Unionist of the excellence of an arrangement
which periodically results in an extra large percentage of
members draining the society's funds by Out-of-Work Pay,
at the very moment that other members are working an
extra large number of hours overtime. Even the employers
are now beginning to object to the arrangement. They feel
that it is unbusinesslike to pay higher rates for tired work.
And they assert that the men's desire to get these higher
rates sometimes leads to dawdling during the day, in order
that the overtime may be prolonged.^

The necessity for precision and uniformity in the deter-
mination of the working hours has been found by experience
to be equally absolute where the Normal Day is enforced by
the Method of Legal Enactment. The elaborate code which
now regulates the hours of labor of women and children in
British industry consists of two main divisions, relating re-
spectively to textile manufacture and to other industries, the

^ The really unprofitable character of systematic overtime was detected by a
shrewd German lawyer in 1777. Justus Moser relates that when the building
operatives worked overtime on his new house, he saw himself thereby defrauded,
as the men in the long hours really got through in the aggregate less work in
return for the day's pay. " Public authority," he adds, " should here intervene
and forbid overtime, which is a fraud on the employer and the customer alike. " —
"On the Work done in the Hours of Recreation," in Patrioiische Phantasien
(Berlin, 1858), vol. iii. p. 151, x\o\x<:.t^\r\.'Qx&Xi\.2,x^Q^% Arbeitszeit rind ArbeitsleisUmg.

348 Trade Union Function

former dating practically from 1833, the latter, it may almost
be said, only from 1867. This difference in antiquity is
reflected in the varying degree of rigidity attained.

Dealing first with the Normal Day in textile manu-
factures, the Act of 1833 (which applied, in express terms,
only to persons under eighteen years of age) prescribed a
maximum of twelve hours a day, less one and a half hours for
meals. But it left it open to the discretion of the millowners
to have their factories open any hours between 5.30 A.M.
and 8.30 P.M., and to fix the meal-times as they chose, whilst
time lost through breakdown of machinery might be made
up as overtime. The factory inspectors soon found that this
elasticity destroyed the efficacy of the law. We need not
relate the incidents of the long struggle waged by the
Cotton Operatives' unions to secure a genuine limitation of
the factory day. One by one the loopholes for evasion were
closed up. The right to make up time lost by breakdowns
was (as regards mills worked by steam) expressly abolished,
the hours of beginning and ending work were definitely
prescribed, the times for meals were fixed, all hours were to
be reckoned by a public clock. In short, by the Acts of
1847, 1850, and 1874 the right of the millowner to work
any extra, or even any different, hours from those prescribed
by law, on any excuse whatsoever, has been absolutely taken
away. However much the circumstances of one mill or
one district may differ from those of another ; whatever may
be the nature of their respective trades or the character of
their markets ; whether they work with cotton or wool, flax
or jute, silk or worsted ; however pressing may be the rush
of sudden orders ; whatever time may have been lost by an
accident to the boiler ; the precisely determined Normal
Day for the protected classes in a textile mill must not be
encroached upon, and may not even be temporarily varied
to suit the convenience either of employer or operatives.
In the case of the textile industry sixty years' experience
enabled the Trade Unionists to persuade the expert officials
of the Factory Department, and even a reluctant House of

The Normal Day 349

Commons, that however specious may be the arguments for
elasticity and qualifications, it is only by the rigid enforce-
ment of precisely fixed and uniform hours that the Normal
Day can be really protected.

In other trades, in which factory legislation is of more
recent introduction, we see the same lesson in process of
being learnt. Between i860 and 1867 the Ten Hours'
Normal Day was introduced for the protected classes in
other industries. The Act of 1878 systematically applied
it to all non -textile factories and workshops. But the
House of Commons could not bring itself to make its
uniform rule precise and effective. Endeavors were made,
by sanctioning overtime under certain conditions, by en-
abling the hours of beginning and ending work to be varied,
by permitting the prescribed meal-times and holidays to
be altered, and by exempting particular processes from
particular restrictions, to meet the varying circumstances of
different industries. So deeply rooted was the feeling
against uniformity that the exceptions and qualifications of
the 1878 Act commended themselves even to the Chief
Inspector of Factories. In spite of his experience in the
textile mills, Mr. Redgrave could welcome with complacency
the " undulating and elastic " line of the new Act, " drawn to
satisfy the absolute necessities and customs of different
trades in different parts of the kingdom," especially men-
tioning the " extension of hours to meet sudden emergencies,
as the case of occupations in which the operatives have to
meet regular slack seasons."^ Twenty years' trial of this
" undulating and elastic line " has convinced the officials
administering the Act that no such uncertain rule
can be maintained. The whole experience of the Factory
Department proves that no limitation of the working
day can really be enforced, unless there are uniform and
definitely prescribed hours before and after which work
must not be carried on. The overtime regulations,

1 Annual Report of H.M. Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops, 1878
(C. 2274 of 1879), p. 5.

350 Trade Union Function

hailed as one of the sensible advantages of the Act of
1878, have gone far to neutralise any regulation of hours
at all. The report of the Chief Inspector for 1894 is full of
complaints by his staff of the impossibility of maintaining
the Normal Day in face of the " partial, unsound, and piece-
meal privilege" thus given to unfair employers, and of
the " modifications " which constitute " a most weakening
element in workshop inspection." ^ The knowledge that
overtime may be " carried on for forty-eight times in a year
is often made," says one inspector, " an excuse for working
until 10 P.M. for three or four nights every week in the
season." ^ " The steady increase of overtime notices which
we receive," declares another, " leads me to infer that . . .
occupiers of factories or workshops . . . are exercising those
privileges without due regard to the spirit of the law, which
only regards overtime as an exceptional contingency, only
to be used when exceptional circumstances require it. . . .
Overtime employment leads to more undetected evasions of
the laws than all the other offences under factory and
workshop legislation." ^

Overtime, in fact, is to-day seldom the " exceptional over-
time " contemplated by the Act ; but, to use the words of
one inspector, merely a means of enabling the employers to
" keep their shops open late " on Saturday nights, and of
causing " females to be kept " systematically late at work
" in dressmaking without a farthing of extra remuneration." ^
" I believe, therefore," officially reports Miss May Abraham,
Senior Woman Inspector in 1893, " that although a with-
drawal of the overtime exception would meet with protest
from employers who have developed its use from an excep-
tion into a principle, there are some who would welcome,
and many who would be indifferent to such an amendment ;
that the large class of employers engaged in the textile and

1 Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops, 1894 (C. 7745 of

1895), pp. 49, 50.

^ Ibid. p. 56 (Mr. Mackie, Assistant Inspector).

3 Ibid. p. 194 (Mr. Dodgson, Inspector). * Ibid. p. 191.

The Normal Day 35 i

allied trades, from whom permission to work overtime has
been rigidly withheld, would greet as a measure of justice its
withdrawal now from trades logically no more entitled to
the exception than their own : and that by the workers its
abolition would be welcomed with feelings of the warmest
gratitude." ^ When Mr. Lakeman, after a whole genera-
tion of work in London factory inspection, has to account for
the long and irregular hours still worked in defiance of the
Act, he emphatically declares " that overtime is the root of
the mischief, for it has choked the law with partiality and
modifications." ^

We have left to the last what is perhaps the most
marked distinction between the Trade Union regulation of
the, Standard Rate and that of the Normal Day. Instead
of the bewildering variety which characterises the claim to a
Standard Rate, where each trade, and each section of a trade,
has its own price, we have, with regard to the Normal Day,
comparative simplicity and uniformity. During the last
sixty years, the demand for a Normal Day has come in the
guise of a succession of waves of popular agitation for a
common and uniform reduction of the hours of labor for all
trades alike. The Ten Hours' agitation of the Lancashire
Cotton Operatives spread, as we have seen, to the builders,
engineers, tailors, and other craftsmen, and resulted, between
1830 and 1840, in the very general adoption of Ten Hours
as the Normal Day in the larger towns. Similarly, the
Nine Hours* Movement, started by the Stonemasons in
1846, spread, during the next thirty years, throughout the
whole range of industry, and resulted by 1871-74 in the
almost universal acceptance of Nine Hours as the Normal
Day of artisans, mechanics, and factory workers and the
laborers working in association with any of these classes.
And it may perhaps be inferred that we stand, at the

^ Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories a7td Workshops for 1893 (C. 7368
of 1S94), pp. II, 12.

- Ibid. p. 50. See also the Opitiions on Overtime (London, 1894), published
by the Women's Trade Union League.

352 Trade Union Function

present day, in the first years of a similar general move-
ment which will result in the equally widespread adoption of
Eight Hours as the standard working day in all branches of
British industry.-^

Here at last we do come to something like communistic
feeling among British workmen. The aristocratic shipwright,
pattern-maker, or cotton-spinner, who would resent the idea
that the unskilled laborer or the woman worker had any
moral claim to as high a Standard Rate as himself, readily
accepts, when it comes to a question of hours, the doctrine
of complete equality. The explanation is simple. The most
rigid class distinctions of the wage -earning world have, in
the matter of hours of labor, to bend before the mechanical
necessity for a Common Rule. The same economic influ-
ences which make it impossible for each weaver in a mill to
come in and out as he or she chooses, make it convenient,

^ The successive reductions in working hours have been very imperfectly
recorded. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the ordinary working day
of indoor trades in London seems to have been from 6 A.M. to 9 P.M., whilst men
working out of doors left off at 6 P.M., or at dark. We have described the attempt
of the tailors in 1720 to shorten the day by one hour, and from a rare work in the
Guildhall and Patent Office Libraries, dated 1747 {A General Description of All
Trades, Anon.), it would seem that, by the middle of the century, a few other trades
had followed their example. The bookbinders (1787) and saddlers (1793)
secured a further reduction to thirteen hours less meal-times, and in 1794 the
bookbinders gained what would now be called a 10^ hours' day (12 hours less
meal-times). Our impression is that at the opening of the present century this
had become in London the usual working day for all the skilled handicraft trades
working by time. By 1834, at any rate, the London building trades bad secured
a ten hours' day and in 1836, the London engineers obtained the same rednction.
Within ten years this became general in most of the large towns, and was adopted
for the textile factories in the celebrated Ten Hours' Bill of 1847. The Nine
Hours' Movement begins with the Liverpool stonemasons in 1846, but does not
become general until 1859-61, nor fully successful until 1871. Meanwhile an
agitation had arisen among the skilled artisans for a Saturday half-holiday. The
building trades had secured a " four o'clock Saturday" in some towns by 1847,
making a 58^ hours' week. By 1861 this had become in London a "two
o'clock Saturday," or 56^ hours a week, an arrangement which was adopted for
the textile factories by the Act of 1874. When, in 1871, the Nine Hours' Day
was won by the engineering and building trades, it took the form of 1 1 hours less
li- hours meal-times, for five days, and six hours less half an hour for breakfast on
Saturday, thus securing 54 hours with a "one o'clock Saturday." In 1890 the
engineering trades on the Tyne and Wear, desiring a more complete half-holiday,
demanded and obtained a "twelve o'clock Saturday" (53 hours). On the great
general revision of hours in the London building trades in 1892, the week was

The Normal Day 353

if not absolutely necessary, for the hours of beginning and
leaving off work to be identical, not for the weavers only,
but also for all the different classes of workpeople employed
in the establishment. And it has been a special feature of
the industrial development of the past thirty years more and
more to include, in a single establishment, not merely different
sections of one trade, but also the most diverse industrial
processes subsidiary to the production of the finished article.
In the leading engineering • and shipbuilding yards of the
Tyne and Clyde, or the great works of the railway com-
panies— to cite only a few out of many examples — we find
to-day workmen of a hundred different trades working in a
single establishment whose hours of labor are almost neces-
sarily governed by the same " steam hooter," or factory bell.^
Any regulations relating to the length or distribution of
the working day tend, therefore, to be identical for all classes
of operatives.

fixed at 50, 47, and 44 hours according to the season, averaging 48* hours
through the year, and always securing the Saturday half-hohday. Finally, we
have the adoption, between 1SS9 and 1897, of the Eight Hours' Day in over five
hundred establishments, including the Government dockyards and workshops,
nearly all municipal gasworks, and a majority of the London engineering and
bookbinding establishments, together with isolated firms all over the country.

This progressive reduction relates, it need hardly be said, only to the nominal
standard hours of the most advanced districts, and takes no account either of the
prevalence of overtime, or of the lingering of longer hours in other districts. In
the absence of precise and authoritative statistics as to the amount of overtime
worked at different periods per person employed, it is impossible to give any
inductive proof of the lengthening of hours by systematic overtime at the moment
when, owing to a slackening of demand, less of the work is demanded by the
community. But the same tendency may be seen in the recorded changes in the
Normal Day itself. In the extraordinarily busy years of 1871-72 the engineering
employers had agreed with the Trade Unions that the week's work should
be 54 hours, and, on the Clyde, 51 hours only. When the great stagnation
of 187S-79 fell upon the industry, and there was much less engineering work
to be done, the employers decided " that the time has arrived . . . when the
idle hours which have been unprofitably thrown away, must be reclaimed to
industry and profit, by being redirected to reproductive work " (Secret Circular of
the Iron Trades Employers' Association, December 1878). They therefore made
a general attempt to increase the week's work to 57 or 59 hours. A similar
attempt was made in the building trades. For an account of this backwardation
in hours, see History of Trade Unionism, pp. 331, 334.

^ See, for this tendency to an " integration of processes " in competitive industry,
the Economic Heresies of the London County Council, by Sidney Webb (London,
1894), a paper read at the Economic Section of the British Association in 1894.
VOL. I 2 A

CHAPTER VII

SANITATION AND SAFETY

In the great establishments of modern industry, where large
numbers of manual workers are massed together, the wage-
contract implicitly includes many other conditions besides
those of the time to be spent in labor, and the rate at which
this is to be paid for. The wage-earner sells to his employer,
not merely so much muscular energy or mechanical ingenuity,
but practically his whole existence during the working day.^
An overcrowded or badly-ventilated workshop may exhaust
his energies ; sewer gas or poisonous material may under-
mine his health ; badly -constructed plant or imperfect
machinery may maim him or even cut short his days ;
coarsening surroundings may brutalise his life and degrade
his character — yet, when he accepts employment, he tacitly
undertakes to mind whatever machinery, use whatever
materials, breathe whatever atmosphere, and endure what-
ever sights, sounds, and smells he may find in the employer's
workshop, however inimical they may be to health or safety.
On all these points Individual Bargaining is out of the
question. The most ingenious employer would find it
impossible to bargain separately with individual workers as

1 "It matters nothing to the seller of bricks whether they are to be used in
building a palace or a sewer ; but it matters a great deal to the seller of labor,
who undertakes to perform a task of given difficulty, whether or not the place in
which it is to be done is a wholesome and a pleasant one, and whether or
not his associates will be such as he cares to have," — Principles of Economics,
by Professor A. Marshall (London, 1895), 3'^ ^^'^'^- P- ^46-

Saiiitation and Safety 355

to the temperature of the workshop or the use of the
ventilating fan, the fencing of the machinery or the provision
of sanitary accommodation : he cannot make any particular
concession to a consumptive weaver in the matter of the
amount of steam to be injected into the weaving shed, or
give special terms to a cautious miner with regard to the
construction of the cage or the thickness of the rope on
which his life will depend. These conditions are necessarily
identical for all the operatives concerned. The issue, therefore,
is not whether there shall be a Common Rule excluding the
exigencies of particular workers, but by whom and in whose
interest that Common Rule shall be made.^

The Trade Unionist demands for safe, healthy, and com-
fortable conditions of work appear to date only from about
1 840, and can scarcely be said to have become a definite part of
Trade Union policy until about 1871." This long-continued
indifference to the risks of accident and disease was, as we
need hardly remind the reader, common to all classes. So
long as sickness and casualties were regarded as " visitations

1 The individual operative "can quarrel no more with the foul air of his
unventilated factory, burdened with poisons, than he can quarrel with the great
wheel that turns below " ( The Wages Question, by Francis A. Walker, New \'ork,
1S76, London, 1891, p. 359). "Where a large number of men are employed
together in a factory ... all must conform to the wishes of the majority, or the
will of the employers, or the customs of the trade." — The State in Kclation to
Labour, by W. Stanley Jevons (London, 1887), p. 65.

^ The coalminers, however, always asked for safeguards against tlic perils of
the mine. As early as 1662, it is said that 2000 colliers of Northumberland and
Durham prepared a petition to the King, asking, among other tilings, that the
mine owners sliould be required to provide better ventilation of the pits. Already
in 1676, the Government, in the person of the Lord Keeper North, was suggesting
that a second sliaft ought always to be provided {The Minets of Nortlnimbcrland
and Durham, by Ricliard Fynes, Blyth, 1873). Similar desires were expressed
by the earliest of the Miners' unions in 1809 and 1825, and in such pamphlets
as A Voice from the Coalmines, or a Plain Statement of the grievances of the
pitmen of the Tyne and Wear (South Shields, 1825), and An earnest address
and urgent appeal to the people of England on behalf of the oppt-essed and
suffering pitmen of the Counties of Northumberland and Durham (Newcastle,
1 83 1). In no other industry do we trace any request prior to 1840 for more
sanitary conditions of employment (as dislinguislied from higher wages or shorter
hours). Neither in the Parliamentary inquiries of 1824, 1825, and 1838, nor in
the numerous investigations of the Commissioners connected with the Factory
Acts, Toor Law, or Health of Towns, have we found any evidence that the
operatives of that time pressed for healthier conditions of work.

356 Trade Union Function

of God," to be warded off by prayer and fasting, effective
sanitary regulations were not to be expected either from
the workmen's combinations or from ParHament itself.^
And whilst the theologian was attributing the workman's
ill -health to the Act of God, the political economist
was assuring him that any unusual risk to health or life,
like any extra discomfort, inevitably brought with it sub-
stantial compensation in the shape of higher wages. We
therefore find that in the comparatively few cases between
1700 and 1840, in which Trade Unions made any complaint
of dangerous or insanitary conditions, they brought forward
the grievance without any idea of establishing regulations to
prevent such conditions for the future, but merely as an
argument in favor of the concession of shorter hours or higher
wages.^ We need not follow the gradual disappearance of
the theological explanation of disease before the progress of
science. Of greater interest to the economic student is the
growth of an opinion among the Trade Unionists, that the
compensation for insanitary conditions brought about by
" the free play of natural forces," was of a totally different
character from that prophesied by Adam Smith and his
followers. To the intelligent Trade Union official it became
increasingly evident that the compensatory effect of bad
conditions of employment took the form, not of higher rates

^ Public health legislation dates only from about 1840 ; see Glen, History of
the Law relatitig to Public Health, loth edition (London, 1888). The first general
Public Health Act was not passed until 1848.

2 Thus, when in 1752, the combination of journeymen tailors of London com-
plained that, by their having to work from six in the morning until eight at night,
" sitting so many hours in such a position, almost double on the shopboard, with
their legs under them, and poring so long over their work by candlelight, their
spirits are exhausted, nature is wearied out, and their health and sight are soon
impaired," all they asked for was an extra sixpence a day wages {The Tailoring
Trade, by F. W. Galton, London, 1896, p. 53 ; published by the London School
of Economics and Political Science). And when, in 1777, the far-sighted and
observant Justus Moser was impressed by the injury to health caused by the
conditions under which apprentices and young journeymen were put to work,
nothing in the nature of factory legislation occurred to him ; his remedy was a
technical institute which should supersede apprenticeship altogether. — " Is not
an Institute required for Artisans ? " in Patriotische Phantasien (Berlin, 1858),
vol. iii. p. 135.

Sanitatio7i and Safety 357

paid by the employer, but of a lower grade of character
among the workpeople. When the conditions of safety,
health, and comfort in the trade fell below the standard of
other occupations, the Trade Union official did not find that
his members got higher wages.^ What happened was that
his union was presently made up of workers of coarser fibre,
worse character, and more irregular habits. And this result
was brought about not entirely, or even mainly, by the
refusal of respectable persons to enter trades in which the
risks to life, health, and character were exceptionally great.
For the great mass of workers, in districts dependent on
particular industries, there was practically no choice of occu-
pation, and hence, over large areas of the United Kingdom,
physical enfeeblement and moral deterioration became the
lot of good and bad alike. Even in the rare cases in which
exceptionally strong unions obtained for their members some
definite compensation for risk of disease and death, the more
thoughtful workmen could not fail to realise that the extra
money was no real equivalent for the lives prematurely cut
short, the constitutions ruined by disease, or the characters
brutalised by coarsening surroundings.

Thus, in the Trade Union world of to-day, there is no
subject on which workmen of all shades of opinion, and all
varieties of occupation, are so unanimous, and so ready to
take combined action, as the prevention of accidents and the
provision of healthy workplaces. We do not propose to
enumerate, or even to summarise in any detail, the various
regulations upon which Trade Unions have insisted for the
protection of the life, health, and comfort of their members.
These necessarily differ from trade to trade according to the

* For over a century economic manuals have reproduced Adam Smith's
celebrated analysis of the causes of differences in wages, without any investigation
of the facts of industrial life. " There is hardly a grain of truth," wrote Fleeming
Jenkin with refreshing originality in 1870, "in the doctrine that men's wages are
in proportion to the [un-]pleasantness of their occupation. On the contrary, all
loathsome occupations are undertaken by apathetic beings for a miserable hire. . .
The best paid is [aJso] the most pleasant life.'''' — "Graphic Representation of
the Laws of Supply and Demand," by Fleeming Jenkin, in Recess Studies
(London, 1S70), p. 182.

358 Trade Union Fttnction

technical processes and particular grievances of the industry.
Sometimes it is the prevention of accidents that is aimed at.
Thus, the United Society of Boilermakers has insisted, in
its elaborate agreement with the Ship Repairers' Federation
of the United Kingdom, upon the following clause : " The
employers undertake that, before men are put to work on
[repairing the great tank ships for carrying petroleum in
bulk, in which dangerous vapour accumulates], an expert's
certificate shall be obtained daily to the effect that the tanks
are absolutely safe. Such certificate to be posted in some
conspicuous place." ^ Innumerable other regulations aim at
the removal of conditions injurious to the workers' health.
Thus, the various Trade Unions of " ovenmen " (potters)
have for a whole generation protested against being forced
to empty the ovens before these have been allowed to grow
cool, on the express ground that this unnecessary exposure
to a temperature between 170 and 210 degrees Fahrenheit
is seriously detrimental to health. Several strikes have
taken place solely on this point, and the Staffordshire Oven-
men's Union now has a by-law authorising the support of
any member who is dismissed for refusing to work in a
temperature higher than 120 degrees.^ The Northern
Counties Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-
weavers has repeatedly withdrawn its members from weav-
ing sheds into which the employers insisted on injecting an
undue volume of steam, and it succeeded, in 1889, in obtain-
ing a special Act defining the maximum limit to which this
practice might be carried.^ The carelessness of employers

1 Payment for repairs on oil vessels : Agreement between the Ship Repai7-ers'
Federation of the United Kingdom and the United Society of Boilermakers, signed
at Newcastle, 1 2th January 1S94. Similar agreements have been made by the
Amalgamated Society of Engineers (Tyneside District) with the Federation (14th
September 1S94), and (Newport and Cardiff District) with the Engineers and
Shipbuilders Employers' Association of Newport and Cardiff, 21st March 1S95,
and in other seaports.

^ Information given to us by the officials ; see also Dr. J. T. Arlidge, The
Pottery Manufaiiiire in its Sanitary Aspects (London, 1892), p. 17.

2 Royal Commission on Labor, evidence Group C ; the Cotton Cloth
Factories Act, 1S89 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 62), amended by the Factory Acts of 1891
and 1895. See the interesting investigation into the results of this legislation by

Sanitation and Safety 359

with regard to the sanitary condition of the places in which
their wage -earners have to work has led to many fitful
struggles. Perhaps the most notable, and at the same time
significant example is that of the Glasgow tailors. As far
back as 1854 we find the union resolving that the members
employed in a certain notorious underground cellar " should
finish their jobs and leave, until a better workshop was
got." ^ In the next year an attempt was made to prohibit
all working in underground rooms. The general meeting
resolved : " That those employers who have pit-shops at
present receive notice to get proper workshops, otherwise the
men will be obliged to refuse to work in all shops the same
not being above ground." ^ During the following years, the
energetic journeymen tailors put into force all the methods
of Trade Unionism to attain their end. Mutual Insurance
was employed to a remarkable extent, any member choosing
to leave an underground workshop being allowed four shillings
a week over and above the ordinary Out-of-Work pay. This
induced the better class of employers to resume Collective
Bargaining, to agree to provide suitable workrooms for their
men, and even to submit them to the inspection of the
Trade Union officials. But neither Mutual Insurance nor
Collective Bargaining availed to put down the evil among the
worst employers. The union then turned to the law. An in-
fluentially signed memorial was presented to the Town Council
in order to obtain a by-law prohibiting the use of underground
workshops altogether, and though this request does not appear
to have been complied with, the increasing stringency of the
sanitary law to some extent served the purpose.^

a Home Office Committee of experts, Report of a Committee appointed to inquire
into the workifig of the Cotton Cloth Factories Act, 1889 [C, 8348], 1897.

1 MS. Minutes of Glasgow Tailors' Society, April 1854.

2 Ibid. January 1855.

3 Report on Trade Societies and Strikes : National Association for the Promo-
tion of Social Science, i860, p. 280, where it is erroneously stated that the clause
desired was actually embodied in a local Act of Parliament. We can trace no
such provision, and underground workshops are, if properly ventilated, still per-
mitted by law. But the use of premises below the ground-level as dwellings is
restricted by the Public Health Acts, and the Factory Act of 1895, sec. 27,

360 Trade Union Function

But safety and health are not the only requirements.
Many trades enforce a series of regulations designed merely
to secure the comfort and convenience of the operatives. In
the innumerable " Working Rules " which govern the build-
ing trades of the various towns, the Trade Unions generally
insist on a clause to compel the employer to provide a dry
and comfortable place in which the men may take their
meals, lock up their tools in safety, and rest under cover in
storms of rain.'

It will be unnecessary to give further examples. The long
and elaborate code of law which now governs employment
in the factory and workshop, the bakehouse and printing
office, on sea and in the depths of the mine, is itself largely
made up of the Common Rules designed for the protection
of the operatives' health, life, or comfort, which have been
pressed for by Trade Unions, and have successively com-
mended themselves to the wisdom of Parliament. And the
Trade Union Regulations of this class, whether enforced by
the Method of Collective Bargaining or by that of Legal
Enactment, are constantly increasing in number and variety.
Every revision of " Working Rules," or other collective
agreements with employers, is made the occasion for new
stipulations. Each meeting of the Trade Union Congress
sees new proposals under this head formally endorsed by the
representatives of other trades. Scarcely a session of Parlia-
ment now passes without new Common Rules for the pro-
forbids the occupation of any such premises as bakehouses if they were not
actually employed as such on 1st January 1S96.

^ Thus, to give only four instances out of our collection of many hundreds,
the London Stone Carvers are found insisting, as early as 1S76, " that, as a pro-
tection from the weather, and to prevent loss of time, all carvers on outdoor jobs
to be supplied with tarpaulins or other suitable covering " ; the London Plasterers
stipulate (1892) that "employers shall provide, where practicable and reasonable,
a suitable place for the workmen to have their meals on the works, 'with a
laborer to assist in preparing them " ; the Nottingham Bricklayers require (1S93)
•' that there shall be a lock-up shop provided for workmen to get their meals in
and put their tools in safety"; and the Portsmouth Stonemasons (1S93) insist
" that suitable shops and mess-houses be erected on all jobs where necessary."
All these Working Rules, it will be remembered, are formally agreed to and
signed by the representatives of the employers and the Trade Union.

Sanitation and Safety 361

tection of the health or safety of one or other class of
operatives being, amid general public approval, added to our
Labor Code/

We attribute the rapid development of this side of Trade
Unionism to the discovery by the Trade Union leaders that
it is the line of least resistance. Middle-class public opinion,
which fails as yet to comprehend the Common Rule of the
Standard Rate and is strongly prejudiced against the fixing
of a Normal Day, cordially approves any proposal for pre-
venting accidents or improving the sanitation of workplaces.
The alacrity with which capitalist Parliaments met these
requests came as a surprise to the Trade Union officials.
To the sweated journeyman tailor at the East End, the fact
that he was compelled to labor in an overcrowded workroom
seemed less detrimental to his health than the excessive
hours of daily toil that were exacted from him. The girls
in a London jam factory are still puzzled as to why the
Government should compel their employer to provide them
with costly sanitary conveniences, and yet permit him to go
on paying wages quite inadequate for their healthy subsist-
ence. It cannot be of more urgent importance to the com-
munity to insist on sanitary refinements than to secure the
fundamental requisites of healthy life and citizenship. Nor
is one set of Common Rules less inconsistent with " freedom
of enterprise " than the other. With regard to Sanitation
and Safety the law has not scrupled to " thrust a ramrod "
into the delicate mechanism of British industry, in the shape
of rigid rules enforced on all manufacturers alike. Whether
a factory be new or old, large or small, in the crowded slums
of a manufacturing town or on the breezy uplands of the
country side, gaining huge profits for its proprietor or actually
running at a loss, the community insists on the observance
of uniform rules as to cubic space, ventilation, meal-times,
stoppages for cleaning, fire-escapes, doors opening outwards,

^ During the ten years, 1S87-1S96, there were passed no fewer tlian thirteen
separate Acts relating to the conditions of employment in factories, workshops,
mines, shops, or railways, besides several general Public Health Acts.

362 Trade Union Fimdion

fencing of machinery, degrees of humidity and temperature,
water supply, drainage, and sanitary conveniences, separate
for each sex. It is in vain that the manufacturers point out
to the House of Commons that these requirements constitute
as real and as burdensome an increase in their cost of pro-
duction as a shortening of the hours of labor, and that the
Factory Inspector's requisition for a ventilating fan and the
erection of additional sanitary conveniences may result in the
actual closing of the oldest and least profitable mills.

It is not easy to find an adequate explanation of this
state of mind. Something, we think, is to be attributed to
the general fear of infectious disease, which the ordinary
middle -class man associates more with overcrowding and
defective sanitation than with insufficient food or overtaxed
energies. Along with this fear of infection there goes a real
sympathy for the sufferers, ill-health and accidents being
calamities common to rich and poor. More, perhaps, is due
to the half-conscious admission that, as regards Sanitation
and Safety at any rate, the Trade Union argument is borne
out by facts, and that it is impracticable for the individual
operative to bargain about these conditions of his labor.
And another factor may come into the decision. There still
exists a certain scepticism as to whether the wage-earner is
capable of wisely expending any larger wages than will keep
body and soul together, or of usefully employing any greater
leisure than is necessary for sleep.^ Ventilating bricks and
shuttle-guards, whitewash and water-closets cannot be spent
in drink or wasted in betting. Mingled with this economic
consideration there is even a subtle element of Puritanism —
the vicarious asceticism of a luxurious class — which prefers

1 To the Iron Trades Employers' Association of 187S — an organisation which
included the leading captains of British industry — a reduction of wages and a
lengthening of hours appeared a positive economic advantage to the community.
•'It has appeared to employers of labor," said their secret circular urging a
return to longer hours of labor and a general reduction of rates of paj-ment,
" that the time has arrived when the superfluous wages which have been dissipated
in unproductive consumption must be retrenched, and when the idle hours which
have been unprotitably thrown away must be reclaimed to industry and profit by
being redirected to reproductive work." — History of Trade Unionism, p. 331.

Sanitation and Safety 363

to give the poor " what is good for them," rather than that
in which they can find active enjoyment.

With pubHc opinion in this state, and a House of Com-
mons predisposed to favor sanitary legislation, it might be
imagined that the necessary Common Rules for securing
health and safety would have been systematically applied to
every industry. This, however, is not the British way of
doing things. Neither the permanent officials of the Home
Office, nor even the Cabinet Ministers themselves, ever dream
of considering it their duty to discover and investigate evils
which have not been formally brought to their notice, nor
spontaneously to initiate remedial measures which have not
been persistently pressed on them by outside agitation.
The House of Commons itself has not yet outgrown its
traditional attitude of a court, to which suitors must them-
selves bring petitions if they desire to have their grievances
remedied, and must present their case too, in certain pre-
scribed forms, on pain of seeing it, however gross the evil,
ignored for many years. The result is that the Common
Rules necessary to secure health and safety in particular
trades are placed on the Statute Book, not according to the
urgency of the need, or the extremity of the evil, but accord-
ing to the strength of the pressure which is brought to bear.
In many individual cases this pressure has come from the
philanthropists. The agitations which led to the prohibition
of the use of "climbing boys" to clean chimneys (1840),^

^ It took over sixty years' agitation to complete this reform. In 1817 a
Select Committee exposed the horrors to which the "climbing boy" was exposed.
Legislation followed in 1834, when the employment of boys under ten was for-
bidden, and it was made a criminal offence for a master to send a child up a
chimney when it was actually on fire ! This caused the insurance companies to
petition against the measure. In 1840 the minimum age for chimney-sweep
apprentices was raised to sixteen, and a formal prohibition of their being com-
pelled to ascend chimneys was embodied in the law. This remained largely
ineffective until, in 1864, the Chimney Sweepers' Regulation Act punished with
imprisonment and hard labor any master who sent a boy up a chimney. The
last case of a boy dying in the chimney — once not unusual— occurred in 1875,
when another Act was passed increasing the stringency of the law. For a general
survey of the progress in this protective legislation, see The Queen's Reign for
Children, by W. Clarke Hall (London, 1897).

364 Trade Union Ftmction

and of the employment of children in theatres (1889),
derived their force from the ability with which their advo-
cates appealed to middle-class sentiment. Similar adroit
management accounts for Mr. Plimsoll's success in 1876 in
extending the Merchant Shipping Acts, though on this occa-
sion the political influence of the organised Trade Unions
came effectively into play.^ The protective rules in the
Mines Regulation Acts have, on the other hand, been
initiated since 1843 by the Coalminers' leaders themselves,
though the direct influence of the Mining Unions has been
aided by general public sympathy. But it is in the Common
Rules secured by the Cotton Operatives that we see the most
striking result of Trade Union pressure. The Factory Acts
which their support enabled Mr. Oastler and Lord Shaftes-
bury to carry between 1833 and 1847 were mainly directed
to a limitation of the hours of labor. Since 1870, how-
ever, the ingenuity and persistence of the cotton officials
have greatly extended the scope of the legal regulation of
their trade. The elaborate and detailed provisions of the
law as to stoppages for cleaning and protection of machinery,
the ventilation of the mills, and the exact space to be allowed
between the fixed and moving parts of the mule, the regu-
lation of the temperature and the degree of humidity in the
weaving-shed, go far beyond anything that Parliament has
yet done in the way of collective regulation of the conditions
of labor in the factories and workshops of other trades.^

^ History of Trade Unionism, p. 356.

2 This is the more remarkable in that cotton manufacture is an industry in
which the margin of profit has long been steadily declining, and has, according to
many authorities, now almost vanished. Foreign competition, too, is admittedly
keen and increasing. On the other hand, the wholesale slop clothing trade has,
during the present generation, expanded by leaps and bounds, and has notoriously
produced colossal fortunes. Yet whilst the cotton operatives secure from Parlia-
ment i-efinement after refinement at the cost of their employers, the unfortunate
men and women employed by the wholesale clothiers, whose woes were laid bare
by the House of Lords Committee on the Sweating System, 1888-90, are still
practically excluded from the protection of the Factory Inspector. See " The
Lords' Report on the Sweating System," by Beatrice Potter, Nineteenth Ceniziry,
Tune 1890 ; and Fabian Tract No. 50, Stveating: its Cause and Remedy (London,
"1893)-

Sanitation and Safety 365

On the other hand, the genuine public sympathy with the
unfortunate chain and nail worker in the Black Country,
with the London "fur -puller" and match-box maker, with
the laundress or the dock-laborer, has resulted in nothing
but sham legislation of an entirely illusory character,^
Experience proves, in fact, that public sympathy with the
worker's desire for Common Rules securing safe and healthy
conditions of work leads to effective regulation only when
the grievances, besides being graphically and persistently
pressed on the House of Commons, are accompanied by
proposals for reform which have been worked out in all their
technical detail by practical experts. To put it concretely,
the factory legislation which each trade has obtained, has,
during the last twenty years, varied in stringency and
effectiveness, not according to the misery of the workers or
the profitableness of the enterprise, but almost exactly with
the amount of money which the several unions have expended
on official and legal assistance.

So far we have dealt only with the promotion of health
or safety by means of specific regulations prescribing the
conditions which experience has shown to be necessary to
prevent accident or disease. In one direction, however, the
Trade Unionists have departed from this, the general line of
their policy, and have sought safety in imposing upon the
employer, not positive regulations to prevent the evil, but an
obligation to pay compensation for it when it has happened.
This leads us to the long and bitter controversy connected
with " Employer's Liability," in which, during the last twenty
years, both workmen and politicians have more than once
shifted their ground. To understand the changing features
of this controversy, we must examine, in some detail, both its
history and its various aspects.^

' On the futility of the laundry clause in the Factory Act of 1895, see the
article, "Law and the Laundries," in the Nineteenth Centioy, December 1896,
published by the Industrial Sub-Committee of the National Union of Women
Workers.

2 The best account of this difficult subject is the Home Office Memorandum
printed as Appendix CLIX. to the Labor Commission Blue Book, C. 7063,

366

Trade Union Function

By the common law of England a person is liable, not
only for his own negligence, but for that of his servant acting
as such. It does not appear that this law was, in old times,
made use of by workmen against their employers — probably
no one thought of such an insurrectionary proceeding — but
in 1837 an action (Priestley v. Fowler) was brought against
a butcher by one of his assistants to recover compensation
for injuries resulting from the overloading of a cart. It was
proved that the overloading was due to the negligence of a
fellow-servant. On this ground the judges decided that the
injured servant could not recover compensation from the
common employer. This decision is now deemed by some
scientific jurists to have been bad law ; ^ but, good or bad, it
founded the distinction which has ever since been made
between strangers, to whom the employer is responsible for
the negligence of his servants, and the servants themselves.

III. A (1894), pp. 363, 3S4, and the comments by Sir F. Pollock in the same
volume (Appendix clviii. pp. 346-348), with Mr. A. Eirrell's Fotir Lectures
on the Law of Employers' Liability at Home and Abroad (London, 1897).
The Report and Evidence of the Select Committee of 1887 (H. C. No. 285
of 1SS7) is also important. For a more detailed and technical account of
the law and its development, see Employers and Employed, by W. C. Spens
and R. F. Younger (London, 18S7), or Duty and Liability of Employers, by
AV. H. Roberts and G. H. Wallace (London, 1885). The Trade Union view is well
given in the pamphlet Employers' Liability : '■^ Past and Prospective Legislation,
-with Special Refe}-ence to Contracting- Out," hy Y-Amoni Brown (London, 1896).
This is ably criticised in the Daily Chronicle pamphlet, The Workers^ Tragedy
(London, 1S97). For another point of view, see Mr. Chamberlain's article in
the iVineteenth Century, November 1892, and his speeches in Parliament during
May and July 1897 ; Miners' Thrift and Employers' Liability, by G. L. Campbell
(Wigan, 1S91) ; and Employers' Liability : What it Ought to Be, by Henry W.
Wolff (London, 1897). The exhaustive report of the French Government
"Commission de Travail" for 1892 contains full information on Continental
legislation, as to which see the interesting proceedings of the International
Congresses on Industrial Accidents, held at Paris, 1889, Berne, 1891, Milan,
1894 (Brussels, 1S97); Dr. T. Bodiker's Die Arbeiterversicherung in den
Eiiropdischen Staaien (Leipzig, 1895) ; and the elaborate bibliography published
in Circular No. i, Series B, of the Musee Social (Paris, 1896).

^ Sir Frederick Pollock remarks, in the Memorandum already cited, " I
think the doctrine of the American and English Courts (for it is American quite
as much as English) is bad law as well as bad policy. The correct course, in my
judgment, would have been to hold that the rule expressed by the maxim
respondeat superior, whatever its origin or reason, was general. . . . No such
doctrine as that of common employment has found place in the law courts of
France or of any German State."

San it at ion and Safety 367

The lawyers explained that the workmen must be held
implicitly to have contracted to take upon themselves, as
part of the risk incidental to their calling, the possible negli-
gence of fellow-employees, for whose action, therefore, the
common employer could not fairly be considered liable.

To the manual worker this distinction, for which Lord
Abinger was chiefly responsible, seemed an intolerable piece
of " class legislation." The workman, injured in the actual
performance of his duty, was at least as fit an object for
compensation as the chance passer-by. The exception,
moreover, destroyed all real responsibility of the largest
employers even for their own negligence. In mines and
railways, and in the large establishments characteristic of
modern industry, the legal " employer " was seldom present
or in personal direction of the operations. He might be
guilty of the grossest carelessness in choosing his managers ;
he might not provide sufficient means for proper appliances ;
he might worry his agents to increase the speed of working,
deliberately bringing pressure to bear on his superintendents
and foremen to increase the output or lower the cost of
production, to the hazard of the lives of all concerned. Yet
because he did not give the specific order, or direct the use
of the particular machine, out of which the accident arose, he
escaped all liability for compensation to his injured workmen,
on the plea that the negligence was that of their fellow-
worker, the manager whom he had put in authority over
them.

Under these circumstances, a Trade Union agitation for
" employers' liability " was sooner or later inevitable. It was
started by Alexander Macdonald, the leader of the coal-
miners, whose remarkable career we have traced in our
History of Trade Unionism} At the conference of miners'
delegates at Ashton-under-Lyne in 1858, bitter complaint

1 See the History of Tf-ade Unionism, pp. 2S4-292 ; the Rep07-t of the Cotfer-
ence of the National Association of Coal, Lime, and Ironstone Miners of Great
Britain and Ireland [at Leeds in 1863] (London, 1864) ; Macdonald's speech in
the similar report for 1881 (Manchester, 1S81) ; and his speech in Report of the
Elevejtth Afinual Trade Union Congress (Bristol, 1878), pp. 17, 18.

368 Trade Union Ftmction

was made that many of the colHeries were without what
would now be considered the most ordinary safeguards against
accidents. No real effort was made by the Government to
enforce the merely elementary provisions of the Mines
Regulation Act of 1842, The frequent mine explosions
which marked the years 1860-67, culminating in the terrible
catastrophes at the Hartley, Edmunds Main, and Oaks
Collieries, where hundreds of miners lost their lives, brought
the question of the responsibility of the employer prominently
to the front. " How long then," asked the miners at their con-
ference in 1 86 3," shall such conduct and workings be tolerated?
To talk of humanity is nothing, and the law as now carried
out is useless. To make the result costly is, then, the only
present remedy. . . . When men's lives are held to be sacred
their safety will be looked to as a matter of vital importance.
At present we ask them to be considered costly, and com-
pensation to be awarded accordingly. Many are alive to
costs who are dead to all higher feeling, and these should be
dealt with accordingly." ^ It is easy to understand the miners'
policy. Their industry was already subject to elaborate
Common Rules, which were steadily increasing in number and
scope. What was lacking, in the absence of any serious
Government inspection, was some means of compelling com-
pliance with the rules. Failure to observe them was prima
facie evidence of negligence on the part of the manager of
the mine. If the Miners' union could recover damages from
the mine-owner whenever an accident occurred in a colliery
where the law had not been obeyed, the risk of having to pay
out several thousand pounds would, it was argued, induce the
employer to take the prescribed precautions against accidents.
The proposed right of the operative to sue an employer was
merely a practical method of enforcing obedience to the
Common Rules regulating the industry. Thus, to Alexander
Macdonald, employers' liability presented itself only as one
of the instruments of his general policy of obtaining legal

1 Transactions and Results of the National Association of Coal etc. Miners of
Great Britain (London, 1863), pp. x.-xiii.

Sanitation and Safety 369

protection for the health and Hfe of the underground
workers.

This argument was soon reinforced by another. In 1872
the proposal was, at the instance of the newly-formed Amal-
gamated Association of Railway Servants, taken up by the
Trade Union Congress. Inspired, as the Congress then was,
by the able men who were fighting the battle for the work-
men's freedom of association, it was eager to denounce all
laws which excluded manual workers from the personal
rights enjoyed by other classes of the community. To the
Parliamentary Committee of these years the wage-earner's
disability to recover compensation from his employer, in cases
in which a stranger could successfully have sued, seemed
another of the invidious disabilities to which the law at that
time subjected workmen as such. The lawyer's contention
that the wage-earner, by entering into a contract of service,
had placed himself in a position different from that of the
ordinary citizen, was incomprehensible to them. "There seems
to be no sufficient reason," declared the Parliamentary Com-
mittee in 1876, "for these exceptions to the general law.
Negligence in the employer, or in some person for whose
conduct he is ordinarily responsible, and whom he has the
power to dismiss, must of course be shown. But if that is
shown, why should more be required in the case of a workman
than in any other case. The present state of the law takes
away a motive for the exercise of careful control and super-
vision by the employer. It even makes it his interest not
to examine too minutely into the way in which his work is
carried on, lest he should be held to have personally inter-
fered, and to have become personally liable. The proposed
alteration of the law would not be any exceptional legislation
in favor of workmen : it would be merely the repeal of an
exceptional exclusion of them from the ordinary protection
of the law." ^

^ Parliamentary Committee's Report to the Ninth Annual Trade Union
Congress, 1 8th September 1876, pp. 3, 4; see History of Trade Unionism,
chap. vii. Between 1872 and 1879 no fewer than eight Employers' Liability
VOL. I 2 B

370 Trade Union Function

The energetic agitation between 1872 and 1880 was
entirely based on these two arguments. Almost every
session saw the matter brought before Parliament in one
form or another ; and each Ministry in succession promised
to effect an amendment of the law. At last, in 1880, by
the skill and persistence of Mr. Broadhurst, an Employers'
Liability Act was passed, which went far to meet the con-
temporary Trade Union demands. The " doctrine of common
employment " was not absolutely abolished ; but an employer
was made liable to compensate his injured workmen when-
ever the accident resulted from the negligence of any super-
intendent, manager, or foreman, or from obedience to any
improper order or rule. A special clause, put in for the
benefit of railway servants, made the employer responsible
for the negligence of any person in charge of railway signals,
points, or engine.

Though the workmen (and, in particular, the miners and
railway servants) thus obtained a large measure of the reform
they had demanded, experience soon convinced the Trade
Unionists that, even to the extent that the 1880 Act went,
placing the workman in the same position as the ordinary
citizen did practically nothing to secure his safety from
accident. The argument that the wage-earner ought to be
placed, as regards compensation for accidents, in the same
position as any one else, led also to the conclusion that he
should be free to enter into any contract as to his legal rights,
whether by way of compromising an accident already suffered
or by way of compounding, in advance, for any possible acci-
dent in the future. The employers accordingly met the new
Act by inventing the device since known as " contracting out."

It was decided in 1882, in Griffiths v. The Earl of
Dudley,^ that if a workman continued in employment after
receipt of a notice that he must forego all his rights under

Bills were introduced in the House of Commons ; see the interesting pamphlet
by Mr, C. H. Green, Employers' Liability : lis History, Limitation, and Exten-
sion (London, 1896), written by an insurance official from an insurance point of
view.

1 9 Queen's Bench Division, 357.

Sanitation and Safety 371

the Act, and accept, in lieu thereof, a claim on a benefit
club to which the employer contributed, he was held to have
entered into a contract to relinquish the rights given him by
the Act of 1880. The consequences of this decision were
soon apparent. It did not suit a large employer to be
exposed to the risk of an indefinite liability, or to the worry
of being sued for compensation by every aggrieved workman.
It became a custom in many collieries, and in some railway
and other large undertakings, to establish a special accident
fund or benefit society, to which both employer and workmen
subscribed, and from which was provided, without litigation,
substantial relief in all cases of accident, whether due to
proved negligence or not. This enabled the partners or
shareholders to satisfy their moral responsibilities to disabled
workmen at the least possible expense and trouble to them-
selves, since their wage-earners directly contributed a portion
of the fund, and the total amount of the firm's payment was
precisely defined in advance. Such a fund, moreover, tended
to attach their workmen permanently to their service by dis-
posing them to abide by the employer's conditions, rather
than forfeit, by going elsewhere, their claims on the firm's
benefit society. Above all, the existence of such a fund,
providing as it did for all accidents whatsoever, enabled the
firm confidently to insist that its workmen should "contract
out" of the Employers' Liability Act, and thus forego the
more limited but legally enforced claims for compensation
which they could otherwise make under it.

The vehemence and persistency with which the entire
Trade Union world has protested against this practice of
" contracting out " has all through been incomprehensible to
the middle-class man. To him the whole object of Em-
ployers' Liability is compensation to the injured workman or
his family. If by a special accident fund this compensation
can be provided, not merely for some, but for all accidents
whatsoever, and if, moreover, the expense of litigation can
thereby be avoided, it seems a clear gain to both parties.
What the middle-class man fails to realise is that this is to

372 Trade Union Fttnction

remit the all-important question of safety of the workman's
life to the perils of Individual Bargaining. The Trade
Unionists assert that the workman's consent to forego his
legal claim is given practically under duress, since a man
applying for employment has no free option whether or not he
will join the firm's benefit society, and so relieve his employer
from that pecuniary inducement to guard against accidents
which the Act was intended to afford. Moreover, it is said
that this inability of the individual workman to bargain
about the conditions of his employment leads, in certain
instances, to his being simply defrauded, the benefit of the
employer's fund being inferior to what he could obtain by
relying on the Act and paying his contributions to an ordi-
nary friendly society. But the fundamental Trade Union
objection is that this " contracting out," even if willingly
acquiesced in by each individual workman, is against public
policy, as defeating the primary purpose of the Act. If the
employer, they say, can avoid all liability for negligence by
making an annual contribution, fixed in advance, he has no
inducement to take precautions against individual accidents.
Macdonald's idea of protecting the workman's life by making
accidents costly is, in fact, thereby entirely defeated.

For the last fifteen years the Trade Union leaders have,
therefore, waged bitter war against " contracting out," ^ and
have persistently forced upon Parliament their demand for
an express prohibition of the practice. In 1893 the Cabinet
was converted to the Trade Union position. Once again the
Trade Unionists found all their demands embodied in a
Government Bill, which successfully passed the House of
Commons. An amendment was inserted by the House of
Lords preserving the liberty of contracting out of the Act,
but under certain significant new safeguards.^ In emphatic
condemnation of the practice of the London and North-

1 The London and North-Western Railway Company, and all but one of the
South-West Lancashire coalowners at present (1897), explicitly compel all their
operatives to "contract out."

2 The House of Lords' Amendment, together with the final discussion upon
it, will be found in Hansard's Parliameyitary Debates, 13th February 1894.

Sanitation and Safety 2)1 Z

Western Railway Company and the Lancashire Coalowners,
the House of Lords declared that " contracting out " was in
no case to be made a condition of the workman's being given
employment. It was not even to be left any longer to Indi-
vidual Bargaining. No " contracting out " was to be per-
mitted unless the financial basis of the employer's benefit
society had been approved by the Board of Trade as fair to
the workmen. But this was not all. No " contracting out"
was to be allowed, however favorable to the men might be
the consideration offered, unless it had been collectively agreed
to by the workers in the establishment considered as a whole.
For this purpose, elaborate provision was proposed for a
" secret ballot " of the workers to be taken under authority
of the Board of Trade at intervals of not less than three
years ; and a two-thirds majority was to be necessary for
consent. Thus, under no circumstances was it to be within
the option of an individual wage-earner, acting as an indi-
vidual, to forego his legal rights. In spite of this remarkable
concession to the central position of Trade Unionism — the
objection to Individual Bargaining — the majority of the
House of Commons, at the instance of its working-men
members, preferred to abandon the Bill rather than accept an
amendment allowing the detested contracting out under any
conditions whatsoever.^

The controversy has now been narrowed down to so fine
a point that the Trade Union leaders may any day get from

^ The bitterness with which the Trade Union officials object to "contracting
out," and the underlying reason which led them to refuse even the safeguarded
provision of the House of Lords' Amendment, are, we think, connected not with
"contracting out" as such, but with the existence of employers' benefit societies.
An accident fund or benefit society, confined to the workmen in a particular
establishment, is, as we shall see in our chapter on " The Implications of Trade
Unionism," in many ways inimical to Trade Unionism. Employers' benefit
societies are far older than the Act of 1880, and exist in many firms which do
not contract out. Moreover, contracting out may take place, as in the South
Wales coalmines, with an accident fund common to the whole area, and thus
independent of any one employer. Employers' benefit societies cannot therefore
be swept away by a side wind. If public opinion is to be led to agree to their
prohibition, this must come, like the removal of other deductions from wages, by
an amendment of the Truck Acts.

374 Trade Union Function

one party or the other the legislation they desire. We
are, however, inclined to believe that just as they were dis-
appointed with the Act of 1880, though it gave them prac-
tically what they then demanded, so they will find equally
unsatisfying any measure on the lines of the Bill of 1893-94,
about which they were so enthusiastic. The fact is there is
no reason to believe that the mere prohibition of " contracting
out" will do anything to diminish the number of accidents.
Attempts have been made to prove that the comparatively
f few undertakings in which contracting out prevails have a
higher percentage of accidents than those in which the
Act applies. But no statistical evidence yet adduced
on the subject will stand examination.^ It is said, for
example, that in Lancashire and Wales, where the coal-
miners contract out, the proportion of accidents is appreci-
ably higher than in Yorkshire or Northumberland, where
they do not. But this was the case also before the Act
of 1880: moreover, the proportion of accidental deaths
to persons employed seems to be diminishing more rapidly
in Wales and Lancashire than in Northumberland. It is
even gravely argued that the London and North -Western
Railway Company has eight times as many accidents as the
Midland — as if nothing turned on the different definitions of
an accident ! The truth is, there is no such difference of
pecuniary interest as is supposed between the employer who
" contracts out," and the one who remains subject to the Act,
In the vast majority of cases the employer does not take
the trouble to ask his workmen to bargain away their legal
rights ; ^ he protects himself against the worry of litigation by
the simpler device of insurance. On payment of a definite
annual premium to an ordinary insurance company he is
indemnified against any loss by claims under the Act, the

^ A well-known barrister, who has been engaged in between three and four
hundred Employers' Liability cases, almost exclusively on the side of the workmen,
informed us that his experience has convinced him that the legal liability for
compensation had no effect whatever in preventing accidents, at any rate in coal-
mining.

, 2 Thus, in iSgi.only 119,122 coalminers, out of 648,450, had contracted

Sanitation mid Safety 375

company, to boot, taking all the trouble off his hands. The
fear of damages may here and there induce a small master
to obey, more promptly than before, the factory inspector's
order to guard a driving wheel or fence a lift shaft. But ir.
the great staple industries, insurance against accidents, at a
rate of premium which is, in practice, uniform for all the
firms in the trade, is becoming almost as much a matter of
course as insurance against fire. Thus, even where the work-
men retain all their legal rights, the employer has usually no
more pecuniary interest in preventing accidents than he has
where they have been compelled to contract out of the Act.
" Contracting out," with its accompanying contribution to an
employer's benefit society, is, in fact, itself only a minor form
of insurance.

Insurance stands, therefore, in the way of the Trade
Union plan of preventing accidents by making them costly.
In the case of ships at sea, this fact has occasionally led
philanthropists to suggest that insurance should be pro-
hibited. But insurance is merely a private bargain, often
indeed only a co-operative arrangement between friends ;
and no such prohibition could possibly be enforced. Be-
sides, insurance is itself only a device for spreading an
occasional lump sum payment equally over a number of
years : so that the largest establishments prefer to be their
own insurers. Here the setting aside of a few hundred
pounds a year to form a fund out of which to pay compen-
sation for occasional workmen's accidents is a flea-bite
compared with the cost and trouble of adopting the elab-
orate precautions that might totally prevent their occurrence.
This brings us to the economic centre of the whole argu-
ment. What has been discovered is, that in the majority of
industries it costs less, whether in the form of an annual

out, the practice being unknown in Northumberland, Durham, Yorkshire, the
Midlands, and Scotland. Of railway companies, only the London and North-
western (compulsorily), and the London, Brighton, and South Coast (optionally),
employ this expedient. In other industries we know only very few cases — such
as Messrs. Chance's great glass works, and Mr. Assheton Smith's Dinorwic slate
quarries — where the men contract out.

2iT(> Trade Union Function

premium or in that of an occasional lump sum out of profits,
to compensate for accidents than to prevent them.^

Considered as a method of preventing industrial accidents,
the whole system of employers' liability is an anachronism.
When Parliament became convinced that no coal mine could
be safely worked without a second shaft, it did not seek to
mend matters by conceding to the miners a right of recover-
ing compensation from the mine-owner who worked without
such a shaft. What happened was that all mine-owners
were peremptorily ordered to have a second shaft, under
penalty of heavy fines for each day's neglect to comply with
the law. When public opinion demanded that the operatives
in a crowded factory should not be exposed to the risk of
being burnt to death, the House of Commons never thought
of removing this risk by any process of compensation ; it
commanded every mill-owner to provide proper fire-escapes,
or be punished by the police magistrate. This is the
method of our factory, mines, railways, and merchant ship-
ping Acts, and all our public health legislation. " Imagine,
for the sake of illustration," wrote Jevons in 1887, "that
there is in some factory a piece of revolving machinery
which is likely to crush to death any person carelessly
approaching it. Here is a palpable evil which it would be

1 Thus, to take only one industry, there can be little doubt that the large
number of accidents to railway servants (on an average, over forty every day,
a quarter of which are connected with moving vehicles) could, as regards
shunters, be at once diminished by the universal adoption of such appliances
as automatic couplings ; and that in particular, the almost daily sacrifice of
platelayers could be avoided by the rigging-up of temporary signals. But to
adopt such precautions throughout the extensive English railway system would
be extremely expensive, and possibly irksome.

The trifling amount of the premium that suffices to meet all compensation and
costs under the Act of iS8o is, in this connection, very significant. The Iron
Trades Employers' Association covers the liability of firms employing 28,000 men
in engineering and shipbuilding by a premium varying from fifteen to twenty-
seven pence per ;!Cloo paid in wages. In the building trade it is four shillings
per ;j/^ 100. In Northumberland and Durham the coalowners have a mutual insur-
ance association, to which they pay annually a sum sufficient to meet all damages
and costs which any of their members have to pay under the Act of 1 880. Their
total payments during five years were only ;^400 a year, a sum which would not
have gone far in pro\iding any safeguards in all their collieries. See Evidence
before Select Committee on Employers' Liability, 1887 (H. C. No. 285).

Sanitation and Safety 377

unquestionably well to avert by some means or other. But
by what means ? " And he concluded that there was one
" mode of solving the question, which is as simple as it is
effective. The law may command that dangerous machinery
shall be fenced ; and the executive government may appoint
inspectors to go round and prosecute such owners as disobey
the law." 1

This sounds simple ; but it involves two troublesome
preliminaries. First, an elaborate technical investigation to
ascertain exactly what practical precautions should be
adopted ; and, second, to induce a capitalist Parliament to
enforce them against negligent employers. In 1872 the
latter condition was so hopeless that the Trade Union
leaders of that day could see nothing for it but to fall back
on the indirect method of making accidents costly to the
employer. But public opinion has made a prodigious stride
during the last twenty years. Parliament no longer refuses
to regulate, in minute detail, the processes of particular
industries. Though both the scope and the administration
of our industrial legislation still leave much to be desired,
it now takes only a few years' agitation for a group of
philanthropists or a well -organised Trade Union to get
embodied, either in an Act of Parliament or in a " special
rule " of the Home Secretary, any well-considered regulation
for promoting health or safety which has been approved
by the scientific experts. Meanwhile, in one industry after
another, the inspection necessary for the enforcement of the
law is steadily becoming a reality. By the Coal Mines
Regulation Act of 1887 the miners in any pit are enabled
to appoint two inspectors of their own, who are empowered
to inspect, once a month, every part of the workings, and
formally to record their report upon them. In 1858 there
were only eleven Government inspectors of mines, all told.
By 1896 this number had been increased to thirty-nine
(including assistant inspectors), and the service made much

^ The State in Relation to Labour, by W. S. Jevons (London, 18S7), pp.
1-4.

378 Trade Union Fnnction

more efficient. In the ten years 1884- 1893 over four
thousand raihvay workers lost their lives by accidents with-
out the Board of Trade troubling even to inquire into more
than a dozen of the cases ; now, with the appointment of two
railway workers as assistant inspectors, about half the fatal
accidents that take place are made the subject of elaborate
official investigation, with a view of suggesting precautions
to prevent their recurrence.^ In short, the protection of
the worker against industrial accidents has now become part
of the acknowledged work of Government. An avoidable
casualty in a factory or a mine is no longer regarded merely
as an injury to the individual, to be atoned for by the pay-
ment of money compensation : under modern legislation it is
an offence against the community punishable by the magistrate.
From this public obligation to provide for health and safety
there can obviously be no "contracting out." Nor is it
possible for the employer to evade his liability by any
payment to an insurance company. The inspector and the
magistrate are empowered to see, not only that the fine is
paid, but also that the law is complied with. The idea of
relying for the protection of life and health upon the chance
activity of interested plaintiffs in search of personal compen-
sation, seems, to the modern jurist, archaic. Like murder,
theft, and embezzlement, the unnecessary risking of the
workers' lives has passed from the domain of civil to that of
criminal law.

Let us now leave the arguments used in support of
employers' liability by the Trade Union officials, and con-
sider why it secures the suffrages of the rank and file.
What the individual workman sees in the proposal is, not
so much a vague chance of lessening the risk of accidents,
as the certainty of a lump sum down when one occurs, to
enable him or his widow to set up a little shop. To the
miner or the railway servant it seems an intolerable hardship
that his family should be reduced to beggary through no

■^ Report of General Secretary to Annual General Meeting of the General
Raihvay Workers' Union (London, 1897), pp. 12-17.

Sanitation and Safety 379

fault of his own. What he wants is, not to find out whose
fault the accident is — as likely as not it is nobody's fault —
but to be compensated for his misfortune. That is also the
concern of the community, which has an admitted interest in
fulfilling for him that " established expectation " upon which
foresight and deliberateness in life depend. Here all inquiries
as to whether the accident is caused by the personal negligence
of the manager or the carelessness of a fellow-workman, or
whether it is the result of a fog or an inexplicable explosion,
are quite beside the question. Whether from the standpoint
of the community or from that of the injured workman, the
notion of making compensation in any way dependent on
such considerations is pure inconsequence. Accordingly,
wherever the community itself undertakes public services, it
is every day compensating more equitably those who suffer
bodily injury in the performance of their duties. In the
army and navy, the Civil Service, and the police, in the Fire
Brigade, and other branches of municipal administration,
though the treatment of weekly wage-earners is still far from
being as favorable as that of salaried officers, we see con-
stantly a fuller acceptance and more generous interpretation
of their right to compensation. Private individuals and
corporations sometimes show a sense of the same responsi-
bility. In many particular instances large industrial under-
takings will give a " light job," or even a pension, to a clerk
or workman disabled in their service. Whenever a sensa-
tional accident occurs at sea or in the mine, subscriptions
pour in to save the sufferers or their widows and orphans
from the workhouse. In short, in all those cases in which
public opinion can now be directly appealed to, it is found
to be largely in agreement with the workman that it is
intolerable for his livelihood to be cut short through no
shortcoming or fault in his own character or conduct.

We have said above, parenthetically, that an accident is
as likely as not to be nobody's fault. It is necessary to
emphasise this, because most accidents are, to use the
traditional phrase of the bill of lading, " the act of God."

380 Trade Union Function

In the great majority of industrial casualties — probably in
three cases out of four — it is impossible to prove that the
calamity has been due to neglect on any one's part. A flash
of lightning or a storm at sea, a flood or a tornado, irre-
sponsibly claim their victims. The greatest possible care in
buying materials or plant will leave undiscovered hidden
flaws which one day result in a calamity. In other cases,
the accident itself destroys all trace of its own cause. In
many, perhaps in most, of the casualties of the ocean or the
mine, the shunting yard or the mill, the difficulties in the
way of bringing home actual negligence to any particular
person are insuperable.^

Here, then, we discover a fundamental objection to the
doctrine of employers' liability — its irrelevance to the issue
between the community and the injured workman, and its
practical inapplicability, even as an arbitrary makeshift, to
most of the cases it is aimed at. Actual experience indi-
cates that it neither prevents accidents, nor insures their
victims. And it has the further drawback that to compel
the workman to extract his compensation from the employer
is inevitably to plunge him into litigation. Even where
compensation can now be recovered the law costs are a
serious evil. Moreover, unless the sufferer happens to
belong to a strong and wealthy Trade Union, which takes
his case up, it is usually quite impossible for him to fight
it at all, from lack of both knowledge and funds ; so that he
is practically driven to accept any compromise offered by the
employer. The Home Office itself admits the failure. In

1 The proportion of industrial accidents for which actual or constructive
negligence by the employer can be shown has been variously estimated at from
one-tenth lo one-half of the whole. The Employers' Liability Assurance Cor-
poration, which insures employers against their liability under the Act of 1880,
found that, in this class of policies, claims were made on them for only 24 per
cent of the accidents reported ; and estimated that, in another class of policies,
where all accidents whatsoever were insured against, only 3026 out of 26,087
admitted claims (or less than one-eighth) represented accidents for which the
employer might have been held legally liable. See evidence before Select Com-
mittee on Employers' Liability, 1887 (H. C. No. 285), pp. 4165-4308, and
Appendices.

Sanitation and Safety 381

its official memorandum on the state of the law it goes so
far as to say, " the truth is that to the workman litigation
under the Act of 1880 has more than its usual terrors. It
is not merely that litigation is expensive, and that he is a
poor man and his employer comparatively a rich one : it
is that when a workman goes to law with his employer, he,
as it were, declares war against the person on whom his
future probably depends ; he seeks to compel him by legal
force to pay money ; and his only mode of doing so is the
odious one of proving that his employer or his agents — his
own fellow -workmen — have been guilty of negligence."
Finally, such migratory workers as seamen find legal
remedies against their employers absolutely illusory, owing
to the impossibility of collecting and keeping together their
witnesses, if these are fellow-seamen, during the law's delays.

Let us now examine the question from the employer's
point of view. Why should he bear the cost of an accident
which is the " act of God," merely because it happens to
have occurred on his premises, especially when the same
unavoidable calamity which has injured his employees may
have crippled, or even ruined, his own business ? And even
in the case of accidents due to his own neglect, how can any
proportion be depended on between the degree of his culp-
ability and the penalty of adequately providing for all the
sufferers ? One accident may involve the payment of a five-
pound note to a man who has been laid up for a week with
a scalded hand : an exactly similar accident, caused in an
exactly similar way, may kill or disable for life a score of
people. The most criminal negligence may lead only to a
breakdown which hurts nobody, whilst a very venial over-
sight may make an employer liable to fabulous compensa-
tion. Thus there is injustice in making him liable for
avoidable accidents, and no justice at all — no sense, in fact
— in making him liable for unavoidable ones. Is it to be
wondered at that employers resolutely resist Liability Bills
in Parliament without regard to party exigencies ?

We now see why the provisions of the Employers'

382 Trade Union Function

Liability Act of 1880, like those of the score of Bills which
have since been introduced for its amendment, are inadequate
and even illusory. It was, no doubt, pleasant to get, under
the Act, some pecuniary compensation for a comparatively
small class of cases, which would otherwise have remained
unprovided for. It would no doubt have been a boon to a
larger number of sufferers if the Bill of 1893-94 had been
passed. But such measures, however useful they may be to
particular sections of wage-earners, deal only with a small
proportion of the cases of hardship, and do not discriminate
in their favor on any logical or permanently tenable ground.
Abandoning, then, the idea that systematic provision for
the sufferers from industrial accidents can be got out of
any possible penalties for negligence, however widely the
lawyers may stretch the term, what shall we say to the
suggestion, as yet scarcely whispered by Trade Unionists,
that the law should be so extended as to make provision for
sufferers from all industrial accidents, whether due to the
proved negligence of any superior or not. Both in Germany
and Austria this idea has been already embodied in elaborate
schemes of universal provision for accidents, which rank
among the most remarkable of social experiments. In
England the proposal has appeared as a natural outcome of
the Trade Union idea of maintaining the continuity of the
worker's livelihood. At the Trade Union Congress of 1877,
universal provision for all industrial accidents, the funds to
be provided by a tax on commodities, was suggested by a
London compositor, as an alternative to the usual employers'
liability resolution. It was vehemently denounced by
Thomas Halliday, a leader of the coalminers, who said
" they wanted no tax upon coal. What they wanted was
that their lives and their bodies should be preserved. The
best way to secure this was to make the employers re-
sponsible, and make them pay the cost. What they
wanted was not money, but their lives and limbs preserved."
This view was endorsed by Alexander Macdonald and
accepted by the Congress amid loud cheers. Thus, the

Sanitation and Safety 38

o

rooted belief in employers' liability as a means of preventing
accidents, coupled, perhaps, with the fear of a deduction from
wages for compulsory insurance, brushed aside a proposal
which deserved more careful consideration. By it we are,
indeed, taken outside the domain of anything that can be
called employers' liability, however much the phrase may
be strained. This involves a reconsideration of the incidence
of the burden. To compel employers to incur the liability
implied by adequate compensation for all accidents what-
soever, would, whether done directly or by insurance, involve
a serious burden upon every enterprise, which would certainly
be shifted, though not without friction and expense, on to
the customers, in the form of higher prices. What is more,
it would fall unequally upon different industries according to
their risk, and would thus be transferred unequally to different
classes of consumers, not at all in proportion to their ability
to bear this new burden, but partly at haphazard, partly in
proportion to their actual consumption. At every " reper-
cussion " of the tax, there would be an additional " loading,"
so that the ultimate charge on the consumer would, as in
the case of excise duties on raw materials, far exceed the
original sum. As soon as public opinion is prepared to
decide that all accidents ought to be compensated for, it
will be at once easier, fairer, and more economical to provide
the necessary annual sum from public funds, and to raise a
corresponding revenue in accordance with the recognised
canons of taxation.

Upon the question likely to interest politicians — how
soon public opinion will arrive at such a point — all that can
be said is that the electors are rapidly becoming aware that
accidents are an inevitable part of the cost of modern
industry ; indeed, statistically considered, they are not
accidents at all, but certainties. And, as we have seen, the
public conscience, which has never been perfectly easy on
the subject — how could it be in a great mining, manufac-
turing, and seafaring community like ours ? — grows per-
ceptibly more sensitive from decade to decade. The question

384 Trade Union Function

cannot be let alone : some solution must be found. At
present what stands most conspicuously in the way of
public provision for all sufferers from accidents, coupled
with factory legislation for their prevention, and criminal
prosecutions for the punishment of negligence, is the
belief in Employers' Liability. And Employers' Liability,
as we have seen, breaks down at every point. The con-
clusion is obvious.

It would be an incidental, but very advantageous, result
of any scheme of public provision that every accident would
have its inquest. There would be many gains in extending
the present system of public inquiry into casualties. Such
an inquiry is now held, {a) by the coroner, if death has
resulted, or (in the City of London) if there has been a fire ;
{h) by an officer of the Board of Trade, in cases where a
ship has been wrecked or a railway accident involving
injury to passengers has occurred ; and {c) by an ofificer of
the Home Office in mining accidents. Industrial accidents
of every kind must at least be notified to a public office.
If a public " inquest " were held, by a duly qualified public
officer (with or without a jury), whenever an accident caused
loss of life or limb, or other serious bodily harm, to a
wage-earner in the course of his employment, the investi-
gation and publicity would probably do much to secure
compliance with the Factory or Mines Regulation Acts,
and so diminish the number of accidents. If any system
of public provision for the sufferers were established, such
an inquest would serve a useful purpose in determining
whether a casualty had been caused by somebody's negli-
gence or by carelessness on the part of the sufferer himself,
or whether it was, in the strict sense, an accident. Where
the casualty had arisen from the employer's failure to
comply with the law, or from any other gross negligence, a
criminal prosecution would naturally follow, any fine im-
posed thus indirectly reimbursing the State for the expense
caused. When the sufferer himself had, by carelessness,
brought about his own calamity, his compensation could be

Sanitation and Safety 385

wholly or in part withheld, though if death had ensued
there would be no public advantage in making his widow
and orphans go short of necessary maintenance. The
compensation itself should in all cases be payable by the
Government out of public funds. Whether there is any
practical advantage in the Government, as in Germany
and Austria, then levying the amount on corporations of
employers (and through them upon the consumers and wage-
earners), instead of directly upon the taxpayers as such,
seems to us extremely doubtful. Such a system of finance
contravenes, like an excise duty on raw materials, all
the orthodox canons of taxation. It is perhaps more to
the point to say that any attempt to levy an insurance
premium upon the workman's weekly wage would, in
this country, encounter the unrelenting opposition of the
whole Trade Union and friendly society world.^

If now we look back on the whole Trade Union argu-
ment from the workman's point of view, it is easy, we think,
to see running through it one simple idea. Whether we
study the regulations imposed by the Collective Bargaining
of the iron and building trades, or the elaborate technical
provisions of the Factory, Mines, and Merchant Shipping
Acts ; whether we disentangle the complicated issues of
" common employment " or those of " contracting out," we
always strike the same root principle, a resolute protest by
the manual worker against being required to sell his life or
health, in addition to his labor. The individual wage-earner
knows that he may always be bribed or terrorised into
accepting conditions of employment injurious to health or
dangerous to life or limb. He therefore seeks, through his
Trade Union, to prohibit Individual Bargaining on these
points, and to enforce, in all establishments, those conditions
of employment which experience has shown to be necessary
for sanitation and safety. It is in vain that the economists

1 See, on this point, the significant Minority Report by Mr. Henry Broadhurst,
M.P., in the Report of the Royal Commission on the Aged Poor, 1S93-95, C.
7684, p. xcviii.

VOL. I 2 C

o

86 Trade Union Function

have assured him that extra risks bring higher wages ; or
the employers offered him liberal inducements in return
for " contracting out " of protective legislation. What the
Trade Unionist has, for a whole generation, uniformly
answered, is that he will not " coin his blood for drachmas."
Hence his persistent hankering after Common Rules, which
shall definitely prescribe how much cubic space shall be
allowed, what safeguards against accidents shall be adopted,
and what provisions shall be made for protection against
disease and discomfort. What is remarkable is that, in
this resolute determination to lift out of the sphere of
" personal freedom " the option to suffer disease, maiming,
or death, public opinion has emphatically endorsed the
Trade Union view. It is no longer permitted to the sailor
to decide whether he will, for extra wages, accept the risk
of going to sea in an overloaded ship, or to the cotton
operative whether, in order to get employment at all, he will
put up with a weaving-shed dripping with steam. We do
not now leave it to the white lead worker or the enameller to
bargain with their employers as to the extent to which they
will risk their health by dispensing with costly precautions ;
or allow the coalminer the option of earning high wages
by foregoing the elaborate ventilation of an exceptionally
perilous pit. And it is not only in the ever -lengthening
Factory, Mines, Railways, and Merchant Shipping Acts that
this conversion of the public is apparent. The Employers'
Liability Act of 1880 was itself a proof that Parliament
overrode the lawyers' contention that the workmen must' im-
plicitly accept, as part of the wage contract, whatever risk to
life or health was incidental to their industry. When, in
order to evade this law, employers invented the device of
" contracting out," a Liberal House of Commons decided
actually to prohibit the risk of accident being made a matter
of contract at all, whilst even the Conservative House of
Lords resolved that under no circumstances could it be left
to Individual Bargaining. Finally, the slackness which has
now come over the whole controversy of Employers'

Sanitation and Safety 387

Liability is, we think, to be attributed largely to a half-
conscious appreciation by the public that the mere making
of accidents costly — a liability which can always be insured
against — is not the way to prevent them, and that to foist
an illusory liability on the employer for constructive negli-
gence is not the way to provide for the sufferers. As far as
the United Kingdom is concerned, the practical conclusion is
to prescribe, by definite technical regulations, the precautions
against accident and disease which experience and science
prove to be necessary ; to punish any breach of these
regulations whether any accident has happened or not ; to
hold a public inquiry into every serious case of accident,
and (as part of the punishment) make the employer pay a
forfeit to the State according to the degree of his guilt,
whenever the accident has resulted from any breach of the
rules or other clear negligence ; and to provide from public
funds for the injured workman and his family, however the
accident has happened, according to the extent of their
needs.

The foregoing analysis of the Trade Union controversy
upon Employers' Liability was written in August 1896, and
published in January 1897/ Since that date the whole
situation has been changed by the introduction and passage
into law of Mr. Chamberlain's revolutionary " Workmen's
Compensation Bill." This measure is admittedly no final
solution of the problem, and we prefer, therefore, to leave
intact our detailed examination of the position in which the
controversy stood in 1896, rather than attempt a hasty
reconstruction on the basis of an Act as yet untested by
experience.

The measure which the Conservative Government of
1897 has passed as an alternative to the Liberal Govern-

^ Pro^essive Review,

o

88 Trade Uniort Function

merit's proposal of 1893-94, seems, in an almost dramatic
manner, to give the go-by to all the old controversies.^
Instead of quibbling over the degree to which the employer's
liability for negligence can be stretched, the new law makes
him, in most of the great industries of the country, individ-
ually liable to compensate his workmen for all accidents
suffered by them in the course of their employment, whether
caused by negligence or not. Thus, without expressly
abolishing the doctrine of " common employment," the law,
by securing a certain limited compensation for every acci-
dent whatsoever, now puts the workman in an altogether
different position from the injured stranger, who can claim
only in case of the employer's real or constructive negligence.
And although " contracting out " is nominally permitted,
provided that the scheme is certified by the Chief Registrar
of Friendly Societies as being not less favorable to the
workman than his position under the Act, so wide is now
the scope of the law and so stringently is this exception
guarded, that most of its attractiveness to the employer will
have disappeared. The Trade Unionists were, accordingly,
well advised in accepting Mr. Chamberlain's bill, notwith-
standing its limitations and defects. The right to compen-
sation for all accidents, now granted to about a third of the
manual workers, cannot permanently be withheld from the
other two-thirds, and the numerous flaws that will certainly
manifest themselves in the working of so novel and so
far-reaching a statute, may be confidently left to the
amending bills to which one Government after another will
find itself committed.

The particular employers upon whom the new law im-
poses a large and indefinite pecuniary liability have, we
think, a real grievance. Certain industries have been thus
burdened, whilst others, no less liable to accidents,^ have

^ For a bitter attack on this measure from the Conservative employer's point
of view, see J. Buckingham Pope's Conservatives or Socialists (London, 1897).

2 Besides all the processes of agriculture, the building or repairing of houses
less than 30 feet high, and all workshop industries, the Act excludes seamen and

Sanitatioft and Safety 389

been left free. Even within the bounds of a single trade,
establishments using one process are made liable to pay
compensation for casualties which no care or precaution
could prevent, whilst others, using a different process, escape
any but the illusory liability of the old law. The novel
penalty for accidents to which some employers are thus
subjected bears no relation to the degree of their guilt in
trying to prevent them ; a casualty due exclusively to the
" act of God " will cost them no less than one due to their
own personal negligence. In practice the liability to com-
pensation is simply insured against, and employers within
the scope of the new Act find themselves saddled with an
extra insurance premium, constituting an addition to the
cost of production from which other capitalists are exempt.

The two -thirds of the manual workers whom the Act
now excludes are suffering from an injustice which can-
not easily be redressed on the lines of the present law.
It may be practicable to put a liability to pay com-
pensation for all accidents upon a railway company, a
coalowner, or the registered occupier of a steam factory.
Even in these cases, if the employer neglects to insure,
the sufferers in an extensive accident may sometimes find
their claims baulked by the firm's bankruptcy. But a large
proportion of the excluded workmen are employed by small
masters, themselves often little removed from the status of
wage-earners, or by migratory contractors of one kind or
another, only just living from hand to mouth. Insurance in
such cases would be unusual, if not even impossible. Any
serious accident in their little industry would, on the one
hand, reduce them to bankruptcy, and, on the other, deprive
the sufferers of any real chance of extracting compensation
from them. Yet the two-thirds of the wage-earners thus
employed cannot permanently be denied the compensation
for all accidents now granted to the other third. If it is
socially expedient to compensate the workers in the great

fishermen ; carmen and drovers and others dealing with horses and cattle ; and
such riverside occupations as boatmen and lightermen.

390 Trade Union Function

industries for all accidents, there is neither equity nor good
sense in withholding a like compensation from those who
suffer accidents in other trades.

In our opinion, there must inevitably be a development,
either towards the formation of compulsory trade groups,
collectively responsible for the accidents occurring in the
establishments of their members, or else towards simple State
compensation. The former plan, adopted in Germany and
Austria, has the economic advantage of making each in-
dustry self-supporting, and thus avoiding the disastrous con-
sequences of the growth of " parasitic trades," on which
we dwell in the subsequent chapter on " The Economic
Characteristics of Trade Unionism." It would, moreover,
emphasise the Trade Unionist principle that an industry
should be regulated not by the will of individual employers,
but by its own Common Rules. Organisation among em-
ployers, and therefore Collective Bargaining, would be greatly
promoted, with the result that a great impulse would prob-
ably be given to Trade Unionism itself. But the necessary
regimentation of employers and their control by rigid rules
would be extremely distasteful to English capitalists, whilst
there would be real difficulty in adapting any such organisa-
tion to the remarkable variety, complexity, and mobility of
English industry. Simple State compensation avoids all
these difficulties, and requires no more regimentation or regis-
tration than is already submitted to by every mine or factory
owner. If it is desired, as the Marquis of Salisbury declared in
the House of Lords in support of Mr. Chamberlain's bill, to
create a great life-saving machine, State compensation affords
the most effective means to this end. The fact that the Treasury
paid for every casualty would change the official bias about
dangerous trades, and we should promptly have the Govern-
ment setting its scientific advisers and factory inspectors to
work to devise new means of preventing accidents, to be
enforced by the Factories, Mines, Railways, and Merchant
Shipping Acts, The public inquests into all serious cases
would themselves do much to make the capitalists take

Sanitation and Safety 391

every possible precaution, and the Factory Inspector's
criminal prosecution of careless employers, which could not
be " insured against " or avoided by bankruptcy, would do
the rest. Nor would the employers object. Now that Mr.
Chamberlain has, in most of our staple trades, made them
individually liable for all accidents, a Government which
proposed, as the only practicable way of extending compen-
sation to the other industries, to place the liability directly on
the State, and to spread its cost impartially over the whole
body of income-tax payers (requiring, perhaps, an additional
threepence in the pound), might count on the powerful sup-
port of the great capitalists in the coal, iron, and railway
industries, who would find themselves relieved of the special
and exceptional burden now cast upon them.

CHAPTER VIII

NEW PROCESSES AND MACHINERY

A GENERATION ago it was assumed, as a matter of course,
by almost every educated person, that it was a cardinal tenet
of Trade Unionism to oppose machinery and the introduc-
tion of improved processes of manufacture. " Trade Unions,"
said a well-known critic of the workmen in i860, "have
ever naturally opposed the introduction of machinery, such
introduction tending apparently to reduce the amount of
manual labor needed, and thus pressing on the majority.
No Trade Union ever encouraged invention."^ In support
of this opinion might have been quoted, for instance, the
editor of the Potters' Exmniner^ an influential leader of the
Potters' Trade Unions, who in 1844 could still confidently
appeal to experience in ascribing all the evils of the factory
operatives to this one cause. " Machinery," he wrote, " has
done the work. Machinery has left them in rags and with-
out any wages at all. Machinery has crowded them in
cellars, has immured them in prisons worse than Parisian
bastilles, has forced them from their country to seek in other
lands the bread denied to them here. I look upon all
improvements which tend to lessen the demand for human
labor as the deadliest curse that could possibly fall on the
heads of our working classes, and I hold it to be the duty of

1 " Trades Unions and their Tendencies," by Edmund Potter, F.R.S., in the
Transactions of the N'ational Association for the Promotio7i of Social Science
(London, i860), p. 761.

New Processes and Machinery

ovo

every working potter — the highest duty — to obstruct by all
legal means the introduction of the scourge into any branch
of his trade."

Nowadays we hear no such complaints. When in 1892
Professor Marshall published a careful criticism of Trade
Union policy and its results, he deliberately refrained from
taking into account or even mentioning, the traditional
hostility of Trade Unions to inventions or machinery,^ And
when in 1894, the Royal Commission on Labor reported
the result of its three years' elaborate and costly inquiry into
the claims and proceedings of the workmen's organisations,
it found no reason to repair this significant omission. The
Commissioners heard the complaints of employers in every
trade, and certainly exhibited no desire to gloss over the faults
of the workmen. But if we may trust the summary of evi-
dence embodied in the lengthy Majority Report, resistance to
machinery no longer forms part of the procedure of British
Trade Unionism. Although the Commissioners analysed the
*' rules and regulations " of hundreds of separate Trade
Unions, in none of them did it discover any trace of antag-
onism to invention or improvement."

The fact is that Trade Unionism on this subject has
changed its attitude. It is quite true that during the first
half of the century the Trade Unionist view was that so
forcibly expressed in the Potters' Examiner. But in 1859
it was noticed by a contemporary scientific observer that
neither the Trade Unions in general, nor even those in the
same industry, showed any real sympathy with the
Northamptonshire bootmakers' strike against the sewing-
machine, " deeming it neither desirable nor practical to resist
the extension of mechanical improvements, although very
sensible of the inconvenience and suffering that are sometimes
caused by a rapid change in the nature and extent of the

1 Eknienis of the Ecottomics of LidusUy (London, 1S92), Book VI. ch. xiii.
" Trade Unions."

2 See, in particular, the voluminous analysis of Rzdes of Associations of
Employers and of Employed, C. 6795, pp. xii. 513. 1892.

394 Trade Union Function

employment afforded in any particular trade." ^ In 1862 the
Liverpool Coopers, who had formally boycotted machinery in
1853, resolved " that we permit any member of this society
to go to work at the steam cooperage." ^ During this decade
the Monthly Circular of the Friendly Society of Ironmoulders
contains numerous earnest exhortations by the Executive
Committee to the members not to resist " the iron man," the
new machine for iron moulding. " It may go against the
grain," they say in December 1 864, " for us to fraternise with
what we consider innovations, but depend upon it, it will
be our best policy to lay hold of these improvements and
make them subservient to our best interests." ^ The United
Society of Brushmakers, which had in 1863 and 1867 sup-
ported its members in refusing to bore work by steam
machinery, and had formally declared that they must " on no
account set work bored by steam by strangers," ^ revised its
rules in i 868, and decided " that should any of our employers
wish to introduce steam power for boring, no opposition shall
be offered by any of our divisions, but each division shall have
the discretionary power of deciding the advantage derived
from its use." ^ These conversions gain in emphasis and
definiteness from decade to decade, until, at the present day,
no declaration against innovations or improvements would
receive support from the Trade Union Congress or any

^ " Account of the Strike of the Northamptonshire Boot and Shoe-makers in
1857, 185S, 1859," by John Ball, F.R.S., Irish Poor Law Commissioner and
(1855-1858) Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies; better known as the
founder of the Alpine Club. Printed in the Report of Social Science Association
on Trade Societies and Strikes, i860, p. 6. The same volume refers (p. 149) to
the fact that the organ of the Chainmakers' union "did not hesitate to condemn
as foolish the strike of the shoemakers in the Midland Counties against the intro-
duction of machinery. "

2 AIS. Minutes of the Liverpool Coopers' Friendly Society, July 1853 and
September 1S62,

3 Friendly Society of Ironmoulders, Monthly Circttlar, December 1864.

* Annual Report of the United Society of Brushmakers for 1863. See also
Report for 1S67.

^ Rules of the United Society of Brushmakers, edition of 1 86g. Such few
disputes as have since occurred in this society have arisen (like that at Norwich
in 1S92) over the exact amount of the piecework rate to be paid on machine
work.

New Processes and Machinery 395

similar gathering.-^ Among all the thousand-and-one rules
of existing Trade Unions we have discovered only a single
survival of the old irreconcilable prohibition, and that in
a tiny local industry, which is rapidly fading away. The
Operative Pearl Button and Stud Workers' Protection
Society, established at Birmingham in 1843, and numbering
about 500 members, enjoys the distinction of being, so far as
we are aware, the only British Trade Union which still pro-
hibits working by machinery. Its latest " Rules and Regula-
tions " declare " that the system of centering by the engine
be annihilated hi toto, and any member countenancing the
system direct or indirect shall be subject to a fine of two
pounds. Any member of the society working at the trade
by means of mill-power either direct or indirect, shall be
subject to a fine of five pounds." ^

But every newspaper reader knows that the introduction
of machinery still causes disputes and strikes ; and no doubt
many excellent citizens still pass by the reports of such dis-
putes as records of the old vain struggle of the handworker
against the advance of industrial civilisation. An examina-
tion of the reports would, however, show that the dispute
now arises, not on the question whether machinery should
be introduced, but about the conditions of its introduction.
The change has even gone so far that there are now, as we
shall show, instances of trouble being caused by Trade Unions

1 The latest case in which a union has ordered a strike simply against the
introduction of machinery into a hand industry is, so far as we know, that of the
Liverpool Packing Case Makers' Society in iSS6. The strike failed, and the
men have since worked amicably with the machine, and have now become com-
pletely reconciled to it on finding, as their secretary informed us, that it had
largely increased the trade.

2 Rules and Regulations to be observed by the members of the Pearl Button and
Stud Worker^ Protection Society, held at the Baptist Chapel, Guildford Street,
Birmingham (Birmingham, 1887), Rule 26, p. 14.

We believe that two or three of the old-fashioned trade clubs in branches of
the Sheffield Cutlery trades, such, for instance, as the File Forgers and the Table-
blade Forgers, still refuse to recognise the new machines which are largely at
work in their trades, and which are therefore operated by a new class of workmen.
On the other hand, other local unions such as the File cutters, Sawsmiths, and
the Pen and Pocket Blade Forgers, have made no objection to the machines, and
have encouraged their members to take to them.

39^ Trade Union Function

putting pressure on old-fashioned employers to compel them
to adopt the newest inventions. The typical dispute to-day
is a dispute as to terms. The adoption of a new machine,
or the introduction of a new process, in superseding an old
method of production, usually upsets the rates of wages based
on the older method, and renders necessary a fresh scale of
payment. If wages are reckoned by the piece, the employers
will seek to reduce the rate per piece ; if by time, the workers
will claim a rise for the increased intensity and strain of the
newer and swifter process. In either case the readjustment
will involve more or less higgling, in which the points at issue
are seldom confined merely to the amount of remuneration.
The degree of difficulty in any such readjustment will
depend on the good sense of the parties to the negotiations ;
and in this as in other matters good sense has to be acquired
by experience. Some industries, cotton -spinning for ex-
ample, have had a century of experience of readjustments
of this kind, which have accordingly become a matter of
routine. But in trades in which the use of machinery,
and even the factory system itself, are still comparatively
new developments, the readjustments are seldom arrived at
without a struggle.

As a typical instance of a trade in this stage, take the
modern factory industry of boot and shoe manufacture, which
is notorious for incessant disputes about the introduction of
machinery. In this trade the compact little union of handi-
craftsmen, working for rich customers, has long since been
outstripped by its offshoot, the National Union of Boot and
Shoe Operatives, formed exclusively of factory workers, and
numbering, at the end of 1896, 37,000 members. We have
here an industry which is being incessantly revolutionised
by an almost perpetual stream of new inventions and new
applications of the old machines. The workmen are noted
for their turbulence, want of discipline, and lack of education.
The employers, themselves new capitalists without traditions,
exposed to keen rivalry from foreign competitors, are eager
to take the utmost advantage of every chance. The disputes

New Processes and Machinery 397

are endless, and the prolonged conference proceedings, the
elaborate arguments before the arbitrators, and the complicated
agreements with the employers are all printed in full, afford-
ing a complete picture of the attitudes taken up by the
masters and the men.

The employers' indictment of the operatives has been

graphically summed up by their principal literary spokesman.

" It is true," says the editor of the employers' journal, " that

objection does not take the form of rattening or direct refusal

to work with the machines ; experience has taught the union

a more efficacious way of marshalling the forces of opposition.

To say openly that labor-saving appliances were objected to

would be to estrange that public sympathy without which

Trade Unionism finds itself unable to live. So other methods

are adopted. The work done by the machines is belittled ;

it is urged that no saving of labor is effected by their use ;

the men working the machines exercise all their ingenuity

in making machine work as expensive as hand labor.

There exists among workmen what amounts to a tacit

understanding that only so much work shall be done within

a certain time, and, no matter what machines are introduced,

the men conspire to prevent any saving being effected by

their aid. It is of no use to mince words. The unions are

engaged in a gigantic conspiracy to hinder and retard the

development of labor-saving appliances in this country.

The action of their members in failing to exercise due

diligence in working new machines is equivalent to absolute

dishonesty. It is, indeed, positively painful to any one who

has been accustomed to see, for example, finishing machinery

running in American factories, to watch English operatives

using the same machines. In America the men work^ they

run the machines to their utmost capacity, and vie with each

other in their endeavor to get through as much work as

possible. But in an English factory they seem to loaf away

their time in a manner which is perfectly exasperating. If

they run a machine for five minutes at full speed, they seem

to think it necessary to stop it and see that no breakage has

398 Trade Union Function

occurred. Then they walk about the shop, and borrow an
oil-can or a spanner, wherewith to do some totally unnecessary
thing. This occupies anywhere from five minutes to an hour,
and then the machine is run on again for a few minutes ;
and if the operator is questioned, he says, ' machines are no
good ; I could do the work quicker and better by hand.'
And so he could, for he takes care not to allow a machine to
beat a shopmate working by hand on the same job, and, in
short, does all he can to induce manufacturers to abandon
mechanical devices and go back to hand labor. The spirit
of comradeship is carried to a ridiculous extent, and no man
dare do the best he can, lest his fellow-workmen should be,
as he foolishly thinks, injured. ... It seems to be a settled
policy with the men, not to try to earn as much money as
possible per week, but as much as possible per job, in other
words, to keep the cost of production as high as possible." ^

Assuming all this to be true in fact — and, so far, at any
rate as times of strained relations are concerned, there is no
reason to question its accuracy — let us supplement it by two
other facts which would hardly have been inferred from it.
First, that in the American boot factories which work at such
high pressure, the high pressure is invariably paid for by
piecework rates. Second, that in England it is the workmen
who demand that, in conjunction with the new machines they
should be allowed to work by the piece, as they have hither-
to been accustomed, and that it is the employers who have
resolutely insisted on taking the opportunity of changing to
fixed day wages.^ Here lies the clue to the whole difficulty.
We have already explained, in connection with the Cotton-
spinners, how piecework is the only possible protection of the
Standard Rate for men who are working machines of which

1 The Shoe and Leather Record, 19th February 1892.

- Thus one of the so-called "Seven Commandments" — the ultimatum of the
emplo3'ers against which the great strike of 1895 took place — was the following
"That the present is not an opportune time for the introduction of piecework in
connection with lasting and finishing machinery "{Zai5(7«r Gazette, November 1894).
The lasters and finishers have been accustomed to work by the piece ever since
the beginning of the factory boot industry.

New Processes and Machinery 399

the rate of speed is always being increased. On such machines
payment by the hour, day, or week involves the exacting
from the operative an ever-increasing task of work in return
for the old wages. In the case of the boot operatives the
question is complicated by the fact that the new machines
have introduced a new organisation of the factory, the work-
man steadily becoming less and less of an individual producer,
working at his own speed, and more and more a member of
a " team," or set of operatives each performing a small part
of the process, and thus obliged to keep up with each other.
This enforced " speeding up " would be all very well if the
old plan of paying by the piece were continued. But when
the " more efficient organisation of labor " is coupled with
the introduction of a fixed day wage, the workmen see in it
an attempt to lower the Standard Rate of remuneration for
effort, by getting more labor in return for the old payment.

This position the employers fail even to comprehend.
" I know," said the President of the Employers' Association
in 1894, "that it will be said it is slavery, pace-making, and
driving, and that sort of thing. . . . But the manufacturers
contend that that is not so. For instance, when men are put
to work in a team, they are waited on hand and foot, and
they are never kept waiting for anything, whereas when they
have to ' shop ' their (own) work a waste of time is involved.
That time is saved under the team system." ^ It is part
of the brainworker's usual ignorance of the conditions of
manual labor that the leaders of the employers could naively
imagine that, to be " never kept waiting for anything," is an
advantage to the man paid a fixed daily wage. To the
workman it means being kept incessantly toiling at the very
top of his speed for the whole nine hours of the factory day.
When this high pressure is demanded for the old earnings,
it amounts to a clear attempt to lower the Standard Rate.
How this attitude strikes an employer in the same trade,

1 Report of the National Conference between employers and employed, 6th-8th
January 1 894; reprinted in Monthly Report of the National Union Boot and
Shoe Operatives, January 1S94.

400 Trade Union Function

conversant with American conditions, may be judged from
the following instructive letter written in reply to the editorial
first quoted. " Let us take a look into an English machinery-
equipped factory. What do we see there ? Precisely what
you state, only much worse. The workmen, or very often
boys, who work on weekly wages, try how little work they
can do and how badly they can do that little. They don't
seem to care a scrap so long as they get the time over,
and are glad when the time comes to clear out of the factory
and the day's monotony is over. They are continually medd-
ling with their machines and throwing them out of order.
Then the engineer has to be called in. The result is a loss
of time, a loss of work, and expense also. All this to my
mind arises froin a viistaken policy which English manufacturers
adopt in employing so much boy labor and the weekly wages
system. If the piecework system were adopted, and only
expert men employed on the machines, better work would be
the result, at less cost, and the workman would earn higher
wages. Is not that the secret why an American manufacturer
can produce his goods at a lower labor cost than similar
goods can be produced in this country, while at the same time
the American operative is earning much higher wages than
his English brother?"^

It will not unnaturally be asked why the English em-
ployers should wantonly raise difficulties by choosing the
awkward moment of the introduction of new machinery, to
compel their workmen to abandon the piecework system of
remuneration, which has for several generations been custom-
ary, and to substitute for it a fixed daily wage. The manu-
facturers explain that, if piecework rates were conceded in
connection with the new machines, and if the scale were
calculated on the basis of the workmen's weekly earnings at
the old process, the men would very soon so increase their
skill and quickness as to earn £'^ or £i\ per week, instead of
the time rate of 26s. as at present. But this, as every cotton
manufacturer would recognise, is, economically speaking, no

1 Letter in Shoe and Leather Record, 2Sth February 1892.

New Processes and Machinery 40 1

argument at all. The able secretary of the Boot and Shoe
Manufacturers' Association has repeatedly urged upon his
members that such a result would in no way raise the cost of
production per pair of boots, and, on the contrary, would
positively lower it, by enormously increasing the output per
machine. Unfortunately, such arguments are thrown away
on untrained employers, who even when they are contemplat-
ing the widest extension of their profits, can seldom view
with equanimity the prospect of paying their workmen any
larger amount per week than that to which they are
accustomed.-^

The workmen in the factory boot trade, equally un-
trained in industrial policy, are no less unreasonable than
the employers, and on a cognate point. They, too, are so
scandalised at the prospect of an increased reward being
gained by any one else, that they propose unreasonable and
impossible courses in order to prevent it. When, in 1894,
the Leicester Branch of the National Union of Boot and
Shoe Operatives appointed a committee to draw up a
Piecework List for work done in conjunction with the new
machinery, these workmen naively proceeded on the basis
of retaining the " Statement " of piecework rates under the
old process, merely deducting, for each article, a percentage
estimated to produce a saving to the employer exactly
equivalent to the interest he would pay on the cost of the
new machinery.^ Thus, whilst the terms proposed by the

1 An American observer notes the same feeling among German employers.
" In Berlin even, I found this narrow-minded begrudging of a working-man's higher
earnings. In piecework they reduce the rate of pay of the greater output which
brings higher earnings than the general rate, . . . The manufacturers returned to
the day rate. . . . because the masters found that the men made too much money
under the piecework system." — The Economy of High Wages, by J. Schoenhof
(New York, 1892), p. 400.

The same struggle took place between 1850 and i860 on the introduction of
the factory system and steam power into the Coventry ribbon trade, the operatives
demanding piecework rates and the employers insisting on introducing fixed day
wages, " partly because the piecework system is a more troublesome one than that
of weekly wages, but chiefly because it would work a forfeiture to them of the
benefit from the increase of the productiveness of their machinery. " — Social Science
Association, Report on Trade Societies and Strikes, p. 325.

2 Minutes (in MS.) of the "Piecework Committee," which sat from April to

VOL. I 2D

402 Trade Union Function

employers would leave the workmen no incentive to use the
new machines, those proposed by the workmen would leave
the employers no incentive to introduce them.

The feeling of the workmen in this matter is a super-
stition from the era of individual production. The operative
bootmaker has inherited a rooted belief that the legitimate
reward of labor is the entire commodity produced, or its
price in the market. This idea was the economic backbone
of Owenite Socialism, with its projects of Associations of
Producers and Labor Exchanges.^ In the first number of
the Poor Man's Gtiardian, a widely-read journal of 1 831, it
was expressed in the following verse : —

Wages should form the price of goods ;

Yes, wages should be all,
Then we who work to make the goods,

Should justly have them all ;
But if their price be made of rent.

Tithes, taxes, profits all,
Then we who work to make the goods,

Shall have, just none at all ! ^

When the operative bootmaker proceeds to draft a piece-
work list for the new machines, the rates that he proposes
really express in figures his economic assumption that " wages
should be the price of goods." This state of mind leads
him calmly to suggest, in effect, that he should receive the
entire net advantage of every new invention. The employer
puts in an equally untenable claim to enjoy the whole benefit

September 1894. This Committee was attended by the prominent workmen of
the Leicester Branch and the Branch officials. It is only fair to say that when
it was seen that the rates proposed worked out to an increase of wages in some
cases amounting to as much as 40 per cent, the more experienced officials of the
union protested against its proceedings as likely to bring the whole policy of the
union into disrepute.

1 History of Trade Unio7iism, ch. iii.

2 Place MSS., 27,791-240. The verse is now reprinted in Dictionary of
Political Economy under " Chartism " ; and in the Life of Francis Place, by
Graham Wallas (London, 1897). The same idea inspired the proposals of
Lassalle, and most of the inferences drawn from Karl Marx's Theory of Value,
whilst it still lingers in the declarations and programmes of German Socialism and
its derivatives. It is, of course, inconsistent with present economic views as to
the "unearned increment," arising from the progress of invention and organisation

New Processes and Machinery 403

of the improvement, and regards the workmen's claim as an
attack, not on the community, but on himself. But whatever
the employer may desire, the community believes that, in
the majority of cases, competition quickly transfers his new
gains to the consumer in the shape of reduced prices. In
all these contentions, therefore, public opinion is apt to be
against the workmen's claim, even to the extent of ignoring
their legitimate demand for an increase of earnings com-
mensurate with the greater strain of the new process. The
employers have sometimes known how to use this argument
with great effect on public opinion. The London Master
Builders' Committee complained, in 1859, that the men's
argument in favor of a shortening of hours " implied that
the benefits to be derived from machinery are not the
property of society, of its inventors, of those who apply it,
but are to be appropriated by those whose labor it is
alleged it will displace." ^

When the increase in production does not depend on a
new machine, but arises merely from a further division of
labor, even the experienced leaders of the operatives are
honestly unable to conceive how any one can dispute the
men's claim to enjoy the whole increase. In 1894 a Bristol
firm was charged before the " National Conference " (the
central joint-board) " with having introduced a new system
of working in Bristol," the so-called " team system," which
resulted in the men collectively producing more boots per

of population and capital in dense masses, upon which the modern English
Socialist bases his demand for collective ownership of the means of production,
and the subordination of the producer to the citizen, and the individual to the
community. See Fabian Tract, No. 51, Socialisjn, True and False, and the
Report on Fabian Policy, presented by the Fabian Society to the International
Socialist Congress, 1896 (Fabian Tract, No. 70).

Though the Owenite assumption here referred to was formerly accepted by
large masses of English workmen, and though it still lies at the root of the
desire for Co-operative Associations of Producers, it cannot be said to characterise
the Trade Unionism of the present day, and it will accordingly not be discussed
in our chapter on "The Assumptions of Trade Unionism." The student should
consult, besides the works of Owen, Hodgskin, Thompson, Lassalle, and Marx,
Dr. Anton Menger's Das Recht aiif den vollen Arbeiisert7-ag.

1 Report on Trade Societies and Strikes, Social Science Association, 1S60, p. 62.

404 Trade Union Fttnction

day than before. As the charge was coupled with an
alteration from piecework to fixed wages, there would have
been some justification for a complaint that the Standard
Rate was being imperilled, by the exaction of ever-increasing
exertion for a fixed weekly wage. But instead of taking
this point, the union claimed that unless the day wage was
so fixed that the cost of each boot to the employer remained
no less than before, the alteration should be regarded as a
reduction of wages.^ The men's case was so prejudiced by
this argument that the President (Alderman Sir Thomas
Wright) not only rejected their claim, but also went so far
as to say that, provided the mere weekly earnings were
undiminished, the change of process was not an alteration
of conditions, thus altogether ignoring the question of the
increased effort and strain involved.

The student of this remarkable series of disputes will not
fail to notice that the employers and the workmen both take
up positions which are inconsistent with their own arguments.
The employers have, in the fullest and most unreserved
manner, given in their adhesion to the principle of Collective
Bargaining with regard to all the conditions of labor. They
have emphasised their adhesion to this principle by insisting
on the establishment of a most elaborate machinery for
carrying on this Collective Bargaining, of which they make
constant use. It is therefore inconsistent of them to claim
that any employer has a right to " introduce machinery at
any time without notice," and that changes in " the internal

^ The claim and argument will be found in the Report of the National Con-
ference of the Boot and Shoe Trade, August 1893. "Supposing," asked the
President, "the alteration from piecework to daywork resulted in the worker
receiving more money, would you say that was an alteration of which he had a
right to complain ? " To this question the obvious answer was that if the new
process involved greater exertion or strain than the old, an actual increase of
weekly earnings might well mean a lowering of the Standard Rate (of remuneration
for effort), and thus involve a grievance to the workmen. But instead of taking
this line the men's spokesman said, " I should say that if a particular individual
got that money and the employer got eleven dozen of work done at the price of
ten dozen provided by the Statement, that that involved a reduction of wages."
The same confusion of ideas appears in the cases of "team system" discussed at
the National Conference of January 1S94.

New Processes and Machinery 405

economy of the factory or the manipulation of the workmen "
are matters for the autocratic decision of each individual
factory owner. It is no doubt a question for each employer
to determine whether or not he will introduce a particular
machine, just as it is for him alone to decide whether or not
he will engage twenty additional workmen. But the regula-
tions and conditions under which the men will be engaged,
or will change their habits of work, are obviously matters
which, on the assumption of Collective Bargaining, cannot be
settled by the will of one party to the wage contract, or even
by the agreement of particular employers and particular
workmen, but must be arranged as a Common Rule by
negotiation between the authorised representatives of both
sides. The employers, moreover, have repeatedly adopted in
their negotiations the principle of the Standard Rate, that
is, the uniform maintenance throughout the trade of identical
payment for identical effort. It is therefore inconsistent of
them to insist on fixed time wages, on a change of process
which must inevitably result in progressively increasing the
intensity of effort imposed on the workmen. Unless there
is some arrangement by which the operatives are ensured
progressively increasing earnings, proportionate to this pro-
gressively increasing intensity, the employers are under-
mining the Standard Rate, that is, insidiously diminishing
the rate of payment for a given amount of effort. The
operatives, on the other hand, whilst recognising that their
very existence as factory bootmakers depends on the super-
session of the individual hand bootmaker, are always re-
senting the further division of labor and the increased use
of machinery. And though they take their stand on the
fundamental principle of maintaining the Standard Rate,
and therefore of insisting on a Piecework Statement, they
yet cannot bring themselves in the new processes to propose
rates which would work out, even at the start, to earnings
equivalent only to their present wages. If the men frankly
asked for an increase in their Standard Rate of so much
per cent, to be worked out in detail by a revision of the

4o6 Trade Union Function

" Statement," the claim would be discussed on its own
merits, as an incident in the perennial higgling between
employers and employed. It may well be that the moment
when profits are being largely increased by a change of
process, is a specially opportune occasion for a rise of wage.
But, when the demand for an advance is disguised in an
assumption that any departure from the old " Statement " is
to be resisted as a positive reduction, the employers get into
a state of inarticulate rage at what seems to them the
intellectual dishonesty of the men's proceedings. If the
operatives desire to maintain the modern Trade Union
principle of the Standard Rate, they must abandon, once
for all, the diametrically opposite assumption that " wages
should be the price of goods," and at once set about the
compilation of a new piecework list applicable to the great
variety of machines and diversity of conditions in the various
factories. Such a list would, no doubt, cost trouble, especially
in view of the survival of many small manufacturers, each
using only one or more of the new machines. But similar
difficulties were met and overcome twenty years ago when
the trade became a factory industry, and American experience
shows that they are not insuperable to-day.^

The gradual introduction of composing and distributing
machines into the English printing trade affords an instance
of somewhat similar difficulties in another industry. These
machines began to be used about 1876, but, owing to the
imperfections of the earlier inventions, it was not until the

1 The experience of the English Co-operative Wholesale Society, whose
colossal boot factory remained unaffected by the general stoppage of 1S95, is
interesting in showing how an exceptionally able manager, himself once an
operative, has (in anticipation of the agreement of a piecework list for the new
processes) partially solved the problem, by making the weekly wages roughly
proportionate to the increasing output. On a certain " lasting machine " the out-
put varies from 666 pairs per week to as much as 1270, according to the skill
and zeal of the operator. Mr. Butcher has known how to encourage zeal and
skill, by refusing to adhere to the uniform rate per week given by many of the
employers to all their workmen in each process ; paying as much as 40s. to the
principal operator, and (instead of taking on boys) giving 35s. a week even to
his "followers." He declares his intention, on the output rising to 1500 pairs a
week, to increase the wages to £2 : los.

New Processes and Machinery 407

last decade of the century that their competition with the
old hand compositor came to be seriously felt The advent
of the machine has throughout been most distasteful to the
men. But the Compositors' Trade Unions have from the
first disclaimed any desire to prevent its introduction, or to
forbid the members to work it. Their policy has been to
secure the new employment to their own members on terms
which protected their Standard Rate. No pretension on
their part to receive the whole advantage of the Linotype
machine is on record, but it is asserted that they have
claimed a share of it. The Chairman of the Linotype
Company, speaking to his shareholders in 1893, declared
that " Nearly all the offices which have taken the Linotype
are union offices — in some cases working by day, and in
other cases working by piece. Surely that is sufficient
proof that the labor difficulty is not a very serious one. The
union [men] have, in my opinion, acted very fairly towards
us. All they have said is this : ' Our men think you have
an invention which is a great advantage to the trade — saves
a great deal of money and labor — and the men should have
their fair share of the advantages.' Let the masters pay
them fairly, and then I believe there will be no difficulty
whatever in introducing this machine."^ In 1894, the
London Society of Compositors was able to come to a
satisfactory agreement with the newspaper proprietors, who
have up to the present been the chief users of the machine,
and it is now at work in the London newspaper offices under
conditions formally accepted by both parties.^

^ Speech of the Chairman of the Linotype Company, at the Ordinary General
Meeting of Shareholders, Cannon Street Hotel, London, nth May 1893.

^ New and amended rules agreed to at a Conference between the Representa-
tives of the London Daily Newspaper Proprietors, and of the London Society of
Compositors, held at Anderton's Hotel on 7th June 1894.

Composing machines.

1. All skilled operators — i.e. compositors, justifiers, and distributors, as dis-
tinct from attendants or laborers — shall be members of the London Society of
Compositors, preference being given to members of the Companionship into
which the machines are introduced. Distribution to be paid at a minimum rate
of 38s. per week of 48 hours, day-work.

2. A Probationary Period of three months shall be allowed, the operator to

4o8 Trade Union Function

Now let us turn from the trades in which the introduc-
tion of new machinery is recent enough to be a source of
continual friction to those in which this has long ceased to
be the case. In the great industries of cotton-spinning and
cotton-weaving every part of the machinery employed has,
during the last hundred years, been enormously improved.
In the early stages of this mechanical progress each step
was the subject of furious strife between masters and men,
on much the same lines as the battles now being fought in
the boot and shoe industry. For the last thirty years, how-
ever, the unions have genuinely abandoned all idea of oppos-
ing improvements, or of exacting the whole advantage of
their introduction. The conditions under which any improve-
ments in machinery shall be introduced have, by common
consent, long since been taken out of the hands of the
individual employer, or the particular group of operatives.
Any change whatsoever in "the internal economy of the
factory, or the manipulation of the workmen by the
employer" — which, to the new class of boot manufacturers,
seems a matter for their own autocratic decision — is, in the
cotton industry, referred as a matter of course for prior
deliberation and agreement between the expert salaried
officials of the Trade Union and the Employers' Association.
As the basis of negotiation, the principle of maintaining in-
tact the Standard Rate of payment for a given quantity of
effort is unreservedly accepted by both sides. The employers

receive his average weekly earnings for the previous three months. During this
period he shall not undertake piecework.

3. In all offices when composing machines are introduced, the operators and
case hands shall commence composition simultaneously. . . . Compositors and
operators in such offices to be guaranteed two galleys per day of seven working
hours on Morning papers, and on Evening papers twelve galleys per week of 42
hours.

4. The scale of prices for machine work shall be, Linotype, 3jd. per one
thousand ens for day-work in Evening paper offices, sfd. per thousand ens for
work done in Morning paper offices, jd. per one thousand extra on all types above
brevier ; Hattersley, 4d. per one thousand ens for Evening paper work, and 4^d.
per one thousand ens for Morning paper work.

This agreement was, in 1896, superseded by a more elaborate one, framed
on similar lines. — See Labour Gazette, August 1896.

New Processes and Machinery 409

recognise that any increased speed or complexity of the
process means increased intensity of effort to the operative,
which must therefore be remunerated by progressively in-
creasing earnings. They would never dream of suggesting
the substitution of fixed time rates of wages, and they agree,
without demur, to a Piecework List which, definitely fixed
in advance, completely secures to the workmen these pro-
gressive earnings. On the other hand, the operatives have
unreservedly abandoned any idea that " wages should be
the price of goods," We can imagine the amusement with
which such experienced Trade Union officials as Mr. Mawds-
ley or Mr. Wilkinson would listen to the suggestion that
any lowering of the cost per yard to the employer must
necessarily be a reduction of wages to the operative. They
would reply that, so long as the cotton operative was assured
of his Standard Rate, he had no concern with the cost of
production at all, except that any reduction resulting from
wise administration or improvement of process was posi-
tively advantageous to the workmen, by securing for their
product an ever-extending market. The Trade Unions of
cotton operatives actually meet the innovating employers
half-way, by agreeing to a piecework rate which decreases
with every rise in the productivity of machinery. The
employer therefore knows that every improvement that he
can introduce will bring him a real, though not an unlimited,
saving in his cost of production. The operatives, on the
other hand, have the assurance that the graduated piecework
rates, already settled by mutual agreement, after careful
consideration by their expert officials, will not only protect
their present weekly earnings, but will also immediately
remunerate them for any increased eiifort involved. They
have learnt, moreover, by experience, that any consciousness
of the increased effort will soon disappear as the closer
attention and quicker movement become habitual. It is
true that by accepting a lower piecework rate they give up
any claim to monopolise for themselves the " unearned
increment " of the new invention. On the other hand, they

4IO Trade Union Function

are secured by the employers' concession of a predetermined
Piecework List, in all the " rent " of the new dexterity which
practice at the new process inevitably produces. Thus, the
steadily rising speed of working, which to the boot opera-
tive, compelled by his employer to labor at a fixed time
wage, is "pace-making and slavery," means to the cotton-
spinner a welcome addition to his weekly earnings, and a
permanent rise in his Standard of Life.

The United Society of Boilermakers and Iron-ship-
builders base their agreements with their employers on
similar principles. Thus the internal economy of the vast
shipbuilding industry of the North-East coast of England
is governed by the following formal treaty as to new appli-
ances, etc. : " Notwithstanding any of the above clauses the
shipbuilders are to be entitled to a revision of rates on
account of labor-saving appliances, whether now existing
and not sufficiently allowed for, or hereafter to be intro-
duced ; for improved arrangements in yards ; for rates to
be paid in vessels of new types where work is easier, and
for other special cases. The terms of these revisions to be
adjusted by a committee representing employers and the
Boilermakers' and Shipbuilders' Society. The men shall in
like manner be entitled to bring before the said committee
any jobs, the rates of which may require revision due to new
conditions of working, structural alterations in vessels, or
any other cause." This agreement met with some opposi-
tion from a section of the workmen, who objected to any
allowances being made for machinery, etc. To this com-
plaint the Executive Committee of the union replied : " It
is well known to the oldest shipyard plater in our society
that he can go into some yards and plate a vessel at lo
per cent per plate less in one yard than he can in another
on account of the difference in machinery. The employer
therefore who has the best machinery is being paid for his
machines through having his work done at a cheaper rate.
. . . This is done all over, and rightly so. It is well known
to our platers that, on account of the difference of facilities

New Processes and Machinery 411

for doing work in the different yards, we have never been
able to get a standard Hst of prices for plating." -^

We may now sum up what seems to us the outcome of
Trade Union experience in deahng with new processes and
machinery, and what, judging from the general tendency
and the example of the Cotton Operatives, may be expected
to become the universal policy. We see, in the first place,
that the old attempt of the handicraftsman to exclude the
machine has been definitely abandoned. Far from refusing
to work the new processes, the Trade Unionists of to-day
claim, for the operatives already working at the trade, a
preferential right to acquire the new dexterity and perform
the new service. In asserting this preferential claim to
continuity of employment, they insist that the arrangements
for introducing the new process, including not only the rates
of wages but also the physical conditions of work, are
matters to be settled, not solely by one of the parties to the
wage contract, but after discussion between both of them.
Moreover, on the principle of Collective Bargaining, the
matter is not one which can be left even to agreement
between any particular employer and his workpeople, but
one which must be settled by negotiation, as a Common Rule
to be enforced on all employers and operatives in the
particular trade.^ When this Collective Bargaining takes
place, the Trade Union always proceeds on the fundamental
assumption that under no circumstances must the " improve-
ment " be allowed to put the operative in any worse position
than he was before. The change of technical process,
which may revolutionise all the conditions of this working

1 Monthly Report of the United Society of Boilermakers and Iron-shipbuilders,
January 1895.

2 This claim, to make the circumstances under which a change of process
shall take place a matter for Collective Bargaining, has only lately been admitted,
or even comprehended by employers ; and the demand would, in many trades,
still be regarded as preposterous. Until 1871, indeed, combination for any
other objects than improvement in wages or hours was a criminal offence, and it
never occurred, even to a good employer, that the most momentous change in
the method of working could be a matter for mutual arrangement between his
workpeople and himself

412 Trade Union Fu7tction

life, is calculated greatly to increase the productivity of his
labor, and should, it is claimed, at any rate not be made the
occasion of any encroachment on the privileges or advan-
tages which he has hitherto enjoyed. This involves, not
only that his weekly earnings shall be maintained, but also
that the length of the working day, the amount of physical
or mental exertion required by his task, or the discomfort or
disagreeableness of his work shall either not be increased, or
else that any increase shall be fully paid for by extra rates.
It will, moreover, be demanded that any defensive or other
regulations, which have hitherto been accepted, shall be
continued and made applicable to the new conditions. The
pieceworker will expect a definitely settled detailed list of
prices ; the timeworker will require any accustomed protec-
tion against being " driven " beyond the normal speed,
whilst in trades in which apprenticeship has hitherto been
regulated a continuance of the regulation will be insisted
on.-^ All this merely comes to a demand that the condition
and status of the workman should not be deteriorated by
the change which is to bring a new profit to the employer.
To this there will sometimes be added the further claim
which stands, it is obvious, on a different footing, that the
wage-earner should receive some of the advantages to be
derived from the improvement, and that he should therefore
take the opportunity of obtaining, as a condition of his
acceptance of the new process, some positive increase in his
Standard Rate.

1 Comfort and habits of life often play an important part in these negotiations,
leading sometimes to obstruction, sometimes to encouragement of a change.
Thus the Yorkshire Glass Bottle Makers' Society refused in 1875 to work with
a new gas furnace, because they declared it would involve a three-shift system ;
an objection paralleled by the Northumberland and Durham miners' refusal to
shorten the hours of boys, because it will probably involve a change from two
to three shifts. In both cases the men assert that the alteration of hours would
be inconvenient and unpleasant to them. On the other hand, when in 1876 a
new system of " pot-setting " was invented in the glass trade, which was safer
and more rapid than the old process, the Yorkshire Glass Bottle Makers' Society
passed a resolution demanding its adoption, and insisting on those firms which
still retained the old plan paying 2s. per man for the operation, as compared
with only 6d. for the new system. — See the Annual Reports of the Yorkshire
Glass Bottle Makers' Society for 1875 and 1876.

New Processes and Machinery 413

It is interesting to observe that, with the acceptance of this
new pohcy by the employers, and its complete comprehension
by the workmen, it is not the individual capitalist, but the
Trade Union, which most strenuously insists on having the
very latest improvements in machinery. In the English
boot and shoe trade, every improvement is, as we have seen,
made the occasion of a prolonged wrangle between employers
and workmen. In Lancashire it quickly becomes a grievance
in the Cotton Trade Unions, if any one employer or any one
district falls behind the rest. The explanation of this differ-
ence is obvious. No employer takes any trouble to induce
the laggards in his own industry to keep up with the march
of invention. Their falling behind is, indeed, an immediate
advantage to himself But to the Trade Union, repre-
senting all the operatives, the sluggishness of the poor or
stupid employers is a serious danger. The old-fashioned
master spinners, with slow-going family concerns, complain
bitterly of the harshness with which the Trade Union
officials refuse to make any allowance for their relatively
imperfect machinery, and even insist, as we have seen, on
their paying positively a higher piecework rate if they do
not work their mills as efficiently as their best -equipped
competitors. Thus, the Amalgamated Association of
Operative Cotton -spinners, instead of obstructing new
machinery, actually penalises the employer who fails to
introduce it ! This remarkable difference, in the attitude
of both workmen and employers, between the two great
English industries of cotton-spinning and bootmaking, goes
far to explain their very different standing as regards
technical efficiency. The English boot manufacturer is
always complaining of the far higher efficiency of the
splendidly-equipped factories of Massachusetts and Con-
necticut. The Lancashire cotton mill, in the amount of
output per operative, easily leads the world.

There remains one other type of case to be dealt with,
namely that in which the new process, instead of being
worked by the old skilled hands, supersedes them by a class

414 Trade Union Fu7tction

of entire novices. As this happens to be the very type
which, from its association with tragic episodes in industrial
history, strikes the public imagination most forcibly, and has
accordingly become a commonplace in the denunciations of
our industrial system from the more extreme platforms of
social reform, its omission, so far, may have struck the
reader as an unexpected oversight. It is possible for the
introduction of a new machine or process to annihilate the
utility of a workman's skill as completely as the photograph
has annihilated the miniature, the railway train the stage
coach, or petroleum the snuffers. The heart-rending struggle
of the handloom weavers against the power loom is perhaps
the best-known instance. Let us follow, step by step, or
rather stumble by stumble, the road to ruin of an in-
sufficiently organised trade supplanted by machinery.^

When the handicraftsman begins to find his product
undersold by the machine-made article, his first instinct is
to engage in a desperate competition with the new process,
lowering his rate for hand labor to keep pace with the
diminished cost of the machine product. This is obviously
the "line of least resistance." No newly-devised machine,
worked by novices, and not yet perfectly adapted to the
process, can convince a skilled handworker that it will
ever succeed in turning out as good an article as he can
make, or that the saving of time will be at all considerable.
The very fact that a lad or a girl at ten or fifteen shillings
a week can perform the new process with ease, only con-
firms him in his attitude of disparagement and incredulity.

1 The struggle of the small hand industry against the factory system can be
best studied at present in Germany and Austria, where the position is being
described in detail by scores of competent observers. See, among other studies,
Professor Gustav Schmoller's Zur Geschichte der Deutschen Klei7igewerbe im igih
Jahrhundert (Halle, 1870) ; Dr. Eugen Schwiedland's Kleingeiuerbe und Haus-
industrie in Oesterreich (Leipzig, 1894), 2 vols. ; and his two Reports Ueber eine
gesetzliche Regehtng der Heimarbeit (Vienna, 1896 and 1897) ; Dr. Kuno
Frankenstein's Die Deutsche Hausindzisti-ie, 4 vols. ; the article " Hausindustrie "
by Prof. Werner Sombart in Conrad's Handworterbuch der Staatswissenschaften,
vol. iv. ; and the magnificent series of monographs on particular trades or
districts, published by the "Verein fur Sozial Politik" as (inter suchungen iiber
die Lage des Handwerks in Detitschland (Leipzig, 1894-97), 12 volumes.

New Processes and Machinery 415

In such a mood a man does not throw away the skill which
is his property and staff of life, to consent to become either
a machine-minder at one-half or one-third of his accustomed
wages, or else begin life afresh in some entirely new
occupation. He confidently pits his consummate skill
against the first clumsy attempts of the undeveloped machine,
and finds that a slight reduction in the Standard Rate for
hand labor is all that seems required to leave his handi-
craft in full command of the market. His well-intentioned
friends, the clergyman and the district visitor, the news-
paper economist and the benevolent employer, combine
to assure him that this — the Policy of Lowering the Dyke
— is what he ought to adopt. But, unfortunately, this is to
enter on a downward course to which there is no end. The
machine product steadily improves in quality, and falls in
price, as the new operatives become more skilled, and as the
speed of working is increased. Every step in this evolution
means a further reduction of rates to the struggling hand-
worker, who can only make up his former earnings by
hurrying his work and lengthening his hours. Inevitably
this hurry and overwork deteriorate the old quality and
character of his product. The attempt to maintain his
family in its old position compels him to sacrifice everything
to the utmost possible rapidity of execution. His wife and
children are pressed into his service, and a rough and ready
division of labor serves to economise the use of the old
thought and skill. The work insidiously drops its artistic
quality and individual character. In the losing race with
the steam engine, the handwork becomes itself mechanical,
without acquiring either that uniform excellence or accurate
finish which is the outcome of the perfected machine.
Presently, the degraded hand product will sell only at a
lower price than the machine-made article. The worse the
work becomes the more irregular grows the demand.
Those select customers, who have remained faithful to the
hand product, find, by degrees, that its former qualities have
departed, and they one by one accept the modern substitute.

4i6 Trade Union Function

And thus we reach the vicious circle of the sweated in-
dustries, in which the gradual beating down of the rate of
remuneration produces an inevitable deterioration in the
quality of the work, whilst the inferiority of the product
itself makes it unsaleable except at prices which compel the
payment of progressively lower rates. The handworker,
who at the beginning justifiably felt himself on a higher
level than the mechanical minder of the machine, ends by
sinking, in physique and dexterity alike, far below the level
of the highly-strung factory operative. There is now no
question of his taking to the new process, which has
risen quite beyond his capacity. He passes through the
long-drawn-out agony of a dying trade.

This, in main outline, is the story of the handloom
weavers in all the branches of the textile industry.-^ We see
the same grim evolution going on to-day in the chain and
nail trade in the Black Country, and among the unorganised
sections of the tailors and cabinetmakers. We need not
dilate on the misery to which these unfortunate workers are
reduced. But it is important to observe how the interests
of the consumers are affected by this " Policy of Lowering
the Dyke." It is, in the first place, to be noted that it in no
way stimulates the spread of machinery or the perfecting of
the new process. The constant yielding of the handworker
even diminishes the pressure on his employer to adopt the
newest improvements, and positively tempts him to linger
on with the old process. So long as he can compete with
his rival by another cut off wages, it will not seem worth
while to lay out capital and thought in new machinery.
Thus, the transition from the old system of production to
the improved methods is delayed, to the loss of the consumer
for the time being. But what is perhaps of greater import-
ance to the community is the disappearance of any real

^ "Heartbroken and objectless in their squalid poverty, their insight into the
active stirring world beyond them, with its various moving springs and wires,
became perverted, and they stuck to their falling trade with a kind of obstinate
fatalism." — John Hill Burton, Political and Social Econofny (Edinburgh, 1849),
p. 29.

New Processes and Machinery 417

alternative to the machine product. The degradation of the
handworker's craft, resulting, as we have seen, directly from
the forcing down of his Standard Rate, deprives the nation
of the charm given to the old country stuffs and furniture
by their artistic individuality. Even the machine-made
product is the worse for the deterioration of the handicraft.
It gradually loses the ideal of perfect workmanship and
artistic finish, to which the inventor and operative were
perpetually striving to approximate. It is, indeed, difficult
to discover any advantage whatsoever, either to the handi-
craftsman or to the community, in a policy which, whilst
failing to stimulate the use of labor-saving machinery,
neither saves the handworkers from misery, nor preserves to
the community what is of value in their handicraft.

Here, then, we have the dramatic instance as it actually
occurs ; and certainly the reality is as harrowing as the most
fervidly descriptive platform orator can make it appear. And
yet its tragedy is incomplete without the final demonstration
that the really cruel stages of all this suffering are needless,
and are caused not by the iron march of industrial evolution,
but simply by the adoption on the part of the workmen and
their employers of this " Policy of Lowering the Dyke." We
have failed to discover a single instance of supersession by
machinery, in which it would not have been possible for the
superseded handicraft at least to have died a painless death.
There are industries which have been changed by machinery
as thoroughly as weaving, but in which, owing to the enforce-
ment of a different policy by the Trade Unions concerned,
the handworkers have not only survived, but are to-day
busier, more highly paid, and more skilful than ever they
were before.

The Amalgamated Society of Cordwainers, an organisa-
tion dating from the eighteenth century,^ had, up to 1857,
enjoyed a complete immunity from any invasion by machinery

1 See History of Trade Unionism, p. 51, where a circular of 17S4 is quoted.
The organisation was reformed in 1S62, and in 1S74 it took the name of the
Amalgamated Society .of Boot and Shoe Makers.

VOL. I 2 E

41 8 Tirade Union Function

or new processes. The application of the sewing-machine to
bootmaking, and the successive introduction of new inven-
tions led, between 1857 and 1874, to a complete revolution
in the trade. At first the rank and file of the workmen
bitterly resented the change of conditions, and the employer
introducing a new machine was often met by the most
unreasonable demands. But the Executive Committee of
the Trade Union, whilst maintaining intact the established
scale of prices for handwork, steadfastly refused to sanction
any resistance to the new processes. On the contrary, it
persistently advised all its members who failed to get hand-
work at the established high rates, to accept employment at
the new factories at whatever they could get, and gradually
to work out a new piecework list adapted to the altered
conditions. In order to secure this fresh " Statement "
these members were advised to join hands with the new men
whom the factory brought into the trade, and freely to admit
them into their branches. Thus, already in 1863, it was
resolved "that men employed in the rivetting and finishing
peg-work, and those working in factories, be recognised, and
can belong to any section, or form sections by themselves." ^
This policy, pressed on the members at every opportunity,
was quickly accepted, with the result that the union found
itself, in a very few years, composed of two distinct classes
of members, handicraftsmen and factory workers. When

1 The Trade Sick and Funeral Laws of the Amalgamated Society of Cord-
wainers (London, 1863). The "rivetters" became a separate class, when,
about 1S46, rivetting was introduced in place of stitching. See the manifesto of
the Leicester shoemakers, quoted by Marx, Capital, Part IV. chap. xv. sec. 7
(vol. ii. p. 457 of English translation of 1887). The operatives in the factory
boot manufacture are at present divided into the follovs^ing classes: (l) the
" clickers," the men and lads who cut from skins the sections of the boot and
uppers; (2) " rough -stuff cutters," the men who cut the bottom material by
knives set in powerful machines; {3) "fitters," men who place the upper
leathers in position for " closing "; (4) " machinists " (often women) who " close "
or stitch the uppers; (5) "lasters," men or boys who place the closed uppers
over the last and attach the bottom material (in hand-sewn work these are known
as " makers," in " pegged work," now nearly obsolete, they are called " pegmen "
or "rivetters"); (6) the "finishers," who blacken the edges, clean the soles,
and generally polish up the boot. The two latter classes form a large majority
of the whole.

New Processes and MacJiineiy 419

the latter began actually to outnumber their old-fashioned
colleagues, it was found convenient, as we have already-
mentioned, that they should break off, and form a society of
their own, the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives.
The Amalgamated Society of Cordwainers, now again con-
fined to the handicraftsmen, has ever since continued to
pursue the same line of policy. It has remained on amicable
terms with the new society, neither competing with it for
members, nor in any way obstructing its remarkable growth.
But what is more important, it has steadfastly refused to
allow its own members to compete in cheapness with the new
process. If a handmade boot is desired, the old scale for
handwork must be paid. Many consequences have resulted
from this policy, some of which might not, at first sight,
have been expected. As the employers found no way of
getting a commoner class of boots made by inferior hand
labor at low rates, machinery has gone ahead by leaps and
bounds. But it has created an entirely new trade for itself
The keeping up of a high level of price for the handmade
article has not destroyed the demand, but has, on the con-
trary, given it permanence and stability. The employers,
finding themselves bound in any case to pay the old scale of
rates, have had to concentrate their attention on obtaining
the finest possible workmanship, as only in this way were
they able to tempt their customers to prefer the necessarily
expensive handmade product. Those persons who are pre-
pared to pay well for first-class workmanship find therefore
that they can still obtain exactly what they require, and
hence remain faithful to the handmade boot. Meanwhile,
the handicraftsmen have become a select body, not because
they have closed their ranks, but because none but men of
long training and exceptional skill can find employment at
the recognised scale, or do the highly-finished work which
the employers require in return for such high rates. Com-
petition between the handicraftsmen takes, in fact, the form
of a continuous elimination of the less skilled amonsr them.
who are encouraged, in their youth, to go into the machine

420 Trade Union Ftmction

trade. The result has been that the skilled hand boot-
makers, whilst somewhat diminishing in numbers, have
positively improved their scale of prices and average earn-
ings, and more than maintained their level of skill. Finally,
notwithstanding a continuous improvement in the efficiency
of bootmaking machinery, the handmade boot still remains
an ideal to which inventors and factory managers are per-
petually striving to approximate their commoner product.

This analysis of the policy of the Amalgamated Society
of Boot and Shoe Makers finds a remarkable confirmation
in the analogous case of the paper manufacturers. A gener-
ation ago this old trade of skilled handworkers, closely
combined since the middle of the eighteenth century,^ was
seriously menaced by the rapid spread of machine-made
paper. Foreign competition, too, began, on the repeal of the
paper duty in 1861, to cut into the trade of the English
manufacturers, and the United Kingdom, from being a large
exporter of paper, gradually became a large importer. The
hand papermakers, who had, from time immemorial, enjoyed
wages 15 or 20 per cent higher than those even of skilled
artisans in other trades, made no attempt to prevent or to
discourage the introduction of paper-making machinery, or
even to secure the new work for their own members. The
machine-workers were at first admitted to membership of
the handworkers' union, but few of them joined, and (as in
the analogous case of the boot and shoe operatives) it was
afterwards found more convenient for the new class of work-
men to form organisations of their own.^ The highly-paid

1 " Our Society," said the spokesman of the Original Society of Papermakers
in 1891, "can go back, according by the records, to 150 or 160 years." Its
very archaic rules, preserved in the appendix to the Report of the Committee
on Combinations of Workmen, 1S25, are referred to in the History of Trade
Unionism, p. 80.

^ It was stated in evidence in 1874 that "the Society is composed of some
700 men, of whom 420 are employed in vat mills," the former comprising a very
large proportion of the entire handmade trade, and the latter only a trifling
proportion of the machine trade {Report of Arbitration on the Question of an
Advance in Wages . . . lOth July 1874, Maidstone, 1874, p. 53). At present
(1897) the machinemen are organised in two separate unions, the Amalgamated
Society of Papermakers, a strong body in the South of England, and the National

New Processes and Machinery 421

handworkers were incessantly advised to moderate their
demands, so as to enable their employers to compete with
the new machine mills, which started up in every county.
As early as 1864 a leading employer gave them an ominous
warning. " When you see . . ." he said, " regular machine
mills (such as I intend to stand by, if driven from the vats)
rising up around you . . . remember the old fable of 'The
Goose with the Golden Eggs ' . . . lest . . , you lose the
position in which you now stand." ^ " How can we compete
with the machine paper unless wages are reduced ? " asked
a millowner in 1891. "I say the best course for you to
adopt," replied the spokesman of the operatives, " is to keep
up the quality and the price of handmade paper." ^ This
policy has been consistently pursued by the Trade Union.
Far from consenting to lower its members' rates of pay, it
has taken every opportunity to raise them. " We have never
had a reduction of wages in the paper trade," declared the
men's secretary in 1874.^ "In 1839," a leading employer
told the arbitrator, "there was an increase of wages, in 1853
a slight modification, in 1854 a slight increase, another
increase in 1865, in 1869 a slight increase, when beer money
was given instead of beer. ... So we went on from 1838
to 1872, giving these three or four rises, and, in 1872, a rise
of sixpence per day was conceded by the employers without
any great fuss"; * the pay of a first-class vatman for a " day's
work" in a Kentish mill being now 6s. 5d., as compared
with 4s. 7d. in 1840.^ It is interesting to find the workmen
expressly comparing their own attitude with that of the

Union of Paper Mill Workers of Great Britain and Ireland, a weaker society
with membership chiefly in the North of England and in Scotland.

1 Notes of Proceedings at a Meeting of Paper Manufacturers and Journeymen
Papermakers Relative to an Advance in Wages (Maidstone, 1S64), p. 34.

2 Report of Arbitration Meeting between Employers and Employed in the
Handmade Paper Tf-ade ... on 29th January 1891 (Maidstone, 1891), p. 65.

3 Arbitration Report of 1S74, pp. 14, 17. "Never once in the history of
the trade had there been a reduction of the prices." — Report of Meeting of
Employers and Employed ... on 15th September 1884 (Maidstone, 1884),
p. 18.

■* Arbitration Report of 189 1, pp. 45-46.

^ See table of rates in the Arbitration Report of 1874, p. 33.

42 2 Trade Uition Inunction

Amalgamated Society of Cordwainers, and justifying it on
the same grounds, " There is no doubt," declared their
spokesman in 1891, "that handmade paper will continue to
hold its own in the market. There are now many branches
of industry where machines play a very important part in
the production of various goods. . . . [But] if you want a
splendid article in those materials, you must have handmade.
. . . The same remark applies to the shoemaking trade.
Handmade shoemakers now command higher wages than
ever they did in the history of the trade. Their services
have become much more important and valuable since the
introduction of machines, which now manufacture all parts
and all kinds of shoes. The people know that if they want
a good boot they must have handmade. It seems to me
. . . that handmade paper is precisely in the same position.
If people want the genuine article they will, notwithstanding
the cost, go in for handmade paper." ^ That this policy
has, in the paper trade, been attended by success is admitted
on all sides. The rigid maintenance of high rates for hand-
made paper has given the utmost possible encouragement to
the introduction of machinery, wherever machinery could
possibly be employed. The production of machine-made
paper has accordingly advanced by leaps and bounds, to the
great advantage of the public in the cheapening of the article
for common use. But this enormous increase of production
has in no way injured the trade in the superior handmade
paper. No attempt is made to compete in cheapness with
the machine-made product, the manufacturers, like their opera-
tives, preferring to concentrate their attention on turning
out as different a grade of quality as possible. The result
has been in the highest degree remarkable. Instead of
handmade paper mills having "to be closed all over the
country," as was expected in i860, it was reported to the
arbitrator that by 1874 there were actually considerably
more vats at work than had ever formerly existed ; that by
1 89 1 the number of vats and the amount of the sales had

^ Arbitration Report of 1 89 1, p. 10.

New Processes and Machinery 423

still further increased ; and that " the last sixteen years have
been the most successful sixteen years that we have ever known
in the trade." ^ All this is fully conceded by the employers.
"The masters," declared their spokesman in 1 891, "never
made such large profits in the old days as they have made
since. I admit [that] my father, for instance, who had a
good mill, could only make a bare living." ^ Meanwhile the
speed and continuity of the work has been steadily increased,
until the actual output in pounds of paper per man per year
in the best-equipped mills is now greater than it has ever
been in the history of the craft. The prosperity of the
employers, as their leading representative explained in 1891,
" has been due to two causes. In the first place there has
been — and I think the other gentlemen present will bear me
out in this — a great increase of sobriety and steadiness on
the part of the men. There was a time when they did not
work, sometimes for weeks together, five days a week. , . .
That is one great cause to which I attribute our prosperity.
. . . The other cause is the introduction of improvements by
the masters. The mills are very different from what they
used to be. . . . It is easier for the men to make seven days
a week now than it was years ago to make six days. . . .
Formerly there were many breakdowns at our mills. . . .
All these things have been changed." ^ We see, therefore,
that in spite of the adverse influence exercised, as we shall
show in a later chapter, by the Trade Union Restriction of
Numbers and the monopoly enjoyed by the old-established
employers, the enforcement of a high Standard of Life in the
handmade paper trade, far from destroying the livelihood
either of masters or men, has been accompanied by a marked
advance in their prosperity, and a distinct differentiation
between the old product and the new. The policy of main-
taining simultaneously the quality and the price of the hand-

^ Arbitration Report of 189 1, p. 30. 2 juj^ p_ ^g^

^ Ibid. pp. SO-5I' In the handmade paper trade "a day's work" is a

definite quantity of paper, varying according to size and weight. It has no relation

to the period of employment.

424 Trade Union Functioii

made article, whilst it has given a positive encouragement to
the introduction of machinery into the trade, has proved, in
fact, the salvation of the hand papermaker's craft.

Much the same policy has been pursued by the Amalga-
mated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners with regard
to the introduction of " ring-spinning," an ingenious appli-
cation of the old " throstle-spinning," which dates from about
1 88 1. By the substitution of the "ring frame" for the
" mule," it has been found possible, in the manufacture of
certain " counts " of cotton (the coarser " twist " up to
about "50's"), greatly to diminish the amount of skill
and effort required. What formerly demanded the con-
centrated attention of a highly -skilled man is now within
the capacity of an untrained woman. Had this invention
been made fifty years ago, the mule -spinners would un-
doubtedly have done their utmost to prevent its adoption,
and to exclude women from any participation in cotton-
spinning. But no such action has been taken, or even
suggested. Although the Cotton -spinners' Trade Union,
especially in its close alliance with the Weavers and Cardroom
Operatives, now exercises a far more effective control over
the industry than at any previous period, ring spinning by
women has, during the last fifteen years, been allowed to
grow up unmolested.^ It was practically impossible for the
adult male spinners, earning two pounds a week, to insist
on claiming for themselves work which could be done by
women at fifteen shillings a week. But they might have
attempted to stave off the innovation by lowering the rates
for their own work, and thereby discouraging their employers
from making the change. This, as we have seen, was the
policy followed two generations ago by the handloom weavers.
The Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners
adopted an entirely different course. When an employer
complained that he could no longer compete with rivals who

^ The ring-frame spinners were even received into the Amalgamated Associa-
tion of Card and Blowing Room Operatives, with the full assent of the Spinners'
officials, as being the most suitable textile organisation for them to join.

New Processes and Machinery 425

had adopted the ring frame, unless his mule-spinners would
accept a lower rate, he was told that under no circumstances
could any " lowering of the dyke " be permitted. What he
was offered was, as we have described, a revision of the
piecework list so arranged as to stimulate him to augment
the rapidity and complexity of the mule, in order that the
mule-spinners, increasing in dexterity, might simultaneously
enlarge the output per machine and raise their own earnings.
The cotton -spinners in short, like the hand bootmakers,
preferred to meet the competition of a new process by
raising their own level of skill, rather than by degrading
their Standard of Life. The result has been that, except
under certain circumstances, the mule has, up to now, fairly
held its own. The number of mule-spinners, like the number
of hand bootmakers, remains about stationary, and this
without the slightest attempt or desire to close the trade
to newcomers. Like the bootmakers, indeed, the mule-
spinners are subject to a constant process of selection, the
employers naturally refusing to engage, at such high rates,
any but the most skilled men.

There is, however, one point, on which the policy of the
cotton-spinners with regard to the ring frame, and that of the
papermakers with regard to the machine, has fallen short
of the policy of the hand bootmakers with regard to the
factory system. The Amalgamated Society of Cordwainers
did its utmost, as we have seen, to organise the new class of
factory workers,^ so that these could, as quickly as possible,
secure a new Standard Rate commensurate with the skill
and effort required. This, it will be obvious, is really a
necessary corollary of the maintenance of a Standard Rate.
The adoption of a new process must, on the whole, be
deemed an advantage to the community when it effects a
real saving of labor or economy of skill. But it is a very

^ " That clickers, stuff-cutters, pegmen, finishers, and machinists working at
the shoe trade are admitted into society. That all women working at the shoe
trade be admitted into the Association upon the same terms, and entitled to the
same rights of membership as the men." — Resolution of the National Union of
Boot and Shoe Operatives' Conference, i6th September 1872.

426 Trade Union Fu7iction

different thing when the attractiveness of the new process to
the employer is due, not to any real economy of human
labor, but to the chance of employing a helpless class of
workers at starvation wages. Unless the workers at the
new process are paid wages sufficient to maintain them at
the required new level of skill and efficiency, the new process
must be, in some way, parasitic on the community. To give
a concrete instance, if the daughter of a mule-spinner, reared
in a comparatively comfortable household, and maintained at
home at a cost of fifteen shillings a week, offers her services as
a ring-spinner at ten shillings a week, the competition between
the mule and the ring frame may reasonably be deemed
" unfair." If the woman had to live on the ten shillings,
her strength, her capacity of attention, her regularity of
attendance, and possibly her respectability, would inevitably
degrade. She could, moreover, not bring up, on her wages,
a new generation of ring-spinners to replace her. So long
as the underpaid worker is otherwise partly maintained —
perhaps the most usual case with women and children — the
employer is, in effect, receiving a bounty in favor of a
particular form of production, and the community has no
assurance that the competition between the processes will
lead to the survival of the fittest. " Whole branches of
manufacture," to use the weighty words of the Poor Law
Commission of 1834, " may thus follow the course, not of
coal mines or streams, but of pauperism : may flourish
like the fungi that spring from corruption, in consequence of
the abuses which are ruining all the other interests of the
place in which they are established, and cease to exist in
the better administered districts in consequence of that better
administration." ^ From the point of view of the com-
munity, therefore, it is vital that, however low may be the
standard of skill and strength required by the new process,
there should be maintained such a level of wages as will, at
any rate, fully sustain the new operatives at that standard.

^ First Report of Poor Law Commissioners, 1834, p. 65 of reprint of 1884
(H. C. 347).

New Processes and Machinery 427

From the point of view of the workers at the old process, it
is clearly of the utmost consequence that the new process
should get no false stimulus by such a " bounty " as we have
described.

This argument, to which we shall recur in our chapter
on " The Economic Characteristics of Trade Unionism," is
only slowly penetrating into the minds of the mule-spinners.
Unlike the Amalgamated Society of Cordwainers, the Amal-
gamated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners took no
trouble to organise their new competitors, the women ring-
spinners, to whom the employers were allowed to pay as
little as they pleased. After fifteen years' experience, how-
ever, this idea is beginning to dawn on the officials of the
Cotton-spinners' Union, though no positive action can yet
be recorded.^ But it has never yet occurred to the old-
fashioned close corporation of hand papermakers that they
are in any way called upon, in their own interest, to assist
the comparatively unskilled operatives in the machine paper-
mills of the North of England to secure a proper Standard
Rate. And the Amalgamated Society of Tailors never
dreams of taking steps to organise the ill-paid women of
the clothing factories.

We see, then, that where skilled labor is replaced by
unskilled, the paramount importance of maintaining the
Standard of Life warns off the handworker, both from any
claim to work the new process and from any attempt to
compete in cheapness with machine work. The hand
bootmakers, the hand papermakers, and the cotton mule-

^ Thus, in May 1896, we find the following warning note in the organ of the
Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners. In the ring-frame
spinning, " employers and their agents have practically had the whole field to
themselves in the matter of fixing prices and wages, as they have had no oppo-
sition from Trade Unions and their officials, and under the circumstances they have
taken great care to pay little enough for the labor of the operatives who are
employed on the frames. . . . The rapid increase of this class of spinning is
preventing the extension of mule-spinning, and so damaging the future prospects
of the little piecers of to-day. The Spinners' Union have made a mistake in not
paying attention to getting ring-spinners as members of their association, and
framing a list of wages to govern this class of labor." — Cotton Factory Tunes,
15th May 1896.

428 Trade Union Function

spinners have, in their several ways, discovered another
poHcy, viz. : rig'orously to enforce the old high rate of pay
for the old work, frankly to abandon to the machine any
part of the trade within its scope, and more and more to
concentrate attention on maintaining and differentiating the
peculiar qualities of their own special article. But this
enlightened self-interest requires, from the economic stand-
point, to be supplemented by a consideration of the claims
of other classes of operatives. The Trade Unionist is begin-
ning to recognise that he has a deep interest in maintaining
the Standard Rates of other sections of workers. The logical
outcome of Trade Union experience in all these difficult
cases seems, indeed, to be a minimum standard of remunera-
tion for effort, whatever the grade of labor, so that, under
no circumstances, would any section of workers find itself
reduced below the level of complete maintenance.^ Whenever
an employer seeks to substitute a lower for a higher grade
of labor, it is only by some such enforcement of a minimum
that the community can avoid the pernicious bounty to
particular occupations or processes, irrespective of their
social advantageousness, that is involved in the labor being
partially maintained from other sources than its wages.^

^ We must refer the reader for a full explanation of this difficult point of
Trade Union theory to our chapter on "The Economic Characteristics of Trade
Unionism."

2 The employers' proposal that one operative should attend to two or more
machines falls econoi-iically under the head of "speeding up," rather than under
that of a change of process, and has therefore been implicitly dealt with in our
chapter on "The Standard Rate." The wage-earner's traditional resentment
of any labor-saving innovation is here mingled with his even stronger objection to
what is commonly an attempt to evade the Standard Rate, by exacting more
bodily exertion or mental strain for the same money. Thus the Carmen, paid by
time, at a rate for which they are accustomed to mind one horse and cart,
strongly protest against one man being required to attend simultaneously to two
vehicles. The same feeling influences pieceworkers unless they are sufficiently
protected by a Standard List to have confidence that the increase in the day's
task and earnings will not be followed by a reduction of rates. The women
cotton-weavers of Glasgow, who are practically unorganised, and whose piecework
rates, unprotected by any effective list, are always going down to subsistence
level, stubbornly refuse to work more than one loom each. The cotton-weavers
of Lancashire, on the other hand, whether men or women, relying confidently on
their strong Trade Union and their Standard Lists, willingly work as many

New Processes and Machinery 429

looms — two, four, and even six — as they can manage (see " The Alleged Difference
between the Wages of Men and Women," by Sidney Webb, Economic Journal,
December 1S91). The employers' attempt to induce engineers to attend to
more than one lathe or other machine has led to much friction. In this instance
it is not clear to us what is the exact issue. If it is suggested that the engineer
should, for the weekly wage hitherto paid for one machine, in future mind two,
the case is merely one of an attempted reduction of the Standard Rate, which the
men naturally resist. We are unable to gather whether the employers have
made it plain that they propose to increase the time wages— say to time and a
half — when two machines are minded, or whether they are prepared to establish
and bind themselves to adhere to a Standard List of piecework rates, which
would automatically secure to the operative an increase in earnings proportionate
to the increase in strain. If either of these courses were adopted, we see no
reason why the engineers should not, like the cotton-weavers, willingly mind as
many machines as they can without undue strain. If the employers claim the
right to assign an operative to as many machines as seems fit to them, without
arranging special rates with the Trade Union officials, this is simply a denial of
the elementary right of Collective Bargaining, and will be fought as such.

CHAPTER IX

CONTINUITY OF EMPLOYMENT

The Trade Union Regulations which we have described in
the foregoing chapters have dealt exclusively with the main-
tenance and improvement of the conditions of employment :
they have left untouched the problem of unemployment. A
Standard Rate, a Normal Day, and safe and healthy con-
ditions of work are of no avail if there is no work to be got.
"We are willing to admit," said the Engineers of 185 i, and
the Cloggers of 1872, "that whilst in constant employment
our members may be able to obtain the necessaries of life.
Notwithstanding all this, there is always a fear prominent
in the mind of him who thinks of the future that it may
not continue ; that to-morrow may see him out of employ-
ment, his nicely -arranged matters for domestic comfort
overthrown, and his hopes of being able, in a few years, by
constant attention and frugality to occupy a more permanent
position, proved only to be a dream. How much is contained
in that word ' continuance,' and how necessary to make it a
leading principle of our society ! " ^ " In a fluctuating trade,"
say the Tailors, " many who depend for the necessaries of
life on their daily toil are often deprived of employment in
the most inclement season. They wander through the

1 Preface to Rules and Regulations of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers
(London, 1851), and also to Rtdes of the Rochdale Operative doggers' Society
(Rochdale, 1872). The same sentence occurs, with verbal variations, in other
Trade Union rules. (The cloggers make the "clogs," or wooden shoes, com-
monly worn in the streets by the Lancashire operatives.)

Continuity of Employment 431

country from city to town, and from town to village, in
search of employment, but, alas, in vain. This continues
until, upon the mind of an honest man, the thought rests
like an incubus. When and how shall I relieve myself of this
degradation ? " ^

We touch here the " dead point " in our analysis of
Trade Union Regulations. In spite of the vital importance
of the question to men dependent on weekly wages for their
whole livelihood, no Trade Union has hitherto devised a
regulation which secures continuity of livelihood as a con-
dition of employment.

At first sight it would seem as if the best way to obtain
Continuity of Employment would be to require the employer,
as a condition of getting the workman's service at all, to
enter into a contract of hiring for a specified long term.
This is not the course which the Trade Unionists have
followed. Engagements for long terms were once common
in many trades, and farm-servants in some parts of the
country are still engaged for the year. But the mobility
and vicissitudes which characterise modern industry are
hostile to such permanence, and employers have come to
prefer the shortest possible engagements, often insisting on
freedom to discharge their operatives at a few hours' notice.
This tendency, far from being resisted by the Trade Unions,
has invariably been encouraged by them. The Coalminers
of Northumberland and Durham fought hard to get rid of
their "yearly bond"; the Staffordshire Potters in 1866
enthusiastically threw off the " annual hiring " ; the " monthly
pays," once common in all occupations, have been replaced
by weekly, or at most, fortnightly settlements ; and many
Trade Unions have, at one time or another, expressly pro-
hibited their members from entering into longer engagements,
a prohibition now generally omitted as the practice has
become obsolete.^

^ Preamble to Rziles of the Amalgamated Society of Tailors (Manchester,

1893)-

- Thus the Scottish Ironmoulders' Society has, since 183S, forbidden engage-

432 Trade Union Function

This policy needs no explanation for any one who under-
stands the Trade Union position. The " yearly bond " or
annual hiring always meant, in practice," the conclusion of
a separate agreement between the employer and each indi-
vidual workman, and especially when the various terms of
service did not expire on a uniform date, was incompatible
with Collective Bargaining. Moreover, once the agreement
was entered into, the wage-earner found himself, at any rate
for the specified term of notice, practically at the mercy
of the employer's interpretation of the conditions. The
wage contract seldom contains express stipulations with
regard to any other points than the amount of remuneration,
and perhaps the hours of labor, and it is always implied
that the wage-earner binds himself to obey all lawful and
reasonable commands of his " master." It is in the wage-
earner's power to throw up his job when he likes that his
status differs most essentially from that of a slave, and if he
foregoes this power, and binds himself for a long term to
put up with practically whatever conditions, outside those
expressly stipulated for, the employer may choose to impose,
it is obvious that the Trade Union loses all power of protect-
ing him against economic oppression.-^ The briefest possible
term of service, terminable at a day or a week's notice on
either side, has accordingly come to be preferred, for different
reasons, by both employers and Trade Unionists,^ This

ments longer than "from pay to pay," the rule now in force (1892) providing
*' that no member of this association shall enter into any engagement, either
directly or indirectly, for any given time longer than from pay to pay, unless
specially authorised by Executive." The United Kingdom Society of Coach-
makers, whose rule on the subject dates from 1840, now ordains (1896 edition)
that "no member be allowed to article himself under penalty of expulsion."
The Tinplate Workers of Glasgow had a rule in i860 that no member should so
engage himself as to prevent his leaving his employer with two weeks' notice ;
the Liverpool Painters said one week. — Report on Trade Societies and Strikes,
by the Social Science Association (London, i860), pp. 133, 297.

^ We recur to this aspect of the wage contract in our chapter on " The Higgling
of the Market."

2 It was a special aggravation of the "yearly bond" among the Coalminers
that, whilst the workman bound himself for a whole year to hew coal whenever
required by a particular employer, that employer did not guarantee to find
him continuous employment, and could lay the pit idle whenever he chose

Continuity of Employinent

rOO

does not mean, as regards the great majority of industries,
that the employers are incessantly changing their workmen,
or workmen their employers. Wherever costly and intricate
machinery is used, and wherever the processes of different
workmen are dovetailed one into the other, it pays the em-
ployer to retain, even at some sacrifice, the services of the
same body of men, accustomed to his business and to each
other. In these trades accordingly, a well-conducted work-
man may rely on retaining his employment so long as his
employer has work to be done.

In other industries this absence of any permanent engage-
ment between master and man leaves the employer free to
get his work done to-day by one set of workers, and to-
morrow by quite another set. Whenever work is " given
out " to be done in the workers' own homes, the employer
can dole out the jobs as he chooses, sometimes to one
family, sometimes to another. A wholesale clothing con-
tractor in East London has thus hundreds of different
families looking to him for work, amongst whom his fore-
man will, each week, arbitrarily apportion his orders. The
London Dock Companies maintain what is essentially the
same system with regard to their casual labor, the fore-
man, at certain periods of the day, selecting fresh gangs of
men from among the crowd of applicants at the dock gates.
Both outworkers and dockers are nominally free to seek
work elsewhere, when not engaged by their usual employer.
But as they are expected, under pain of being struck off the
list, to present themselves to ask for work at certain hours,
they practically lose any real chance of obtaining other
employment.'^ This extreme discontinuity of employment

(R. Fynes, The Miners of Northumberland and Durham, Blyth, 1873). A similar
one-sidedness is found in other old contracts of hiring. The chief examples of
genuinely bilateral agreements for long terms relate to indoor servants, seamen,
and mechanics sent on jobs abroad.

1 "The Docks," by Beatrice Potter (Mrs. Sidney Webb), in Charles Booth's
Life and Labor of the People (London, 1889), vol. i. of first edition; and
H. Llewellyn Smith and Vaughan Nash, 77^;? Story of the Dockers' Strike
(London, 1889). This system of engaging casual labor by the hour still prevails
in the London docks, but it has, since 1S90, been modified by an increase in the
VOL. I 2 F

434 Trade Union Function

is not confined to unskilled laborers or low - paid home
workers. In many skilled handicrafts, where the work is
done individually and by the piece, the operative is required
to remain in the employer's workshop, or at his beck and
call, without being guaranteed either work or pay. " There
are firms," reported to the Royal Commission on Labor
the representative of the Sheffield trades, " which require
their workpeople to present themselves to the managers to
receive work at certain times during the day. When they
have entered the place in the morning the gates are closed,
and whether they have work or not they cannot leave the
premises till noon, except by special permit from the firm,
and so from noon to evening. ... I know of a case in the
steel trade where the men were expected to be in the firm
from 9 A.M. to 6 P.M., if they had but five shillings' worth of
work during the week. The men struck against it." ^ The
Macclesfield Silk -weavers are in an even worse position.
The employers " give out " work to be done in the weavers'
own homes, and distribute it so irregularly that a workman
may be kept idle for days or even weeks. Nevertheless, as
the handloom belongs to the employer, the operative :has to
pay loom-rent for it week by week with absolute continuity,
whether any work has been given to him or not, and he is
forbidden by the owner of the loom to use it for any other
manufacturer who might offer work.

To capitalists concerned only for present profit, this
extreme discontinuity of employment offers several ad-
number of men who are given preferences for employment. The dockers are
now divided into three registered classes (permanent men, A list, and B list, each
man being numbered in his own class), and one unregistered class (C or casuals).
No guarantee of employment is given to any man, but each day's work is allotted,
as far as it will go, strictly according to the order of the classes and the numerical
order of the men in each class. Thus, the regularity of employment of the
preference men has been increased at the expense of making the work of the
casual docker less continuous than before. In so far as the change is a step
towards the total abolition of the casual system, it must be regarded as an
improvement. — See Charles Booth, Life atid Labor of the People, vol. vii.
(London, 1896); and the chapter on " Les Unions de Dockers" in Le Trade
Unionisme en Angleterre, edited by Paul de Rousiers (Paris, 1897).

^ Evidence of C. Hobson, Q. 19,029, before Royal Commission on Labor
(Group A), 24th March 1892.

Continuity of Employment 435

vantages. Where the industry is seasonal or otherwise
irregular in volume, as in the case of dock labor and the
clothing trade, the employer is able, without expense to
himself, to expand or contract his working staff in exact
proportion to the state of the weather or change of tides or
seasons. The giver-out of work can at any moment quad-
ruple his production to fulfil a pressing order, and then drop
back to the current demands of a slack season, without
incurring factory-rent or other standing charges. The army
of men and women standing at his beck and call cost him
nothing except for the actual hours that they are at work.
And the very existence of such a " reserve army " places
each member of it more completely at his mercy with regard
to all the conditions of employment. Wherever this " reserve
army " exists in conjunction with home-work, or otherwise
under circumstances making Individual Bargaining inevitable,
the employer can practically dictate terms. How disas-
trously the whole arrangement operates for the workers con-
cerned has been described by every observer of the sweated
trades.

To oppose such a disastrous irregularity of work is a
fundamental principle of Trade Unionism. Unfortunately,
where the system prevails, the workers are seldom in a
position to combine for their own protection. We see a
feeble attempt to cope with the evil in the regulation of
the Dock, Wharf, and Riverside Laborers' Union, that any
man taken on in the London docks shall be guaranteed at
least four hours' continuous work. Certain classes of rail-
way servants complain that, whilst they are forbidden by the
railway company to take any other employment, they are
given only casual and intermittent work, and paid only by
the job. To remedy this grievance the General Railway
Workers' Union is proposing that it should be enacted by
law that every person who is required "to give the whole of
his time to the service of the company shall, unless legally
dismissed from such service, before his employment is termi-
nated, be entitled to a week's notice, or a week's wages in lieu

43 6 Trade Union Fttnction

of notice, and he shall be entitled to full weekly wages
while in such employment." ^ But examples of Trade Union
policy on this point must be sought in the more strongly
organised trades in which, though so dangerous a discon-
tinuity does not actually exist, there is some danger that
it might, if not resisted, insidiously creep in. Thus, the
highly-paid compositors in London daily newspaper offices
who must stand by waiting for copy to come in, and then
work at lightning speed to catch the press, insist on all
the men in attendance being guaranteed " a galley and
a half" — that is, being paid 5s. gd. on a morning paper,
or 5 s. 4|-d. on an evening paper — whether they are actu-
ally required to do as much work or not.^ The old-
fashioned union of hand-working Papermakers goes farther,
and rigidly enforces the Regulation known as the " Six
Days' Custom," which ensures that not less than six days'
work, or the equivalent payment, shall be found each week
for all the men employed. If an accident occurs, or an
engine breaks down, the employer no more thinks of
depriving his workmen of their livelihood during the stoppage
than he does that of his clerks or manager. He can dis-
charge his men by giving them the customary fortnight's
notice, or by paying them the customary forfeit of one
guinea, but so long as he retains their services he must pay
them at least the agreed minimum of weekly wages.^

1 General Secretary's Report to Annual General Meeting, 1897.

2 The minimum used to be "one galley"; then the rule ran, in mystic
phrase, "one galley four hours' work, and extra pay for more than a quarter
galley an hour when asked to pull out." We are indebted to Mr. C. Drummond
for the following explanation. The newspaper compositors, being paid by the
piece, and guaranteed a minimum of work, can do it at their own speed. But in
order that the "printer" {i.e. manager of the department) may have some control
over the time taken, it is agreed that the maximum within which one galley must
be completed is four hours, though the compositor will, for his own sake, seldom
take so long. It happens very occasionally, when the "printer" is compelled to
insist on the utmost possible speed, that he will order the men to "pull out," i.e.
use every effort. Men working under such an order are entitled to extra pay
for all over a quarter of a galley done in an hour.

3 " That the Six Days' Custom be as follows : Twenty-two post per day and
ten on Saturday" {Rules and Regulations of the Original Society of Papermakers,
Maidstone, 1887), Rule 28. The French papermakers in the eighteenth century

Continuity of Employment 437

Similarly, the Flint Glass Makers have a binding custom by
which the employer is required to find his men a minimum
of " eleven moves a week," being thirty-three hours' work, or
pay a corresponding amount in wages.^

In other trades where work is irregular, the Trade
Union objection to its being arbitrarily distributed by the
employer — leading, as this does, to the extreme dependence
of the wage -earner — has led to regulations for "sharing
work." If the workmen know that, however scanty may be
the work to be done, it will be fairly distributed among them
all, there is much less temptation for the poorer or more
grasping members to seek to secure themselves by offering
to accept worse conditions of employment.^

The most primitive form of sharing work is seen in the
" turnway " societies of the Thames watermen, for regulating
the " turns," or order in which the men plying at any
particular " stairs " serve the passengers who present them-
selves.^ What is essentially the same arrangement is
presented by the " House of Call " system, under which,
among the Tailors, Compositors, Bakers, Upholsterers, and
sometimes Joiners and Painters, the employer wanting a

required six weeks' notice on either side. — Du Cellier, Histoire des Classes
Laborietises en Frafice (Paris, iS6o), p. 292.

1 This custom is recognised in the trade, and is enforced by County Court
judges, if the wage contract includes no express stipulation to the contrary. See
the cases reported in the Flint Glass Makers' Magazifie, August 1874 and March
1875, in the Birmingham and Rotherham County Courts.

2 The growth of the great industry and the world commerce led to a similar
development in French Trade Unionism. Du Cellier {Histoire des Classes
Laborieuses en France, p. 385) notes that, after 1830, the workmen's associations
were occupied in devising means to mitigate the evils of unemployment. Where
the work was individual in character, the employer was obliged to give the jobs
in succession to the several workmen in their order on the roll. Where the work
was done in concert, it was shared equally by the whole staff, instead of the
number being reduced.

^ These "turnway societies," incidentally described in Mayhew's London
Labour and the London Poor (London, 1 851), are probably of great antiquity.
There were societies of watermen at Rotherhithe in 1789, and of those "usually
plying at the Hermitage Stairs" in 1799, whilst already in 1669 we read that
"our Gravesend watermen, by some temporary and mean pretences of the late
Dutch war, have raised their ferry double to what it was, and finding the sweet
thereof, keep it up still " (Thomas Manley's Usury at Six per Cent Examined,
London, 1669). See the Jdistory 0/ Trade Unionism, pp. Ii, 20.

438 Trade Union Function

workman is encouraged or required to send to a place of
resort for the unemployed, and the man who has been longest
on the list is, if suitable, deputed to fill the vacancy/ This
arrangement, which is in some trades worked for the mutual
convenience of both parties, may degenerate into a refusal
to the employer of any power of selection. Thus the Flint
Glass Makers insist on the employer taking the member who
has been the longest out of work,^ whether he is competent,
or suitable, or not ; and the Silk Hatters expressly arrange
so that the employer may not even see the man assigned to
him, before he is engaged.^ This is, in effect, to maintain
a craft monopoly, having all the economic characteristics of

1 The Compositors at London, Glasgow, Manchester, etc., use the Trade
Union Office for this purpose; and the Engineers at Manchester keep a "vacant
book " in their local office. Most of the smaller trades use particular public-
houses as their " House of Call," the publican often himself keeping the register
of the unemployed. For incidental descriptions of the " House of Call " system,
see The Tailoring Trade^ by F. W. Gallon.

In France the practice of sharing employment was carried so far in some
of the incorporated handicrafts that the member who had been longest in
continuous work ceded his place in favor of any who had remained a certain
time unemployed. — DuCellier, Histoire des Classes Laborieuses en France, p. 289.

2 Rtihs and Regulations of the National Flint Glass Makers Sick and Friendly
^oaV^y (Manchester, 1891). Rule X. is as follows: "When a man falls out
of employment the F[actory] S[ecretary] shall inform the District] S[ecretary]
who shall at once write to the C[entral] S[ecretary] for an unemployed certificate ;
and when a man is applied for by an employer the F.S. shall apply to the
D.S., and should there be no one suitable in the district, he shall write to
the C.S. stating what kind of man is wanted, wages, etc., so that there be no
mistake as to the man sent to fill the situation. "When an employer applies for
men the unemployed roll shall be consulted before any promotions be granted
either to journeymen or apprentices. Note. — Rule X. is not intended to compel
a master to engage any man to whom he has a reasonable objection, the same
to be considered by the District Committee." The Flint Glass Makers' Magazine
contains many references to employers' complaints of this procedure.

3 The Silk Hatters' custom is so universal that it is only incidentally referred
to in the rules. As explained to us by officers of the union it is as follows :
" Employers are not allowed to choose, or even to see, workmen whom they
engage. A member out of work calls at a hatter's workshop, and sends in a
small card (the 'asking ticket'), showing that he is a financial member [i.e. not
in arrear with his contribution), and what branch of work he does. The
journeymen in each workshop take it in turns to attend to such cards. On its
being sent in, the man whose turn it is goes in to the employer and asks, ' Do you
want a bodymaker ? ' (or a shaper, as the case may be). This is called ' asking
for' the unemployed member. If the employer says 'yes,' the man is told to
come in and commence. If 'no,' his card is returned, and he goes off to the
next shop."

Continuity of Employment 439

a drastic restriction of numbers, with which it is invariably
combined/

Any such restriction on the employer's freedom of choice
between one workman and another is, however, quite
exceptional. More generally, the Trade Union seeks to
promote the sharing of work by regulations directed against
the greed or selfishness of its own members. Thus the Ship-
wrights' Provident Union of the Port of London retains to the
present day the substance of its original rule of 1 824 that " no
member shall engross a greater quantity of work than he can
accomplish by working the regular hours of the trade, viz.
not before or after the recognised working hours per day
throughout the year ; and that no work be performed inside
after the men on the outside of the ship have left work, so
that every opportunity may be given to those who are out
of employ." ^ The same intention inspires the regulations
in many handwork trades against " smooting " or " foxing "
or " grassing," that is, working for a second employer after
putting in a full day elsewhere. Thus the Manchester
Union of Saddlers provides that " no member of this union
shall be allowed habitually to work for any other employer
than the one by whom he is regularly employed, except
there are none out of work in the branch. And no member
shall be allowed to obtain any work at this trade whilst in a
situation, to do after his working hours for any person except
his own employer." ^ And the Wool Shear Benders and
Grinders, a tiny Sheffield handicraft, absolutely prohibit
their members from working in any other wheel or factory
than the one in which they are regularly employed.^ An

^ We recur to this subject in our chapter on "The Economic Characteristics of
Trade Unionism."

2 Rules of the Shipwrights' Provident Union of the Port of London ; see
the original wording in a note to the chapter on " The Normal Day."

3 Rules of the Union of the Saddlers, Harness Makers, etc. (Manchester, 1889).
Similar rules exist in many other trades, such as the Compositors, Brushmakers,
Coachmakers, etc.

■* The Yorkshire Glass Bottle Makers' Society has a signed agreement with all
the employers, which is renewed annually. Among other matters, it provides that
"in the event of any furnace being out for repairs, slack trade, or stopped for

440 Trade Union Fiuiction

extreme case is presented by the Scythe Grinders' Trade
Protection Society, which arranges for its members a definite
year's engagement, in all cases terminating on the 6th of July
(Old Midsummer Day), by which it is understood that no
man is ever discharged during the year for slackness of trade,
the ebbs and flows of the work of each establishment being
shared among the staff with which it started the year. But
these are archaic survivals. In the great modern unions
any desire to promote the sharing of work by regulations of
this type is merged in the general objection to Overtime,
and the maintenance of the Normal Day.

The common Trade Union desire to maintain the Normal
Day, especially in its manifestations against Overtime and in
favor of a Reduction of the Hours of Labor, has at all times
been strengthened by the belief that a strict regulation of the
working time would incidentally cause employment to be
more continuous. Thus, the Amalgamated Association of
Operative Cotton-spinners, in supporting Lord Shaftesbury's
" Ten Hours' Bill," gave as one of their objects, " a more
equitable adjustment or distribution of labor, by means of
shortening the hours of labor." ^ And when, in 1872, there
was a new movement for reducing the Normal Day, the
same idea recurs in the argument that this would " secure

any other cause, the workmen shall, as far as practicable, share the work ; provided,
nevertheless, that if after a furnace has been out for four months, and there is no
probability of its being started again, the master to be at liberty to discharge the
sui"plus workmen."

1 Circular of 19th January 1845, in Minute Book. Fifteen years later the
Cotton-spinners thus referred to their successful agitation : " It should always
be remembered that anterior to the introduction of factory legislation, the em-
ployers dictated the hours of labor to their workpeople ; and in the various
localities those hours varied accordingly, ranging from seventy-four hours and
upwards. As, however, in some instances the mills were kept running night
and day, we shall certainly be under the mark in assuming that the average
hours worked at that time, throughout the country, were 75 per cent per week.
It is obvious that sixty people working seventy-five hours per week would produce
nearly as much as seventy-five now do working sixty hours, and thus from 20 to 25
per cent of the factory population would be thrown destitute upon the streets. It
is equally clear, moreover, that it is the scarcity or redundance of labor in the
market which regulates the rate of wages ; and, as under the circumstances we
have named, some of the workpeople would be almost worked to death, while
those thrown out would be reduced to a state bordering on starvation from the

Continuity of Employment 441

them moderate but constant employment." ^ In so far as
this means only that a reduction of the hours of those in
employment would, other things being equal, cause the work
to be shared among a larger number of operatives, and so
prevent some from being wholly unemployed, the case is,
like that of the Shipwrights whose rule we have quoted,
merely one of sharing work. As unemployed men have to
be maintained somehow, generally by their fellow-members,
it may well be more convenient to the whole body that the
largest possible number should be employed for the normal
hours, than that some should be working abnormally long
days, and others walking the streets in search of a job. In
times of general depression of trade, or of temporary contrac-
tion of demand for a particular industry, such an arrange-
ment seems to the Trade Unionist obviously reasonable.
The employer, on the other hand, more than usually eager
in bad times to reduce the cost of production, would prefer
to lengthen the hours of labor, so as (at time wages) to get
more work for the same weekly wage, or (at piece rates) to
get a larger output in proportion to his standing charges.
Hence we arrive at the paradox that it is generally in times
of depression, when the world requires less carpentering or
engineering work to be done, that attempts are made to
lengthen the Normal Day of those carpenters and engineers
who are in employment at all, with the result that the
number out of employment is unnecessarily increased. In
1879, fo'' instance, at a time of exceptional contraction of

want of it, the wages of labor would, as a matter of course, from the intense
competition to obtain employment, come down to starvation point ; and all our
efforts, whether exerted singly or in concert, would be utterly powerless to arrest
their downward course. It is clearly then the duty and interest of every worker
in the factories of this country to resist, by every legitimate means in his power,
not only any attempt to violate the law by overworking women, young persons,
and children, but to treat with contempt all overtures by which it is sought to
induce him to work more than sixty hours per week, inasmuch as this righteous
law is the palladium of his success in his endeavour to improve his social con-
dition."— Rtiles of the Amalgamated Associatioti of Operative Cotton-spinners,
edition of i860, preface.

1 Circular of 7th January 1872, ibid. See, for other examples, The Eight
Hours' Day, by Sidnev Webb and Harold Cox (London, 1891).

442 Trade Union Function

business, the Clyde shipbuilders insisted on increasing the
working hours from fifty-one to fifty-four per week, and the
Manchester builders added from two to three hours to the
working week.^ It is in face of attempts of this sort that
the Trade Union Regulations for maintaining the Normal
Day seem incidentally to protect the workers from an
unnecessary discontinuity of employment.

The reader will see on closer examination that these
Regulations, though apparently directed towards Continuity
of Employment, are in reality designed primarily to prevent
the evils of Individual Bargaining, and to save the workmen,
especially in bad times, from falling into personal dependence
on the employer or his foreman. Thus the Trade Union
objection to the conditions of employment being fixed in
advance for long periods completely disappears, as we may
learn from the little example of the Scythe-grinders, when
this fixing takes place by the Method of Collective Bargaining.
The " Working Rules," for which all sections of the building
trade persistently struggle, habitually determine the rates of
wages, hours of labor, and many other conditions for an
indefinitely long period, from which neither employers nor
workmen can depart without giving six months' notice. The
Miners' Federation in 1893 willingly bound themselves to
continue to accept the then existing rates of wages for a
year, in return for a corresponding pledge from the associated
employers not to seek a reduction during that period. In
like manner, the Trade Union objection to the doling out of
work in slack seasons ceases when this distribution is made
in accordance with any such collective arrangement among
the operatives themselves as those that we have just de-
scribed.^ None of these regulations secures, or even attempts

1 History of Trade Unionism, pp. 332-334.

2 The workers may even resort to the primitive expedient of casting lots ;
thus the Rules and Regulations of the Warpers' True Benevolent Sick and Burial
Society (Rochdale, 18S4) prescribe "that when a mill stops working where our
members are employed, and it is obvious that such stoppage will be for some
time, when all the men are finishing their work within two days, they shall cast
lots whose name shall be first on the list."

Continuity of Employment 443

to secure, to the workmen a full week's work or a full week's
wage for every week in the year. They have little real bear-
ing on Continuity of Employment and are, in substance,
only incidents of the Method of Collective Bargaining, re-
quired to maintain the Standard Rate and the Normal Day.

There are, in fact, no Trade Union Regulations placing
upon the employer the obligation of providing continuous
employment for the wage -earners whom he chooses to
engage. Wisely or unwisely the Trade Unions have tacitly
accepted the position that the capitalist can only be ex-
pected to find them wages so long as he can find them
work. Continuity of employment becomes, therefore, con-
tingent upon continuity of the consumer's demand, or more
precisely, upon an exact adjustment of Supply and Demand.
Both employers and workmen wish this adjustment made and
continuity secured. But capitalists and manual workers have,
with a few exceptions on both sides, advocated diametrically
opposite ways of obtaining it. When business becomes slack
and sales fall off, the employer's first instinct is to tempt
customers by lowering prices. He assumes that, whatever
may be the cause of the depression, he can still get orders, and
so keep his mills going full time, if only he is enabled to quote
a sufficiently low price for his product. For this reduction
he looks mainly to the rate of wages. The landlord insists
on his fixed rent or royalty, and the mortgagee or debenture
holder on his fixed interest. It would be fatal to economise
on buildings, machinery, or plant, which must either be kept
up to their highest efficiency or replaced earlier than need
be at serious cost to himself. It is not worth while, and it
is contrary to the brainworker's tradition, to nibble at the
salaries of managers or clerks. The conclusion seems
inevitable. The alternative to stopping altogether is, whilst
the employer temporarily foregoes some of his profits, the
workman shall forego some of his wages.

The Trade Unionists entirely dissent from this policy.^

1 Thus, the factory bootmakers, in a time of great depression of trade,
emphatically protested against the employers' policy "When in consequence

444 Trade Union Function

They point out that, to them, it is not a question of tem-
porarily diminishing surplus profits ; what is at stake is their
weekly livelihood, the actual housekeeping of their families
and themselves. To the vast majority of workmen, a ten
per cent reduction of wages means an actual diminution of
food and warmth, an actual privation in the way of clothing
and house-accommodation, which they declare to be physi-
cally exhausting and detrimental to their industrial efficiency.
No manufacturer would think it wise to let his buildings and
machinery fall into disrepair, or to reduce the ration and
stable accommodation of his horses ; why, asks the Trade
Unionist, should he adopt this suicidal policy with regard to
the most important factors of his productive efficiency, — the
human laborers whom he employs ? ^ If the employer, under
the pressure of competition in slack times, tempts the con-
sumer to buy his particular commodity by indefinitely
worsening the conditions of employment, he is, in thus
deteriorating the physique and character of successive relays
of workers, giving away what does not belong to him, the
capital value of the human beings in his service.

It is a further aggravation to the Trade Unionist that
he believes the sacrifice demanded of him by the employer
to be worse than useless. Merely to offer commodities at a
lower price in no way increases the world's aggregate demand

of the reckless unscrupulous competition among capitalists we find our com-
merce becoming less day by day, banks stopping payment, firms v/hich had
become bywords in the past for their supposed stability found to be in a state of
hopeless insolvency, we protest against that doctrine which would find a panacea
for these evils in a general reduction of the wages of the workers or an increase
in their hours of labor." — Monthly Report of the National Union of Boot and
Shoe Operatives (December 1879).

1 The acceptance by employers of contracts at prices which cannot possibly
be made to pay at the existing rates of wages is a subject of constant complaint.
The preface \.o\hQ Bylaws, Order of Business, and Rules of Order of the Window -
Glass Workers of England (?,MnAer\znd, 1886) declares, " Whilst admitting that
sometimes pressure is brought to bear on the capitalists or employers, [that]
in too many instances, instead of offering any resistance, they accept terms that
are disadvantageous to themselves, trusting to their power of remunerating
themselves by legally pilfering a portion off each of their workers' weekly
earnings ; and there is no limit to the extremes to which labor can be pushed,
unless it be that fixed by the Poor-Law authorities and the price paid for their
test labor."

Continuity of Employment 445

for commodities. It may suit the immediate purposes of a
single employer, by undercutting his rivals, to engross their
trade. It might conceivably suit all the employers in a
particular trade, by cheapening their wares, to engross more
of the aggregate demand for commodities than would other-
wise come their way.^ But in either case the total demand
remains the same, being, in fact, identical with the total
product, and all that has happened is a gain in continuity
in one direction, balanced by an equivalent loss somewhere
else. Thus, the Trade Unionist declares a lowering of price
to be no real cure for a general depression of trade. When
such a policy is adopted all round, the aggregate income of
the producers is no greater than it would have been if they
had kept up their rates and done less work. The only
result is that the workers have to do more work for the same
money, and though the wage-earners share, as consumers, in
the benefit of the lowered prices, the fact that they only
consume a third of the product makes the operation a net
loss to their class.^ If it is retorted that one country may,
by a judicious cheapening of its products, engross more than
its normal share of the diminished trade of the world, and
so keep its own wage -earners employed at the cost of

1 It must not be forgotten that a fall in the wages of any particular section of
workers would, at best, produce a much less than proportionate fall in the retail
price of their product. Thus, when the Northumberland coal hewers are urged
to submit to a ten per cent reduction, in order to stimulate the demand for their
coal, they may well reply that, receiving as they do on an average about ijd. per
ton of coal hewn, this ten per cent reduction of wages, which would mean a
serious shrinking of their family incomes, could not possibly result in lowering the
price to the London consumer to a greater degree than from 24s. to 23s. lO^d.
per ton, or by about a half per cent.

The actual variations of price have, in most industries, little connection with
variations of wages. " During the last twenty years the retail price of cotton
thread has varied from a penny to twopence per spool of 200 yards — that is, 100
per cent — following, more or less closely, the variations of manufacturers' prices.
All this time the wages of women workers, who constitute the great majority of
operatives in the thread mills, have scarcely varied." — Prof. W. Smart, Studies in
Economics (London, 1896), p. 259.

2 In the United Kingdom from three-fifths to two-thirds of the annual pro-
duct of commodities and services are consumed by the one-fifth of the population
above the wage-earning class ; see the reference to official statistics given in Fads
for Socialists (Fabian Tract, No. 5).

446 Trade Union Function

foreigners, the Trade Unionist has the reply that, according
to the orthodox Theory of International Trade, any such
artificial stimulus to national industry must necessarily be
as powerless to increase the total volume of the trade as
a Protective Tariff or a system of Bounties on Exports.
We shall examine the whole of this argument in our chapter
on " The Economic Characteristics of Trade Unionism." It
concerns us here only as explaining the persistent Trade
Union policy of fighting their hardest against any lowering
of wages, and submitting only to superior force.^

But certain sections of the Trade Union world do not
stop at this negative attitude. They have propounded, as
a means of coping with depression of trade, a diametrically
opposite policy, which they have done their best to press
their employers to adopt. The Cotton Operatives and Coal-
miners — trades which we are always having to couple
together — have repeatedly met their employers' demands for
reduction of wages by an equally confident demand for a
restriction of the output. This policy dates from the very
beginning of the century. Thus, to quote an official report
of 1844, " It can scarcely be credited by one calmly investi-
gating the state of this large body of laborers, that many
thousands of them — in fact, the whole of the colliers and
miners in Lanarkshire, with a few exceptions, amounting to
1 6,000 men — have, for many years past (since the repeal of
the Combination Laws in 1825), placed themselves under
regulations as to the amount of their labor, which, had they
been attempted to be enforced by the authority of any
government whatsoever, in any country calling itself civilised,
would have roused the indignation of every thinking man, as
against an act of the most intolerable despotism. And yet

1 In our History of Trade Umonis?ii we have described how, for a few years,
a small number of unions, mainly in the coal and iron industries, accepted the
employers' arguments, and agreed to the celebrated arrangement of the SHding
Scale, which the Coalminers have now practically abandoned. We refer to this
method of adjusting wages in our chapter on " The Assumptions of Trade Union-
ism." Particulars of all known Sliding Scales are given in Appendix II. of the
History of Trade Unionism.

Continuity of Employment 447.

these regulations were intended by the working colliers . . .
for the maintenance of wages at a fair level, for their protec-
tion against overwork, and against an overstocking of the
market of labor and the market of coal. ... A certain day's
work, called the ' darg,' is fixed, which the colliers themselves
allow no one to exceed." ^

The policy of regulating the output of coal in proportion
to the demand for it at the current price has always remained
a leading principle of the Coalminers. The " darg," or limit
to the day's product of the individual hewer, has at no time
extensively prevailed, and is to-day characteristic not of good
Trade Union districts, but only of the half-organised Ayrshire
and Lanarkshire pits. In England restriction of output has
taken the form only of a counter proposal, justifying the
miners' refusal to lower wages.^ When the coalowners have
pleaded their accumulating stocks of coal as a reason why
wages and prices should be lowered, in order to stimulate
demand, the miners have suggested that Supply and Demand

^ Report of Commissioner to inquire into Coalmining, No. 592 of 1844, vol.
xvii. p. 31, quoted in J. H. Burton's Political and Social Econo7)iy (Edinburgh,
1849). In one or two old piecework trades — notably some branches of the Potters
and Glass Bottle Makers — a similar limitation of individual output has prevailed
under the name of "stint" or "tantum." " In our light metal shops," wrote
the secretary of the North of England Glass Bottle Makers' Society in 1S95,
" the Society has a tantum fixed, which the men are not allowed to exceed : if
they do it is paid into the Society, as a reference to the reports will show. . . .
. I give you a copy of the tantum for light metal in our district as mentioned : —

Reputed Quarts

10 oz. Codd's

5 oz. Codd's ....

Imperial Pints

Reputed Pints above 12 oz.

Do. under 12 oz., no restriction.

All bottles made in excess of the above the money is paid into the funds of the
Society." — Report of the Rates of Wages, Lists of Numbers, etc., of the Glass
Bottle Makers of Great Britain and Ireland (Castleford, 1895), P- 49-

2 The Rules of the Mitters'' United Association of the County of Fife (Dunferm-
line, 1868) refers in the preamble to " the fearful stocks of coal which have accumu-
lated in the county, which evil stands out like a bold monster, to defy us in
having our just rights." T):\q Articles of Regulation of the Operative Collieries
of Lanark and Dufnbarton of 1S25 declared "that there should never be allowed
to be any stock of coals in the hands of any of the masters." — See Huskisson's
Speeches (London, 1831), vol. ii. pp. 369, 371.

no

dozen.

105

>j

115

))

IIS

,,

"5

>»

448

'^rade Union F^inction

should be adjusted rather by diminishing the output than
by forcing coal upon unwilling buyers. In one recent
instance the Trade Union gave a practical illustration of this
policy. In March 1892 the Miners' Federation saw its
members threatened with a reduction of wages by coal-
owners unable to keep up their sales. The men resolved
to "take a week's holiday," with the result that the stocks
were temporarily diminished, and the reduction was not
insisted on.^

^ This policy of restricting the output has, under the name of " Limitation of
the Vend," long been characteristic of the coal trade. From 1771 to 1844, a
period of seventy-three years, there existed, almost continuously, a systematic
organisation among the coalowners of the Tyne and Wear for fixing price and
output. " The colliery owners met annually and agreed upon what was called
the ' basis,' that is, the proportion which each colliery should sell of the total
'vend.' They met monthly, and sometimes fortnightly, to fix what was called
the ' issue ' for the following month. There was an understanding as to the
price at which each colliery should sell. A fine of from 3s. to 5s. per Newcastle
chaldron was paid by those who at the end of the year had exceeded their
quantity, and this was received by those who were short ' (D. A. Thomas). The
result was that prices were greatly and continuously raised. It appears that so
long as the arrangement effected an actual restriction of the total output, it worked
satisfactorily enough to the coalowners. But eventually each coalowner strove,
by opening new pits and increasing their capacity, to increase his own "basis."
The arrangement then ceased to restrict the total output, and became only one of
"sharing work," which came to an end in 1844 by the revolt of the larger
collieries, who desired to work their pits to the full capacity. Particulars are to
be found in the Reports and Evidence of the Parliamentary Committees of 1800,
1829, 1830, and 1873 on the coal trade (G. R. Porter's Progress of the Nation,
London, pp. -283-286 of 1847 edition ; Cunningham's Growth of English Industry
and Commerce, vol. ii. p. 463 ; Some Notes on the Present State of the Coal
Trade, by D. A. Thomas, INLP., Cardiff, 1896). Mr. Thomas proposes to
institute a similar " Limitation of the Vend " for South Wales, urging that if each
colliery agreed to produce only its allotted quota of the total output, prices would
be automatically maintained, without the need of any concerted action among
the sellers as to price, and without actually limiting the total supply below the
demand for it at existing prices. This proposal seems to contain, in not
providing against a reckless increase in the number and capacity of pits, the
same inherent weakness that eventually broke up the Tyne and Wear arrangement.

The coalowners in Westphalia and Pennsylvania have gone farther. The
Rhenish Westphalian Coal Syndicate has, since 1893, conducted all sales for the
Westphalian coalowners, fixing both price and output. The Coalowners'
Association of Pennsylvania, in conjunction with the great railway companies,
has an essentially similar arrangement for the supply of anthracite. Sir George
Elliot's bold proposal (described in the Times of 20th September 1893) of ^^
amalgamation of all the coalmines of the United Kingdom into a single company
of ;^ 1 10,000,000, subject to a government control over rises in price, may
eventually be adopted in preference to a merely capitalist trust.

Continuity of Employment 449

For twenty years a similar policy has been urged by the
Cotton Operatives at each recurring period of contraction of
trade. In the great depression of 1878, when the value of
English exports of cotton piece-goods fell no less than 17
per cent below those of 1872, the employers insisted that
only by a 10 per cent reduction could they continue their
trade. The weavers denied that any such reduction would
"remove the glut from an overstocked cloth market,"
especially in view of the fact that the quantity of piece-goods
exported was no less than before, but offered to give way,
provided that the employers would, on their side, consent
to put all the mills on short time, so as to stop the over-
production.^ Again, in the depression of 1885, the employers
pressed for a reduction, and the operatives — this time the
spinners — formally offered to " accept a reduction of i o per
cent and four days a week ; 5 per cent and five days ; or
full rates with full time." " " The employers," as their able
secretary explains, " looked upon this as a fallacy, knowing
from experience that short time meant increased cost of
production." ^

We do not propose to enter into the complicated
economic arguments which are urged for and against this
policy of meeting the vicissitudes of demand by a deliberately
regulated production.^ Whatever may be said in favor of
Restriction of Output, any systematic use of this device is
out of the reach of mere associations of wage-earners. They
can, of course, temporarily stop all production by simultane-
ously refusing to work, as in a strike or in the week's holiday
arbitrarily taken by the Miners' Federation in 1892. But

^ See the Cotton-weavers' manifesto of June 1878, given in the History of
Trade Unionism, pp. 329, 330.

^ Minutes of Sub-Committee, Executive Committee, and Representative
Meeting of the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners, June
18S5.

3 Fifty Years of the Cotton Trade, by Samuel Andrew (Oldham, 1887),
p. 10.

* The Trade Union position in the controversy of 1878 was ably maintained
by Mr. (now the Right Hon.) John Morley, in his Over Production ; an address
delivered at the Trade Union Cottgress, 1878 (Nottingham, 1879).

VOL. I 2 G

450 Trade Union Ftmction

when the industrial machine is in motion, any direct limita-
tion of output is beyond the power of the Trade Union. A
strongly-organised union might insist that no member should
produce more than a given quantity per day (the Coal-
miners' " darg "), or that all the establishments in the trade
should work only a limited number of hours per week (the
Cotton Operatives' " short time "), But neither of these
expedients has, in practice, any effective result in diminishing
the total amount of production below what the employers
desire. It is always possible to employ more miners in the
pit, to work additional seams, or even to open up new pits.
The millowner puts in additional machines, and directly
prices rise owing to the rumour of restriction, old mills are
reopened and new ones erected. Any attempt on the part
of the wage -earners to limit the output of the individual
operative, though it may cause inconvenience, or increase
the expense of carrying on the industry, has, therefore, no
practical effect in restricting the total amount that will be
produced. Hence, though the English Coalminers and
Cotton Operatives remain firmly convinced that it would be
desirable for their employers to restrict production, they
have taken no steps to effect this restriction by Trade
Union Regulation.^ The Trade Unionists in short, like
the majority of English employers, have hitherto stood
helpless before the inscrutable ebb and flow of demand, and
have accepted as inevitable the corresponding fluctuations
of work.

Thwarted in their efforts to secure continuity of em-
ployment, either from the employer or from the consumer,

1 Restriction of output is, in fact, an employer's device, not a workman's, and
it is usually practised (as in the Coalowners' "Limitation of the Vend" or an
ordinary Trust) without the help of the wage-earners, though occasionally (as in
the "Alliances" of the Birmingham bedstead manufacturers hereafter described)
with the co-operation of the Trade Union. Its economic effect is incidentally
referred to in our chapter on " The Economic Characteristics of Trade Unionism."
We may say at once that, from the workman's point of view, it is of no avail
in maintaining wages unless it is accompanied by the Common Rule of the
Standard Rate, and that with such a Common Rule it is unnecessary and
useless.

Contimnty of Employment 451

particular Trade Unions have turned their force in another
direction. If they cannot protect themselves against the
fluctuating demands of the capitalist and the consumer, they
can at any rate build up barriers against their fellow-work-
men. Hence, we find certain sections of the Trade Union
world of to-day clinging to the mediaeval expedients of
apprenticeship and limitation of the recruits to a trade,
the exclusion of women, and the maintenance, as against
other workmen, of a vested interest in an advantageous
means of livelihood.

It is significant that it is only at this point in our analysis
of Trade Union regulations that we find ourselves face to
face with the idea of " monopoly." The Standard Rate, the
Normal Day, and a safe and" healthy place of work can be
simultaneously enjoyed by the entire wage-earning class of
the country. So far from there being any desire that these
conditions should be a privilege of any class or section, the
Trade Unionists claim that, on any of these points, a success-
ful stand made by one union renders it positively easier for
other grades of workmen to put forward similar claims.
When the contractors and master builders in any town have
been induced to agree to definite Standard Rates for all the
bricklayers, stonemasons, and carpenters in their employment,
they are predisposed to complete the arrangement by con-
ceding a Standard Rate even to the laborers. And when
the leading unions in a town press the Town Council either
itself to pay " Trade Union wages," or to compel its con-
tractors to do so, this demand is always intended to apply
equally to all classes of wage-earners. Still more is this the
case with regard to the Normal Day, which almost inevitably
tends, as we have seen, to become identical for all classes
of operatives in the same establishment. Finally, all the
regulations for securing the sanitation of the workplace and
the prevention of accidents necessarily benefit the wage-
earners without distinction of grade, merit, or sex. But in
the regulations with which we deal in the next two chapters,
based upon the idea of a vested interest in a trade, asserted

452 Trade Union Function

by one set of workmen to the exclusion of others, we have
a cjaim of an entirely different nature, akin to those put
forward by the holders of *' free-hold offices," ecclesiastical
benefices, or Civil Service appointments, when these are
threatened with abolition or reorganisation.

END OF VOL. I

Printed by R. & R. Clark, Limited, Edininrgh.

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